It is essential that we maintain the relative naval strength of the United States.—Charles Evans Hughes.
Not since the war has there been such widespread, continuous, and serious attention to naval matters in the United States, as during the twelve months which elapsed between the preliminary negotiations leading to the London Naval Treaty and the final ratification of the treaty by the Senate.
This period marked an active renewal of the pacifist movement through strongly intrenched societies and various organs of publicity toward curtailment of American armaments regardless of equity. Their general line of argument was that armaments are a prime cause of war, and that the United States should vigorously promote world peace by ensuring the success of limitation conferences, even to the extent of sacrificing American interests if necessary. This is a reflex of the idealism so strongly imbedded in the American fiber, which apparently had been whetted by the failure of the Geneva conference of 1927.
Perhaps of greater significance was the nature of the opposition. The ranks of the national defense "die-hards," always in a great minority in the United States during periods of profound peace, had grown abnormally thin from the obvious improbability of an early war, and from aeronautical and other developments tending to lessen the value of naval effort close to shore. On the other hand, there was surprisingly strong adherence by a large section of the press to the doctrine of a navy for trade protection, and the corollary of American sea power proportional to American ocean commerce.
This represents a radical change of attitude towards the Navy, for which an awakening foreign trade consciousness, following the rapid expansion of over-seas commerce since 1922, is principally responsible. Previously the security of the country against invasion from seaward, and the protection of coastal cities against bombardment, had grown to become generally accepted as the major naval functions. The rather widespread realization of the value of a navy for the protection of a great trade upon which the general prosperity and economic life of the country depends, is an unexpected outcome of the year of public discussion of naval topics. It seems certain to have a profound effect upon American naval policy in the future.
Basis of treaty support.—A large section of the American public, including many naval officers, favored the London treaty for the sake of certain advantages, notwithstanding the alleged inequities respecting trade protection and other features.
The extension of naval limitation to include all classes of combatant types of ships met with virtually unanimous approval, even though such limitation was applicable only to the three leading navies. The belief was widely held that this should have a tranquilizing effect upon the entire world, and further that it would protect the United States against dropping too far behind other naval powers through unrestricted building by them on a scale which America might dislike to match.
Concerning the latter point there had been a disturbing disillusionment following the Washington conference of 1922. There the United States had led the way in sacrifices in the belief that it had succeeded in eliminating competition. Reference to the official report of the American delegation at Washington shows that their whole position was predicated upon the assumption that
the core of the difficulty is to be found in the competition in naval programs, and that, in order appropriately to limit naval armament, competition in its production must be abandoned.... One program inevitably leads to another, and if competition continues its regulation is impracticable. There is only one adequate way out and that is to end it now....The effort to escape sacrifices is futile. We must face them or yield our purpose.
It is also clear that no one of the naval powers should be expected to make these sacrifices alone. The only hope of limitation of naval armaments is by agreement among the nations concerned, and this agreement should be entirely fair and reasonable in the extent of the sacrifices required of each of the powers.
This is the state of mind with which the American delegates entered the conference of 1922 and which persuaded them to concede more than any other delegation for the sake of gaining an agreement to stop naval competitive building. Their belief in such a result is clearly evidenced by the closing remarks of their official report on the naval treaty, where it is set forth that
The treaty absolutely stops the race in competition in naval armaments ... it is far from probable that the absence of limitation, in the other field (i.e. auxiliaries) will lead to production of either auxiliary craft or submarines in excess of their normal relation to capital ships.... The limitation of capital ships, in itself, substantially meets the existing need, and its indirect effect will be to stop the inordinate production of any sort of naval craft.
That these deductions from the Washington naval treaty soon proved to be grossly erroneous needs no elaboration here. Notwithstanding a marked American deficiency of cruisers the spirit of the treaty as interpreted by our delegation prevailed against new programs for their construction in the United States, even in the face of large auxiliary programs quickly undertaken abroad. This developed an uncomfortable dilemma for America. Reluctant to enter into a new competition which would invalidate the supposed principal result so recently achieved at the Washington conference, she found herself rapidly losing her relative standing among the naval powers.
