"You know," said Admiral Vern Clark, Chief of Naval Operations, leaning forward during a mid-March 2004 interview, "our people were at the heart of everything the Navy accomplished last year. It is truly a wonderful thing; we are winning the 'battle for people'-to have the right people with the right skills and equipment, at the right place at the right time. They were the foundation for all of our successes in 2003, and they will be the critical element for achieving our 'Sea Power 21' vision.
"Our performance in Operation Iraqi Freedom as well as our continuing efforts in the global war on terrorism demonstrated more than just combat excellence," Admiral Clark confirmed. "It validated our strong emphasis on readiness and highlighted the value of naval forces able to exploit the vast maneuver space afforded by the sea. It proved the importance of having the latest technologies and systems for command and control, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and attack. But most importantly, it reaffirmed the single greatest advantage we hold over any adversary-the genius of our people. ... It is the key element of our own asymmetric advantages."
Operation Iraqi Freedom
"A year ago, we had 164 Navy ships and almost 78,000 sailors at sea in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and the global war on terrorism," Admiral Clark noted. "In all, 221 of our then 306 ships, about 73% of our total force, were under way. Seven of 12 carrier strike groups, 9 of 12 expeditionary strike groups, 33 of 54 attack submarines, and some 600 Navy and Marine Corps tactical aircraft were forward deployed in support of the national commitments and policy."
On 21 January 2003, secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld ordered the Abraham. Lincoln (CVN-72) carrier strike group, returning home from a six-month Middle East deployment, to move from its holding area near Australia to the Persian Gulf. The Theodore Roosevelt's (CVN-71) group, completing a Caribbean predeployment workup, received orders to move as quickly as possible to reinforce two other carriers-the Constellation (CV-64), already in the Gulf, and the Harry S. Truman (CVN-75), in the eastern Mediterranean-for possible strikes against Saddam Hussein and Iraqi forces. A fifth carrier strike group, centered on the Carl Vinson (CVN-70), moved into the western Pacific to provide a stronger presence and to complement other U.S. forces (two dozen long-range Air Force bombers sent to Guam and F-15E Eagle strike aircraft and reconnaissance assets moved to Japan and Korea) to enhance stability in northeast Asia. The Nimitz (CVN-68) got under way on 10 January from San Diego to complete a highly compressed three-week training exercise, after which she and her escorts were ready. Finally, the George Washington (CVN-73) strike group, which returned to East Coast home ports in December 2002 after a six-month deployment that saw combat operations in support of U.N. no-fly zones over Iraq, was placed on 96-hour standby. "This underscored the enduring value of our carriers and sea-based tactical aviation in the 21st Century," Admiral Clark affirmed.
The Navy played critical roles in the lightning-swift defeat of Iraqi regular forces and the rout of Saddam Hussein and his Baathist thugs. Long-range precision strikes by Tomahawk cruise missiles launched from surface warships and submarines destroyed key targets. In the opening hours of military hostilities on 20 March, four Aegis cruisers and destroyers-the Milius (DDG-69), Donald Cook (DDG-75), Bunker Hill (CG-52), and Cowpens (CG-53)and two nuclear-powered attack submarines-the Cheyenne (SSN773) and Montpelier (SSN-765)launched more that 40 Tomahawk cruise missiles. Carrier-based fighter and attack aircraft destroyed Iraqi defenses and communications systems. Navy airborne electronic attack aircraft ensured joint air superiority, with the venerable EA-6B Prowlers escorting Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force aircraft to their targets. Navy mine countermeasures forces guaranteed the safety of critical waterways; SEALs conducted covert operations against leadership targets; and prepositioned and strategic sealift ships provided the equipment and material needed for victory.
Operation Iraqi Freedom confirmed what Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King understood more than a half century ago: "I don't know what the hell 'logistics' is, but I need a lot of it!" Twenty-one combat logistics ships and 76 strategic sealift ships provided materiel and ordnance for joint forces at sea and ashore. "The Military Sealift Command delivered more than 32 million square feet of combat cargo, more than 34,000 tons of combat and support cargo, and more than one billion gallons of fuel to America's war fighters during the combat phase [of Operation Iraqi Freedom]," Admiral Clark said. Military Sealift Command also chartered more than 210 merchant vessels to help move 94% of the joint and combined warfighting capability needed for the campaign.
