As the U.S. Navy confronts a more belligerent People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) operating across the Pacific, it made good progress in 2023 on instilling a new sense of urgency in operations, acquisition, force development, and organizational transformation. While much more needs to be accomplished to get the service on a real war footing, the Navy’s recent achievements should not be dismissed.
At the top, senior Navy civilian and military leaders stepped up their warnings on both the threats posed by the PLAN’s growth trajectory and China’s increasingly reckless operations at sea that challenge long-established norms of Navy leaders speaking clearly and repeatedly about PLAN actions and capabilities. This was long overdue.
“The Navy recognizes that this is a decisive decade—a decade during which command of the seas will determine the balance of power for the rest of this century,” former Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Michael Gilday said at his retirement in August. “We are undergoing revolutionary changes in our plans, in our platforms, in capabilities, how we lead and support the men and women of Team Navy.”1
Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro also is pushing the Navy to move faster in technology development and shipbuilding to pace the PLAN threat and has launched several initiatives to improve the Navy’s rate of change and adaptation to this threat. In a speech at Harvard University in September, he said: “The People’s Republic of China is building up its naval fleet at a rapid pace. In the 20 years since I left active duty, the PLA Navy has tripled in size, and is on pace to have over 400 naval warships by 2030.”2
Two key initiatives are the Disruptive Capabilities Office (DCO) and a new Maritime Statecraft Initiative. The DCO is an acceleration cell for moving promising technologies, concepts, and capabilities rapidly through the Navy’s acquisition bureaucracy. The statecraft initiative is to more effectively harness the collective power of the nation’s various departments, agencies, and offices that focus on the oceans, environment, defense, and trade to counter China’s ascendent maritime position.
Experimentation and Exercises
The U.S. Pacific Fleet has markedly increased its pace of experimentation and exercises in the past year and has been more willing to broadcast the success of those activities. These positive developments signal, hopefully, that Navy leaders are realizing the deterrent power inherent in advertising the testing of and experimentation with new operational concepts and technologies, and the fielding of new weapon systems. “The theme that we use at IndoPaCom is we have to think, act, and operate differently every day,” according to Admiral John Aquilino, head of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (IndoPaCom).3
Probably the most significant experiment in the past year was the historic deployment of a flotilla of four unmanned surface vessels (USVs) to the western Pacific operating area. As part of Integrated Battle Problem 23.2, the prototype USVs Sea Hunter, Seahawk, Ranger, and Mariner deployed with the USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70) carrier strike group. The USVs transited the Pacific Ocean from the West Coast to Hawaii in August and then operated with U.S. Seventh Fleet in Yokosuka, Japan.
Significantly, the USVs operated as fully integrated elements of the fleet’s battle force and not as experimental vessels. “Nothing can replace being out in the field, so to speak, or out conducting real-world operations,” said Commander Jeremiah Daley, commanding officer of USV Division 1. “Even if we were a traditional ship that was new—that was manned—integrating and planning and utilizing something that’s new into already established tactics, techniques and procedures, it’s not an easy task to do.”4
Several firsts were accomplished on this operational deployment, including an underway replenishment of a USV at sea from the USNS Charles Drew (T-AKE-10). The unmanned flotilla also visited Australia, where the vessels participated in the Autonomous Warrior exercise before arriving back in the United States in January. The vessels sailed a total of 46,651 nautical miles—almost all under autonomous control.5
Since the procurement funding for the Navy’s medium and large USV programs keeps getting pushed to later this decade, the existing prototype USV force is exercising an outsized role in the current development of operational doctrine, tactics, and unmanned systems logistical support. This heavy use, however, is beginning to take a toll on the vessels, which were offshore resupply vessels for oil platforms before their conversion to unmanned operations. The Navy recently sold one of the USVs, the Nomad, for scrap.6 One new USV, the Vanguard, built by AustalUSA, will join the fleet this year. It is the first USV built from the keel up for unmanned operations.7
After many fits and starts with various operating schemes, the fleet is now taking full advantage of the operational flexibility that littoral combat ships (LCSs) bring to operations in the Pacific. Operating mainly Independence variants, Pacific Fleet is still using the two-crew (Blue/Gold) manning model that dramatically increases the deployment length for the ships. Using the two-crew model, the USS Charleston (LCS-18) deployed to the Seventh Fleet area of operations for 26 months!8 The Freedom variants on the East Coast have transitioned to a single-crew concept.
