Of Fighters and Facts
By Vice Admiral Thomas F. Connolly, U. S. Navy (Retired), Former Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air)
The strident and mostly inaccurate criticisms leveled at the Navy’s new fighter, the F-14, pose several questions that should be of interest to the public in general and to the readership of the Proceedings in particular. This observer, speaking from a point of close awareness of the F-14 program, suggests that a valid rebuttal may be made of such media and Congressional denouncements as: “A textbook case of what can go wrong in weapons planning,” “A microcosm . . . of the problems which plague our defense establishment,” A part of “10-year-old ideas which have never been thought through,” About an aircraft that does “no mission well,” and which promises to have the “attributes of another great defense turkey.”
What is really wrong with the F-14? At this stage, the F-14 is ahead of anything achieved in any comparable weapons system. This is a flat contradiction to pronouncements from Congressmen and commentators alike, who consistently compound inaccuracy and ignorance to suggest the conclusion that the greatest technical nation in history has lost its touch for effective design and production. Common sense, however, should prompt the thoughtful citizen to require further discussion before accepting such dismal judgment—and much material is available for correcting the record, as it is presently being reported.
The F-14 promise is most easily understood by comparisons. It will replace the Navy’s F-4 Phantom, a carrier-based fighter, whose very successful design was laid down in the mid-1950s. The F-14 will be produced with the same modern technology as the Air Force F-15. Both the F-14 and F-15 must be built to compete in combat with the best that the Soviets can produce—the Foxbat, Flogger, Flagon, the older MiG-21 Fishbed, as well as other designs which they seem to be developing.
The F-4 Phantom has been, and still is, a great airplane, but its capabilities that reflect a 15-year-old technology make it a poor match for the coming generation of Soviet fighters. By comparison with the F-4, the F-14 is 200 knots faster, and has more than a 40% higher radius of action, range, and endurance. Its landing speed is 25 knots lower than the F-4, which means much better and safer carrier operations. It has a higher roll rate, better acceleration, turns inside the F-4, and has a higher operating ceiling. Its radar and weapons control system are several times better than those in the F-4. It carries more weapons of higher lethality and greater range. It is the first and only U. S. stand-off multishot interceptor. At no penalty, the F-14 will provide air-to-surface weapon accuracies equal to the best, that is, to those of the Navy and Air Force A-7 Corsair II. The F-14 has 360-degree pilot visibility, and it is highly maneuverable. Using a new engine now in development, the “B” version of the F-14 will have a thrust-to-weight ratio of 1.1 at takeoff and 1.25 in combat at 10,000 feet. The Air Force F-15, using their version of this engine, also will enjoy a great augmentation in tactical maneuverability. There are two major “comparison arguments” made by opponents of the F-14. The first says “the F-4, with improvements, can handle the threat. It is now in production and relatively cheap, so why not save money and buy only improved F-4s?”
The answer is that the F-4, unimproved, after more than 4,000 production aircraft, costs close to $5 million per copy. With improvements, this cost will rise. There are added penalties as well—more weight, a lowering in top flight altitude, and a drop in top speed. The improvements contemplated are basically a small rise in subsonic maneuverability, an area where the F-4 can take a bad hammering from present-day Soviet fighters, and a fairly major updating of the avionics portion of the weapons system, to improve reliability and usefulness in a dogfighting arena such as Vietnam or Suez.
The F-4 can, of course, be continued in production for several more years, but it has no further growth without major redesign, amounting to a new airplane. The best reason to buy more F-4s is that they are comparatively cheap. But the F-4 cannot cope with Soviet missile capabilities or the stable of their new fighters. The nation needs new and better fighter weapons systems, the F-14 for the Navy and the F-15 for the Air Force. Both are expensive at the outset, but both will far out-perform the F-4 in every department. We must recognize and accept that the F-4 is a vintage combat vehicle.
The second argument most often heard against the F-14 is: “Why build both the F-14 for the Navy and the F-15 for the Air Force? Why not build one airplane, halve the costs, and fly it from either carrier decks or land bases?” The answer here is that the F-15 design will not do for the Navy, as it has not been designed for the carrier environment. To modify it for carrier operations would increase its weight by 10% and reduce each aspect of its combat performance by about the same proportion. The cost would rise, and the final product available in three years would be inferior to the F-14 now flying and designed for carrier operations from the start. The F-14 can, of course, be successful in land-based operations, as has been the case with the F-4 and several others. But the reverse is not true.