To solve this difficulty President Coolidge called the Geneva conference of 1927. When that failed he chose the only remaining alternative of an American cruiser program calculated to restore our relative naval position. There were great outcries both at home and abroad, that America was thus starting a new naval competition. However illogical these may have been they served still further to crystallize public opinion upon the need of stopping competition, and by 1929 there was virtually no division of opinion anywhere on this point.
Thus the elimination of naval competitive building became in America the universally accepted main object of the London treaty. When it had been accomplished at least temporarily among the three leading navies, it became the main factor in American approval of the treaty.
Those aligned against the treaty were as strongly in favor of the elimination of competition as anyone. Their objection centered about the contentions that America paid too heavy a price at the conference table, and that all signatories benefited equally by stopping competition and hence the mutual concessions should have been more equitable. If we are to gain any appreciation of probable future American naval policies it is necessary to examine into at least the most important of the various objections which have been advanced against the treaty. The point of view and principles which they represent are so fundamental as to give assurance of their growing influence, and now that the admitted advantages of the treaty have been achieved, our analysis may be removed from the realm of controversy and criticism, and be confined to the constructive object of research and deduction for future benefit What follows is presented in that light.
The ratio of relative strength.—A main objection to the London treaty, admitted even by its proponents, is the lowered relative strength of the United States as compared with the theoretical 5:5:3 ratio in tonnage established at the Washington conference. Assuming that the provisions of the treaty are complied with normally, the total tonnage ratios for the three navies will become 5 for the United States, 5.2 for Great Britain and 3.25 for Japan.
The comparatively large elevation of the Japanese ratio has been especially criticized on the ground that it appears to have no rational basis. That the 5:5:3 proportion was very liberal to Japan on any reasonable set of assumptions, is evident from the conclusion officially reached at Washington in 1922 that the relative security of the powers remained unimpaired. The Japanese delegation assented to the ratio on this assumption after restrictive agreements had been made regarding the increase of fortifications and naval bases in the western Pacific Ocean. There appears to be less reason for elevating Japan's ratio when we take into account her comparatively small size, population, wealth, over-seas commerce, etc., and the ease of protection of her main trade routes.
In the discussions and debates on the London treaty by the American Senate, the proponents laid great stress upon the very embarrassing situation confronting the American delegates by the relatively low standing of the United States in cruiser strength when the conference met. The status quo in cruisers of Great Britain and Japan was said to have given those countries a great diplomatic advantage, which rendered it necessary for the American delegation to make concessions respecting the ratio in order to reach an agreement.
The critics of the treaty stoutly maintained that the 5:5:3 ratio should not ethically have been subject to modification at London, because of the clear recognition and acceptance of its essential fairness at Washington in 1922; and also because it was then virtually agreed to be applicable not only to capital ships and airplane carriers but also to auxiliary craft and navies as a whole. They argued that such an American understanding in 1922 is shown by the subsequent statements of the American delegates and of President Harding, and by the fact that the United States agreed to forego her rights respecting development of naval bases in the Pacific, and to scrap her great preponderance in battleship power, down to a strength below Great Britain with no compensation other than the ratio. The willingness of the United States to make these sacrifices at Washington was advanced as proof of her understanding that the 5:5:3 ratio was in the future to apply to navies as a whole, since otherwise for her there would have been no need of a scrapping or naval base agreement, nor even any need of a conference.
Not until 1927 did the British attitude at the Washington conference towards naval auxiliary quotas become well understood in the United States. In his first speech accepting in principle the American proposal at Washington in 1922, Mr. Balfour had made some vague differentiation between auxiliaries which were normally a part of the battle fleet and those which were more directly concerned with trade protection. But at that time there was no clear appreciation in American circles of the really very sharp differentiation which Mr. Balfour intended, and which in its effects must very seriously impair the 5:5:3 ratio which in reality constituted the fundamental of the American proposal. Mr. Balfour clarified the British attitude in a speech in 1927, and more recently Mr. Winston Churchill has given even greater illumination by making public in Parliament one of the hitherto secret dispatches sent by the British Cabinet to Mr. Balfour during the 1922 conference. This dispatch was as follows:
We welcome your decision to press for the total abolition of submarines. Even if you can obtain this, we wish to be consulted before a final decision is taken upon the limited scales of construction in small craft permitted to the various signatories. The position of Britain, with her world-wide possessions and food supplies, on the one hand clearly requires an entirely different standard from that acceptable by self-contained nations. We apprehend, however, that there is very little chance of the abolition of submarines being agreed upon, and in this event we must insist at all costs upon absolute freedom in regard to the character and number of all vessels under, say, 10,000 tons. We cannot, in the face of French freedom to construct a great submarine fleet, to say nothing of the submarine and cruiser construction of other powers, enter into any agreement fettering our liberty to build whatever numbers and classes of cruisers and antisubmarine craft we may consider necessary to the maintenance of national and imperial life. We feel sure, from our knowledge of your outlook on the whole problem, that you will share this view to the full. Even at the cost of a complete rupture, we feel certain you will not agree to any restriction in this sphere without previous consultation with the Cabinet.