The Navy is now looking to add LCS maintenance capabilities in Australia, Guam, the Philippines, and Brunei, in addition to the LCS support hub in Singapore. The USS Oakland (LCS-24) deployed for Autonomous Warrior in Australia, where it operated as a mothership for the USV flotilla on deployment. “We’re not setting any boundaries. We’re looking at all options that we can utilize,” Captain Marc Crawford, the LCS Squadron 1 commander, said.
With all Independence variants now deploying with the Naval Strike Missile (NSM), the fleet upgraded the offensive firepower of the variant in 2023 by testing SM-6 containerized launchers on both the USS Tulsa (LCS-16) and Savannah (LCS-28). “I think the question of do the ships have lethality and capability—is kind of off the table,” said Rear Admiral Ted LeClair, director of Task Force LCS.9
Western Pacific Operations
The Navy engaged in several high-profile operations in the western Pacific in 2023, despite major demands for naval forces in other parts of the globe. In November 2023, naval forces conducted a multi-large deck event (MLDE) with the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF). The aircraft carriers USS Carl Vinson and Ronald Reagan (CVN-76) joined the helicopter destroyer JS Hyūga for exercises and integration events. According to Rear Admiral Pat Hannifin, commander of Task Force 70 and Carrier Strike Group Five, the MLDE is “a testament to the strong relations we maintain with like-minded allies across the region—and the world—that we are able to bring together a tightly coordinated and united international force like this.”10
Several weeks later, the Carl Vinson conducted trilateral drills with the JMSDF and Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) following the launch of a North Korean military reconnaissance satellite. According to the ROKN, the intent of the exercise was “to bolster joint operation capabilities and close coordination between the countries amid North Korea’s evolving nuclear and missile threats.”11 CNO Admiral Lisa Franchetti and Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy James Honea visited the carrier two days before the exercise and met with the chief of the ROKN, Admiral Yang Yong-mo.
The Makin Island Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) with the embarked 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) participated with the Armed Forces of the Philippines in this year’s Balikatan exercise, the largest iteration of the 33-year-old exercise series to date. More than 17,000 troops took part, up from 9,000 troops the previous year.12 The exercise featured a multitude of capabilities and events, including a sinking exercise during which six F-35Bs launched from the USS Makin Island (LHD-8) and sunk a decommissioned warship with precision munitions.13
The USS America (LHA-6) participated in the Talisman Sabre exercise with Australia in summer 2023. The America brought a complement of F-35Bs and more than 1,000 Marines to the exercise, which included simulated amphibious assaults and numerous other operations. According to Rear Admiral Christopher Stone, commander of Task Force 76/3, “We come together to practice our skills across all domains, including everything from missions like humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to high-end major combat operations and everything in between.” The 2023 iteration of Talisman Sabre included 30,000 troops from 13 nations.14
New Organizations and Reform
In 2023, the Navy stood up multiple organizations, ranging from acquisition to readiness, to facilitate reform. The surface warfare community established Naval Surface Readiness Group (SurfGru) Southwest in San Diego in December 2023. This command joins other SurfGrus in fleet concentration areas focused on improving maintenance and force generation.15 SurfGrus were a key initiative by previous surface warfare boss Vice Admiral Roy Kitchener, who said, “With the focused support of the SurfGrus during the maintenance and basic phases, precious time will be freed up for operational squadrons to concentrate on their warfighting role.”16
The SurfGru concept was inspired in part by the Cold War–era readiness destroyer squadrons that fulfilled similar roles. The 2010 Balisle Report that was highly critical of surface ship maintenance strongly recommended the reestablishment of these squadrons, but Navy leaders at the time were not receptive to the concept in the wake of the report’s release.17 As surface navy leaders continue to prioritize improving force generation and ship maintenance, the SurfGrus will likely play a substantial role in realizing these aims.