In addition to the two “comparison arguments” against the F-14, there is the separate, formidable body of opinion which says “The F-14 will be a very expensive airplane. Why does not the Navy build it at less cost? For that matter, why build it at all?” The answers to these kinds of questions lie in both the economics and political realities of life today. The F-14 is expensive, but so is everything else when measured by yesterday’s wage and price scale. The F-15 is also expensive; so is the Boeing 747, the Douglas DC-10, and every other advanced airplane in today’s market.
The Phantom, after more than a decade of production, is expensive. The F-14 is expensive at this time because this is the time when production learning curves are at their highest levels. At the same stage in the F-4 program 12 years ago, the cost of each aircraft calculated in total program unit dollars was also high, even in 1959 dollars. In 1972 dollars the price would be 50% higher. F-14 program costs are high, but they do include spare parts, support equipment, extra engines, pay for flight testing, and items to equip carriers and bases to support the F-14. The F-14 dollars also buy tooling and meet many other costs that are parts of all new aircraft developments. Yet, it is true that, unless the Defense Department buys quantities of F-14s large enough to gain the benefits of efficient production, the cost of each F-14 will remain high. Both the Navy and the Marine Corps need F-14 capabilities, and if these needs are met, production quantities will go up and the unit cost will go down.
Before we undertook the F-14 program the Navy thoroughly studied what could be done to improve the F-4 meaningfully. The results in 1967 showed that it would be far better to build a new plane, from cost as well as performance considerations. Decisions of this type are not reached lightly—the difficulties of gaining approval of and support for a major new defense program are too great. The dollar impact of a major new program on ongoing programs and the standing needs of the Navy is severe, one that endures for years. Hard compromises must be reached and lived with.
Need for the F-14 has been reviewed over and over again, in almost ceaseless rounds of budgeting and rebudgeting. In every defense budget session, the F-14 has stood up because of the recognized need for its superior performance characteristics and because the airplane is doing exceedingly well in development and flight testing. It is being produced by a team of top U. S. industrial firms, selected under tough competitive bidding. Where would we go to get better performers? Is it possible that those who find so much fault with these efforts have lost balance in perspective and judgment?
To answer the more nebulous and irresponsible questions like “Why build any new airplanes?”, the political realities of today’s world must be faced. The United States is a nation surrounded militarily as well as geographically by water. These waters are now used freely by Soviet ships and submarines, and are overflown by their military aircraft. The same waters are used in the transportation of vast amounts of raw materials, fuel, food, and manufactured goods which are vital to the daily life and processes of most of the nations of the world. But these waters are not necessary to the Soviets. Mindful of history and our role in it in this century, the Soviets have built a navy and weapons, as well as ground and air forces, that without engaging “in prolonged conventional war” with this country can, at times and under circumstances of their choosing, readily oppose the flow of material, supplies, and support almost any place in the world. Today, the principal counterforce that can oppose and prevent such a thwarting of a national will is an effective U. S. Navy.
It should be clear that a situation in which the United States could not control the use of the seas for effective movement of fuel, munitions, heavy vehicles, and equipment would make our long-held overseas strategy difficult and costly if not wholly unworkable. It would isolate us as a nation and radically alter the present roles of the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps.
While such a change might satisfy those who wish to forego a U. S. world role—to stay uninvolved at home—it does not appeal to the rest of us who believe that such a role is neither possible nor right. It would not stop Russian Power plans and would lead to our demise as a strong, free, and prosperous nation.