The critics of the London treaty urged that had Americans understood in 1922 the full import of British reservations to the principles of limitation agreed to at Washington, there would then necessarily have been less sacrifice of American battleships and more insistence upon the 5:5:3 proportion applying to auxiliary tonnage in future agreements; that whatever may be the ethics of this question as between Britain and America when it comes to Japan there were no corresponding reservations in 1922; and that the American concession respecting naval bases was obviously for the purpose of establishing the ratio, then deemed to be fair and reasonable, with no subsequent change to alter such equity.
Regardless of ethics, however, recent opposition to the treaty in the United States was based upon a belief that the American status quo in 1930 entitled her to more consideration in establishing future tonnage quotas for naval auxiliaries. The United States entered the conference with a very large surplus above the 5:5:3 ratio in destroyer tonnage. Of this some 63,000 tons, represented by sixty-one vessels, appears to have been counted out, even though under age, merely from having been placed on the disposal list a few months previously. It was argued that their status was thus parallel to the British disposal list of battleships in 1922, which then had to be counted in order to establish a near parity with the United States. But even excluding these sixty-one American destroyers the status quo ratio was 10 for the United States, 8.5 for Great Britain, and 5.5 for Japan, as compared with 10:10:7 in the final agreement. Similarly in submarines the United States entered the London conference with a substantially greater tonnage than either Britain or Japan, yet agreed to a new ratio of 10:10:10.
Granting all that can be said as to the deficient American 1930 status quo in cruisers, in the view of treaty critics that deficiency appeared to have been fairly balanced by her surplus of destroyers and submarines. In reaching a basis for future limitation a reasonable compromise might appear to have been, to have traded off as between excess cruiser tonnage on the one hand and excess destroyer and submarine tonnage on the other hand—retaining the 5 :5 :3 ratio in all three classes. Instead of this the United States was reduced below that ratio in every single class of auxiliaries—cruisers, destroyers, and submarines.
When the conference was called the United States had a large tonnage of obsolete cruisers, the scrapping of which had been held in abeyance until the completion of her new cruiser construction program. President Coolidge had made it very clear when this program was authorized that it was a "replacement" program, made especially necessary by large new cruiser programs having been previously started abroad, while America, in accordance with her interpretation of the spirit of the Washington treaty, had withheld new construction.
Considering the fact that one of the provisions of the London treaty is that the right of replacement is not lost by delay in laying down new ships, to the treaty critics it appeared that the same principle might have been recognized in computing the American cruiser status quo. Either the old obsolete tonnage might have been counted, or the replacement tonnage already authorized and appropriated for. Instead, both seem to have been eliminated from the calculation, and nothing counted except ships under twenty years of age actually built or building. A further argument advanced in support of counting the obsolete ships in the status quo was the fact that when the conference met there was no established and agreed upon age beyond which a cruiser could be said to be obsolete. Such an age limit could be fixed only by the conference itself.
If the American obsolete cruisers, or the tonnage already authorized to replace them, had been counted there would have been no deficiency in America's cruiser status quo. To have counted them would have been analogous to what was done with some British obsolete battleship tonnage at the Washington conference, and further would have offered some balance to various other concessions made by the United States in the treaty—such as delaying the construction of three American cruisers beyond the life of the treaty, advancing the replacement age for 172,000 tons of antiquated British cruisers, etc.