In 2023, the Surface and Mine War-fighting Development Center (SMWDC) launched the first cycle of its new surface requirements group (SurfRG). This entity formally inserts the tactical expertise of surface warfare tactics instructors into acquisition and systems development. The SurfRG seeks to align fleet, program office, and resource sponsor efforts and provide recommendations on surface capability development. The first cycle of the SurfRG was completed with the August 2023 signing of a technical solution recommendation letter. The following month, SurfRG representatives provided a classified briefing on tactical priorities to more than 100 industry representatives at the Surface Navy Association West Coast Symposium.18 For the next cycle, SMWDC is including more touchpoints for industry to engage with the SurfRG.19
Secretary Del Toro established several new organizations to accelerate and improve service acquisition. In September 2023, at an event celebrating the 100th anniversary of the Naval Research Laboratory, Del Toro announced the creation of the DCO to rapidly deliver new capabilities to operational commands through accelerated prototyping and experimentation.20 The DCO also will play a role in devising the Navy’s contribution to the Department of Defense’s Replicator Initiative, which is intended to field thousands of drones to counter great power threats.21
The DCO will carry on the work of the Unmanned Task Force (UTF) pilot program, which recently concluded. Some of UTF’s classified work focused on how to counter specific great power challenges with unmanned technology and use streamlined processes to rapidly field unmanned capabilities. According to Del Toro, the DCO “will look very much like the Unmanned Task Force in the beginning. Until we actually start expanding the different topics and issues, we’re going to be working in the Disruptive Capabilities Office.”22 The DCO will inherit the UTF’s processes and reporting chains, which include directly reporting to the Secretary and the Vice Chief of Naval Operations. Secretary Del Toro touted this arrangement, in which having a “direct line with top leadership” allows decision-makers to “make quick decisions, especially quick resourcing decisions . . . so that we can actually get things moving faster.”23
Finally, in September Del Toro created the Department of the Navy Science and Technology Board. According to its charter, the board’s function is to “provide independent advice and recommendations on matters relating to the Department of the Navy’s scientific, technical, manufacturing, acquisition, logistics, medicine, and business management functions.”24 Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin appointed former Navy Secretary Richard Danzig to chair the board.25 Danzig stated that the board will examine the potential of several high-profile emerging technologies, including autonomy, robotics, and generative artificial intelligence. The board’s composition includes senior figures from academia and industry and former DoD civilians and retired service members.
Force Development and Capability
The Navy’s force development is increasingly focused on cultivating high-end warfighting skills and capabilities. In 2023, the Navy’s combat exercising grew more complex, and the service is working on critical new capabilities and upgrades that are poised to make the fleet more lethal.
The Navy conducted the second iteration of its Large-Scale Exercise (LSE) series in 2023. This exercise included 25,000 sailors and Marines and seven numbered fleet commands and spanned 22 time zones.26 The global nature of the event was driven in part by an understanding that high-end threats will not be confined to a single regional theater.27 According to Captain Chris Narducci, lead planner for LSE, “We need to know how to fight better and how to operate on that global scale because it’s not going to be a regional conflict with our strategic competitors. . . . It will be a global event because they are globally distributed themselves.”28
The scale of LSE makes it distinct from other complex Navy exercise events, such as CompTUEx and Fleet Battle Problems, which often feature a single carrier strike group and typically focus on the tactical level of war. LSE featured numerous strike groups and exercised multiple three- and four-star commands at the operational level of war. LSE forces included a single live carrier strike group plus five virtual/constructive carrier strike groups, four virtual/constructive amphibious readiness groups, and more than a dozen additional ships and submarines.29 These force totals are informed by realistic estimates of the Navy’s availability and surge capacity in a crisis. According to Rear Admiral Eugene Burcher, the exercise director, “Most exercises, you assume various different things. . . . [In LSE] we’re using actual numbers and that forces that tension and makes the exercise much more realistic.”30 Burcher also emphasized that LSE used the actual force laydown and ordnance levels that existed in the June 2023 timeframe, two months before LSE began.
A major goal of LSE was to assess and refine the Navy’s distributed maritime operations (DMO) concept. Aside from the global distribution of the exercise, the Navy during LSE sought to explore how to distribute forces on tactical levels and to challenge headquarters’ ability to manage the distribution of a larger number of forces. According to Pacific Fleet Commander Admiral Samuel Paparo, a major benefit of LSE was “the scale of forces that you’re tracking. . . . By injecting virtual tracks you stress the headquarters’ ability to see and understand the space and to note what each unit is doing and encountering across a wide geography. . . . the effect of simulating virtual units and virtual activity is to stress the command centers to get them up on a wartime footing.” In-depth analysis will inform the design of the next iteration of LSE and provide recommendations for a range of functions, including tactics, training, and capability requirements.31
Live, Virtual, Constructive Training
The Navy is bolstering its investments in live, virtual, and constructive (LVC) technology, which will allow exercises to be taken to new heights. LVC played a major role in LSE 2023 and is enhancing unit-level tactical training throughout the fleet.
