Since July 2019, the Marine Corps has undertaken what is arguably the most rapid and large-scale transformation and modernization effort in its history. Reembracing its naval roots, the Marine Corps has refocused itself as an afloat global crisis response force, reinforcing its ability, with the Navy, to be forward postured to respond to crises, to stand with allies and partners facing emerging threats during competition, and to seize and defend key maritime terrain during conflict.
This is not the first time the Marine Corps has been challenged coming out of a counterinsurgency and returning to its mission as “soldiers from the sea.” After World War I, the service focused mainly on small wars and counterinsurgency. Leading up to World War II, the Marine Corps practiced to become the world’s preeminent amphibious fighting force. After that war, it again become a second land army in Korea and Vietnam.
Today, the Marine Corps again finds itself transforming to refocus on its naval mission. Critics of the modernization initiative known as Force Design 2030 assert it has significantly damaged the service’s ability to execute its responsibilities under Title 10 and as a crisis response force. They blame, in part, the divestments made to ground, air, and logistics capabilities.
Their assertions could not be further from the truth. Force Design advances proven concepts necessitated by the Marine Corps’ refocus on the maritime domain, the emergence of cyber and space domains, and the fact that all domains are now contested in new ways.
Watching Pacing Threats
Understanding where the Marine Corps is today requires looking to the interwar period and the ideas of Lieutenant Colonel Earl Hancock “Pete” Ellis in the 1920s and 30s. General John A. Lejeune, 13th Commandant of the Marine Corps, referred to Ellis as an “amphibious warfare prophet.” Many Marines today would say the same. In 21st Century Ellis: Operational Art and Strategic Prophecy for the Modern Era (Naval Institute Press, 2015) editor and Marine B. A. Friedman writes:
The beginnings of a forward deployed Marine Corps can be directly traced to Ellis’ study Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia, approved as a “war plan” by General Lejeune in 1921 and the blueprint the U. S. Navy and Marine Corps used to fight Imperial Japan in World War II. In it, Ellis accurately predicted not only war with Japan but also how the United States would win, including the need to defeat the Japanese Navy, the necessity of establishing bases with which to strike mainland Japan, and the task organizations that the Marine Corps would need to support the Navy.
General David H. Berger, the Commandant since 2019, is addressing a wicked problem in the Indo-Pacific, identified as the United States’ pacing threat in two consecutive National Defense Strategies authored by two different presidential administrations. He is no radical, intending to tear down the Marine Corps. He is a career infantryman who served much of his time in and around the Pacific. Contrary to what critics assert, General Berger developed a deep understanding of and appreciation for the strengths and abilities of the Marine Corps, gained from a front row seat to changes in the western Pacific for much of his career.
His pedigree as a keen observer of Marine infantry organization and operations and a practitioner of both led him as Commandant to seek a rapid assessment to identify organizational gaps and seams in light of today’s peer threats. Reinforcing what two previous Commandants outlined—in Marine Corps Operating Concept (General James E. Amos) and Expeditionary Force 21 (General Robert B. Neller)—the assessment team recognized that the service was not organized, trained, equipped, or postured to compete with threats that were rapidly advancing in all domains with expansive development and employment of technologies such as drones, long-range precision fires, and communication networks.
In July 2019, General Berger released the Commandant’s Planning Guidance, which charted an ambitious course, directing the service to modernize its capabilities to face peer competitors today and tomorrow. These efforts maintain many of the service’s historical capabilities while recognizing that the character of war has changed and the Marine Corps must adapt, as it always has. The result is a Marine Corps still organized around the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) construct, but with some specialized forces aimed at the unique challenges posed by China in the western Pacific. Lieutenant Colonel Ellis did much the same in his time—recognizing how the world and war had changed and proposing ways for the Marine Corps to build on its strengths to adapt to the changes.
Innovation Is the Heart of the Corps
Since 1775, innovation has been at the forefront of all the Marine Corps does. The modernization process the Marine Corps is undergoing echoes Ellis’s approach and thinking. Through a cycle of experiment, evaluate, and experiment again, the Marine Corps’ transition over the past three years has made it the most modular it has ever been, while remaining fundamentally connected to ideas within Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia throughout. The future operating environment will place heavy demands on the Sea Services that will require flexible and tailorable options across competition, crisis, and conflict. The concept for stand-in forces rests on employing naval expeditionary forces in the littorals. Marines will remain “first to fight”; nothing changes with “standing in.”
It is a misconception that the entire Marine Corps is changing to serve as an Indo-Pacific stand-in force; two large MAGTFs—I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) and II MEF—can surge or respond to crises when called on. These MAGTFs are adapting to changes in the operating environment to become more lethal, expeditionary, and interoperable with the joint force as they integrate new all-domain technologies. They will continue to deploy and stand shoulder to shoulder with allies and partners and reassure them of a shared commitment to common interests. To do this well is hard—Marines must have a persistent presence on the soil of their compatriots.
A Concept for Stand-in Forces, released in 2021, nests within the joint warfighting concept and is based on operational concepts familiar to the Marine Corps throughout its history. Stand-in forces will be positioned forward-—within range of an adversary’s long-range weapon systems—while working with and through allies and partners. Properly resourced, these forces will thrive with limited to no local infrastructure and will provide a persistent layer of integrated deterrence for the rest of the joint force.