But, for the Kremlin, there still remains a vexing problem; that is, the U. S. Navy and its aircraft carriers continuing to stand athwart every horizon leading to conquest. And though they lack a satisfactory solution to this sea-power barrier to aggression, the Soviets can, with considerable reason, look forward to the day when the American Navy with its potent aircraft carriers will have atrophied from neglect. Indeed, at the very time when the nation’s grasp of the essential importance of sea-based airpower diminishes, Soviet planners show increasing recognition of U. S. aircraft carriers as powerful and versatile elements of opposition in the world. They have concentrated on vehicles, weapons, and tactics to attack carriers. “Overflights” of our carriers these past several years were intended in large part to weaken U. S. confidence in and support for carriers. They know how our country works and how to exploit its processes. That the Navy has prepared to deal with their missile-shooters is not well enough known to our citizens because it is not an easily discussable subject. Carrier-based reconnaissance, early-warning, command-and-control aircraft, together with long-range fighters, attack, and ASW aircraft, will, if called upon, be effective against the Soviet missile teams and each component thereof. The F-14, with advanced sensors and weapons, is a key element in a greatly improved Navy capability to oppose any adversary effort to prevent our use of the seas.
The strong tendency of many opinion molders to denigrate defense thinking, defense programs, and the capabilities of men responsible for defense, is a serious matter. Many of our people, our young college people in particular, have been taught or influenced to believe that we—the United States—are responsible for the arms competition. We, who came to Russia’s rescue in World War II, who put Europe back on its feet, along with much of the rest of the world—without taking a square foot of land or control of any government—we are the bad guys? Nonsense! For 26 years the U.S.S.R. has held control of “acceptable” governments of countries unable to regain their historic freedoms since Hitler overran them.
The effectiveness of our opposition, which really represents the Free World’s only chance for remaining free and independent of imposed Communism by whatever means, will be determined by the balanced adequacy of our strategic and conventional forces. And it is here that the nation’s understandable concern for certain internal matters has come into confrontation with the urgency of defense needs. The verbalized thinking often gets mixed—war is bad, therefore defense is bad. At this point, the reminder should be made that defense and national well being are complementary. In this world today, we cannot have one without the other. That portion of national defense with which this discussion concerns itself is seapower, and the many elements which make up seapower. The modern attack aircraft carrier, with a striking power continually improved by the introduction of new aircraft like the F-14, is demonstrably the most effective package of national defense that can be bought with the defense dollar.
Today’s attack carrier is a tougher target, has greater, and more-varied firepower in her air wing, performs more missions, carries more versatile aircraft, and can operate further away for longer periods at higher speeds than any warship ever built. It is the backbone of naval effectiveness and underwrites U. S. ability to carry out our own national security strategy and all that means for peace and security to NATO and all other countries who prefer freedom U. S. style, and still hope for our steadfast opposition to the spread of Communist power and takeover—for our own best interests as well as theirs.
The important thing about carriers is that they provide versatile offensive and defensive strength at sea where confrontation with the Soviets is likely to occur, if it comes, and where other forms of U. S. military power cannot be brought to bear or be even fractionally as effective. If the Soviets are stopped at sea, or believe they will be, the game is very probably won by us. In the opposite case, we lose—and we lose a great deal.
Many of the political-military-economic “experts,” so often appearing in today’s mass media, will be quick to say that the Soviets would never threaten at sea unless we provoke that threat. Such expressions of naive “expertise” continue to be disturbing to those whose responsibilities for U. S. protection and well-being include a keen awareness that the nation’s defenses cannot be permitted to deteriorate further from the combined erosive effects of an euphemistic assessment of adversary tactics and objectives and a domestic social euphoria. For, in a world menaced by the rising power and uncompromising goals of Soviet Communism, the penalty for neglecting our armed readiness is terminal. Opportunity for second-guessing is nonexistent.
The Officer Educational Specialist—A Proposal
By Lieutenant John B. Washbush, U. S. Naval Reserve, Assistant Professor of Naval Science, NROTC Unit, Marquette University, and Lieutenant Commander Lee R. Hess, U. S. Naval Reserve, Ph.D. Candidate in Educational Psychology, Marquette University
The academic standards of the ROTC have been much discussed and debated in the past several years. This focus of attention has caused many improvements, both in curriculum and instructor assignment procedures. The quality and qualification standards for the ROTC instructors, however, deserve continuing evaluation and need further upgrading.
In a letter to Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, dated 14 October 1969, Marquette University President, Father John P. Raynor, S. J., said:
The very concept of a university is changing within our society. Those who currently are engaged in university careers feel this movement keenly. Those who expect to work in this changing environment will be less than effective if they do not understand the direction and extent of the change. Yet understanding of this type will require rather thorough knowledge of the history and philosophy of higher education as well as knowledge of the structure and governance of higher education institutions. Without this knowledge, a future university instructor will have difficulty in grasping the full dimensions of his role, no matter how well he understands the discipline which is his major academic concern.
