The House Armed Services Committee has done a most constructive national service in pointing the way towards sound development of unification. Its report on the controversial investigation that it made last year on aviation matters is filled with wise comment and valuable suggestions for future guidance that the armed services will do well to digest and follow.
With fine perspicuity the Committee concluded that service prides, jealousies and rivalries had “only a bare minimum of influence on this controversy,” and pointed to “fundamental professional disagreements on the art of warfare” as the root cause. This view is fully in accord with War College teaching that a commonly held “conception of war” within a military organization is all but indispensable. When leaders think differently of the ways in which war should be conducted, inevitably sand enters the machinery of cooperation.
Under such adverse conditions it matters very little what the outward forms of organization and administration may be. Until the intangibles of conviction are well resolved there can be no genuine unification. It can only be a deceptive sham, a theory without sufficient substance to make it effective in defending the country and in supporting national policies.
A cardinal problem that now confronts us in the development of true unification lies in the chasm separating Army and Navy concepts of organization, administration, and operations. Let us remember that these have evolved from widely differing conditions and experience through nearly two centuries. Habits and customs established in such a way have a psychological fixation that cannot be substantially changed over night. They correspond to what psychologists call “mores” of personal character, akin to instinct. Such ingrained attitudes necessarily require considerable time and new experience before lasting alteration of them can be effected.
We of the Navy accept as a matter of course that a ship must be even more than a unified organization. We know beyond the least question that she has to be closely integrated internally, with coordination achieved through the authority of a single individual. Otherwise she cannot be effective enough as a unit in combat or other emergency. In principle the same pattern applies to fleets and to naval shore stations. Perhaps from long association with the Navy, the Marine Corps is also more than a unified body. It also is closely integrated, including all of its various elements—even its aviation. Within both the Navy and the Marine corps, integration amounts to an instinct.
This has never been true of the American Army. Since its origin seventeen decades ago it has never been truly unified—much less integrated. In reality it has been a loosely knit aggregation of semi-independent Corps, rather than an Army. Traditionally Cavalry, Infantry, Artillery, and Quartermaster Corps come to mind, each almost a separate empire. In recent years the first three have been merged at top levels, but custom seems still to keep them unintegrated lower down. Then we have Corps of Engineers, Inspectors, Judge Advocates and others, each largely sufficient unto itself. As Armies grew in size and land warfare increased in complexity, the strong tendency was to create additional, semi-autonomous Corps. Recent decades have seen the Artillery and Quartermasters each split into two separate corps, and new ones established such as Signal, Ordnance, Chemical, Finance, Tank, and Air.
All this represents a basic difference between Army and Navy organizational- administrative concepts. In the very period when some of the foregoing Army Corps were born the Navy abolished its Engineer Corps and Construction Corps and integrated their functions with the Line. To the Army a new element in warfare suggests a new Corps. Its trend towards disunification has ever been strong, and in sharp contrast to the naval and the Marine Corps impulse towards integration of each new element into the general body.
The great divergence of these two viewpoints was never more pronounced than in the case of aviation. Its advent reacted upon the Army as a reason for adding one more to its already numerous aggregation of Corps. As aviation grew rapidly into a major element of combat, the Air Corps expanded correspondingly not only in size but also in independence. Finally the centrifugal force of this rapid movement flew the Air Corps entirely out of the Army’s orbit. The re-named “Air Force” became completely independent of the Army. And this in the name of “unification,” to the complete mystification of the Navy. A sailor could be forgiven in believing that the most logical first step towards unification of the Armed Services would have been the unification of the loosely-knit Corps-ridden Army itself; including the actual integration of Air Corps with Army rather than separation of the two.
It is a paradox that the cardinal cause of separating Air Corps from Army—viz., the primary combat importance of aviation— was the very reason influencing the Navy to integrate aviation within itself ever more intimately. In unity there is strength. The closer the integration of ships and planes the more powerful is their joint effort. Sea-air power as a merged entity is a much stronger oceanic combination than if divided into two semi-independent elements of ship-power and plane-power.
A great wealth of war experience has so amply proved the soundness of this concept of naval power as to make it incontestable. The successes of the integrated American and Japanese Navies proved it, as did the reverses of the British and other navies while they were un-integrated. This accounts for the volcanic eruption of naval feeling and resistance to the recurring efforts towards transferring naval aviation, or any of its legitimate naval functions, to the control of land aviation authorities. To the Navy such separation would be a fatal operation, like dissecting out of the human body its circulatory system, or several vital organs. This view is diametrically opposite to the Army’s supine concurrence in lopping off its Air Corps, as though it were an unessential protuberance.
