Misreading Mahan

Bombs full of sand. That should have been the first red flag.

In 1919, Rear Admiral William Benson, the first Chief of Naval Operations, attempted to dissolve the fledgling naval aeronautics program. He stated: “I cannot conceive of any use that the fleet will ever have for aircraft. . . . The Navy doesn’t need airplanes. Aviation is just a lot of noise.” Benson had been influenced by Mahanian doctrine, set forth in 1890 by American naval officer and historian Alfred T. Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660–1783, which led to the popular—and not unfounded—belief that a dominant navy was critical to military success and national power.

Then–Assistant Secretary of the Navy and future President Franklin D. Roosevelt personally ordered the preservation of naval aviation, arguing, “[Aviation] might conceivably, in the Navy, become the principal factor. I don’t know whether the Chief of Naval Operations will agree with me, but I might say that later on, in the future, aviation might make surface ships practically impossible to be used as an Arm.”¹ Roosevelt’s words would prove to be prophetic when Japan attacked the Navy’s battleships at Pearl Harbor in 1941.

Power Struggle

However, the question was far from settled in 1919. Roosevelt’s boss, Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, was under pressure from multiple directions, including bomber advocate Billy Mitchell. Daniels ordered a test, which he intended to settle the question once and for all. The USS Indiana (BB-1), an outdated surplus battleship, was subjected to aerial bombardment. Though the ship eventually sank after the test, a report concluded, “The entire experiment pointed to the improbability of a modern battleship being either destroyed or completely put out of action by aerial bombs.”

Leaked photos suggested otherwise. Massive damage had befallen the old ship. More details came to light, including that no live ordnance had been used in the test. All the bombs had been inert and filled with sand. The Navy had later detonated explosives on the surface of the ship where the bombs had made impact. By some accounts, the Navy counted only about 25 percent of the actual hits as valid.²

Humans are notoriously biased toward the status quo. Large groups of humans have even more inertia to overcome. Bias can creep into the evaluation of new ideas, and even in the face of overwhelming evidence, it can be difficult to introduce radical change. In rare cases, however, remarkable individuals can find a way to alter course. Mahan himself knew this: “The wise or unwise action of individual men has at certain periods had a great modifying influence upon the growth of sea power.”³

Rear Admiral William Moffett saw the value of naval aviation. Taking advantage of the publicity surrounding the rigged test, he formed the Bureau of Aeronautics. He would spend much of the next decade supervising the development of naval aviation tactics and aircraft carrier development.

For Benson and Daniels, it may have seemed that Mahanian doctrine had been proven wrong. The dominance of aircraft carriers in the Pacific war would only reinforce that notion. However, those who used The Influence of Sea Power to justify the push for battleships over aircraft carriers completely misread Mahan.

Mahan’s Principles

Mahan in fact warns his readers to avoid the exact pitfall of Benson and Daniels. In the introduction to The Influence of Sea Power, Mahan says “a precedent is different from and less valuable than a principle. The former may be originally faulty, or may cease to apply through change of circumstances; the latter . . . remains a standard to which action must conform to attain success.”⁴ Instead of looking to how things have been done in the past, Mahan stresses the importance of the underlying principles. 

War is defined by underlying constants, much like the laws of physics. Mahan explains: “War has such principles; their existence is detected by the study of the past, which reveals them in successes and failures, the same from age to age.”⁵ Though technology continues to advance, the underlying principles do not vary. The Marine Corps’ bible on war, Marine Corps Doctrine Publication 1: Warfighting, agrees: “War is both timeless and ever changing. While the basic nature of war is constant, the means and methods we use evolve continuously. . . . One major catalyst of change is the advancement of technology.”

Airplanes did not exist when Mahan wrote his book. Nevertheless, the principles detailed in The Influence of Sea Power would have predicted the aircraft carrier’s dominance over the battleship. Mahan uses the replacement of the galley by the sailing ship as an example for his principles. Galleys once were seen as the ultimate design for delivering naval power, perfected over centuries. With their hundreds of rowers, galleys could travel in any direction with just an order. In contrast, sailing ships—with their large, unwieldy sails—were at the mercy of prevailing winds. However, the sailing ship ultimately proved dominant, and was the focus of Mahan’s study that concluded that naval power had been the decisive domain in recent history. The galley had always been subservient to the dominant land domain of the ancient era.⁶ Mahan laid out three principles to explain the transition: speed; good quality, long-range offensive weapons; and efficient use of human capital to operate those weapon systems. 

Speed

Once the technology was perfected, the sailing ship far outstripped the galley in pure speed. With a skilled captain, it could run circles around the older design. While the galley could move independent of the wind, its speed was quickly exhausted as the rowers tired. Another American military theorist, Air Force Colonel John Boyd, formalized the importance of speed to success in war.

Boyd said that as humans fight, they are locked into their own competing observe, orient, decide, and act (OODA) loops. One must first observe the situation. Where is the enemy? What do they have? Next, one must orient. What is the likely implication of what I am seeing? What are my options? One must then decide. What action offers the best chance of success? Finally, one must act. If the enemy can complete their OODA loop faster, your action likely will fail, as it is now based on outdated information. Therefore, maintaining a faster tempo of operations is a powerful advantage. By the time a galley completed the action portion of its OODA loop, a sailing ship would have been able to move to an entirely different position.