Further, if future ROTC instructors are to be accorded the stature of academic rank, they must be judged in large part as their colleagues are judged, that is, on the basis of teaching ability and scholarly attainment. This is important if Military and Naval Science Departments are to be afforded the respect due to any department deemed worthy to be included in the academic community. Anything less would seem to be prejudicial both to the faculty members of the military departments and the students they teach.
In brief, then, the creation of a corps of academic careerists within the Armed Forces would seem of significant importance if officers are to continue to be educated on university campuses.
Although much of the tension and turmoil surrounding the ROTC issue has been dispelled since these words were written, they are every bit as relevant today.
An article in the 11 October 1971 issue of U. S. News and World Report noted that the Defense Department is making a strenuous effort to strengthen the ROTC programs, and that Congress is receptive. The number of scholarships is to be increased and subsistence allowances raised to make the ROTC programs more attractive. Recent ROTC inquiries by universities have prompted curriculum review and focused much-needed attention on the military and academic qualifications of the ROTC instructors.
In May 1971, a jointly-adopted statement by six national higher education associations noted that officer education, like other fields of professional training, requires continuous reassessment and updating. Their recommendations included:
(1) Shared responsibility for development and establishment of ROTC curricula between the school and the respective military department.
(2) Establishment of procedures for regular periodic program evaluation at each institution.
(3) Granting of academic status consistent with the institution’s organizational structure.
(4) According the senior military officer of each ROTC program on campus a position consistent with the institution’s rules of rank and title for a senior head of program.
(5) Granting of academic credit for ROTC courses to be determined on the same basis as for other courses offered by the institution.
(6) Nomination as prospective military instructors of officers with advanced academic degrees, competence in teaching.
While interest, cooperation, and improvement continue to be evidenced, it is time to reopen the instructor corps issue proposed by Father Raynor. Because the writers are naval officers with considerable NROTC instructor experience, the discussion will be limited to the naval Service, but obvious extrapolations can be made to the other Services.
Benefits to the Navy of a career academic corps of officers would extend far beyond the NROTC. A new career field would be open to those who either do not desire at-sea command or who have strong desires to augment sea duty with shore assignments that assist in the primary training of prospective officers. At the same time, they would actively pursue academic challenges. Officers in the educational specialty would be available for staffing and administering the NROTC, the Naval Academy, naval and interservice colleges (Naval Postgraduate School, war colleges, and the like), and numerous Navy schools. These officers would also be eligible for many Navy Department and Defense Department assignments, particularly in the fields of education and training.
There need be no hard and fast rules on undergraduate preparation for such a specialty. Postgraduate training, however, would preferably be in the fields of history, political science, psychology, educational administration, educational psychology, international relations, and business administration. A master’s degree plus courses in teaching methods and educational psychology should be required for consideration for this specialty. Practice teaching experience would be mandatory and could be gained while pursuing the master’s degree. Successful completion of all aspects of the prerequisite program plus acceptance as a Naval Science or Naval Academy instructor would complete academic preparation.
Under no circumstances should an officer be allowed to apply for this program unless he has completed a minimum of three years of aviation squadron or shipboard duty, and completed all normal qualifications (such as officer of the deck underway). He should have compiled a good academic record, have demonstrated excellent performance of duty, have displayed sound leadership ability, and have evidenced a strong desire both to assist in officer and enlisted training and undertake a career in teaching and scholarship.
Retention in the specialty would require successful completion of an initial tour as either an NROTC or Naval Academy instructor. Qualification for billets as NROTC executive or commanding officer, head of department at the Naval Academy, and staff assignments to the Postgraduate School and to Service and war colleges would be dependent upon acquiring a doctorate degree. Command at sea could also be made available for those so desiring. The Educational Specialist would be a restricted line officer if he did not desire command at sea opportunity and wanted to devote his entire career to work in the specialty. Line officers desiring at-sea command opportunity, however, would carry an education and training sub-specialty code and would alternate education and training assignments with line assignments. Flag rank opportunities would likewise be within reach.