Here then is a fundamental difference in concepts of war that calls urgently for reconciliation among the Armed Services if they are to recognize the wisdom of the House Committee and be guided by it rationally. The principles underlying integration of aviation with naval surface forces seem equally applicable and compelling for land armies. Our Marine Corps has set a standard unmatched by any other American military organization. It is unique in having its own aviation closely integrated with ground combat units. The splendid effectiveness of this true unification was superbly demonstrated in many contests of the late war and since then in Korea. Recent ill-considered suggestions to abolish the Corps must have been in blissful ignorance that the art of close-in aviation support of ground troops would thereby have been lost in this country —quite aside from losing leadership in amphibious warfare as well as destroying the best example we have of esprit and morale. Parenthetically it may be observed that morale can be built up and sustained more readily in relatively small organizations and that consequently the unification of them into large groups, when carried too far, tends to lower the standard of morale.
There is one basic and indispensable requirement for true unification or integration of aviation with surface forces, whether afloat or ashore. The aviators must have sufficient competence in surface warfare (on sea or land) to comprehend the effect of their efforts from aloft upon the course of operations below. However good a pilot may be as a flyer, and however good his plane and weapons, he cannot support surface forces well without understanding how they fight and their combat problems. By the same token surface commanders must be well enough versed in aviation to understand its needs, difficulties, capacities, etc. Otherwise the two arms cannot possibly work together as a well coordinated team, nor can the full value of air support be realized.
This dual, basic requirement is the rock which from the start has split apart and hurled in opposite directions the thinking of Navy and Marines on the one hand, and Army and Air Force on the other hand. The separation of the Air Corps from its Army followed principally from ignoring this requirement. Here, then, is another concept of war which the Armed Services must harmonize if their unification is ever to be a reality rather than mere theory.
In a recent article in Foreign Affairs Admiral C. M. Cooke has stated the case clearly. He says that since 1920 “a naval aviator was a qualified naval officer, and naval officers, many of them aviators, became increasingly indoctrinated in aviation. Naval Officers were air minded, and, no less important, air officers were surface minded; without this general understanding of naval principles, and experience and proficiency in surface operation, the air officer could not understand the possibilities of his own arm.” Nor could the surface officer possibly appreciate the tremendous potentialities of a genuinely integrated “air-surface” force. The whole set-up very naturally led to the development of an aviation component of seapower.
With the Army it was quite different. The several Line Corps took little interest in the potent new arm that was developing under their noses. The flyers of the Air Corps nearly all lacked proficiency and training as soldiers. Even General Mitchell, the principal early leader, had been first commissioned from civil life into the Signal Corps and never had considerable military line experience. Almost automatically this whole background led the Air Corps to develop aviation as something quite apart from the Army proper, and ultimately, actually to separate from it. The Corps’ main interest usually lay in independent action, principally strategic bombing.
Because of the consequent neglect of the function of close tactical air support to ground troops, the potency of which was amply demonstrated by the Germans and Russians in the late war, Admiral Cooke now argues that “soldiers need wings.” He contends that “years will be required to create an experienced body of ground- indoctrinated air personnel, and air-indoctrinated ground personnel, and to develop special equipment and methods. This growth will be accompanied by continuously changing tactical concepts, and even changes in strategic concepts, to fit in with the increased mobility and offensive power that our ground-air force will acquire.” He also feels that “the integration of our ground forces . . . with an expanding ground-air element, is today the most pressing task of our military leaders.” I agree fully.
II
A number of other seriously conflicting concepts of warfare need to be reconciled if the Committee’s advice is to be taken seriously and the national interest well served. Among these is the question of overseas air bases. For some years the Air Force has contended that the increasing radius of action of planes diminishes the need of advanced bases, and even the need of navies. We now have planes capable of taking off from the United States, bombing Russia and returning home non-stop. Then why should distant overseas air bases be necessary or desirable? Within this question lies another —the justification of the large carrier, which in essence is an air base of great mobility.
