Neither Iran nor the United States wants war. The situation in the Arabian Gulf region is complicated and has been for more than four decades. Despite U.S. efforts, the Iranian regime has survived, and its regional power has in fact grown. But Iran is experiencing increasing economic and domestic political pressure. Recent U.S. actions continue to damage Iran’s prestige. The Iranian Air Defense force shootdown of a civilian airliner further embarrassed Iran and the accidental sinking of its own support ship in an exercise has weakened confidence in its military competency.
The U.S. Navy’s cumulative sea-control measures have put Iranian naval forces in a corner. Such a strategy is prudent, but it may make Iran Sun Tzu’s “desperate enemy.”1 As the Navy plans for the possibility of a fight in the restrictive waters of the Strait of Hormuz and the Arabian Gulf, it should consider its own past battles, especially those where it was the desperate, underdog adversary.
The Battle off Samar
As the sun rose over the Philippine Sea in October 1944, Japanese Admiral Takeo Kurita’s Center Force made its way through the San Bernardino Strait. Previously thought to have retreated after the Battle of Sibuyan Sea, Kurita’s force slipped into the operating area of the air-support escort carriers (CVEs) of the Seventh Fleet, Seventh Task Force, Fourth Task Group, Task Unit Three (77.4.3)—Taffy 3. The CVEs were sitting ducks, their air wings already en route to Leyte to support the Sixth Army as it slugged its way up the Leyte Valley. Thin-skinned and only able to make 19 knots, against the Japanese battleships and cruisers’ 25 knots, the carriers would be quickly run down and destroyed in any attack. With Taffy 3 destroyed, Taffy 2 would fall, and nothing would stand between Kurita and the U.S. landing forces at Leyte. It was a desperate situation. Taffy 3 must fight.
As historian James Hornfischer descried the situation: “By any measure the mathematics of the engagement were preposterously against [Taffy 3]. The Yamato displaced nearly 70,000 tons. She alone matched almost exactly in weight all thirteen ships of Taffy 3. Each of her three main gun turrets weighed more than an entire Fletcher-class destroyer.”2
The creative defense of Taffy 3 started with a desperate counterattack. Against overwhelming odds, the U.S. destroyers turned and charged into the oncoming onslaught. The tin cans slowed the oncoming Japanese, but the cost was high. Aircraft from Taffy 2, located farther south, and Taffy 3’s returning, practically unarmed planes attacked the Japanese force.3
The force with overwhelming combat power usually wins—but not always. Setting aside the details of the fight, when the weaker force wins, as at the Battle off Samar, it can be decisive, and there are lessons in those victories great naval powers should learn. Any conflict with Iran pits seemingly weaker Iranian naval forces against the apparently overwhelming force of the U.S. Navy—an “underdog” scenario that must be considered by U.S. maritime planners.
Hubris by the attacker and overperformance by the defenders are two critical factors in the making of such an underdog victory. The American way of war centers on the use of overwhelming force, sometimes called the “Weinberger-Powell Doctrine.” The U.S. fascination with technology has changed specifics of the use of overwhelming force, making it more about high-end weapons or information decision superiority than the mass of actual combat power. But the supremacy of weapon technology can create an air of invincibility that leads to overconfidence, breeding hubris.
Kurita maneuvered his force to create a situation where he entered the battle with confidence his overwhelming force would sweep the Americans from the sea, setting the conditions for the second critical factor in underdog victory: overperformance by the defender.
Defenders typically have self-preservation as a goal. The attacker must generate and sustain the will and materiel of the attack. In many ways, the defender has the more straightforward proposition, but a well-constructed defense must consist of many offensive blows—counter- or spoiling attacks—to make it effective. Defensive overperformance in attack under duress brings such shock it shakes the adversary’s will to sustain the attack. Advantage must be made of prebattle training and equipment as well as the terrain to achieve defense through spoiling attacks. Defensive guile and audacity in the attack are also necessary to squeeze a slight competitive edge from a dire situation, making the opponent hesitate and question what he is willing to risk to achieve his objective. As the Battle off Samar shows, a good defense is about a quick and decisive series of spoiling attacks.
The Enemy Only Has to be Lucky Once
The complexity of the operating environment in the Arabian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz would be difficult to overstate. The summer 2019 dispute with Iran highlighted the incompatibility of Iran’s hegemonic designs with U.S. objectives. Further, it emphasized to the United States that it relies on a Saudi Arabian ally whose monarchy, cultural homogeneity, and Sharia values are not harmonious with its own system and values. A naval conflict in the region would put the United States in an offensive position, seeking sea control. Iran would be on defense, looking to conduct sea denial. The Navy would surely be the victor in war at sea with Iran, but victory would come at a cost.
Iran is a classic underdog; it has the underdog’s opportunity to be a spoiler. Its military is not devoid of capability, and if they overperform from the underdog position, they could have limited but spectacular success. Many believe the United States to be risk-averse, and minimizing risk certainly is essential—the value of the object must be proportional to the risk. The real concern is the “hot, fresh, and now” mentality of current U.S. culture sees little value in a fight with Iran. Recent history has shown the U.S. population wants immediate, decisive success, without cost, from its military. But the regional complexity could make it difficult to achieve significant results before the population stops caring. The calculus of war today leaves us with a Clausewitzian-Trinty puzzle box—disagreement among the people, the government, and the military on the goals and utility of a fight.4
For the Navy, managing the people’s will means that it must not allow itself to fall victim to the underdog strategy. When planning for future sea control operations in the Gulf region, the Navy must consider Iran’s ability to operate within an underdog strategy. Setting the conditions of the information environment, both against Iran but also in support of the U.S. population’s understanding of conflict, is important to managing this trinity. Balancing the confidence and ability of afloat commanders to succeed must match preparing them for the likelihood that Iranian naval forces might fight more aggressively than predicted and overperform, as a result.
Though many questioned former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson’s call for the Navy to embrace the attribute of “toughness,” in an underdog fight with Iran, the need for toughness by those fighting—and those on the homefront—is essential.
1. “Cumulative sea control” is a concept presented in Rear-Admrial J. C. Wylie, USN, Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1967) 22; “Desperate enemy” is found in Sun Tzu, Art of War (Translated by Lionel Giles, 1910).
2. James D. Hornfischer, The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailor (New York: Bantam Books, 2004) 165.
3. Historical stock footage, “Battle off Samar near the island of Leyte in the Philippines, during World War 2,” clip: 65675029339, duration: 8min 13 sec, 25 October 1944, criticalhistory.com.
4. Refers to Karl Von Clausewitz’s secondary Trinity (people, government, and military) found in On War, section #28 in Book 1, Chapter 1 and in Harry G. Summers, Jr’s, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (U.S. Army War College: Carlisle, PA 1981).