The surface warfare community has implemented numerous safety and training changes since the deadly collisions in 2017. It created a tracking system for underway and simulator hours, designed a circadian rhythm instruction for use by the fleet, and increased surface warfare officer (SWO) training at all levels. The Navy also modified the department head career path, but there has been little change at the division officer (DivO) level.
Following the 2017 mishaps, a 2021 Government Accountability Office report identified seven key faults in the surface community, two of which were that the SWO community has the worst retention of Navy communities and that the SWO career path needs to be reassessed. As of 2023, the Navy has taken some steps to correct these faults. There have been changes to the flexibility of career milestones, including allowing SWOs to begin department head training between six and nine years of service instead of the previous standard of seven and a half years. There also is the new option to be a chief engineer for a single, longer tour at the same command instead of two 18-month-long department head tours. The largest changes at the DivO level were shifting projected rotation dates for a first tour to 30 months and adding additional schools for mariner skills training.1
These changes were designed to emphasize bridge watchstanding and improve family planning and professional development—issues SWOs identified in community surveys.2 However, they do not address the problem of too many ensigns on board ships—which dilutes watchstanding experience—nor do they address the faults with a generalist career path in an increasingly complex environment.
At present, all SWO training within the first five years of service includes nine weeks at Basic Division Officer Course (BDOC) and three weeks at Officer of the Deck (OOD) Phase 1 in San Diego or Norfolk before officers report to their first command. After their first tour of 24 to 30 months, SWOs attend OOD Phase 2 for three weeks in Newport, Norfolk, or San Diego, and then attend Advanced Division Officer Course (ADOC) for five weeks in Newport. OOD Phase 1 and 2 were part of the reforms following the 2017 collisions to increase shiphandling and mariner skills. In total, that is 20 weeks—approximately five months—of formal training early in an officer’s professional career.
There are two faults with this method: the decentralization of training and the disjointed training schedule. The Navy should revamp the DivO training pipeline to centralize training and implement single period of longer schooling and specialization in the second DivO tour.
Centralized Training
Consolidating all DivO pipeline courses at a central location, ideally Newport, Rhode Island, would provide greater instructional oversight. Training is a core component of any military organization and serves as a cultural unifier, baselines all personnel, and is imperative for leader development.3 Today, Surface Warfare Schools Command (SWSC) disseminates curriculum and lessons to various schoolhouses staffed by predominantly post–second tour DivOs. Consolidating at one location would allow direct oversight and permit dynamic, modified curricula if a deficiency is found—similar to the style of instruction at the Aegis Training and Readiness Center. In an increasingly complex military environment, and especially as new platforms and capabilities are introduced to the fleet, this flexibility is crucial.
Instructors should be subject-matter experts in the curriculum, such as experienced senior enlisted members, limited duty officers, warrant officers, warfare tactics instructors, and professional mariners, with positions also available for civilians and retirees. Most of the instructors at the Aegis Training and Readiness Center and some instructors at OOD Phase 1 and 2 meet these criteria already, and those schools are better for it.4 Instructors would not only teach, but also advise curriculum changes based on fleet needs and updates to tactics, techniques, procedures, and technical manuals. An annual or semiannual community survey of department heads, executive officers, and commanding officers could identify knowledge gaps among new ensigns, allowing dynamic curriculum changes in response to fleet needs. Flexibility like this does not exist when instructors are at a school for only two to three years, have only a few years of experience, and are spread across several locations.
The largest hindrance to centralizing training would be establishing the infrastructure to support it. SWSC is headquartered in Newport and currently supports SWO training at all levels. Depending on the available space in the building, it may be necessary to expand to another building in Newport or renovate the existing structure to support an influx of new ensigns.
The other hurdle would be funding travel to and from Newport and local housing for new accessions. The fiscal year (FY) 2023 standard per diem rate is $157 per day. Using the FY2023 basic housing allowance (BAH) rates for Newport—$2,808 for an ensign with dependents—these two rates would equalize at about 18 days after a permanent change of station (PCS) to Newport for a month, a little under twice the cost of sending officers temporarily. In addition, an influx of new renters likely would drive up the cost of living in the area, which would have some effect on these calculations. The net cost increase would be $8,100 to $9,200 per officer for an 8–12 month school for those going to duty stations stateside except for San Diego. Those going to San Diego would reduce new accession costs $2,400 to $6,400 for an 8–12 month school.5
An Extended Training Pipeline
A single, longer new accession school for all SWOs also would improve the junior officer training pipeline. The curriculum could incorporate all the current SWSC schools and expand them to focus on depth of knowledge. DivOs would receive in-depth training on maritime warfare, the training cycle, navigation, engineering programs, etc. There are schools to which commands can send DivOs, such as 3M University, but depending on where a ship is in its certification and deployment schedule, those schools might need to be delayed or the ship might be unable to send its DivOs. An extended training pipeline would bring DivOs up to speed without the distraction of duty, managing a division, watchbills, training events, or certifications.
The surface navy’s push for on-the-job-training creates a phenomenon in which not all SWO pins are created equal. Two DivOs from the same ship, holding adjacent billets, might have different levels of knowledge if they attended different BDOCs and OOD Phase 2s and a leadership turnover occurred at some point. Looking at those individuals on paper, it might appear that, pending differences in advanced qualifications, they would have the same knowledge of shipboard operations for their ship’s class. However, this is almost never the case.6 It may not be the fault of the officers either, as it could be because of the shipboard training program, favoritism, mentorship, and other factors beyond their control.
