The analytical foundation of Marine Corps force modernization is its focused campaign of learning, which has grown more sophisticated each year since 2019. It employs experimentation across echelons informed by increasingly advanced studies and analysis. It has led to decisions that directly affect acquisitions, driving an urgent fielding of prototypes and full-fledged programs. Marine Corps professionals at Program Executive Office Land Systems (PEO LS) and Marine Corps Systems Command (MCSC) play a pivotal role in leading the acquisition phases of ground and information technology acquisitions and sustainment. Inspired by the Force Design framework, they, too, have embraced a campaign of learning to increase acquisition velocity.
The ordinarily risk-averse and cautious acquisition approach measures success from the acquisition institution’s perspective—milestones achieved and checklists and documents completed—so as to field a near-perfect system. However responsible, it is predictably slow, putting risk on the warfighters’ shoulders as they await fully scaled and supported solutions. But we have learned that it is often safe to operate in “battle override” mode. This enables program managers and their teams to choose appropriate cases in which to remove the standard procedural speed governors that limit it.
“Battle override” challenges traditional approaches and expedites capability acquisition, allowing more rapid delivery of minimum viable capabilities and reducing short-term risks to warfighters. It also helps keep pace with rapidly emerging technologies and changing threat assessments and can shorten the path from prototype to production.
The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL) has been experimenting and prototyping to quickly evaluate cutting-edge science and technology solutions (S&T) to warfighting capability gaps. But these technology advances often do not quickly progress into programs of record that become fielded capabilities. No single organization within the Marine Corps is fully accountable for crossing the technology transition seam sometimes called the “valley of death.”
Despite some success stories, historically there have been far too many prototyping and experimental bridges to nowhere, which often delay capability deployment. To accelerate improvement, in 2017 the Marine Corps created the Rapid Capabilities Office within MCWL. This resulted in the service’s acquisition enterprise developing a “fusion framework” led by the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration (DC, CD&I).
This framework enables the iterative, fully informed development of advanced technology to accelerate the delivery of critical and disruptive capabilities. It will be task-organized to achieve service-level unity regarding which efforts move from innovation to technology development and eventually to programs of record. Teams from across the defense acquisition system—including MCWL; the Office of Naval Research; DC, CD&I; MCSC; PEO LS; and the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity—staff a permanent fusion cell within the framework.
The framework and cell span all classification levels. The cross-functional fusion cell staff are identifying gaps uncovered by fleet observations, feedback, and intelligence information while assessing technologies to fill these gaps. These assessments go beyond traditional technology readiness level assessments and include investment, adoption, and acquisition readiness levels, culminating in a transition decision point. If a transition is viable, the fusion cell staff will begin to conduct an analysis of alternatives, resulting in a recommended transition concept. A high-level, cross-functional targeting board then can recommend one of three courses of action: Continue as an S&T effort, transfer to an existing program office for integration, or send back for further innovation and technology sourcing. If the project transitions to an existing program office, it becomes an executable program-office-led transition plan.
This process allows program managers to import advanced technology more easily into their programs of record or prototyping efforts while allowing S&T practitioners to build bridges that will connect prototypes to production. The inclusion of intelligence and acquisition representatives keeps technology solutions threat-informed and better aligned with planned product improvements in programs of record.
Implementing the framework successfully means that not every experimental or advanced technology prototype will transition to a program. Transition plans completed early enough to influence program-of-record requirements and program objective management requests will have the best chance for success.
The temptation to focus too much on test and evaluation at the expense of scale and capacity must be avoided, however. Fielding technology matters—program managers and PEOs must be afforded sufficient bandwidth and focus to identify the prototypes that have the best chance to scale to production. Accelerating experimentation for its own sake risks widening the valley of death. Considering exquisite technology without a pull into production will only lead to what Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment William A. LaPlante calls a “cul-de-sac on the road to fielding for the high-end fight.”
A different conceptual approach may help achieve that balance. Over the past two years, PEO LS has worked closely with its requirements and resourcing team to manage its discrete combat system–related programs as a “capability portfolio.” Although the Marine Corps does not have a formal integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) program, it does have several programs of record that—combined with Navy and joint programs—contribute directly to service-level and joint IAMD. These programs include Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar (G/ATOR), common aviation command-and-control systems (CAC2s), composite tracking network (CTN), and the suite of ground-based air-defense systems (L-MADIS, MADIS, MRIC) spurred by Force Design initiatives. Three different program offices manage these programs.
The IAMD cross-functional team, spearheaded by PEO LS (under the guidance of the Deputy Commandants for Aviation and CDI), manages an overarching capability road map it developed to track integration maturity across the program offices. This road map aligns with the Navy’s and joint IAMD road maps.
This capability portfolio approach employs gap analysis and adjusts programs to optimize capability and schedule. Program objective management funding initiatives have been filed under the portfolio-level heading “Naval Integrated Fire Control” to ensure delivery of complete warfighting capabilities. But approved funding is allocated to each individual program. A next step in this approach might be to create a portfolio budget profile, consolidating the PEs and budget items at the capability level. This would broaden research and testing efforts and procurement spending plans to increase flexibility as threats and operational needs evolve.
To build on these efforts, the Department of the Navy has assigned PEO LS and two other PEOs to experiment with a similar capability portfolio approach, as the Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption recommended. The commission’s January 2024 final report selected PEOs to be authorized to develop a set of portfolio strategies, processes, road maps, contracts, infrastructure, and architectures. These will enable programs to speed up acquisitions and capability delivery. PEO Land Systems will be applying lessons from the IAMD portfolio to see how this management model—with broader authorities, portfolio-level requirements documents, and consolidated budget lines—could enable greater agility and reprogramming flexibility.
One lesson stands out: Collaborate with warfighters.
Obtaining frequent warfighter and fleet feedback during all phases of acquisition is essential. As important as it is for program managers and their teams to focus on a requirement, listening closely to fleet feedback—especially during the transition from system development to fielding—to reconcile requirement disconnects is at least as important. Put another way: Requirements are necessary and interesting, but fleet feedback should be fascinating to the acquisition community. Fleet feedback and collaboration must become an intentional part of the acquisition process. An organization cannot learn if it does not listen and respond to warfighter needs with a “yes-if” attitude.
The earlier warfighters can provide user evaluations and the sooner acquisition program managers understand anticipated concepts of operations and employment, the closer we can get to delivering a dominant capability. This is especially important in rapid prototyping and fielding. Program offices, capability integration officers, and advanced technology scouts should continually solicit and respond to fleet feedback. Periodic capability portfolio gatherings with fleet participation can be a useful forum for gathering this user data.
With frequent fleet engagement through warfighter participation in testing, user evaluations, and operations demonstrations, initial fielding should go smoothly. Yet, as more systems with concurrent production get fielded, matériel and other issues will arise that will affect system availability and readiness.
Rapidly equipping the Marine Corps with emerging modernized capabilities—both minimum viable capabilities and full-fledged programs of record—remains the “north star” for its acquisition professionals. This continuous campaign of learning helps move the best possible, enduring, sustainable, and cost-effective capabilities from experimentation to fielding through improved collaboration, agility, and velocity.