The protection of shipping by armed naval vessels has often been recorded in the annals of the sea. During World War I, merchant vessels armed with a single gun aft sailed independently, until sinkings by enemy submarines became so numerous that the war might have been lost if the convoy system had not been adopted. During World War II, the so-called “Battle of the Atlantic” was, in effect, a fight to keep the sea lanes open and to safeguard convoys carrying troops and supplies to the battle fronts.
When the United States entered the war we had much to learn from the British, who had been combatting the menace of submarine, surface, and air attacks for well over two years. Since it was necessary for allied escort and other naval vessels to operate together and because of the mixed nature of the convoys, which included ships from various nations, the British system of signals and other forms of communications were adopted by all concerned.
Our own convoy system was organized under the direction of the Commander-in- Chief, U. S. Fleet. An office of “Convoy and Routing” was established in the Navy Department, with an outstanding officer of long sea experience in charge. This office was responsible for the organization of convoys, including the assignment of ships, ports of assembly, sailing dates, routes to follow, general instructions for merchant ships and escorts, etc. When groups of ships for any one convoy loaded in different ports, rendezvous at sea was frequently ordered. Convoys were also ordered into Halifax, N.S., to permit ships sailing from that port to join up.
Eastbound convoys were under the control of the Navy Department until they reached a certain longitude when the British Admiralty took over. A reverse procedure was carried out for westbound convoys.
Close cooperation between “Convoy and Routing” in the Navy Department and the British Admiralty was maintained so that a smooth running organization was developed. As a result, convoys and single vessels had clear sailing to their ports of destination. In order to avoid unforeseen interference at sea, daily position reports of shipping were broadcast by radio from the Navy Department and Admiralty.
The actual assembly of ships and the sailing of convoys and vessels acting singly were the responsibility of the Port Directors’ Offices, established in the principal ports along the Atlantic seaboard. The complement of these offices consisted of Navy personnel, with an experienced senior officer ordered as Director in charge of operations. It was fortunate that the New York office in particular, because of the amount of shipping involved, had such an outstanding officer in charge.
Escorts for the protection of convoys were ordered by the Navy Department from vessels attached to the Atlantic Fleet. These consisted of destroyers, destroyer escorts, Coast Guard cutters, cruisers, and, occasionally, battleships. These last two were included whenever there was a possibility of attack by enemy raiders or more powerful vessels. Small escort carriers were attached to the escort when these became available, and their operations proved to be a major factor in defeating the enemy submarine campaign.
Commodores were ordered by the Navy Department to take charge of the merchant ships in the convoys. They were generally selected from retired officers recalled to active duty. The responsibility for the safety and protection of the convoy, however, rested with the Escort Commander in accordance with orders issued by the Department. In many instances, the Commodore was the senior, but this did not relieve the Escort Commander of his authority to command and issue orders in an emergency.
This delegation of authority to the Escort Commander was a logical decision. The destroyers and other naval vessels making up the escort were equipped with submarine listening devices, radar, direction finders, etc., while the Commodore, who was usually embarked on a merchant ship, had few of these aids to warn him of the approach of submarines or other dangers. Close touch was maintained between these two officers by means of visual signals and radio telephone, familiarly known as TBY.
One of the Commodore’s duties was that of navigation, following the route laid down in orders received before sailing. This route was “Top Secret,” being divulged only to the Commodore and Escort Commander. He was also charged with the arrangement of ships in formation, station keeping, elimination of smoke, disposal of rubbish, darkening of ships, etc. In addition, he maneuvered the convoy by emergency turns to avoid dangerous waters.
Officers assigned duty as Commodores were given an opportunity of acquainting themselves with their duties in the Port Director’s office where they were ordered to report. Several were also ordered to the Royal Naval Dockyard at Halifax, N. S., in order to become better acquainted with British procedure.
Visual signals and radio communications being of such importance, schools for Communication Officers were established and graduates assigned to a Commodore’s Staff. The writer was fortunate in having two of these officers of outstanding ability serve with him for the greater part of the war. Armed guards were part of the complement of all merchant ships. These consisted of two officers and a number of enlisted men sufficient to man the battery which, ordinarily, included one 4" or 5" gun, mounted aft, and several machine guns for use against aircraft.
Before sailing date, a conference was held in the office of the Port Director attended by the Masters of all merchant vessels, Commanding Officers of escort vessels, the Escort Commander and Commodore, with their staffs. The Communications and Armed Guard officers also attended, and a representative of the Pilots Association was on hand.