"We also deployed three fleet hospitals, the hospital ship Comfort [AH-20], 22 P-3 Orion aircraft, 25 naval coastal warfare detachments, and mobilized more than 12,000 Naval Reservists," Admiral Clark added.
Operation Iraqi Freedom saw the first operational deployment of the two-seat F/A-18F Super Hornet strike fighter (the single-seat F/A-18E variant had its combat debut on 5 November 2002, when Super Hornets from the Abraham Lincoln launched weapons against Iraqi targets in the southern no-fly zone). The two-seat Super Hornets of Carrier Air Wing 11 embarked on the Nimitz were fitted with sec ond-generation Advanced Targeting Forward-Looking InfraRed (FLlR) targeting pods, as well as the still-in-development Super Hornet or SHared Advanced Reconnaissance Pod (SHARP) reconnaissance system. "It's really doing well," said Vice Admiral John Nathman, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs, in a March 2003 published interview. "The multimission capability of the airplane is just gangbusters for us-it really is. It's a great story."
Navy aircraft flew more than 7,000 sorties, surface warships and submarines launched more than 800 Tomahawk cruise missiles, and Navy expeditionary warships delivered more than 60,000 combat-ready Marines to Kuwait in 30 days.
"Regime change" in Baghdad also required several days of mine-clearing operations in the northern Gulf, and marked two milestones for U.S. Navy mine countermeasures, according to Rear Admiral John Ryan, then-Commander, Mine Warfare Command, in a mid-July conversation. "This was the first time we deployed the new capability of the Naval Special Clearance Team One, and it was the first operational use of unmanned underwater vehicles." Naval Special Clearance Team One comprises Navy explosive ordnance disposal divers, naval special warfare forces/SEALs, Marine Corps force reconnaissance divers, and marine mammal "systems." In addition to specially trained dolphins, the team had an unmanned undersea vehicle detachment. These operations also included the use of the highspeed catamaran Joint Venture (HSV-Xl). "[Mine countermeasures] is difficult and dangerous," Admiral Ryan emphasized, "but the widespread availability of highly sophisticated naval mines gives pause for concern about future operations."
"We cleared 913 nautical miles in the Khor Abd Allah and Umm Qasr waterways," Admiral Clark said, "and our experiences last year confirmed that the future for mine warfare in the U.S. Navy is organic, in-stride, and distributed. We know that we must get the man and other mammals out of the minefield, hence our investment in a variety of unmanned mine-detection and neutralization systems. And it also revalidated our decision to move out quickly on the [Littoral Combat Ship], which has mine countermeasures as one of its focused missions."
On 1 May, President George W. Bush landed on the Abraham Lincoln as the carrier made her way back to her San Diego home port from the Persian Gulf. "Major combat operations in Iraq have ended," he declared, with a banner proclaiming "Mission Accomplished" serving as backdrop on the carrier's island. The "Coalition of the Willing" had carried out combat operations "with a combination of precision, speed, and boldness the enemy did not expect, and the world had not seen before," the President said.
In retrospect, however, the nature of the victory depended on how one defined "major combat operations." By early October, more U.S. servicemen and women had been killed in "minor" guerrilla operations and terrorist attacks after 1 May than during the two months of major combat, and the administration's planning for the war as well as winning the bloody peace that followed had come into sharp debate, which was particularly fierce when focused on the question of weapons of mass destruction.
And yet throughout the remainder of 2003, the Navy remained engaged, in waters close by the United States and far overseas-a bulwark for U.S. homeland security and defense.
"This was the most 'joint' experience that I have ever been part of," Admiral Clark noted, a view echoed by Admiral Michael G. Mulen, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, in March 2004 congressional testimony. "[Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom] provided valuable lessons that will enhance our power projection [Sea Strike], our defensive protection [Sea Shield], and the operational independence afforded by the freedom to maneuver on the sea [Sea Basing]. The lessons learned thus far," he acknowledged, "reaffirm that the capabilities-based investment strategy, new warfighting concepts, and enabling technologies we are now pursuing in the 'Sea Power 21' vision are right on course."
Sea Strike
A key element of Sea Strike operations is the next-generation destroyer, DD(X). "DD(X) is critical to the Navy's future," Admiral Clark said. "If some think [it] is not high on my priority list, they are mistaken. Our future cannot unfold without it. DD(X) is the heart of our family of ships."
