For more than two years, the Russia-Ukraine war has provided a glimpse into what high-intensity, 21st-century warfare looks like. While much attention has been focused on employing high-tech equipment, a lesser observed but equally important topic is the use of decoys to confuse the enemy. Assembling forces beyond the platoon level has become dangerous, where brigade-level command posts can consistently detect the buildup of enemy forces before frontline troops see them, rousing formidable challenges for attacking commanders and negating the element of surprise. The Russia-Ukraine war provides valuable lessons in adaptability and using decoys to mitigate some aspects of persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) across the forward line of troops (FLOT). In today’s era of great power competition, understanding the enemy’s doctrine and ability to deceive is critical.
Soviet Use of Decoys During World War II
In the Soviet and later Russian military, suddenness and surprise were core tenets to battlefield success. To achieve surprise, Soviet forces extensively used camouflage, commonly known as maskirovka. The term held profound significance within Soviet military doctrine, capturing a range of measures devised to deceive adversaries in times of peace and during combat. Further, Soviet force’s use of decoys was mandatory practice before any major operation on the Eastern Front during World War II.1 This became apparent when, on 5 September 1941, a directive from the Chief of the General Staff outlined detailed instructions on deploying decoys to mislead advancing German forces nearing Moscow. Under the command of General K. D. Golubev, the 43rd Army executed a deception plan, integrating mockup artillery batteries, fake tank concentrations, troop assembly areas, and false forward trenches of the battlefield, using dummy machine gun positions and mannequins. This intricate deception aimed to redirect German forces toward these false positions during artillery preparations before an impending attack.
The use of decoys was equally critical to Soviet operational aims as the Red Army went on the offensive. For instance, in February 1942, the 20th Army began preparations for an offensive northwest of Moscow. Hundreds of mockup tanks, self-propelled guns, vehicles, and aircraft were deployed along a false axis of advance to confuse the Germans as to the actual location of the main Soviet drive. To make the decoys more believable, Soviet engineers used small TNT charges to simulate artillery and tank fire and used loudspeakers to amplify tank engines. German forces reportedly conducted more than 1,000 reconnaissance flights, dropped 60 bombs on these sites, and subjected them to machine-gun fire. During Stalingrad, Major General of Engineer Troops Alexei Proshlyakov, approved a deception plan that made the 104th Engineer and Mine Battalion and the 25th Detachment Camouflage Company build false concentration areas for five artillery regiments and tank corps. After the war, General Alfred Jodl, the former Chief of the Operational Staff of the German Army, said, “We had absolutely no idea about the strength of the Russian troops [around Stalingrad]. There had been nothing here earlier, and suddenly, an attack of great force was made.” Soviet forces often used fake airfields to force German forces to spend significant munitions and used extensive decoys to cross water barriers as they attacked West into Central Europe. By the second period of war, Soviet forces even included two decoy artillery batteries per genuine battery along the most crucial axis of advance.
Ukrainian Use of Decoys
Since the outset of the Russian invasion in 2022, Ukrainian forces have skillfully employed decoys to delay or impede the advance of Russian forces. Ukrainians use decoys mainly to draw Russian fire away from high-value targets. A notable instance occurred during the initial phases of the Battle of Kharkiv, in which Ukrainian forces procured mannequins from commercial establishments within the city. These mannequins were laid out before the oncoming Russian 1st Tank Army, confusing the advancing Russian forces. While it may seem incredulous that such decoys could deceive Russian forces, whose ISR capabilities were considered vastly superior, video evidence published on social media featuring Russian artillery engaging what appeared to be Ukrainian trenches manned by mannequins. These endeavors compound Russian forces’ logistics challenges, exacerbating the demand for more artillery ammunition while revealing the location of the firing unit.
In another notable incident, Ukrainian civilians used decoy checkpoints to slow the Russian advance as Russian forces crossed the Dnipro River near Kherson and initiated a northward advance toward Mykolaiv. The decoys were reminiscent of the U.S. Civil War–era Quaker guns, wooden logs painted to mimic artillery pieces and positioned on fortifications, fostering the belief that the fortifications remained occupied while also blurring the enemy’s perception regarding the fort’s actual size and armament.
Concurrently, Ukrainian forces placed decoys that cajoled Russian targeting efforts throughout the entire depth of Ukrainian lines in Kherson, Zaporizhzhya, and Donbas. These decoys mimicked valuable assets, including U.S.-supplied M777 howitzers, HIMARS launchers, mortar tubes, D-20 and D-30 Ukrainian artillery tubes, American and German tanks, and air-defense systems. The deception tricked Russian forces into using costly and sophisticated munitions, such as Lancet precision-guided and Krasnopol precision artillery rounds. Further, the extensive deployment of decoys may explain why Russian forces continually claim to have destroyed Western-supplied Ukrainian equipment since the beginning of the war. Given Russian’s pronounced dependence on Lancet and laser-guided artillery munitions, these decoys have undeniably imposed logistical strain and exacerbated production pressures on critical weapons, while straining the Russian targeting process. Recent reports also have indicated an apparent shift in Russian operational doctrine, pivoting away from mass-fire tactics and toward more precision-oriented systems to ease the burden on logistics and maintenance bottlenecks, some of which may be in response to the challenges of Ukraine’s decoy tactics.
The main objective of the decoys is to extend the survivability of friendly forces while spending Russian critical munitions. Proliferation of these technologies is growing, with companies like Inflatech providing inflatable tanks, radars, rocket launchers, trucks, aircraft, and naval targets that often are man-portable, can be deployed in ten minutes, and offer packages that allow for self-propelled decoys using remote controls and robotics. More important, these decoys can simulate the multispectral signatures of the items they replicate, including thermal, radar, electromagnetic, visual, and even acoustic signatures.