LVC allows threat-representative capabilities and platforms to feature in Navy exercises, rather than having U.S. units roleplay as opposing forces using U.S. equipment. It allows more friendly and opposing forces to be inserted into the event as constructive or virtual assets, which enables the scenarios to feature larger and more realistic representations of major combat operations. LVC also can allow the Navy to expand the scope of its training areas to include “synthetic geographies” that go beyond the confines of instrumented ranges, whose limited size challenges the ability of live forces to replicate the expanse of a great power threat environment.32
LVC provides a more secure method of exercising compared with similar events with only real units, which can be subjected to competitor surveillance.33 According to Captain Michael Langbehn, deputy commander of Naval Air Warfare Development Command, “By getting those reps and sets in the virtual environment, it gives more threat-representative platforms in the digital world. . . . Being able to operate against those capabilities . . . without tipping our hand or showing what we’re doing is really essential.”34
The Navy has invested nearly $1.5 billion in LVC over the past five years and has plans to continue upgrading and expanding it.35 Major elements of this plan include a new 40,000-square-foot LVC operations center in Dam Neck, Virginia, greater information warfare functionality, and improving the ability of aircraft to integrate into LVC events with warships.36 A related initiative under consideration is the Strike Group Mobile Open Ocean Virtual Range, which would allow carriers to become a central node in providing training range capability afloat rather than being limited to shore-based range infrastructure.37
DDG MOD 2.0
The Navy is embarking on a major upgrade program to enhance the capabilities of the surface force. About 20 DDG-51 Flight IIA destroyers will go through the DDG MOD 2.0 program and be upgraded with the SEWIP Block III electronic warfare systems, SPY-6 radars, and Aegis Baseline 10 capability. The refit is expected to take up to two years per warship, and the program is expected to cost about $17 billion.38 To manage the program, the Navy established a new program office (PMS 451) in September 2023.39
SEWIP Block III will provide enhanced electronic attack, among a multitude of other passive and active capabilities. The SPY-6 radar will provide substantially increased radar resolution and sensitivity. And Aegis Baseline 10 will provide an accelerated ability to push new updates to combat systems via the Aegis Common Source Library.40 The MOD 2.0 upgrades will significantly enhance the air defense and electronic warfare capabilities of the destroyers. They will be introduced on a timeframe that overlaps with the introduction of the Flight III destroyers and the decommissioning of the Navy’s cruisers, helping mitigate the effect of cruisers leaving the fleet.
The USS Pinckney (DDG-91) is the first destroyer to be upgraded through the MOD 2.0 program and the first surface combatant to receive the SEWIP Block III upgrade. After sea trials and a possible deployment, the Pinckney will return for the SPY-6 upgrade.41 Not all upgraded ships will follow a similar path through the program. The next three destroyers to be upgraded will be the James E. Williams (DDG-95), Chung Hoon (DDG-93), and Halsey (DDG-97).
Reloading At Sea
Reloading vertical launch cells at sea has long been deemed technically infeasible. Key challenges include keeping the warship and the logistics ship highly stable while a long munition canister is precisely aligned with the launch cell into which it will be dropped. Even moderate sea states can render this delicate maneuver untenable. But the capability may be coming to the fleet soon, after a series of experiments. The Navy made important strides in testing and refining the capability, and service leaders now believe at-sea reloading will become operational within the next several years.
The capability has been dubbed transferrable rearming mechanism (TRAM) and is being spearheaded by Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC), Port Hueneme Division. Additional testing is planned for summer 2024.42 This is an important priority for Secretary Del Toro, who stated that it will be operational within “three years or less.”43 In December 2023, CNO Franchetti visited NSWC Port Hueneme to observe a demonstration of TRAM.