The Port Director presided at these conferences and opened proceedings with remarks of the convoy formation, schedule of sailing, pilotage, sortie plan, secrecy of information, submarine hazards, etc. He was followed by the Commodore who gave his own instructions regarding forming up, station keeping, darkening ship, disposal of rubbish, breakdowns, rescue vessels, communications, etc. The Escort Commander then covered matters connected with the protection of the convoy in case of submarine, surface, or air attack, picking up of survivors by escort vessels, fueling escorts at sea, etc. During the conference, Masters were given an opportunity to ask questions on matters not clearly understood. The destination of the convoy was not divulged.
A folder was issued to the commanding officers of all vessels which contained the sailing orders as well as general instructions upon a variety of subjects. To name a few, these included a diagram of the ships in formation, order of departure of ships from docks or anchorages, details of swept channel, air coverage, radio telephone and other methods of communication, radio silence, smoke floats, magnetic and sabotage mines, paravanes, balloons, degaussing, etc.
As regards the convoy formation, experience had shown that there was less danger from submarine attack if the ships were formed on a broad front with shallow depth. As a result, the convoy diagram often showed as many as twelve columns with not more than five ships in the center columns and a smaller number on the flanks. Large ships and those carrying valuable cargoes, such as tankers, were placed in the center columns where the danger from torpedoes was lessened.
The Commodore selected for his flagship one of the larger vessels in the convoy with suitable radio and signal equipment. She was stationed as leader of one of the center columns and acted as guide of the formation. Quarters affording ready access to the bridge were assigned to the Commodore and his Communication Officers, when available. The Vice and Rear Commodores, who were often Masters of merchant ships, were stationed on either flank of the convoy. They were held responsible for signals, station keeping, and discipline of ships in their vicinity.
Since information concerning the sailing of convoys was of such vital importance to the enemy, particularly to submarines at sea, those attending the conference were cautioned by the Port Director upon the need of secrecy. Masters and others were told to return to their ships after the conference, and there to remain until the hour of departure.
Before sailing, the Commodore and Escort Commander were briefed in the office of the Commander Eastern Sea Frontier regarding the protection to be afforded by local defense forces, mine fields, air coverage, etc. They were also given an opportunity to study a large wall chart of the Atlantic Ocean on which were shown the locations of enemy submarines together with convoys then at sea.
Enemy U-boats sighted or attacking surface vessels were, of course, reported by radio, which was one means of determining their positions. This information, together with other intelligence reports, enabled convoys and shipping at sea to be kept informed of the general situation through submarine position messages, which were broadcast daily.
The Submarine Menace
Soon after this country entered the war, submarines made their appearance on our seaboard in steadily increasing numbers. Our coastal shipping, for lack of escorts, continued to sail unprotected, and, as a result, many ships were sent to the bottom. In time, however, escorts became available and ships were sailed in convoy. Air coverage, including Navy “blimps,” was also provided, and these measures greatly reduced sinkings along our coast and in the Caribbean.
As the war progressed, the increased efficiency of anti-submarine operations in coastal waters, both at home and abroad, forced enemy U-boats to change their tactics. One reason for this shift was the danger from aircraft operating from shore bases. These were better able to locate and report the presence of U-boats to surface forces operating against them. Planes and blimps were eventually equipped with radar. As a result, coastal waters became too dangerous and submarines began to appear in large groups, called “Wolf Packs,” along shipping lanes far at sea, beyond the range of shore based aircraft.
Large trans-Atlantic convoys, protected only by a few escorts, proved easy marks for U-boat attacks. Scouting lines of submarines were often formed across shipping lanes to make contact and report convoy movements. The formation, once detected, was usually trailed by one or more U-boats to obtain its course and speed, which information was radioed to other boats operating in the area.
The time best suited to approach a convoy in low visibility was at dawn and evening twilight, during which periods the Commodore made a point of being on the bridge prepared for emergencies. However, U-boats became increasingly bold and did not hesitate to attack in broad daylight and at night, regardless of weather conditions. They often appeared on the surface after dark, inside of the formation, from which position it was not difficult to select the most valuable targets for their torpedoes. Masters of ships were instructed to open fire on any submarines appearing between columns or elsewhere, even if ricochet shells might endanger nearby vessels. As more escorts became available, and with the added protection of small aircraft carriers, U-boat sinkings greatly increased, forcing the enemy to adopt more cautious tactics.
