Playing to Win in Contested Airspace

For today’s naval aviators, air dominance no longer is assured. The eroding U.S. technological edge relative to China means the Navy’s presence in East Asia will be ruthlessly contested in coming years. Two decades of technological investment and theft by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has yielded a robust and growing counterintervention defense network. The PLA is preparing for what it calls “joint antiair raid operations”—offensive strikes on U.S. naval forces operating in China’s peripheries.¹ Rear Admiral Lou Yuan of the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences went so far as to publicly float the idea of sinking two aircraft carriers in a strike preceding an invasion of Taiwan.² His hope is that when faced with Chinese aggression, the United States will step back and call it quits, because the cost of intervention would be politically untenable. 

These developments were not unforeseen by U.S. navalists. Public debates about the vulnerabilities of aircraft carriers, the implications of antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities, and China’s pursuit of a strategic “crumple zone” in its near abroad have been central to discussions about future naval strategy.³ The Navy is investing heavily in emerging technologies to put naval aviation on the right side of the cost curve: directed-energy weapons for point defense of carriers against antiship missiles, stealth to make it more difficult for Chinese sensors to target U.S. aircraft, and autonomous aircraft acting as loyal wingmen to empower manned aircraft. 

For the aspiring aviators who will field these systems, the challenge lies in developing operational concepts for their employment. This begins by preparing for offensive operations in areas where U.S. technological overmatch and air dominance will not be a given. The Navy must be ready to punch through Chinese defenses, press the offensive, and win in contested airspace.

Eroding Advantages, Shifting Mind-Sets

The A2/AD debates are emblematic of the conceptual challenges the Navy faces in preparing for conflict with China. Though useful in articulating the technological threat to naval aviation and vulnerabilities of carriers, the A2/AD concept devolved into what Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral John Richardson described as “maps with red arcs extending off the coastlines of countries like China.”⁴ 

The CNO argued these arcs implied impenetrable no-go zones of extreme peril, contributing to a risk-averse mind-set of operating from beyond the arcs of danger. To promote development of more forward-leaning operational concepts—such as penetrating contested zones, operating within them at acceptable levels of risk, and striking PLA forces when necessary—Admiral Richardson instructed the Navy to avoid using the phrase A2/AD. 

The CNO’s push for conceptual clarity coincided with a shift in top-level strategic priorities as expressed in the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS). Post–Cold War, the U.S. method of deterring aggression was modeled on the 1991 Operation Desert Storm.⁵ When aggression occurred, the United States and its allies would mass overwhelming force to roll back the aggressor and restore the status quo. China has taken advantage of this restrained force posture. It seized islands in the South China Sea while remaining just below the threshold that would elicit a full-blown U.S. military response. China’s militarization of these islands—construction of military-capable airstrips, radar stations, and recent tests of antiship ballistic missiles—may make it too costly to roll back PLA forces that are already entrenched.⁶ Recognizing this, the 2018 NDS now emphasizes “delaying, denying, and defeating” Chinese aggression as it occurs.⁷

Delaying, denying, and defeating Chinese aggression implies interdicting the PLA as it undertakes operations, shifting the Navy’s focus from defensive risk mitigation to offensive cost imposition. Rear Admiral Ronald Boxall put the choice in stark terms: Either “we go broke playing defense [or] we can significantly improve our own position through an aggressive offensive posture.”⁸ This shift marks a return to fundamental precepts in U.S. naval tradition summarized best by Fleet Admiral Bill Halsey: Hit hard, hit fast, hit often. U.S. command of the sea has been possible because it has always been certain that those who threaten U.S. interests will suffer more than they can possibly gain.⁹ Like previous generations, the task for the next generation of naval officers is building and fielding a force that will put that same certainty in the minds of Chinese Communist Party leaders. 