The principles involved were clearly illustrated by the great B-29 strategic bombing of Japan during the late war. Taking off from Tinian-Saipan, these giant planes had the radius to bomb Japan and return non-stop to base, which they did do for some months. But the land aviation leaders urged that the half-way island of Iwo Jima was needed also, as an intermediate air base, and accordingly the Marines with naval support took it in a major operation. The losses were heavy; what was the gain? First, the B-29’s could be given fighter protection over Japan, substantially reducing their losses and enabling them to bomb more effectively from lower altitudes. Second, damaged B-29’s could be saved from loss by using Iwo as an emergency landing place. Additional to these two advantages was a third of even greater importance, which alone tripled the effectiveness of the entire enterprise through tripling bomb- loads. General Arnold explained the matter in this way:—“When the field or fields have been constructed, making staging operations possible . . . take-off from the Saipan and Tinian bases, flight to target (Japan) and return to Iwo Jima for fuel will permit a B-29 to carry 16,000 pounds of bombs on high altitude missions, as against the 6,000 pounds of bombs now carried. For flight from (Sai- pan-Tinian) base to Iwo Jima, refuel and flight to target and back to base (Saipan- Tinian) will permit 20,000 pounds of bombs to be carried.” Had the tiny island been big enough to serve the whole force as a refuelling point on both the outward and return flights, then bomb loads could have been six times greater than was possible when operating from Saipan-Tinian alone.
How profoundly significant all this is! Bomb power could be multiplied by six merely by moving the forward base half way to target. Each plane could fly more missions within a given time. More damaged planes could be saved because of the shorter return to base. Fewer planes sustained damage because of the protection afforded by fighters, with the new base within fighter range. The effectiveness of bombs dropped was perhaps doubled from the greater accuracy at the lower altitudes permitted by fighter protection. All in all, combining the several factors, it would seem ultra-conservative to conclude in principle that total effectiveness over the target can be multiplied by ten when the distance of the forward base from the target is cut in half.
Naturally this holds true only when long distances are involved. And further qualifications are in order for varying conditions of the problem, such as different types of planes, types of bombs, etc. Nevertheless the principle is thoroughly sound that by advancing take-off bases closer to the target the power of aviation attack on the target may be greatly multiplied. This is the general concept of the Navy and Marine Corps. To them the contrary view of the Air Force that the long range plane eliminates the advisability of intermediate and forward bases in trans-ocean work seems very fallacious, since such elimination necessarily takes a heavy toll in reduced power over the target for all types of planes and weapons.
Intimately associated with this question of overseas air bases is that of finance. The apportionment of the defense dollar among the three services is involved; also the matter of how much drain is put upon the national resources for the total defense budget. Once upon a time the alleged cheapness of air power was advanced as a big reason for its development in place of sea power. That fallacy is rapidly becoming apparent. There may be room for argument on the basis of first cost alone, but that is far from the whole story. When we build a ship she lasts as a useful wartime unit for upwards of 30 years. Airplanes on the other hand are much less durable physically, and moreover become obsolete much more rapidly. One should multiply the first cost of airplanes by 4 or 5 to reach a true comparison with the first cost of ships.
The several hundred B-36’s already built or on order stand the defense budget at upwards of 2 billion dollars for first cost over a period of but a very few years. According to press reports they are being rapidly outmoded by the development of a new type of plane, which presumably will require another initial outlay of about $2 billion. But these sums are apparently only a starter. Within the last few weeks the press has announced that our air forces have now reached the level which will require two billion dollars annually to maintain, principally because of normal necessary conversions and replacements due to wear and obsolescence.
It would seem that a reasonable degree of frugality is becoming rather imperative, all the more so if it can be done without diminishing our bombing strength over the target. This combination would be extremely difficult without adopting a general concept of necessarily utilizing advanced air bases. By such adoption very great savings could be made. We have seen in analysis of the Iwo Jima case that moving a base forward by half the distance to target multiplies bombing effectiveness by nearly ten. In reverse terms this is equivalent to saying that for the same result at the target, in principle one plane based on the forward half-way point will do the work of ten planes operating only from the rear base.
The same principle is quite applicable to our trans-Atlantic strategy. The Air Force thesis of basing on continental America for non-stop bombing of Russia and return, simply means ten times more planes employed in the enterprise than would be necessary, for the same target effect, if a forward half-way base were used. Of course the same principle can be applied a second time, by halving the distance to target once more, with a corresponding further gain superimposed on the first. Since ten times ten equals one hundred the theoretical extreme might be that one plane operating from a second advanced base could equal the effect over the target of one hundred planes restricted only to a base in the United States.
Although such a ‘TOO to 1 shot” appears rather fantastic, yet it is sound in theory. Rather than go so far, a compromise would seem sensible. Let us assume that we had two advanced bases, one half-way between home and target, and the second advanced to three- quarters of that total distance. If then we cut the bombing force ten times, it might still exert ten times more power at the target than could the original force operating solely from the United States.