An at-sea reloading capability would be a significant force multiplier for the Navy. High-end warfighting is likely to feature large expenditures of munitions, which would cause warships to leave the theater of operations to reload. But, Del Toro argues, “if we are able to rearm our warships’ vertical launch tubes at sea, we can stay in the fight far longer. We won’t have to withdraw from combat for extended periods to rearm. . . . The potential operational and strategic implications of this capability are enormous.”44
Allies, Allies, Allies
One formidable advantage the U.S. Navy possesses over the PLAN is the ability to draw on the full spectrum of allied and partner naval assets deployed across the Pacific. Japan, South Korea, Australia, and recently the Philippines are all engaged in boosting their naval shipbuilding levels or acquiring ships and weapon systems from the United States or other Pacific allies. Often referred to as an unmatched network of allies and partners, this is a powerful force enhancement that helps offset, to some degree, PLAN numerical superiority. “Each exercise and operation demonstrates that we are committed to working together to increase our interoperability and strengthen deterrence across the region,” CNO Franchetti said during a November tour of the region.45
Importantly, the United States has been steadily working to bring South Korea and Japan together for additional naval exercises and cooperation, even without the U.S. Navy present. This development might occur within the next year or so. Experts are touting the significance of the newly forged United States, Korea, and Japan defense cooperation agreement codified in Washington last August. The trilateral agreement expands military exercises and cooperation on missile defense and shores up defense supply chains.46 In addition, Japan has signed a $2.3 billion deal to procure 400 Tomahawk cruise missiles from the United States, which will significantly expand the offensive striking power of the JMSDF.47
The new emphasis on the Pacific is not limited just to Asian allies. NATO’s navies are also deploying, or planning to deploy, naval forces to the Indo-Pacific in the coming years. “The link between Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security is not either/or, but both/and,” said the United Kingdom’s naval attaché to the United States, Commodore Roger Readwin.48
To that end, NATO navies, such as those from the U.K., Italy, and even Norway are planning to deploy naval assets to the Indo-Pacific region in coming years to demonstrate both alliance resolve and the importance of ensuring security in the Pacific region. The Royal Navy plans to begin regular patrols of its Astute-class nuclear-powered submarines from Australia beginning in 2026, and another carrier strike group will deploy to the region in 2025. HMS Queen Elizabeth deployed to the western Pacific in 2021.49 Significantly, Italy is planning to deploy its Cavour carrier to the Rim of the Pacific exercise this year. The Cavour’s airwing includes F-35B aircraft, which are compatible with U.S. Navy aircraft.50
Navy leaders are fully aware of the challenges ahead and are attempting to move the service onto a more aggressive operational footing. As Admiral Franchetti makes crystal clear in her Warfighting Priorities, the entire Navy “must think, act, and operate differently, leveraging wargaming and experimentation to integrate conventional capability with hybrid, unmanned, and disruptive technologies.”51
1. U.S. Navy, “CNO Relinquishment of Office Remarks,” navy.mil, 14 August 2023.
2. Hon. Carlos Del Toro, remarks delivered at Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 26 September 2023.
3. ADM John Aquilino, USN, comments on a panel at Reagan Defense Forum, 6 December 2023.
4. Megan Eckstein, “Navy Brings Unmanned Vehicles to Japan to Bolster Fleet Integration,” Defense News, 21 September 2023.
5. U.S. Third Fleet, “Integrated Battle Problem 23.2 Concludes as Unmanned Vessels Return to Homeport,” press release, 16 January 2024.
6. Joseph Trevthick, “Navy Ghost Fleet Drone Ship Is Being Auctioned Off,” The Drive, 3 January 2024.
7. Rich Abbot, “Austal USA Launches Fourth Overlord USV,” Defense Daily, 11 January 2024.
8. “Task Force LCS Focuses on Stability, Reliability and Sustainability: An Interview with RADM Ted LeClair, Director of Task Force LCS,” Surface Sitrep, Fall 2023.
9. Gidget Fuentes, “Navy Keeps Expanding LCS Missions Even as Both Classes Shrink,” USNI News, 8 November 2023.
10. “Two U.S. Navy Carriers Join Japan Destroyer on Multi-Large Deck Event in Philippine Sea,” Carl Vinson Carrier Strike Group and Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group Public Affairs, 7 November 2023.
11. Dzirhan Mahadzir, “USS Carl Vinson Underway with Japanese, South Korean Warships for Deterrence Patrol,” USNI News, 27 November 2023.
12. Rene Acosta, “U.S., Philippines Kick off Largest-ever Balikatan Exercise as Defense, Foreign Affairs Leaders Meet in Washington,” USNI News, 11 April 2023.
13. PO3 Kendra Helmbrecht, USN, “Makin Island ARG Conducts Balikatan with the Armed Forces of the Philippines,” Pacific Fleet Public Affairs, 28 April 2023.
14. David Vergun, “U.S. Marines, Navy Join Forces in Novel Ways During Australia Exercise,” DoD News, 1 August 2023.
15. Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, “Naval Surface Force Establishes Surface Readiness Group in San Diego,” 14 December 2023.
16. VADM Roy Kitchener, USN, “Organizing to Fight and Win at Sea: The Surface Force Imperative,” CIMSEC, 29 November 2022.
17. Megan Eckstein, “U.S. Navy Considers Cold War–era Squadrons to Boost Readiness,” Navy Times, 9 January 2023.
18. Naval Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center (SMWDC), “SMWDC Hosts Industry Partners for Inaugural SURFRG Outbrief,” 13 September 2023.