Since the status quo has been of such importance in establishing future ratios at all of the limitation of armaments conferences, there has been considerable concern in the United States over the cruiser status quo at the conference to be held in 1935, at which the attitude of the powers is not to be prejudiced by the terms of the London treaty. The question arises whether the cruiser allowances established at London are more likely to govern the 1935 agreement than the then existing cruiser status quo. It was argued in senatorial debate that if the latter is to receive the major consideration in 1935, then American interests are gravely jeopardized by the London treaty, because of the large amount of cruisers which will be under construction by Britain and Japan, by reason of the special provisions abnormally advancing the date of replacement for certain cruisers.
The general question of lowered American ratios was regarded with great uneasiness in view of the striking sacrifices made at Washington to stabilize world peace, on the assumption that the 5:5:3 ratio was reasonably fair and permanent. After this to find the American relative position undermined at London, in consequence of our scruples against building between 1922 and 1928, together with the possibility of a further undermining in 1935, was greatly deplored, and this view seems bound to influence American naval policy in the future.
Trade protection power.—Perhaps the most serious opposition to the London treaty in the American Senate and press centered about the seemingly undue impairment of American trade protecting power, relative to the other countries participating in the agreement. For example in the case of Japan it was contended that she was left with virtually complete power to stop American trade to the value of two billion dollars annually, in the region from eastern Africa to China and Australia, inclusive, which is out of all proportion to Japanese trade which the United States might stop. It was similarly maintained that the treaty insured to Great Britain the ability to cut off all overseas trade of the United States except that to the Caribbean region and that with the west coast of the Americas. Under such circumstances it is obvious that the world-wide commerce of Britain would remain substantially unimpaired by any action within the power of the United States.
In discussing such questions it is not at all necessary to assume war between the countries with which comparisons have been drawn. The fundamental consideration is the relative trade protecting capacity of the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, in the regions of important world commercial markets, quite irrespective of what nation the trade may need protection against. Moreover international law has long recognized certain forms of trade interference as being measures short of war, among which may be classified the economic blockade so prominent in League of Nations literature. It would appear only equitable that the power to protect trade should be at least approximately proportional to the magnitude of the trade, whatever the nature of the menace against it, or from whatever quarter such menace may come. It was upon such general rather than specific grounds that this phase of the treaty met with objections.
The controversy in the Senate on this point was precipitated by the statements of several officials who had been attached to the American delegation at London, in testimony before the two Senate committees which held extensive hearings on the treaty. It was clearly brought out that the agreements entered into at London had been predicated by the American representatives exclusively upon considerations of fleet combat strength, and without any reference to American commerce protection ability. This seemed paradoxical in the face of expert testimony by one of the strong treaty proponents that fleet combat strength had been so nicely balanced through limitation at Washington and London, that no one fleet of the three powers concerned could make a transoceanic attack upon another without serious danger of defeat. The only logical conclusion to be drawn was that war between any two of the navies so limited must of necessity be almost exclusively commercial in nature, which is doubtless true.
Moreover there was criticism that the American delegation had thus given in to the fundamental British position so strongly held at Washington and Geneva. The misapprehensions as to Mr. Balfour's attitude in 1922, which were clarified several years afterwards, have already been explained herein. The same position was very lucidly propounded by Mr. Bridgeman and other British delegates at Geneva in 1927, and was really the basic reason for the failure of that conference. It has meantime been the subject of elaboration by Mr. Winston Churchill and many other British speakers and writers. It amounts to the doctrine that the special situation of Great Britain respecting food supplies and extended trade routes makes it necessary for her to have substantially greater trade protecting power than any other country, and renders it equitable that she should enjoy such superior advantages.
Many Americans felt that the London treaty went too far in this direction and thus conflicted with a wholesome American viewpoint, which in the long run should be better for the amicable relations between the two countries. Adherence to this American standpoint, as it has often done in the past, brought unwarranted imputations of want of sympathy and unfriendliness towards Great Britain, and even of aggressive and warlike designs against her. To set forth this American attitude with some precision therefore seems to be important, if serious misunderstandings are to be avoided by its apparently persistent growth.