The usefulness of Educational Specialists in the field of enlisted training cannot be overemphasized. These officers would make significant contributions by manning key billets at enlisted schools and training commands, particularly in supervising educational administration, improving curricula, and improving the techniques and quality of teaching. Training and schooling are as vital to the Navy as its ships and aircraft. Using the expertise of naval officers who are devoting their careers to improving the training and learning of Navy personnel makes obvious good sense. A typical career pattern for the Naval Educational Specialist is shown in Figure 1.
Years of Service | Tour | Rank |
0-3 | At Sea—attain basic qualification and experience | Ens-Lt(j.g.) |
3-4 | Postgraduate schooling to obtain M.A. and teaching training and experience | Lt(j.g.)-Lt |
4-7 | NROTC/Naval Academy instructor (continue studies on a not-to-interfere basis) | Lt |
7-9 | At Sea—department head tour | Lt-Lcdr |
9-11 | Postgraduate schooling to obtain doctorate | Lcdr |
11-13 | Naval Academy professorship/ NROTC XO/PG School billet | Lcdr-Cdr |
13-15 | Bureau/DoD tour or at sea (XO) | Cdr |
15-18 | CO, NROTC Unit | Cdr-Capt |
18-21 | War or Service College professorship or at sea (CO) | Cdr-Capt |
22 on | Bureau/DoD tour, War or Service College, or NROTC CO | Capt |
| President, War or Service College, Bureau/DoD tour, Superintendent, USNA, or Staff assignment | Flag |
Creation of this specialty would be of both short-run and long-run benefit to the Navy. The jobs already exist, but they would be better filled and administered. Retention would be most favorably affected. This would be true for those in the specialty because of the opportunities and challenges presented them. It is also highly probable that these specialists would have a significant positive effect on motivating the officers and enlisted men they instruct and train, both for better individual performance and for Service careers. Certainly the professionalism of the Navy as a whole would be heightened and also refined.
The Navy has not acted with the dispatch nor with the energy required by the present situation. As the Navy reduces its size, it is of the utmost importance to ensure that the knowledge, capabilities, professionalism, and continual upgrading of its personnel be conducted in the best manner possible. Billets at training commands and Navy educational commands, such as the NROTC, must not be allowed to become asides. The best product demands the best ingredients—students as well as teachers and administrators. Sacrifices made in the name of economy or convenience in the field of Navy education and training will produce effects the Navy can ill-afford.
The Educational Specialist proposal offers a method of revitalizing not only the NROTC, but all aspects of Navy training as well. It makes little sense, if any, to staff billets in this area with people who have not proven their abilities and have been specifically trained to man them. The idea that a naval line officer can do virtually any job is blatantly false. We train operational specialists. Why then, do we not apply the same logic to training educational specialists?
The current problems facing the Navy involve more than just numbers and hardware. A more professional outlook and method applied to education and training will not completely solve these problems, but will make them much more solvable.
Certainly, better trained people will be more easily motivated both to do their own jobs well and to make the Service a career. The academic careerist corps proposal made by Father Raynor, and the position taken by the education associations reflect the concern of the academic community with the qualifications and abilities of the ROTC instructors. The Navy can take little pride in the fact that these proposals have come from without. It is time to be active rather than reactive. The challenge and the opportunity are there and should be accepted. Procrastination may allow time to blunt the issues, but only action will eliminate problems and change things for the better. If nothing else, action now will make it easier to meet and contend successfully with the demands of the future.
The Protest at Snowy Beach
By Commander Ralph W. Blanchard, U. S. Navy, Deputy Public Affairs Officer, Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic and Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet
An Atlantic Fleet cold weather exercise, both off and on the coast of New England last winter, taught the Navy and Marine Corps a number of lessons, not the least of them being to be prepared for an onslaught from the anti-military community.
The protest at “Snowy Beach” turned into a production whose cast ranged from a handful of citizens sincerely concerned about the environment, to highly vocal anti-military groups. The scenario, a protest based on the ecology issue, included dramatic climaxes in state and federal courts. The federal decision came only 14 hours before the amphibious portion of the exercise was scheduled to begin.
With that setting, it came as no surprise that one of the major problems encountered was that of achieving the public affairs goals for the Fleet exercise, confronted as it was with a protest phenomenon designed to denigrate the role of the military.