19. Dmitry Filipoff, “RDML Wilson on Sharpening the Surface Force,” CIMSEC, 8 January 2024.
20. Navy Press Office, “SECNAV Delivers Remarks at NRL 100th Anniversary Ceremony,” 28 September 2023.
21. Noah Robertson, “Replicator: An Inside Look at the Pentagon’s Ambitious Drone Program,” Defense News, 19 December 2023.
22. Megan Eckstein, “Del Toro Says Disruptive Capabilities Office to Solve Navy Challenges,” Navy Times, 28 September 2023.
23. Eckstein, “Del Toro says Disruptive Capabilities Office to Solve Navy Challenges.”
24. “Charter Establishment of Department of Defense Federal Advisory Committees–Department of the Navy Science and Technology Board,” Federal Register, 17 July 2023.
25. Megan Eckstein, “Navy Launches Board to Help Services Leverage New Science and Tech,” Navy Times, 21 September 2023.
26. Sam LaGrone, “25,000 Sailors, Marines to Prepare for Global Conflict in Large Scale Exercise 2023,” USNI News, 24 July 2023.
27. Diana Stancy Correll, “Navy, Marine Corps Test Warfighting Concepts,” Navy Times, 15 September 2023.
28. Correll, “Navy, Marine Corps Test Warfighting Concepts.”
29. Dmitry Filipoff, “Simulating Global Naval Warfare: Capt. Chris Narducci on Large Scale Exercise 2023,” CIMSEC, 31 October 2023.
30. Correll, “Navy, Marine Corps Test Warfighting Concepts.”
31. Filipoff, “Simulating Global Naval Warfare.”
32. Megan Eckstein, “Navy Seeks to Offer Virtual Training to More of the Fleet,” Navy Times, 25 August 2023.
33. Megan Eckstein, “U.S. Navy, Marines Push to Make Virtual Training More Real,” Defense News, 13 April 2023.
34. Allyson Park, “I/ITSEC NEWS: Live, Virtual, Constructive Called the Future of Navy Training,” National Defense Magazine, 29 November 2023.
35. Eckstein, “Navy Seeks to Offer Virtual Training to More of the Fleet.”
36. Eckstein, “Navy Seeks to Offer Virtual Training to More of the Fleet.”
37. Brandi Vincent, “Navy Exploring New Concept to ‘Replicate Ashore Training Range Capabilities Afloat’,” Defense Scoop, 3 April 2023.
38. Sam LaGrone, “Navy Destroyer Modernization Program Could Cost $17B, Take Up to 2 Years Per Hull,” USNI News, 31 January 2023.
39. Stew Magnuson, “SNA NEWS: New Navy Office Charts Path to Rapidly Upgrade Destroyers,” National Defense Magazine, 10 January 2024.
40. Daniel P. Taylor, “Lockheed Seeks to Field Aegis Combat System Capabilities Faster Through Baseline 10,” Seapower Magazine, 4 April 2022.
41. Megan Eckstein, “Northrop Grumman Makes Play to Add Power, Space on DDGs for Weapons,” Navy Times, 24 January 2023.
42. Brett Davis, “Navy Must Innovate to Meet Its Challenges, Del Toro Says,” Seapower Magazine, 10 January 2024.
43. John Grady, “SECNAV Del Toro: Navy Ready to ‘Respond with Conviction’ to Red Sea Threats,” USNI News, 11 January 2024.
44. Navy Press Office, “SECNAV Delivers Remarks at Surface Navy Association Symposium,” 12 January 2023.
45. Dzirhan Mahadzir, “CNO Franchetti: Indo-Pacific Still U.S. Top Priority,” USNI News, 24 November 2023.
46. Bryant Harris and Noah Robertson, “Biden Brokers New Defense Commitments Between Japan, South Korea,” Defense News, 18 August 2023.
47. “Japan Inks Deal to Buy 400 Long Range Missiles from U.S.,” The Japan Times, 18 January 2024.
48. Author’s notes, Surface Navy Association Symposium, 9 January 2024.
49. Speech by U.K. Indo-Pacific Minister, Anne-Marie Trevelyan, 8 December 2023; and Kate Tringham, “U.K. Carrier Strike Group to Visit Japan in 2025,” Jane’s, 13 December 2023.
50. Author’s notes, Surface Navy Association Symposium, 9 January 2024.
51. ADM Lisa Franchetti, USN, CNO Warfighting Priorities, 10 January 2024.