"Our requirements are clear," Rear Admiral Charles Hamilton, Program Executive Officer for Ships, stated in mid-August. "We are designing and building a highly survivable warship that will carry the fight to the enemy through offensive operations and long-range precision-strike weapons. This multimission warship will contribute to littoral surface, air, and subsurface dominance, and project offensive power deep inland. To achieve this, we are employing a total-ship engineering approach and will, through enhanced automation, deliver to the fleet an optimally manned warship-[with] no more or no fewer people than we need to do the job."
In 2003, the Navy and Northrop Grumman Ship Systems began DD(X) system design, with a first-unit construction award expected in 2005, ship delivery in 2011, and initial operational capability in 2013. This will be undertaken at the same time the Navy is moving ahead with other elements of the "family of ships" concept-the Littoral Combat Ship and a next-generation CG(X) cruiser-to meet the needs of the 21st century. In March, the Navy decommissioned the Arthur W. Radford (DD-968). Following deactivation, she will be Northrop Grumman's testbed for new technologies and ten engineering development models, key among which will be an integrated power system and electric drive propulsion, a composite deckhouse, and a dual S- and X-band radar, all going into the DD(X).
Sea Shield
Admiral Clark regards the Littoral Combat Ship as the U.S. Navy's "most transformational effort and my numberone budget priority." During the midMarch interview he said, "The [Littoral Combat Ship] is key to enhancing our ability to establish Sea Shield superiority, not just for our carrier strike groups and expeditionary strike groups, but for future joint logistics, command and control, and prepositioned ships moving to support forces ashore." Although other missions are being addressed, including naval surface fires/precision effects in support of special operations forces ashore, the Littoral Combat Ship's focus is on mine countermeasures, antisubmarine warfare, and antisurface warfare requirements for Sea Shield operations.
After what was a lightning-fast process, on 17 july the Navy announced it was awarding fixed-price contracts to teams headed by General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin Naval Electronics and Surveillance Systems-Surface Systems, and Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems to develop preliminary designs for the Flight O Littoral Combat Ship (the basic hull, mechanical, and electrical "seaframe"), with reconfigurable and interchangeable mission modules to come later. The Navy plans to build two Flight 0/Seaframe Littoral Combat Ships and then further refine the new class's concept of operations and mission modules.
There were nearer-term Sea Shield successes. "The Aegis destroyer Higgins [DDO-76] provided early warning and tracking to joint forces in Kuwait and southern Iraq during last year's hostilities," Admiral Clark said, "to help warn forces and defend against the threat of theater ballistic missiles." Although the Higgins demonstrated a tracking-only capability, continued ship-based missile-defense tests last year showed what clearly was within reach.
"We advanced our missile-defense capability with another successful flight test of our developmental sea-based defense against short-to-medium-range ballistic missiles," Admiral Clark added. "In December, the USS Lake Erie (CG-70) and Russell (DDG-59) combined to acquire, track, and hit a ballistic test target with the next-generation SM-3 surface-to-air missile-the fifth success in six tests." The Navy is coordinating closely with the Defense Department's Missile Defense Agency to achieve an initial missiledefense capability in late 2004.
How this ship-based system will be employed, in conjunction with the emerging Fleet Response Plan, has yet to be decided. "The Combatant Commanders will have to make hard choices on apportionment of assets," Admiral Clark said. Inasmuch as perhaps all 22 of the verticallaunch-capable Aegis cruisers and a good portion of the 56 Aegis destroyers will have a ballistic-missile-defense capability, achieving the correct balance between general-purpose naval operations and national-level ballistic-missile-defense requirements will be a continuing challenge.
Sea Basing
"The seabase is a collection of ships and aircraft that can exploit the maneuver space offered by the ocean," the Defense Science Board concluded in its August 2003 report on Sea Basing. "A seabase is not just a ship, not just prepositioned materiel, not just helicopter assault-it represents a complex capability ... a hybrid system of systems consisting of concepts of operations, ships, forces, offensive and defensive weapons, aircraft, communications and logistics."
"Our task is to exploit all of the utility that we can from the freedom of maneuver that we have operating from our domain," Admiral Clark said. But what is being addressed for beyond the near future has the potential to transform the way the United States and its friends and al lies fight from the sea. "Sea Basing is not about platforms, nor is it limited to logistics," Admiral Clark explained. "Sea Basing provides the dynamic access, speed of response, flexibility, and persistent sustainment capabilities we need to execute combat operations ashore. We will exploit the maneuver space afforded by the sea to enable and conduct joint operations at time and a place of our choosing."