The largest percentage of ship losses occurred in convoys making voyages to Murmansk. It was not only the menace from U-boats that made these trips hazardous, but vessels were subjected to bombing raids by shore based aircraft. In addition, two enemy battleships, the Tirpitz and Scharnhorst, were based on the Norwegian coast and these were a constant threat. The last named vessel was trapped while making an attempt to attack a convoy and was sunk in the ensuing engagement by the British battleship Duke of York and lighter forces. In one convoy alone, more than seventy per cent of vessels were sent to the bottom.
When Portugal declared war and joined the Allies, bases for aircraft were established in the Azores. Planes operating from these islands helped materially to clear the surrounding areas where enemy U-boats had taken a heavy toll of shipping en route to and from North Africa and Mediterranean ports.
Improvements in methods to combat the enemy’s submarine campaign did not mean that the enemy failed, on his part, to increase the efficiency of his U-boats. Before the end of the war, a new type appeared, equipped with a “schnorkel,” which permitted it to operate for long periods submerged. These boats were soon encountered in coastal waters and sinkings continued, but at a diminished rate.
Defense Against Submarine Attacks
To counter enemy action, a convoy had a protective escort of destroyers, or other naval vessels, which covered the front and flanks of the formation. Another was stationed astern to keep trailing U-boats submerged, which reduced their speed and helped to prevent attacks from that direction. Escort ships were so spaced that their listening devices could detect submarines approaching or passing through the screen. They always steered a zig-zag course, which helped to increase the coverage of their under water sound equipment and made them less vulnerable to torpedoes.
During the first years of the war, convoys, except those of very slow speed, also zigzagged during daylight, following a plan signalled each morning by the Commodore. As danger from under-water attack decreased, zig-zag was resorted to only in areas where submarines were reported to be operating.
When the sound equipment, short title “sonar,” of one of the escort vessels made a contact which was thought to be a submarine, the convoy was ordered to cease zig-zagging and then make an emergency turn to avoid the dangerous area. If the contact was close to the formation, the turn was made towards the danger so that ships “head on” would make a smaller target. These emergency turns consisted of simultaneous changes of course of 45 degrees by all ships, to starboard or port, in obedience to flag and whistle signals made by the Commodore. At night, colored light signals were used.
Before escort vessels were equipped with radar, submarines were often able to approach under cover of darkness and fire torpedoes without being detected. However, radar deprived the enemy of this advantage as U-boats, on the surface, could be detected long before they could reach a position dangerous to the convoy. It also provided ample warning so that emergency turns, if required, could be readily made, not only to avoid submarines, but other dangers as well, such as surface vessels, wrecks, icebergs, etc.
All merchant ships were eventually supplied with radio telephones, a great help to the Commodore. These were always manned at night. Masters’ conferences by phone were sometimes held by the Commodore in the evening, when occasion warranted, but too much use of this means of communication was considered unwise in spite of its short range, since the enemy might be listening in on the same frequency. Radio silence was, of course, maintained by all ships to prevent the enemy from obtaining convoy positions through radio bearings. Fortunately, bearings could not be taken on radio-telephone conversations.
The introduction of aircraft in anti-sub- marine operations proved the death knell of the U-boat.
With the advent of the small escort carrier, plane protection was often provided for the whole voyage. Carrier planes would take off at dawn to scout ahead and on the flanks of the formation and flew far enough in advance to cover the course of the convoy during the night. Both shore based and carrier planes were eventually provided with radar, which permitted them to locate and attack submarines on the surface, charging batteries, etc., at night, or in thick weather.
Towards the end of the war, these small carriers seldom accompanied the convoys, but instead, were employed in what were called “hunter-killer” groups made up of one carrier and several destroyers for protection and depth bomb attacks on U-boats located. The British, also, organized similar groups which sometimes operated in conjunction with our own. Operations thus changed from the defensive to the offensive. Areas were chosen where submarines were most active, and the number of sinkings credited was largely increased.
While U-boats were responsible for the most serious losses of shipping, convoys were also subjected to air attacks which took their toll. Trans-Atlantic routes to the United Kingdom were usually laid down far enough away from the continent to make shipping safe. However, convoys voyaging to North Africa and the Mediterranean were not so fortunate, due to the proximity of enemy air bases, and many ships were sunk.
One means of protection against such raids was by the use of smoke, all vessels being provided with smoke floats as well as apparatus for making smoke on board. This helped to hide the convoy and confuse enemy aircraft. Another device was the use of captive balloons which hindered air attacks, especially at low altitudes. Maneuvering the convoy by emergency turns in the direction of attack was also helpful as well as the eternal vigilance of watch officers and personnel on lookout duty.