We have in the first place the very obvious fact that parity in navies between the two countries cannot mean equality of sea power. This follows from two conditions which are unlikely to change materially for a great many years. The wide dispersion of the British Empire, affording strong points of support to naval effort in every important region of the globe, amounts to a multiplication of the power of the British Navy. Reference is made not only to the many naval bases offering facilities for repairs, sources of supply, and security of refuge, but also to the great commonwealths and colonies ready to afford economic, military, and every complementary aid to naval strength. The second condition is the size and characteristics of the British merchant marine, representing an auxiliary to purely naval strength of immense importance.
With these two elements supplementing her Navy, Britain need have no fear that parity in navies with America threatens British naval supremacy. The truth of this is clearly recognized by those in America who have been contending for mere parity in navies with Britain, and should be sufficient to absolve them from the charge of aggressive intent. They maintain that while equal naval power cannot give America sea power even approximating equality with Great Britain, such a proportion of navies is the minimum which the extent of American over-seas interests, stable peace, and general equities demand.
The marked superiority which Britain enjoys on a basis of equality in navies becomes even more accentuated when it comes to a specific consideration of trade protection, apart from general fighting strength, especially remembering that the balance provided by naval limitation precludes the likelihood of combat between concentrated fleets.
To begin with there are three British battle cruisers, of such speed and power as to render them capable of a major role in commerce protection and commerce raiding. Except in the smoothest weather their speed should be at least equal to the 8-inch-gun category of treaty cruiser, which fact gives Great Britain a superiority in this category far exceeding assumptions as to treaty terms that might be made academically.
The relatively high speed of the five battleships of the Queen Elizabeth class also places them in a semi-commerce protection class, because of the wide dispersion which may be safely made of them without danger of injury from a concentration of much slower opposing capital ships. Conversely they prevent a similar dispersion of slow opposing battleships for commerce protection or attack. Thus Britain enjoys the immense advantage of eight capital ships which to an important degree are accessories of cruiser warfare, whether conducted for the defense or the attack of trade.
The next cardinal factor entering into trade warfare that requires some detailed examination is the matter of naval bases. The fundamental effect of bases in multiplying the numbers of ships is not always understood or admitted. The principle involved may be made clear by an example. Let us compare the trade protecting power in the China Sea of the American, British, and Japanese 8-inch-gun cruiser quotas established by the treaty, assuming that the nearest bases available were respectively Honolulu, Singapore, and Nagasaki.
Since a 10,000-ton cruiser can steam about 15,000 miles each American cruiser would consume two-thirds of her fuel in going to and returning from the China Sea where she could consequently spend only one-third of her total time engaged in her trade protection mission. In comparison with this a British or Japanese cruiser, operating from Singapore or Nagasaki, could spend nearly four-fifths of her time protecting commerce in the China Sea. Their marked advantage over the American cruiser would be entirely due to the much greater proximity of their base to the operating ground.
Translated into terms of numbers of cruisers which can be kept employed in useful work, in order to keep four cruisers on station, the British or Japanese would need a total of five cruisers while the United States would require twelve. Hence in this case the five British or Japanese cruisers are a match for twelve American cruisers, and, for the sole reason of having near bases, the British or Japanese effective numbers have been multiplied by 2.5 as compared with American numbers. The relative strengths in 8-inch-gunners under the treaty, for this particular example, thus in reality becomes eighteen for the United States, thirty-seven for Great Britain, and twenty-five for Japan.
Lest it be assumed that an extreme case has been chosen for the purpose of illustration, it may be stated that the same relationship applies as between American and British 8-inch-gun strength to the great trade region off Buenos Aires. Along every other vital British trade route, excepting that to Canada, her advantage incident to naval bases is even more pronounced, and to this trade warfare advantage should be added, not only the already mentioned battle cruisers and Queen Elizabeths, but also as a third major element, the great British preponderance of merchant ships suitable for use as naval combat auxiliaries.
The value of armed merchant ships as a substitute for cruisers in blockade and trade protection operations was amply demonstrated during the World War. While a single merchant ship may not be a match for one regular cruiser carrying the same armament, it is necessary to consider the question from the viewpoint of multiple numbers. Then it becomes evident that to equal the fighting power of a given force of merchant auxiliaries at least 50 per cent of their total number is required in regular cruisers.