In December 2003, Michael Wynne, Acting Under secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, directed the development of a Sea Basing plan that "should anticipate the creation of a joint concept of operations" as well as "the integration of material and non-material solutions." In addition to the Defense Science Board, there is a broad array of thinking about Sea Basing. For example, last year, Vice Admiral David Brewer, Commander, Military Sealift Command, formulated a Sea Basing concept for several very large modified commercial vessels ("expeditionary support ships") outfitted with "a selective discharge system" using bar codes and smart warehousing and transfer technologies. The vessel then under consideration by Military Sealift Command was 1,140 feet long, 140 feet wide, and capable of carrying 6,000 20-foot containers.
A team of researchers at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, already had come up with a different solution. Rejecting the feasibility of a floating warehouse that could transfer supplies at sea, the Monterey team concluded that a squadron of trimarans operating collectively could serve as a base for intheater forces. Each trimaran would displace about 86,000 tons and would carry six vertical-takeoff/landing F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, four heavy-lift aircraft, and 16 MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft. Six of these ships would comprise the seabase, with three additional trimarans serving as "shuttle ships" to replace depleted vessels during extended operations. Two of the six could embark a Marine battalion. The Marine Corps also identified high-speed catamarans as key to a joint logistics experimentation strategy that would test high-speed vessels shuttling equipment and supplies from maritime prepositioned ships in forward areas. Both ship-to-shore and ship-to-ship operations are being addressed.
The critical nodes in such future Sea Basing systems seem to be the at-sea transfer equipment and smaller "shuttle" or "connector" ships to link up with the various larger vessels and move materiel to forces on land, Vice Admiral Cutler Dawson, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Requirements, and Assessments, noted during an April 2004 interview. "For the 'connectors,' we are looking at air-cushion landing craft, a landing craft replacement, or a high-speed vessel, as well as [at] modular mission packaging and reconfigurable volumes for both large ships and small ships. In that regard, the modular Littoral Combat Ship, which right now is focusing on three littoral warfighting missions, could also be an ideal platform for high-speed-around 40-50 knots-intratheater/littoral lift."
Sea Trial
In mid-January 2003, during two days of tests that preceded a Sea Trial experiment dubbed "Giant Shadow," the Florida (SSBN-728) launched two Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles, the first cruise missile launches ever from a ballistic missile submarine. The U.S. Navy's program for the conversion of the first four Ohio (SSBN-726)-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines to guided missile subs (SSGNs) received an boost that underscored the transformational potential of a second career for the Navy's largest submarines.
"These first at-sea launches were meant to demonstrate that all the modeling and engineering estimates, calculations, and predictions were correct," Captain Brian Wegner, the Navy's SSGN program manager, remarked in a mid-February 2003 interview. "The demonstration validated the entire concept, and the program is on track."
That completed, the Florida moved to an extended multimission test of the SSGN's contributions to innovative network-centric warfare concepts and support of special operations forces. The Giant Shadow experiment focused on how a network of forces comprising a stealthy platform, special operations personnel, unmanned undersea and aerial vehicles, and sensors (underwater, overhead, and ground) could be used to clarify ambiguous intelligence and provide persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance of a weapon-of-mass-destruction threat, and then to "find, fix, and finish" the threat, in the parlance of the Navy's SEAL teams.
"To say that we were surprised by the results of the experiment," Captain William Toti, assistant chief of staff for warfare requirements at Naval Submarine Forces Atlantic, noted in a late-February 2003 interview, "is an understatement. We were astounded . . . just short of shocked with what we learned was within the art of the possible."
With their combined arsenal of more than 600 land-attack Tomahawks and a maximum of some 400 special operations personnel, the four SSGNs will be "truly transformational," Captain Wegner explained. "The SSGN meets secretary of Defense [Donald] Rumsfeld's definition of 'transformation,' because the SSGN, with its tremendous payload, can employ technologies and systems developed by others to create affordably an entirely new capability for the joint force. It remolds the SSBN to perform joint missions never envisioned by its designers, for a fraction of the cost of developing a comparable capability from scratch."
