One crucial military capability under scrutiny in the Pentagon is seabased joint forcible entry operations. Civilian policy makers question the nation's need for this capability; they cringe at the investment stream for amphibious and prepositioning ships, mine clearing systems, naval surface fires, and the Marine Corps' Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle.
In weighing the costs of these programs, however, they must think in strategic terms about the distinct advantages of a vigorous power projection capability, which include:
* Credible Deterrence. The ability to conduct joint forcible entry operations at a time and place of our choosing deters would-be aggressors. This effect is more lasting than other forms of deterrence or coercion because it threatens regime survival.
* Negation of Enemy Anti-Access Strategies. To the degree U.S. forces can avoid defensive systems and slice through littoral regions, they will neutralize enemy antiaccess plans and systems. Because antiaccess capabilities appear to be growing worldwide, forcible entry gains value in today's strategic calculations.
* Generation of Costs for Adversaries. Power-projection expeditionary forces cause our real and potential adversaries to invest in a host of surveillance and defensive systems. Without the need to defend against forcible entry, they could invest more heavily in other warfare areas, such as modern surface-to-air systems that could impose high casualties on U.S. aviation forces in a wide range of operations.
* Ensured Access. Rather than hope that foreign governments will provide overflight rights or port and airfield access-recall the tortuous negotiations with Turkey before Operation Iraqi Freedom-U.S. policy makers must be able to enter any theater during crises.
Seabased power projection preserves operational independence because the joint force is maintained in international waters and embarked in U.S. ships. The ability to quickly introduce maneuver forces and undertake decisive operations enables the joint force commander to seize the initiative and alter the parameters of a conflict. By massing the effects of precision fires and distributed forces, he can retain the initiative and force the opponent to react. The sea is a wide maneuver space that gives the combatant commander the ability to maintain and exploit operational surprise. The enemy may know that a naval task force is coming-but the depth and breadth of the penetration points can be hundreds of miles apart.
Seabased forcible entry extends the competitive space in both spatial and functional dimensions. By creating and using a much larger battle space, we can achieve a greater standoff capability from an enemy's surveillance and fire systems. In operational terms, this means he must have larger, more expensive systems with longer-range target acquisition or delivery means to reach out and hit the U.S. joint force. This imposes additional costs and difficulties on him. Further, amphibious forcible entry operations dilute his defenses by causing him to stretch his forces, thereby weakening them and delaying reaction times.
Powerful seabased expeditionary forces contribute measurably to increased operational tempo by increasing the speed, mobility, and maneuverability of the joint force while decreasing (or eliminating) operational pauses for logistic support of maneuver forces ashore. By their combinations of operational maneuver and firepower, forcible entry operations also present a range of dynamics and dilemmas to adversaries. The enemy commander can respond to our deep maneuver by concentrating his units, which exposes them to our joint fires. If his forces remain fixed in place, they can be isolated and eliminated in detail. Whatever the enemy decides, he faces a series of dilemmas for which he will have fewer and fewer options.
The strategic and operational advantages of seabased forcible entry are clear and extremely compelling. Power projection is not a risk-free enterprise, but advances in Navy and Marine Corps capabilities will offer revolutionary opportunities to further extend our exploitation of the seas. Both the Navy's "Sea Power 21" and the Marine Corps' ship-to-objective maneuver concept represent marked increases in the ability to protect, project, and support joint forces from the sea.
Today's dynamic and dangerous world demands fresh thinking. Classical amphibious assaults—with long planning cycles, ponderous force closure timelines, and vulnerable beachheads full of supplies and troops—qualify as "old think." But we have not seen the end of the need to rapidly insert combat forces to strike at our enemy's critical vulnerabilities. Because power projection from the sea is a unique asymmetric tool, the Pentagon's transformation efforts and resource allocations should reflect that reality.
Retired Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel Hoffman works for EDO Professional Services at the Expeditionary Force Development Center, Quantico, Virginia.