Another aspect of the value of merchant auxiliaries in trade warfare is well illustrated by the recent remarks of Mr. Winston Churchill in Parliament. He assumes two navies "A" and "B," each of which possesses fifty cruisers. If "A" by sending ten of its cruisers to raid the trade routes of "B" can draw thirty cruisers of "B" to protect those trade routes, the resultant forces available for battle will not be equal. While he was not speaking of merchant auxiliaries the same principle is applicable to them. They are of great value in forcing hostile regular cruisers to desist from raiding and to devote themselves to the protection of their own trade.
The Navy possessing a great surplus of merchant auxiliaries could thus substantially reduce the menace to its trade, and this in turn would free many of its regular cruisers from trade protection duties and enable them also to be employed in raiding. In other words, comparing two equal forces of regular cruisers in trade warfare, if one of them is augmented by a great preponderance of merchant auxiliaries, it will be able to take the offensive and put the other cruiser force almost entirely on the defensive.
The foregoing comment is especially applicable if regular cruisers carry guns no larger than those which may be mounted on merchant ships, and in some quarters this has been assumed to be a principal reason for the apparently persistent British desire to limit other navies to the 6-inch-gun cruiser as far as practicable.
An eminent American authority has estimated that if all regular cruisers were of the 6-inch-gun type, a ton-for-ton and gun-for-gun parity in regular cruisers between the British and American navies would enable Britain to bring to bear four 6-inch guns to our one, in practically every important trade region in the world; taking into account Britain's advantages in both merchant ships and naval bases, but without considering naval units other than cruisers.
This furnishes one very obvious reason for the American desire for an unrestricted right to build 8-inch-gun cruisers within the fixed limits of individual size and total tonnage. Another reason is the availability of British capital ships, especially battle cruisers, for trade warfare, because 8-inch-gun cruisers are the closest approach to battle cruisers that it is possible for America to have under the present lull in capital ship construction.
This whole matter of trade protection is much broader than the technical details necessarily entering into it, the discussion of which has led to unwarranted implications that those who stand for adequate American commerce protecting power do not stand for peace. Rather is the reverse the fact if history carries any lesson.
Criticism of the London treaty centered on our impaired trade defense ability as much as any other question, and this seems to be of great significance in indicating the trend of our naval policy of the future. It shows a growing public appreciation of the basic function of a navy, its inherent relation to the prosperity and economic life of the country, and a return to the traditional American naval policy.
Propaganda and naval policy.—The day has gone by when it is possible to consider national policies, naval or otherwise, purely on the basis of facts and national interests. As each broad question comes under the lens of public attention the focus is almost invariably blurred by propaganda, and as our whole government machinery is peculiarly and critically sensitive to public opinion, the decision is often founded on distortion, misrepresentation, and fallacy.
There is nothing new in government by public opinion created through the press. Joseph Danvers complained of it in the House of Parliament as early as 1738. In the History of Journalism in the United States, Payne points out that "Before England knew of this power, this new authority, it was established in America."
Except for the freedom of the press and the public-spirited, militant journalism of Samuel Adams, Benjamin Franklin, and others, the American Revolution never could have been begun, much less sustained through six trying years. Meantime, says Payne, "The ideal of government by public opinion has been more nearly achieved in this country than elsewhere."
The development of this ideal has seen some extraordinary phases. President Washington's proclamation of neutrality in the war between England and France, brought forth a frank and direct appeal over his head to the American people by the French Minister Genet, through an American editor who was also an employee of the State Department. The President found it necessary to draft Alexander Hamilton to conduct a counter-propaganda before public opinion could be turned conclusively in favor of neutrality.
Students of American history are sufficiently informed of the virulent, inflammatory, abolitionist propaganda which continued for thirty years prior to the Civil War and made that war inevitable. An analogous movement with which the present generation is more familiar is that affecting prohibition laws.