Other Sea Trials conducted during 2003 included the fleet battle experiments conducted by second and Third Fleets, naval special warfare missions, and Marine Corps' ship-to-objective maneuver experiments, the latter focused on the Australian-built, high-speed catamaran Swift (HSV-X2) as a seabasing "shuttle-ship" linking prepositioned ships with maneuver elements ashore. The first major exercise involving the Swift came in Destined Glory 2003, an October exercise off Turkey.
Meanwhile, the Sea Swap experiment continued throughout 2003, to see how best to maximize on-station time for warships by flying replacement crews to forward-operating areas rather than rotating ships. "We have our fourth crew aboard the USS Fletcher [DD-992]," Admiral Clark noted, "and our third crew on board USS Higgins. We have avoided several million dollars in transit fuel costs and increased our persistent presence forward without lengthening the deployment times for our people-always a concern."
Sea Warrior
"I continue to be amazed at how well we are doing in winning the 'battle for people,'" Admiral Clark said. "Retention has never been better, and for the third straight year we've seen record retention levels. In 2003, we retained nearly 61% of our first-term sailors, a full four points above goal, while attrition was driven down another 10% from fiscal year 2002, three points lower than goal." Such retention and attrition successes allowed the service to lower its accession goal to slightly more than 41,000 people last year, down from 56,700 in 2000.
Part of the success, to be sure, is that the Navy is recruiting more highly qualified and motivated men and women, "More than 94% of our recruits last year held high school diplomas," Admiral Mullen noted, "and some 3,200 of them had completed at least 12 semester hours of college credits." Another factor is the development of the Fleet Response Plan and the Flexible Deployment Concept during 2003 to "ensure a proper balance between readiness to surge versus the practical need to place responsible limits on the optempo of our sailors. To provide safeguards for our people, [the Flexible Deployment Concept] proposes the establishment of two windows when ready ships could be available for employment, either on routine presence deployments in support of combatant commanders, or on shorter 'pulse' employment periods in response to emerging requirements. These windows provide predictability. Sailors will know when they might be expected to deploy, and combatant commanders will know which forces are ready to respond to emergent needs."
With a goal of reducing total personnel by some 7,900 people by the end of fiscal year 2004, and a desire to reduce that even further, the service is trying innovative manpower concepts, afloat and ashore. For example, optimal manning of the service's warships is critical. Experiments last year with the Boxer (LHD-4), Milius, and Mobile Bay (CG-53) resulted in "revolutionary shipboard watch-standing practices, while reducing overall manning requirements and allowing our sailors to focus on their core responsibilities," Admiral Clark pointed out. "Optimal manning means optimal employment of our sailors."
Fleet Response Plan
In the March 2004 interview, Admiral Clark acknowledged the challenge of reaching the approximately 375 warships that the new global concept of operations envisions. "But the increase in striking power from today's 12 carrier battle groups to 12 carrier strike groups and 12 expeditionary strike groups, not to mention multiple missile-defense surface action groups and multimission guided-missile submarines," he underscored, "will bring about a broad transformation in the Navy's contribution to U.S. security, at home and overseas."
"We need to be able to provide [Operation Iraqi Freedom]-like capability everyday," Admiral Clark said. "This has led us to the Fleet Response Plan, which resets the force in a way that will allow us to surge about 50% more combat power on short notice and at the same time reduce some of the personnel strain of forward rotations."
Rather than have only two or three carrier strike groups forward deployed and properly equipped at any one time-with the ability to surge only a maximum of two more-the Fleet Response Plan will enable the Navy to deliver six forwarddeployed or ready-to-surge carrier strike groups almost immediately, plus two additional strike groups in the basic training phase in 90 days or less, or "the 'sixplus-two' capability," as Admiral Clark phrases it. "To do this we have fundamentally reconfigured our employment policy, fleet maintenance, deployment preparations, and fleet manning policies to expand the operational availability of nondeployed fleet units."
This new concept also extends to the expeditionary forces. "This past year we deployed the Navy and Marine Corps' first expeditionary strike group, pairing the deep striking power of the USS Port Royal [CG-72], Decatur [DDG-73], and the submarine Greeneville [SSN-772] to the traditional forcible-entry capabilities of our Marines enabled by USS Peleliu [LHA-5], Ogden [LPD-5], and Germantown [LSD-42]," Admiral Müllen noted during the 9 March 2004 hearing. Deploying with the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit to the western Pacific on 22 August 2003, this expeditionary strike group also included unconventional platforms, such as Cyclone (PC-l)-class patrol combatants and the commercially built high-speed catamaran, the Swift.