U.S. Platforms vs. Chinese Countermeasures

Shifting to a more aggressive operational posture has implications for naval aviation in a potential conflict with the PLA. At the outset of hostilities, analysts estimate that carrier strike groups will need to operate 800–1,000 nautical miles off China’s coast to conduct offensive air operations while keeping the threat from antiship missiles manageable.¹⁰ Covering that distance will be a thicket of  naval- and ground-based antiair batteries, defensive counterair, and electronic warfare countermeasures. Platforms will need to penetrate Chinese airspace, operate for sustained periods with minimal detection, and eliminate targets with high degrees of mission independence. Strike groups will be called to blunt Chinese attacks and undertake punitive standoff strikes until mainland antiship systems can be destroyed and carriers can move closer to shore. 

With the retirement of the final F/A-18C Hornet squadron, air wings are fully transitioned to the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet for strike missions and EA-18G Growler for electronic attack. In addition, the first squadron of Navy F-35C carrier-capable Joint Strike Fighters is preparing for a projected maiden deployment in 2021 on board the USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70).¹¹ Although this is a compelling mix of highly capable fourth- and fifth-generation aircraft, it is not a total solution. These aircraft are relatively short-ranged and rely on midair refueling. This refueling challenge currently is addressed in two ways, each with its own limitations: Air Force tankers, which may not be able to operate unaided in contested airspace; and organic refueling, which generally is accomplished by other Super Hornets at the expense of combat sorties.

Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) presents a further challenge for operations in contested airspace. Since 2002, Chinese military leaders have recognized that C4ISR is the backbone of U.S. military primacy and power projection capabilities.¹² Accordingly, PLA doctrine plans for stand-off strikes on U.S. C4ISR systems and platforms in the prelude to conflict. The Chinese likely would strike U.S. satellites early in any high-end contingency, meaning the Navy cannot expect space-based ISR. Assets organic to the carrier, chiefly the E-2C/D Hawkeye, also would be targeted early and operate at extreme risk in contested airspace without dedicated escorts. 

Emerging Tech Can Change the Game

Strike groups and air wings are evolving to run the gauntlet. Three emerging technologies are preparing naval aviation for operations in contested airspace: directed-energy weapons for carrier point defense, carrier-based stealth aircraft to penetrate enemy airspace, and autonomous aircraft to act as force multipliers for manned aviators.

Directed-Energy Weapons

Directed-energy weapons, such as electro-optical laser and microwave radiation systems, are being developed to increase the resiliency of surface groups. Traditional surface-to-air defense systems use interceptors such as the SM-6 missile, which can cost many times more than the incoming missile, making them unaffordable at scale.¹³ These systems would be depleted quickly in a sustained engagement against China, leaving only short-range defenses such as the close-in weapon system Gatling gun to protect the carrier. The threat of missile attack compels carriers to operate from greater distances, where the risk is more manageable. 

By using electro-optical lasers or microwave radiation to burn through a missile’s explosive or fry its guidance systems, directed-energy weapons address this cost challenge on two fronts. First, theoretically they have an infinite magazine. Solid-state lasers, which the Office of Naval Research is prototyping, rely solely on electricity drawn from the ships existing power supply. Surface ships such as the USS Ponce (AFSB[I]-15) have been modified to meet these power demands, while the USS Zumwalt (DDG-1000) represents the first in a generation of ships designed to sustain directed-energy weapons. 

The second advantage of electrical power is affordability. Once procured, a directed-energy system has a much lower cost per use. The Navy successfully prototyped a laser weapon system (LaWS) on board the Ponce. Though not a panacea—they remain susceptible to atmospheric scattering, line-of-sight limitations, and enemy hardening of missiles—directed-energy weapons can augment the existing missile defense architecture.¹⁴ Adding these weapons to a strike group’s arsenal would increase resilience and allow it to push closer to China’s coast.¹⁵

Carrier-Based Stealth Aircraft

Although stealth aircraft have operated for decades, the carrier-capable F-35C Joint Strike Fighter is their first introduction to naval aviation. The F-35C provides the air wing an organic stealth strike capability that will minimize risk to aviators and enable operations in heavily defended airspace. Acting as the vanguard in coordination with electronic attack platforms such as the EA-18G Growler, the F-35C can suppress or destroy enemy air defenses during a fast-moving contingency. Existing platforms can even be upgraded to incorporate elements of stealth technology, as demonstrated by the Advanced Super Hornet. 