The current SWCS curriculum is designed to present a wavetop overview of the numerous warfare areas and day-to-day events on a ship and to complete many of the personnel qualification standards level 100s and 200s required for the SWO pin. The SWO job is inherently complicated and nuanced, but extending the training pipeline would allow more material to be covered and reinforcement techniques such as homework, practicals, and spiral reviews to be employed. Having subject-matter experts conduct training would allow students to dive further into subjects with someone to answer their questions.
The school would use quarters or trimesters with a block education system to allow a rolling enrollment to maximize the number of students. A 4x4 block system would have four 90-minute blocks totaling six hours of classwork. Assuming an hour for lunch and another one-hour block for optional or remedial study, this would result in a standard eight-hour workday.
Block scheduling is an effective model for improving information retention and complex thought, and it allows subjects to be taught at a deeper level.7 The program could be designed to fulfill U.S. Coast Guard requirements for deck officer third mate and engineering third assistant engineer merchant mariner credentials, teach maritime warfare, shipboard engineering programs, and division and Navy administrative programs.
Some students likely would be unable to complete the course of instruction. Light attrition would deal with the Government Accountability Office–identified problem of too many ensigns, too little watchstanding. There would be some filter to prevent 20 first-tour junior officers from filling out a four-section bridge watchbill, as is common across the fleet.8 This also would introduce a filter to spread designated high performers and low performers across the fleet, minimizing the chances there would be too many of one or the other at the same command. Such a change could improve professional pride within the community, increasing retention and reducing the Navy’s need to overcommision SWOs to meet department head quotas.
Specializing as a Second Tour DivO
The U.S. Navy stands out among other navies as the only one with strict generalization at all ranks.9 Platform or billet career specialization should occur after the first DivO tour, and changes should be made to go/no-go assessments. The second tour DivO slating system at the Bureau of Naval Personnel (BuPers) would remain in place; however, follow-on sea and shore billets would be based on the job filled during a SWO’s second tour. Engineering, combat, and operations would be the three main tracks, which would be further divided into engineering (based on plant type), combat systems (based on the suite), and operations (for deck and navigation).
Some watch stations would be restricted to specific tracks because of required schooling. Engineers would principally stand engineering officer of the watch, combat systems officers would stand watch in combat, and operations officers would stand watch on the bridge, allowing DivOs to hone their skills and become true experts. There would be no hard restrictions to prevent cross-rate watchstanding; that would be at the discretion of the commanding officer.
Some changes from BuPers requiring tactical action officer and engineering officer of the watch as milestones would be necessary, but those could be changed to match in-track qualifications. Some second-tour billets receive advanced schooling, so the only pipeline change in those tours would be removing ADOC and OOD Phase 2. Removing these schools would give second-tour DivOs greater flexibility to attend more schooling as determined by the gaining command or BuPers. Billet-based training already occurs between tours, so this change would be subtle apart from removing ADOC and OOD Phase 2.
A post–first DivO tour go/no-go assessment was introduced with OOD Phase 2. Because this plan would remove OOD Phase 2 and ADOC, the assessment and competency checks would have to be modified. There would be navigation, tactical, and program assessments required for first-tour DivOs held at the type-commander level, and if the officer passed, he or she would then be eligible for the SWO pin. It would create a standardized level of knowledge across the fleet, as the SWO pin assessment would make clear what information and skills are required to earn it. For a DivO to be eligible for the assessment, the commanding officer would have to endorse the application. The process would be similar to the command qualification exam currently conducted for SWOs at the department head level.10 Once an a DivO passes, he or she could advance to their next billet.
The dynamism and the desire to lead sailors causes some officers to choose surface warfare over other communities that require more schooling before entering the fleet. The Navy, however, is doing a disservice to its sailors and its DivOs by undertraining SWOs before they report to their first commands. The Bureau of Naval Personnel already has implemented changes at the department head level, but changes also must be implemented at the DivO level to improve the way the Navy trains its junior officers to lead, sail, and fight.
1. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Navy Readiness: Actions Needed to Evaluate and Improve Surface Warfare Officer Career Path, 17 June 2021.
2. GAO, Navy Readiness Actions; and LT Judith H. Cho, USN, “The State of the Warfighter Mentality in the Surface Warfare Officer Community” (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, March 2022).
3. Jim Greer, “Training: The Foundation for Success in Combat,” The Heritage Foundation, 4 October 2018.
4. Geoff Ziezulewicz and Diana S. Correll, “Surface Warfare Officers Cautiously Optimistic about Changes Since Fitz and McCain Disasters,” Navy Times, 17 June 2022.
5. GAO, DoD Needs More Complete and Consistent Data to Assess the Costs and Policies of Relocating Personnel, 9 September 2015. Calculated using ultimate duty station BAH plus the cost of a new accession PCS plus the cost of standard per diem rate compared to the cost of Newport, RI, BAH plus new accession PCS and operational rotation PCS costs from the 2014 GAO report.
6. GAO, Navy Readiness Actions, and Cho, “The State of the Warfighter Mentality.”
7. Ellen H. Reames and Carol Bradshar, “Block Scheduling Effectiveness: A 10-year Longitudinal Study of One Georgia School System’s Test Score Indicators,” Georgia Educational Researcher 7, no. 1 (2009): 19.
8. GAO, Navy Readiness Actions.
9. GAO, Navy Readiness Actions.
10. Commander, Naval Surface Forces, Surface Warfare Officer Career Manual (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 16 December 2019); and Bill Golden, “Get Real, Get Better: Revamping Surface Warfare Officer Qualification,” CIMSEC, 25 Oct. 2022.