The great shipbuilding program launched by this country now became a decisive factor in the war. When losses from submarine and air attacks were outnumbered by new ships put into operation, the “Battle of the Atlantic,” which had hung so long in the balance, was finally won.
Convoy Operations
During the course of the war, the writer received orders as Commodore of fourteen separate convoys with destinations ranging from the United Kingdom to ports in the Mediterranean and Africa. One voyaged as far south as Capetown en route to Egypt. A short description of these operations at sea with brief personal experiences will be covered in the following pages.
My first assignment was a troop convoy composed of nineteen ships, fifteen sailing from New York on April 30, 1942, the remainder joining up at Halifax a few days later. Some fine vessels were included in the formation, the largest being the S.S. Aquitania of 45,000 tons.
The convoy included ships bound for Iceland, as well as the United Kingdom. The total number of troops carried, counting Canadian soldiers embarked at Halifax, was approximately 34,000 men. A time schedule for getting underway was furnished each ship of the convoy by the Port Director’s office, so that vessels would be in proper order in single column when passing through the gate in the submarine net at the Narrows.
The escort comprised the battleship New York, guide of the formation, the cruiser Brooklyn, carrying the Escort Commander, and twelve destroyers. The Commodore’s ship was the Army Transport Cristobal, a fine large passenger liner taken over from the Panama Line. In order to ensure the safety of the convoy while forming up, the destroyers of the escort left several hours earlier and had been sweeping the sea approaches to make sure that there were no submarines present in the area.
Signal to take cruising formation was made by the Escort Commander after clearing the swept channel. Since his ship, the U.S.S. Brooklyn, was the leader of one of the columns in the formation, he assumed tactical command of the convoy. The U.S.S. New York, as guide, slowed down to facilitate the ships astern gaining their prescribed stations. Speed of 15 knots was signalled after all had closed up.
During the day a Navy “blimp” with several Army planes from Mitchell Field afforded air coverage. On the following day, three submarine alarms were signalled by vessels in the escort, and emergency turns were again made. Destroyers dropped patterns of depth charges on each occasion. Similar sonar contact alarms occurred throughout the voyage, but whether these were due to submarines or other causes could not be determined.
An unfortunate event occurred on the third day after leaving Halifax. The weather had been foggy but cleared in the morning, and a British escort carrier, the H.M.S. Avenger, sent up two observation planes to search areas around the convoy. About an hour after they had taken off, fog shut in again and the planes became lost. Pilots asked for radio bearings, but as the convoy was in submarine waters, it was deemed unwise to open up with radio transmission. As a result, the planes never returned, and their crews must have perished.
On May 8th, the Iceland detachment, consisting of the U.S.S. New York and several ships of the convoy with destroyer escort, parted company and proceeded to their destination. On May 10th a plane was sighted which proved to be British, from the coastal patrol. The coast of Ireland was sighted off the starboard bow during the afternoon of May 11th. The formation was changed before dark from six to two columns for entrance into the North Channel. The convoy was dispersed during the night, some ships proceeding up the Clyde while the remainder continued on to Belfast, Ireland, where anchors were dropped in the outer roadstead at about 0130, May 12th.
Since the ships of the convoy were to be assigned other duty, I was ordered to return home in the U.S.S. Brooklyn. On the 18th our ship got underway with the aircraft carrier Wasp and six destroyers and headed to sea, speed 18 knots. The voyage to Hampton Roads was comparatively uneventful except for meeting another convoy almost head on in a heavy fog off the Grand Banks. Thanks to the use of radar, radio telephone, and radical changes of course, serious consequences were avoided.
My next convoy was destined to play an important part in helping to win one of the crucial battles of the war. It was composed of nine fast cargo vessels, carrying some 500 tanks and anti-tank guns for delivery to General Alexander in command of British forces opposing General Rommel in Egypt. This equipment arrived in time to be used by General Montgomery in the battle of El Alamein.
The convoy got under way before daylight on the morning of July 13th and formed three columns with five destroyers as escorts. Our orders were to proceed to Recife, Brazil, where ships were to refuel, and then to shape course for Capetown, South Africa, joining a British convoy en route.
Nothing of importance occurred until the forenoon of July 16th, when the S.S. Fairport, second ship in the left hand column, was torpedoed. Before she went down, her after gun fired one shot, aimed at an object that might have been a periscope.
An emergency turn to starboard was made which placed the Fairport and the dangerous area where she had been torpedoed astern of the convoy. A message received from the rescuing destroyer stated:—“All hands, total one hundred twenty-three, on board. No injured. Master states first hit in number four, starboard, second, number two, port. Nothing seen prior attack. Opinion submarines close.” The fact that both torpedoes hit cargo holds where there were no personnel accounts for the remarkable fact that no lives were lost and no one was injured.