If the military had buried its head in the mile-long sandy beach of Reid State Park in Maine, the public affairs problems would not have disappeared. Instead, it was necessary somehow to transcend the protest issue and provide the public a clear view of what Snowy Beach and the Atlantic Fleet were all about.
Despite the impression received from the inordinate amount of news media coverage, including network television, newspaper stories, and editorials across the country, Snowy Beach was not a major Atlantic Fleet exercise.
It was an exercise involving 33 ships of the U. S. Atlantic Fleet and the 22nd Marine Amphibious Unit, which conducted an amphibious landing of some 700 men of its 1,700-man force. From the Fleet Marine Force’s point of view, the exercise was aimed at seeing how the men and equipment performed during the cold weather landing itself. Marines train under adverse climatological conditions ashore at Camp Drum in upper New York State, but there had been no actual cold weather landing by the Atlantic Fleet since the mid-1950s.
It was for this reason that the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet, had placed a cold weather exercise high on his list of priorities, an action reflective of his NATO military commitments along the cold northern flank of the European continent. Therefore, early in 1971, plans moved forward to conduct a broad-spectrum Fleet cold-weather exercise. By summer, planners had determined from state of Maine officials that the optimum winter weather for such an exercise coincided with the lowest fishing activity. It was the best of all worlds for planners, and the stage was set to hold the exercise during a 10-day period, commencing 17 January 1972 with a modest, but important, landing to occur on 22 January. By fall, the state of Maine had approved the use of Reid State Park, a small, lovely park which had been presented to the people of Maine by the late Walter Reid.
By fall, Navy and Marine Corps units which would participate had been selected; and it was determined that the fishing industry should be briefed at least a month before the exercise. That briefing occurred on 20 December, and the exercise was announced by the Atlantic Fleet the following day.
The protest leaders apparently were dispersed for the holidays. The storm from that sector would riot break until early January; but when it did, it compared favorably with the fierce storms out of the northeast which characterize New England’s winter weather.
Over the holidays, however, there was considerable public interest in the exercise, and the people in Georgetown, Maine, where Reid State Park is located, were fairly well convinced the exercise was not a cause for alarm. The lead paragraph of the Brunswick-Bath newspaper Times-Record on 4 January 1972 summed up local feeling. It said:
There’s some concern about the dunes at the beach and one woman says her cats may get scared, but people here [Georgetown] don’t seem too disturbed about the coming “invasion.”
Concern did center on the dunes, but the newspapers also noted “some worry” about what the inert practice mines would do to equipment that is used to drag for shrimp, should the mines not be recovered.
Local Navy briefings in the area stressed the environmental care the Fleet was taking. Among the constraints in the exercise were prohibitions against using the dunes and against cutting wood. They were normal precautions that the ecology-conscious military always takes during exercises, and the public was told this. Georgetown residents expressed greater concern over the stream of sightseers they feared would descend on the area.
By 7 January, it was obvious that the protest movement was gathering steam. Since the story of 4 January, the Times-Record reported that “. . . opposition to the maneuvers has found its voice both locally and on a state level.” Included in the movement’s voice at this point were a state senator, a Bowdoin College professor of English, and a Georgetown artist, who disavowed any connection to the others. A petition against the exercise which was hung in a local store in the area, however, was taken down after gathering only one name. The senator threatened court action to stop the landing at Reid State Park.
The Press Herald in Portland, Maine, noted on 7 January that the two most vocal protesters at this point “. . . have been active in the anti-war movement for many years . . .” but the newspaper went on in fairness to quote one protest leader as claiming “. . . more than an anti-military feeling is prompting the protests.”
The protest movement was characterized repeatedly by its leaders as being primarily concerned for the ecology, but observers detected a basically anti-military sentiment. In fact, on 8 January, the Augusta, Maine, Kennebec Journal under the headline “Ecology A Cover,” reported that the Maine Parks and Recreation Commission Director felt “. . . the peace movement is behind opposition . . .” to the exercise. A few days later in Augusta, a leading conservationist told newsmen that “. . . the upcoming military maneuver is a philosophical question and not an environmental one.”