The Navy also began forming the first of what "Sea Power 21" termed "missiledefense surface action groups." The Norfolk-based destroyers Cole (DDG-67), Gonzalez (DDG-66), and Thorn (DD-988) formed an independent surface strike group, but under the operational control of the Enterprise (CVN-65) carrier strike group, which deployed on 2 October.
Late in the year, the Navy announced that a Marine Corps general officer would command the third expeditionary strike group, the first permanent assignment of a Marine to overall command of Navy warships, according to naval historian Norman Polmar. Brigadier General Joseph Medina took command of Expeditionary Strike Group Three when the unit was activated on 19 November during a ceremony in San Diego on board the amphibious assault ship Belleau Wood (LHA-3). General Medina's strike group includes the Belleau Wood, amphibious ships Denver (LPD-9) and Comstock (LSD-45), the Aegis cruiser Mobile Bay, Aegis destroyers Preble (DDG-88) and Hopper (DDG-70), and the nuclear attack submarine Charlotte (SSN-766). On board the amphibious warships will be the llth Marine Expeditionary Unit, some 2,300 Marines and sailors from Camp Pendleton and Miramar Marine Corps Air Station.
Sea Enterprise
"We are intent on wringing out the maximum savings possible from throughout the Navy enterprise," Admiral Clark noted, "and we have put in place some $40 billion in initiatives that could save more than $12 billion during the next six years." One far-reaching initiative was the decision last year to establish a single shore installation management organization, the Commander, Navy Installations, to manage all Navy installations worldwide. "I expect that this alone will generate about $1.2 billion across the [Future Years Defense Plan]," Admiral Clark predicted.
Another Sea Enterprise idea is the Naval Sea Systems Command's "one shipyard" concept that was initiated last year. (See the author's "U.S. Shipyards: Between a Rock and a Hard Place," March 2004 Proceedings, pp. 80-92.) This concept focuses on cost, schedules, and quality through standardizing processes, sharing resources among public yards, and partnering with private yards. Other vital elements are material support cooperation, reduction in and avoidance of cost and schedule increases, and resolving critical skills shortages and timing mismatches.
"The One shipyard' concept is a descriptor for a distributed, integrated complex of several facilities throughout the United States, all linked together to form a virtual national shipyard," Rear Admiral William Klemm, Deputy Commander, Logistics, Maintenance, and Industrial Operations, explained. "With the reduced size of the public and private industrial base, we've come to the point where sustaining critical skills has achieved a level of margin that is very difficult to sustain in the long run. In order to deal with that, we tended to concentrate skill sets in certain areas and share those skill sets rather than have each individual yard or facility build and sustain some of the same skill sets that are rarely used and, therefore, very costly to maintain."
"One shipyard" will allow the Navy to move skilled people from one yard to another where the requirements are most pressing. "Basically," Vice Admiral Phillip M. Balisle, Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command, explained, "the idea of One shipyard' is our ability to cross boundaries between the naval and private shipyards in a fluent manner, and to take full advantage of the nation's industrial base in an effective and efficient manner."
This Way Ahead .. . Still
One of the axioms about avoiding painful choices and changes inside the Washington Beltway deals with the administration in power: Wait until the next election dramatically remakes the political landscape. A corollary states that it is possible to wait out "the uniform types" in the Pentagon: They will soon be reassigned or retire, and business as usual will prevail.
On 21 October 2003, President Bush trumped conventional wisdom by reappointing Admiral Clark to another twoyear term, making him potentially the longest-serving Chief of Naval Operations since Admiral Arleigh Burke in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Like Admiral Burke-who was largely responsible for a dramatic transformation of the Navy from an aging World War II fleet to a modern force comprising nuclear-powered submarines, surface warships, and carriers, with guided-missiles for fleet air defense and ballistic missiles for national deterrence-Admiral Clark now has the time to institutionalize "Sea Power 21" and bring to fruition vital programs for the Navy's transformation to a 21st-century force, regardless of who occupies the White House after this fall's election.
Dr. Truver is group vice president, national security programs, at Anteon Corporation in Arlington, Vir ginia, and directs Anteon's Center for security Strate gies and Operations. Kelley Kulina, of the center': defense programs staff, assisted in this overview.