The prelude to our entry into the World War furnished a classic in propaganda. Here on neutral soil the two combatant groups conducted a war of wits and words second in importance only to the action of their armed forces on the battle fronts. Until November, 1916, one group succeeded not only in keeping us "out of war" but also in contributing to the re-election of Woodrow Wilson through that fact. Five months later the other group had gained such complete ascendancy that we went into war with the acclaim of even most of our pulpits—some of the very pulpits, incidentally, which, now lead public opinion to discredit officers of the Army and Navy who were mute before April, 1917, but are now alleged to be breeders of war.
These few illustrations of propaganda in American history are but landmarks of a never ending influence of first magnitude in our national life, which amounts to an authority above the government and which has to be taken into account in any consideration of national policies. This may be a healthy sign of progress of the democratic ideal, so long as the propaganda is a wholesome effort from within the country. But those having the best interests of America at heart cannot avoid anxiety over the growing custom of unwarrantably emphasizing the foreign viewpoint through our free press and other organs which create public opinion.
Coincident with the greatly increased facility for reaching the public quickly there have sprung up numerous highly organized and openly avowed agencies of propaganda, which cover almost every field and embrace nearly every cause, social, political, economic, and religious. Doubtless most of them are sincere and wholesome in their aims and practices, but wittingly or unwittingly, they sometimes advocate measures very inequitable to the United States and markedly advantageous to foreign countries. This is especially striking when they embark upon naval seas too deep for their technical comprehension.
An example of propaganda unjust to American interests is that now in progress against the American merchant marine. We are represented as needlessly upsetting world business and provoking competition and ill feeling possibly leading to war, by building new merchant ships at a time when there is a world surplus of 6,000,000 tons of shipping. This is partly true, as is the case with most propaganda. The remainder of the truth is that the present merchant ship construction in American yards is considerably less than our needs for replacement of ships normally becoming obsolete; that in 1922 there was also a large world surplus of merchant tonnage; that between 1922 and 1928 foreign nations built 10,000,000 tons while we laid down practically nothing; and that they are even now building much more than we are.
An illustration may be chosen from the political field also. We have had our recent difficulties in Nicaragua, the Philippines, and Haiti. No great nation has ever been more altruistic in its dealings with weaker countries than we have been in these cases. Yet the most scathing criticism was meted out to us by the same organizations which have found well-merited justification and sympathy for Great Britain in her firm action in India, Palestine, Egypt, and elsewhere.
The professional reader will be too familiar with the frequent misrepresentation of naval affairs to the great detriment of the United States, and correspondingly to the advantage of other countries, to require the citation of many cases. However innocent this may be as a rule, unquestionably the effect has been a tendency to reduce America's relative naval strength well below her inherent interests, and beyond any reasonable assumptions as to the need of our self-sacrifice in order to promote world peace.
Sufficient reference has been made elsewhere to ways in which the public has been misled respecting the Washington conference. After the failure of the negotiations at Geneva in 1927, we had another example of propaganda at work in the attacks which were launched against "naval experts," who were openly accused of having blocked agreement for the sake of maintaining "big navies." Disregarding all fact and logic this propaganda became especially virulent in the United States against American naval officers, who were even held up to the ugly suspicion of having entered into collusion with shipbuilding interests.
It mattered not that the President, the Secretary of State, and the head of our delegation at Geneva were civilians who gave the most thorough personal attention to every aspect and development of the proceedings and made all of the decisions respecting them. It was of no import that the American naval officers there unanimously stood against a high level of limitation, and supported quotas closely approximating those subsequently adopted with such acclaim at London in 1930.
The paradox of accusing naval officers at Geneva of furthering the cause of a big navy and the pocketbooks of shipbuilders by standing for a low level of limitation has never been made clear. Nevertheless skilled propagandists succeeded so well in inoculating the American people, and even many of our higher officials, with the illogical idea, that between 1927 and 1930 the American naval officer was seriously discredited in his own country.
A final example may be taken from a release by the leader of a publicity agency which has been openly maintained for a number of years by a prominent group of American churches. The release to American papers was from London where the publicist was covering the late naval conference then in session. He was undignified and vituperative in denouncing the American position and almost as severe in criticising the French for having set their demands at 70 per cent of British strength. But when it came to discussing the British angles of the situation there was only justification and sympathy for them. This has been the general attitude of this publicist and many others for a number of years whenever naval topics were under discussion.