For the next few days, the news media coverage of the protesters expanded. The military side of the picture was clarified considerably, however, when the Deputy Commanding General of the Fleet Marine Force held an impromptu news conference in Brunswick, Maine. However, a further boost for the protest side came when the Commissioner of the Maine Environmental Improvement Commission (EIC) voiced his concern at the exercise.
Newspaper comment varied, some in support and some against, but in general, the local news media editorially tended to support the exercise. Not so with The New York Times, which, in an editorial on 12 January condemned what it called an “ill-considered landing.” The editorial which was reproduced in at least one Maine newspaper, contained a number of inaccuracies. For example, it claimed that 1,700 Marines would land in the park instead of the scheduled 700, and said a total of 30,000 men would participate in the overall exercise, a figure double the actual number which was publicly announced.
The anti-military movement peaked on 13 January, when protest groups filed two legal suits in an effort to stop the Atlantic Fleet from holding the amphibious landing. One suit in the Superior Court of Sagadahoc County contended that the State had improperly granted the Navy permission to use Reid State Park. The petition was denied. Another suit was taken into the Federal Court at Portland, based on the contention that the Navy had not complied with Federal Environmental statutes. The ruling on this did not come until 21 January.
A sense of fatigue among the citizens of Maine over the Snowy Beach protest also began to be noticed, about mid-January. The local news media were saturated, and as one columnist put it:
Believe me, the natives are restless. We have had “Snowy Beach” up to our necks! And the poor Marines are probably overwhelmed by the furor all this is causing.
On 16 January, the state’s largest newspaper seemed equally restless with the protest. A long editorial in the Maine Sunday Telegram outlined the precautions the Fleet was taking, and, tongue in cheek, noted The New York Times’ interest, but wished The Times had got the facts correct. The Telegram concluded that:
Maine’s biggest circulation newspaper has one word for the sailors and the Marines now heading for Maine. And that one word is—Welcome!
As Snowy Beach ships got underway from their homeports the next day, the scene was set. The protest movement was beefing up its loud minority voice with new support from the Vietnam Veterans Against War, who promised a demonstration if the Federal Court action ruled in favor of the Fleet; and a New York organization called the Environmental Defense Fund joined the protest movement, presumably with monetary support. And so, despite a simmering public distaste for the movement, the protesters at Snowy Beach were front and center. In one of the wings was a forthcoming court decision, while off in the other was the Second Fleet task force conducting its at-sea phases of the exercise.
The denouement was to come on 21 January, just 14 hours before the scheduled landing, when a federal judge ruled that the protest movement’s charges were without substance. The Atlantic Fleet meanwhile was confronted with the task of ensuring that the Fleet’s mission was explained to the public and of underlining the vital importance of the Atlantic Command area, an unappealing task faced, as it was, with the ecology smoke screen being raised publicly by the anti-military leaders.
To meet Department of Defense directives, which call for a free flow of information to the public on exercises such as Snowy Beach, the Fleet established a five-man Command Information Bureau at the Naval Air Station, Brunswick, a half-hour drive from Reid State Park. Arrangements were made to double the number of newsmen embarking with units of the Fleet, flying them to the USS Franklin D. Roosevelt (CVA-42) and then to the USS Guadalcanal (LPH-7), to be in a position for the landing.
The Command Information Bureau (CIB) accredited 80 newsmen, roughly one for every eight Marines scheduled to participate in the landing. Broadcast and publishing organizations received briefings as they requested them. Hundreds of press queries were processed; and requests for radio interviews were received and granted far into the nights preceding the landing.
Fleet commanders made certain that newsmen were fully briefed when they arrived in the Fleet, and that news material was flown ashore on 21 January, after the 23 newsmen and one newswoman were able to collect their thoughts on that first day’s activities. The dozens of photographs, stories, and the hundreds of feet of motion picture news film, therefore, reached the news organizations in a timely and effective manner. The news coverage, which until now had been primarily the “Protest at Snowy Beach,” shifted toward the exercise itself.
The protest had resulted in wide news media interest, but the fact that the news reports ultimately reflected the Navy-Marine Corps story in an honest, positive manner, was the result of a basically responsible press corps and bone-tiring effort by many people at all echelons in the Fleet.