Furthermore, Metinvest, a Ukrainian metallurgical company, manufactured decoys of Russian and Ukrainian military systems after the war began. Costing less than $1,000, these decoys are crafted from cost-effective materials, primarily plywood and drainpipes. Verified by the Metinvest spokesperson and validated by online video evidence, Ukraine has successfully enticed Russian forces on numerous occasions to engage these decoys, compelling them to squander precious Lancet loitering munitions and laser-guided artillery assets.
Russian Use of Decoys
The Russian military also has used decoys with the same goal as Ukraine: to deceive Ukrainian forces into spending critical Western munitions on fake targets. However, the intricacy of Russian military actions often conceals a more nuanced rationale. Russian forces have, in the past, positioned inflatable tanks in manners that deliberately draw Ukrainian focus while allowing other larger units to move to the assembly areas in preparation for an imminent assault. According to Russian sources, the Russian military has deployed inflatables during the war in a manner that makes it easy for Ukrainian forces to find them. Russian forces then wait a few days, replace those decoys with real tanks, and ambush unsuspecting Ukrainian forces. During the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive in the Zaporizhzhya area of southern Ukraine, Russian forces have used decoy trenches to entice Ukrainian forces into attacking trenches filled with dummies and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), which are then detonated once Ukrainian troops begin to clear them. Those not immediately killed or wounded are often targeted by follow-on Russian ambushes close to the trench line.
Since the onset of the Ukrainian conflict, Russia has developed strategies that improve the survivability of command posts within the weapons engagement zone of Ukrainian and NATO. This initiative grew when the United States provided Ukrainian forces with HIMAR systems, allowing Ukrainian forces to focus on Russian high-value targets with pinpoint accuracy. Recent publications in Military Thought, a prominent Russian military journal, describe advancements in decoy tactics as a pivotal tool to mitigate “problematic issues regarding the survivability of command-and-control centers.” Russia’s employment of inflatable command posts in southern Ukraine represents a calculated effort to lure Ukrainian forces to consume critical munitions on simulated targets.2
In the air, Russia has employed inert, obsolete cruise missiles and Iranian-made drones as decoys, diverting the attention of Ukrainian air defenses and drawing Ukrainian fire with expensive, strategic weapon systems provided by the Western Alliance. In a noteworthy departure from standard practice, Russia also employed decoy devices disseminated via the Iskander-M short-range ballistic-missile system. These sophisticated penetration aids jam radar-frequency emitters and present additional heat sources to confuse infrared-guided missiles. Russia has introduced the deployment of balloons, each with a triangular metal sheet designed to confuse the radar signatures, making these balloons look like incoming missiles or drones. This seeks to create confusion among air-defense operators, leading them to misidentify these decoy balloons and making Ukrainian forces expend high-value air-defense missiles supplied by Western allies.
Another decoy incident unfolded in September 2023 when satellite imagery unveiled a peculiar image at Russia’s Engels air base—a painted Russian Tu-95MS bomber on the airfield’s tarmac. Though seemingly rudimentary, these decoys introduce a layer of uncertainty into the calculus of drone operators, particularly those tasks with discerning three-dimensional forms under low-visibility conditions. Considering the substantial volume of data that analysts are tasked with processing, introducing additional layers of uncertainty could complicate the targeting process.
Proliferation of Decoy Manufacturing
The utility of decoys on modern battlefield has not been lost on most modern militaries. Russia maintains the 45th Separate Camouflage Engineer Regiment, stationed within the Western Military District in Moscow Oblast, and provides inflatable T-72s, S-300s, and fighter jets. Rusbal, another Russian company, creates decoys command posts. These decoys deploy with heaters inside and fake radar signatures, making them appear as real targets to ISR platforms with infrared capabilities .
North Korean tactics also use decoy trenches, tanks, and artillery like the Russians in Zaporizhzhya. Decoys also are commonly employed by China, which studied Serbia’s use of decoy targets during the war in Kosovo against the U.S.-led coalition. According to Chinese battlefield estimates, a one-to-one ratio between real and decoy targets increases the survivability of friendly forces and equipment by 40 percent. Furthermore, Chinese sources suggest a ratio of three decoys to one real asset increases enemy munitions consumption by 70 percent and decreases damage to friendly systems by 50 percent. Of particular interest to China is the ability to hide large equipment by way of fake missile forces and inflatable tanks, rocket launchers, aircraft, and vehicles. In a potential future confrontation with U.S. forces, China will likely implement extensive decoy tactics to confuse the extensive U.S. ISR capabilities. Iran also has enjoyed these systems, and open-source reporting indicates China has shared these technologies with the Iranian military since 2013.
Looking Forward
The evolution of decoy warfare persists, even amid the considerable technological advancements in ISR equipment. U.S. adversaries remain steadfast in pursuing military advantages, adapting their military capacities to endure the rigors of modern warfare. The United States must extensively plan to employ and encounter decoys on the future battlefield. The ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict is the perfect environment to learn and adapt new tactics, techniques, and procedures.
1. David M. Glantz and Jonathan M. House, When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler (United Kingdom: Birlinn Ltd, 1995).
2. Dudko Sergi Mikhailovich, Moraru Alexey Alekseevich, and Smelov Alexey Evgenievich, “On the Issues of Survivability of Control Points of Controlled Arms Formations of the Tactical Level,” Military Thought (2023), 10.