By leveraging low-radar observability, stealth aircraft  will allow the air wing to bring its full throw weight to bear in a future conflict. This will be crucial if Chinese air defenses have not been suppressed. In alleviating some of the pressure on ground-based antiair systems, stealth affords pilots more opportunities to penetrate contested airspace, evaluate potential targets, and eliminate them. Enabling future aviators to dictate the time, place, and circumstances of their engagements will be decisive during operations in contested areas.\

Autonomous Aircraft

In addition to the F-35C, carrier air wings are integrating autonomous aircraft. Scheduled for initial operational capability by 2024, the MQ-25 Stingray has the potential to double the strike range of the carrier air wing while relieving the overworked Super Hornet fleet of refueling and reconnaissance tasks/missions.¹⁶ Requirements for the Stingray evolved, with initial requests for a stealthy, long-range, strike aircraft giving way to a more modest refueling and ISR platform. This evolution exemplifies the process of autonomous system integration, with the first missions being ones that are burdensome for manned platforms.

Refueling missions are essential to carrier operations, but they draw away valuable combat-capable Super Hornets. Reconnaissance missions also test the focus of aviators, and crew fatigue limits long-loiter surveillance. Yet, without these crucial capabilities, air wings would not have the range, endurance, or situational awareness to counter Chinese aggression in contested areas. Autonomous aircraft such the Stingray, Maritime ISR MQ-4C Triton, and rotary-wing MQ-8C Fire Scout will take on these burdensome missions at lower cost per flight hour, allowing air wings to focus manpower on complex missions that require human cognition.   

The true potential of autonomous systems will be realized when they move into force-multiplying combat missions. Autonomous aircraft are being developed that will act as loyal wingmen to manned F/A-18E/Fs or F-35Cs. The concept envisions manned aircraft paired with four to six highly capable autonomous aircraft. Each wingman can be independently configured and tasked for discrete missions such as electronic warfare, air-to-air combat, deep strike, or long-loiter reconnaissance. These systems will give air wings increased mission flexibility while increasing firepower.

There have been some early glimpses of the potential for loyal wingmen in the pairing of existing F/A-18 Super Hornets with Tomahawk cruise missiles during a 2015 test. Launched from the guided-missile destroyer USS Kidd (DD-100), the Tomahawk was guided to strike a moving ship target.¹⁷ With further development, anywhere from six to ten missiles could be launched, under the command of a manned Super Hornet, and together penetrate Chinese-dominated airspace. Australia’s Ministry of Defence already has announced a $30 million investment in the Boeing Airpower Teaming System for a multimission autonomous combat aircraft capable of acting as a loyal wingman.¹⁸ 

Loyal wingmen will make air wings not only more lethal, but also more cost competitive against a peer threat. Given the pace of PLA development, losses among the first wave of aircraft conducting air defense suppression missions could be severe. Such losses will be unsustainable if air wings are composed solely of exquisite hundred-million-dollar manned aircraft. Attritable autonomous aircraft operating under the command of a manned aircraft can mitigate these losses by executing a variety of missions: screening ahead to flush out missile sites, patrolling sectors of sky as manned aircraft egress, or if the situation were urgent enough, becoming kamikaze drones once their munitions were expended. 

Chinese hegemonic ambitions and appetites will continue to grow commensurate to their economic and military might. Checking these ambitions will hinge on the ability of carrier strike groups to integrate directed-energy weapons, stealth, and autonomous aircraft. Yet, these systems alone are not enough to project power into airspace where the PLA may have an advantage. The U.S. technological edge will ebb and flow. What must remain constant is the offensive mind-set that imbues the work of naval officers: aggression, agility, and an indomitable will to win.