On the day of the landing, a demonstration began forming at the Park gate. Efficient Maine state patrolmen lined the entrance, and the growing group of protesters of various persuasions called unanswered questions to them. The Atlantic Fleet’s public affairs representative, who was directing the information program, recognized that certain of the protest groups were genuinely concerned for the Park. As he entered by car, he realized that it might ease tensions and, at the same time, demonstrate the Fleet’s great concern for ecology, if he walked back to the gate and discussed the amphibious landing.
Some of the questions asked by those at the gate illustrated that a great deal of incorrect information had been spread by the anti-military leaders. Many of the questions were asked by people who were not basically anti-military, but confused as to the real issues. Excerpts from the 23 January Maine Sunday Telegram illustrate the anti-military information campaign at Snowy Beach:
Q. What about all the money this is costing the public? (They cited estimates of $35,000,000.)
A. We get paid the same, whether we are here or in Norfolk, and it would not cost any more to run our equipment elsewhere.
Q. Has the Navy ever landed in a state park before?
A. Yes, in North Carolina we had a landing on lands partly owned by the state and partly in private lands. We were given permission to use these lands because citizens felt they could do their country some good by helping keep us prepared.
Q. Is there anything to the rumors that this is actually a preparation for a CIA-sponsored invasion of Chile?
A. Ain’t nothing to that one.
Q. Those troops of yours look cold and bored, and some of them gave us the peace sign. Having any morale problems?
A. They are cold and bored—that’s part of their training.
While there was a strong anti-military feeling pervading the group, the Director of the CIB also detected that most of the group was sincere. The give and take session luckily was successful in its low-key approach, and ended with an offer to the naval officer from the group for coffee, which he accepted.
Other efforts were taken to ensure that the public understood Snowy Beach. Pamphlets were given to people who drove into the area, thanking them for the use of the park and explaining what was happening. Newsmen continued to get timely statements concerning the exercise. At the conclusion of the exercise, the Commander, Fleet Air, Brunswick, appeared on State-wide television and radio as a wrap-up to the drama.
The results of Snowy Beach from the public affairs aspect were good. When the clippings and broadcast reports were in, it turned out the majority of the news coverage had centered on the positive aspects of the exercise, despite the fact that a great deal of coverage had gone to the protest earlier. For example, one network television news program the week before the landing had leaned heavily toward the protest sentiment, but later televised a very objective report. Other nationwide television and radio coverage proved fair in coverage of the exercise. Local coverage was excellent in its fair treatment.
The newsmen and newswomen covering Exercise Snowy Beach were highly conscientious and responsible. In fact, a wire service photographer confided afterwards that he had decided against photographing a young Marine carrying away a small evergreen tree, which he inadvertently had broken with his forklift. “If I’d photographed it,” the civilian newsman said, “it would have been printed and blown way out of perspective. Besides, it was obvious the youngster was really unhappy that he had done some damage.” Responsible journalism calls for honesty, intelligence, perseverance, and telling it like it is—not blowing the story out of context. The next time American journalism is up for criticism, it may pay to recall that photographer’s account.
The protest at Snowy Beach was one that the Navy will long remember, and among the lessons learned was that if the people have an opportunity to know what the military is contributing to the nation, they will invariably support it. The Navy and Marine Corps were genuinely sensitive to the environment at Reid State Park. When the newsmen learned this, they reported it. The sailors and Marines there for training, sometimes got bored and cold, but they kept right on, and when the newsmen saw this, they reported it.
The Atlantic Ocean and seapower play a vital role in our country. When the newsmen wrote about Snowy Beach, they reported that fact. This is not to say that all that was written or broadcast about the exercise was fair and responsible journalism. For example, The New York Times criticized the exercise editorially, but provided its readers only limited coverage of the maneuvers. Despite the exceptions, the news media organizations, in general, demonstrated the highest standards of journalism, and could not be criticized in their handling of Snowy Beach.
The epilogue of the Protest at Snowy Beach was a quiet chorus of newspaper and broadcast reports which told of the conclusion of the Atlantic Fleet cold weather exercise. If it was anti-climactic, at least it was honest and without antimilitary bias; and those who had experienced the throes of the protest were not dismayed at the closing scenes, such as those described by the Portland Press Herald editorial on 26 January 1972, which noted in its lead paragraph that: “Operation Snowy Beach has come and gone and the dunes of Reid State Park remain intact.”