It is essential that we maintain the relative naval strength of the United States.—Charles Evans Hughes.
Not since the war has there been such widespread, continuous, and serious attention to naval matters in the United States, as during the twelve months which elapsed between the preliminary negotiations leading to the London Naval Treaty and the final ratification of the treaty by the Senate.
This period marked an active renewal of the pacifist movement through strongly intrenched societies and various organs of publicity toward curtailment of American armaments regardless of equity. Their general line of argument was that armaments are a prime cause of war, and that the United States should vigorously promote world peace by ensuring the success of limitation conferences, even to the extent of sacrificing American interests if necessary. This is a reflex of the idealism so strongly imbedded in the American fiber, which apparently had been whetted by the failure of the Geneva conference of 1927.
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