Good quality, long-range offensive weapons

Mahan says naval weapon systems must have good quality and long range. Having a longer effective range than an opponent means a combatant can reach out and strike the enemy before the enemy can do the same. A good quality weapon system will have a devastating impact on the enemy when delivered.

Galleys were armed with rams and boarding parties. Both weapon systems were effective but had to be employed at point of contact with the other ship. By contrast, sailing ships were armed with growing numbers of more and more powerful cannons. These weapons could decimate the wooden hulls of a galley and be employed at considerably longer range.

Efficient use of human capital to operate those weapon systems

A belligerent has only so many humans to employ against its opponent. Mahan argues that the more people a combatant has to operate those good quality, long-range weapon systems, the better. For a galley, the primary means of attack was the ram on the front, generally operated by a single helmsman. Most of the remaining manpower—the rowers—operated the propulsion system. Sailing ships, especially as they incorporated multiple gun decks, employed a far larger percentage of their crews to operate their cannons. A smaller portion were employed in the sails and rigging.

Mahan and the Aircraft Carrier

Now consider the three principles as if Mahan was evaluating the battleship versus the aircraft carrier.

Speed

The true comparison of speed is how fast an offensive weapon systems can move around and toward the enemy. A battleship’s armament is tied to the ship, which would have been lucky to achieve 35 knots. By comparison, the Douglas TBD-1 “Devastator” torpedo bomber, often considered slow, could achieve speeds five times greater. 

Good quality, long-range offensive weapons

Aerial bombs and torpedoes were devastatingly effective against the battleships at Pearl Harbor. The air wing of a carrier also could reach much farther than a battleship’s main battery—so far that a battleship would be unlikely to ever sight the carrier itself.

Efficient use of human capital to operate those weapon systems

Battleships were not very efficient weapons. Their primary armament usually consisted of nine naval guns and employed a small percentage of the crew, generously 18 percent on the Iowa-class battleships. An Essex-class aircraft carrier from the same era typically would have had closer to 40 percent of its complement in air wing personnel.

This points to the superiority of the aircraft carrier. Lieutenant Commander John A. Collett wrote in the December 1942 issue of Proceedings: “Air power has not displaced sea power—air power is sea power. The principles of naval warfare as laid down by Mahan still hold—only the weapons have changed. To those who know how to use the new weapons most effectively will go the victory.” His argument would be published a few months after he was killed in action in his Avenger torpedo bomber, as the Navy was trying to defend the Marines’ new outpost on Guadalcanal.

Mahan and the Future

Consider the same principles again to evaluate today’s aircraft carrier against new technological threats that have been rising to meet it—specifically, long-range hypersonic antiship missiles carried by smaller warships or ground-based launchers. 

Speed

A carrier’s primary weapon system is its air wing. The current complement will struggle to maintain supersonic—much less hypersonic—speeds over long periods.

Good quality, long-range offensive weapons

The United States does not yet know the quality of its potential opponents’ weapon systems. Unfortunately, the true test often comes during war. However, the range of future threat missile systems may far exceed even the refueled range of the air wing. Regardless of the actual quality, there may be a significant effect on operations.

Efficient use of human capital to operate those weapon systems

Nearly 100 percent of the personnel involved with ground-based launcher systems are directly related to the weapon system itself. Even for the maritime version, large quantities of missiles could be launched from a vessel with a relatively small crew. U.S. aircraft carriers have not significantly changed their personnel utilization rate since the days of the Essex class.

Help Us, Mahan

Looking at the current threat picture through Mahan’s lens, the problems become clear. The aircraft carrier may not be the dominant warfare system to which the United States has become accustomed. What can be done? Mahan may have some suggestions. 

1. Reinvigorate knowledge of fundamental warfare principles within the Sea Services. Mahan explained: “Conditions and weapons change; but to cope . . . respect must be had to these constant teachings of history.”⁷ Mahan is a start, but Sun Tzu, John Boyd, and Carl von Clausewitz deserve renewed interest. If history seems boring, you are doing it wrong.
2. Reimagine use of the aircraft carrier. The Navy is unlikely to scrap a fleet of multibillion-dollar carriers. New, creative tactics that rely on warfare principles can return it to utility. Mahan said that the inertia of tactical stagnation “can be remedied only by a candid recognition of each change, by careful study of the powers and limitations of the new ship or weapon, and by a consequent adaptation of the method of using it to the qualities it possesses, which will dictate its tactics.”⁸
3. Embrace the new technology. The world will change whether we want it to or not. John Collett, evaluating Mahan’s principles, said it best: “To those who know how to use the new weapons most effectively will go the victory.”

What would John Collett think if the Sea Services were to ignore Mahan’s wisdom at such a crucial moment of transformation? Fair winds and following seas, shipmate. We have the watch.