The foregoing is put forward as a conception of bombing warfare, in conjunction with the utilization of advanced air bases, as a means either of greatly increasing power at the target or the saving of large sums of money, or both. But the naval forces necessary to establish and protect bases are also very expensive. On balance would bases more than pay their way financially? We have already pointed out that ships are 4 or 5 times more durable than planes, with a corresponding factor in their favor on the first cost comparison. Many other factors enter into such a problem which would require very complicated calculations to solve. On the whole the author is thoroughly convinced that overseas bases will much more than justify their utilization on a cost basis, considering the reductions they make possible in the numbers of exceedingly expensive planes.
But it is unnecessary to argue the matter under existing circumstances. As a legacy from the war we have a huge fleet in mothballs that will be available for twenty years at least, for any needful naval effort in connection with the wartime establishment and protection of overseas air bases. Naval first costs in such operations would be negligible, compared with the many billions earmarked or projected for planes greatly in excess of the number required if bases are properly utilized.
A fair question would be, where could suitable bases be located that would satisfy the theoretical conditions set forth above? Assuming a bombing campaign against Russia, a wealth of positions might become available, depending in each case upon the political attitude of the countries having sovereignty over them.
III
Closely related to the matter of overseas air bases is that of the carrier. The heated controversy over the projected carrier U.S.S. United States appears to have arisen from two causes: (1) Sharply differing concepts of war between the Navy and Air Force, largely as to the utility of overseas air bases, and (2) apportionment of the defense dollar.
Aside from the carrier’s great value in many other kinds of naval operations it would necessarily be a key unit in the establishment, protection, and supply of overseas air bases; especially so in the early stages of such an enterprise. In fact, without carriers the establishment and adequate support of trans-ocean air bases would be an impossibility in many cases where severe resistance in the air, on the ground, or at sea was encountered.
The carrier is itself primarily an air base; a unique one of exceptional value as such. In certain unfriendly quarters much emphasis has been placed upon the alleged vulnerability of carriers, particularly to attack by landbased aircraft. The late war clearly- demonstrated the exaggerations in this, and indicated that the palm for vulnerability to air attack goes decidedly to land air bases, in comparison with carriers. These ships are very hard to hit from the air, especially so for pilots of land planes who are seldom proficient when their target is moving at high speed. This was proved many times over in the late war. Then again, modern techniques of protecting carriers by an umbrella of fighters besides numerous attending vessels carrying extremely heavy anti-air batteries, confronts attacking planes with a veritable inferno of resistance. Few survive if they venture close enough to hit, while those maintaining relatively safe distances seldom harm a fast moving target. Of course carriers are not immune to damage from the air. A cardinal predicate of warfare is that losses are involved. But land air bases are more vulnerable to damage than are carriers. The land base has to stay put whereas in addition to its other defensive advantages the carrier can move away from a hot spot.
A highly mobile air base is an especially potent instrument of offense. It can strike heavily with great surprise, from unexpected quarters and at unexpected times, and then withdraw at will from counterstrokes. The fixed land base has nothing comparable to this. But perhaps the most unique and valuable attribute of the carrier is its uncanny ability to apply the principle of multiplying the value of air power, by moving the launching point of planes rapidly towards the target.
In previous sections this principle has been explained, dwelt upon, and illustrated by citing the case of Iwo Jima. It was shown that for long distance work, by merely advancing an air base half way to the target, bombing power over the target is automatically multiplied by from six to ten. This is equivalent to multiplying the number of planes by such a factor. The first step can be repeated and the multiplier squared, and even perhaps cubed. Consider now the carrier advancing on her prey and rapidly multiplying the power of her planes automatically with every turn of her propellers. There is no such magic in land air bases, nor in the planes operating from them.
These and other carrier concepts require clarification in many minds (if one can judge by the opposition in various quarters) to the end that more genuine unification of thinking among the Armed Services may be achieved. We are fortunate indeed that the House Committee in its invaluable report on Unification and Strategy should recognize the utility of giant carriers, and stand forthrightly for naval guidance to the nation in such technical naval affairs.
In these days of guided missiles, jet propulsion, atomic power and a great variety of other new weapons and devices we cannot, of course, rely too precisely upon recent wartime experience for future guidance. Nevertheless the stepping stones of all forms of genuine human progress are laid in foundations of the past. It is normally true that firm advances rest upon well proven principles which only require altered forms of application to them of what is new.