It is by such means that a true and clear understanding of the elements entering into a naval limitation conference and of the results which may be achieved by it become impossible for the American people.
Granting all that can be said as to the impropriety of naval officers attempting to dictate the naval policy of the country—an impropriety which no American naval officer will question—they nevertheless have an obviously important function in the formulation of such policies. Their professional knowledge and advice must necessarily be utilized by statesmen if the vital interests of the country are to be safeguarded at the conference table. Now that we seem to be in an era of periodic limitation conferences it is a matter of considerable national importance that the American public should be protected against the sophistry which would have them discount the advice of their own naval officers, while indirectly and unknowingly accepting foreign naval advice. The United States is dangerously close to that situation today. Indeed propaganda has reached such lengths since the late war in shaping our naval policy that it now has to be considered as one of the major factors affecting such policy. We can no longer count upon basic national interests finally asserting themselves in spite of long intervals of public indifference to naval questions, and notwithstanding the Navy's traditional aloofness from public discussions. The formation of American opinion in such matters apparently has been actively and persistently pursued by interests out of sympathy with American maritime and naval development with the inevitable result that America and many of her civil officials have constantly held sincere opinions unknowingly founded on misrepresentation and half truths. Under such conditions what else could be expected than that America should innocently decide naval questions unfairly to herself?
There are many persons who make light of this situation on the ground that in the end truth will prevail. In one sense this is true. In the hands of skilled propagandists, however, the whole truth prevails only after it is too late to have a decisive influence on the issue.
Conclusion.—The forthcoming era of periodic limitation conferences will require of the Navy more than its traditional public aloofness if the best interests of the country are to be served. There is no need of launching forth into objectionable propaganda. But there is every reason for protecting the country against wholesale misrepresentation and half truth, for the exposure of which technical knowledge may be necessary.
We have for example at the present time foreign opinion constantly appearing in our press that the 8-inch-gun type of "treaty cruiser" is now "useless," with the implication that the United States would make a serious mistake to build up to her treaty quota in this type. There is the never ending propaganda that this country should set an example to the rest of the world by disproportionately reducing its armaments, together with misrepresentations as to our existing strength in comparison with other navies. In respect to our naval needs for commerce protection unsound arguments are often advanced to show that "our trade protects itself" or that shore-based aircraft offer sufficient protection to shipping.
For some years there has been a persistent propaganda with the apparent object of breaking down the American contention that we need a navy to safeguard our neutral rights when other countries are at war. Highly inaccurate statements have been broadcast that when the United States entered the World War she adopted the very practices respecting neutral shipping which she had so vigorously protested against when a neutral herself. The exact opposite is the fact, yet so successful has been the propaganda that even many naval officers have fallen victim to it. This, together with the illustrations given in the preceding paragraph, indicates the existing need of guarding the public against being imposed upon, innocently or otherwise, in publicity concerning naval affairs.
In the last analysis it is the American public which must decide upon their naval policy and this they cannot do intelligently without accurate and sufficiently comprehensive information. Hence we should recognize the value of the national service done by those who criticized parts of the London Naval Treaty. Regardless of the merits of their case they so focused public attention upon the treaty as to bring about a general understanding of its terms, and to formulate public conceptions of a rational naval policy for the future.
For the first time there seemed to be a really widespread appreciation of the one-sided sacrifices made by the United States in 1922, which even ardent London treaty proponents frankly admitted. They also deplored the necessity of lowering our ratio at London in order to gain an agreement carrying complete limitation in all classes of ships. In debate the two senatorial delegates expressed their conviction in the strongest terms that we should henceforth build up to the treaty limits, so as to avoid further sacrifices of the ratio on account of future deficiencies of status quo.
An unexpected development was the exhaustive discussions, both in the Senate and by the press, of the effect of the treaty upon our commerce protecting power as distinguished from fleet combat strength. This seemed to indicate a rapidly growing realization of the close relationship between national economics and naval power.
In all of this we see public opinion and naval policy in the making as a reflex of the London Naval Treaty. But the conceptions thus formed can scarcely survive until 1935 against the onslaughts of misrepresentation and half truth which have been typical since 1921, unless the Navy will do its legitimate part in safeguarding the whole truth.