Another submarine attempted to attack the convoy on the following day. She was detected, however, by one of the escorts, and the depth charges dropped forced her to come to the surface. Soon after breaking water, she turned partly over and sank in a large patch of oil, mixed with air bubbles. This U-boat kill helped materially to lighten the gloom caused by the loss of the Fairport.
Since three submarines were involved in these attacks, there seemed little doubt that the movements of the convoy were known to the enemy. Such information might have been broadcast by radio to U-boats in the area by a Spanish vessel which had been sighted and boarded by one of the escorts two days previously, Spain being well known as a sympathizer of the Nazis’ cause.
Several boatloads of survivors from a torpedoed vessel were picked up by one of the destroyers on the following day. It was learned at this time that our escort was to be. strengthened. This occurred on the 18th, when the cruisers Omaha and Juneau, with one destroyer, joined the formation. These had been detailed by the commander of our forces operating in the South Atlantic, based at Recife and Natal, Brazil.
The voyage from Recife to Capetown was made without difficulty. It had been previously arranged for our convoy to join a British troop convoy of five large passenger ships from the United Kingdom. This was effected on August 5th, when the two formations met to the southward of Ascension Island. The British Commodore, a retired Vice Admiral, took charge of the combined formation. When the two forces joined, our American escort parted company and returned to Recife. This left the British light cruiser Orion, two destroyers and one small French torpedo boat, as our only protection.
After arrival at Capetown, my own orders permitted me to return home by air. No account of this interesting trip will be given, however, as it has little bearing upon convoy operations.
The value of the supplies carried in this convoy to the British forces fighting in North Africa was mentioned in a speech by Prime Minister Churchill before Parliament. The following is quoted from his remarks:—
“As for American tanks, the admirable Shermans, they came to us in the following way. On the dark days when the news of the fall of Tobruk came in, I was with President Roosevelt in his room at the White House. Nothing could have exceeded the delicacy and kindness of our American friends and allies. They had no thought but to help. Their very best tanks, the Shermans, were just coming out of the factories. The President took a large number of these tanks back from the troops to whom they had just been given. They were placed on board ship in the early days of July and they sailed direct to Suez under American escort.
“The President also sent us a large number of self-propelled 105-mm guns which are most useful weapons for contending with 88-mm high velocity guns of which the Germans have made so much use. One ship in this precious convoy was sunk by a U-boat. All these tanks and guns played an important part in General Alexander’s battle.”
While in Casablanca on my second trip to that port, another convoy arrived which had been badly mauled by U-boats en route. The following is quoted from a dispatch regarding these attacks, which gives some idea of the persistence of a “Wolf Pack,” once a convoy has been located:
“On nights of March twelve and fourteen, two submarines attempted approach on surface nearly simultaneously from ahead and from starboard quarter. They were detected by radar and driven down and attacked with depth charges. On night of March thirteen, Keystone, unescorted straggler fifty miles behind convoy, torpedoed. On March fifteen, one submarine came in submerged from ahead, pierced screen, and sank Wyoming on starboard quarter of convoy at sunset with two torpedoes. This submarine escaped in wakes of ships of convoy but was located four hours later by radar, on the surface, and attacked by destroyers left on scene to hunt. On March sixteen, three more submarines attempted submerged tactics, two or more at sunset and one about three hours earlier. All but one were detected and attacked by depth charges. This one believed to have reached firing position outside and to starboard of screen at sunset and hit Benjamin Harrison in center of convoy with one torpedo of long range salvo. On seventeenth of March, twenty minutes after sunset, Molly Pitcher hit by one torpedo from salvo fired at long range from port quarter by submerged submarine. Sub not located but four torpedo wakes seen. Several other attacks were made before the convoy reached port but no more ships were sunk.”
A few of the highlights of other convoy voyages include the bombing of Algiers and ships in the harbor; vessels sunk and serious damage to docks and port facilities in Marseilles, Naples, Oran and Casablanca; heavy swells parting lines and disrupting shipping in Casablanca; collisions, storms at sea, etc., etc. However, space does not permit of any further elaboration of convoy operations.
Before bringing this article to a close, commendation of the officers and men of convoy ships as well as escort vessels should be expressed. Many were new to the sea but their excellent performance of duty under trying conditions against a determined and resourceful enemy indicated a high morale and was a credit to the services which they represented. All hands deserve a “Well Done.”