At the same time, and without discounting the value of the Army and Air Force, maritime mobility is critical to all things in the Pacific; it is not a core competency for either of those services. Special operations forces and submarines will be key to conducting stand-in operations and are essential components of day-to-day deterrence in the Pacific.
Within III MEF is 3d Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR), which was activated in 2022 and is the first of three planned MLRs that will compose much of III MEF’s integrated stand-in forces. Purpose-built and optimized to conduct and support sea-denial and sea-control operations, the MLR comprises roughly 2,000 Marines in infantry, fires, antiair, and logistics units. The formation is designed to be tailorable, scalable, and deployed within the MAGTF construct. Units of action will evolve based on the iterative deployment and continuous experimentation of 3d MLR.
Disrupt, Improvise, Overcome
The MLR will exploit positional advantage to disrupt adversaries through maritime reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance, “own” targets, and seize and defend key maritime terrain through maneuver and persistence. It will support maritime domain awareness, coordinate air and missile defense, and engage enemy maritime targets as part of stand-in operations. Persistently forward even in peacetime, MLRs enhance situational awareness, maintain regional relationships, and set conditions in case of crisis or conflict, including the ability to help introduce larger crisis response forces, such as MEUs, and otherwise complement and enable naval, joint, and combined forces. It cannot be overstated: Operating forward deters coercive behavior and conventional aggression. Forward-deployed naval expeditionary forces build trust and interoperability with maritime allies and partners. The United States and those partners cannot contest malign activities without being present, regardless of access to permanent bases.
Light, expeditionary, and low-signature, MLRs are ideally suited for littoral and expeditionary advanced base operations. Friedman writes that, in “The Advanced Base Force”:
Ellis . . . sketches a general outline of how the Marine Corps should be organized to support the Navy. Of particular interest is a paragraph in which he discusses a “collection of small units” with “no larger units except for temporary command purposes.” Here in nascent form, is the DNA of the modern Marine Corps.
It is the DNA of the MLRs, too. Each will have complementary capabilities that will be synchronized as the other two come online and experiments and assessments continue. Unique to the Marine littoral regiment, compared with other Marine units, is its capable regimental headquarters, intended to develop common air, intelligence, and operational pictures, helping joint and combined forces support and close kill webs. Though presently tailored for the Indo-Pacific, MLRs could eventually be deployed globally.
The 3d MLR at present comprises three subordinate elements:
Littoral Combat Team (LCT). The LCT’s three infantry companies and engineer platoon will seize, control, retain, and protect key terrain. Its medium missile battery employs the Navy/Marine Corps Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System, supporting antisurface warfare with organic, naval, and joint sensors.
Littoral Anti-Air Battalion (LAAB). The LAAB conducts antiair warfare and enables the integration of aviation assets and operations with organic and joint fires. LAAB’s air-control battery provides airspace surveillance, direction, control, intercept, and coordination of antiair and antisurface fires. The battery allows the joint and naval force to gain and maintain custody of littoral targets to support sea-denial operations. The ground-based air-defense battery, using the Marine Air Defense Integrated System, allows for short-range air defense and can counter unmanned aircraft systems.
Littoral Logistics Battalion (LLB). The LLB provides tactical logistics, explosive ordnance disposal, ground equipment maintenance, and medical support to the LCT. The headquarters and general support company provides logistics support and command and control. The combat logistics companies transport supplies and equipment on land and from sea-based connectors. The LLB’s critical operations include resupplying expeditionary advanced bases, management of cache sites, and connecting to higher-level logistics providers and contracted support for the entire LCT.
Stand-in forces’ mobility relies largely on Navy ships and boats, which allow for persistent force presence in crisis and competition and can move large amounts of combat power and logistics in a relatively short period. Today’s amphibious ship and connector fleet is not sized to meet the requirements and demands of the naval expeditionary force—more specifically, the needs of the MLR. Medium landing ships (LSMs) will provide large-capacity shore-to-shore connectors when brought online over the coming years, but a bridging solution to LSM is needed today. As part of development, the Marine Corps is experimenting with the stern landing vessel to create tactics, techniques, and procedures for shore-to-shore connector usage. The littoral maneuver bridging solution for LSM comprises already-fielded platforms such as the expeditionary fast transport and landing craft utility—as well as chartered vessels such as the off-shore support vessel—until LSM is procured in appreciable numbers. To employ naval expeditionary stand-in forces around the globe, ships from which to protect, project, and sustain combat power forward are of vital importance.
Future MAGTF logistics around the world will be further supported by the Global Positioning Network (a new prepositioning concept) and Navy and contracted shipping as well as Marine Corps air support. Wargaming, experimentation, and analysis are ongoing and will help inform future changes in the design of the MLR. Maritime mobility, industry relationships, and advanced technological development will be critical to achieving not just the MLR, but all the service’s modernization goals—just as they have been for generations.
First to Fight
Perhaps lost in the debate over Force Design and its validity, is the individual Marine. The infantry remains the foundation of the Marine Corps, and every Marine will be a rifleman first and foremost—always. How we make Marines and officers will not change. The men and women of the Marine Corps remain the center of gravity, grounded in an ethos and culture summed up by three key words: honor, courage, and commitment. The new concepts and formations coupled with more and better tools have not weakened the Marine Corps. They have made it more lethal. Ultimately, Marines will still locate, close with, and destroy the enemy.
There is no doubt that today’s force modernization requires bold steps to modernize how the Marine Corps organizes, trains, equips, and postures its forces against not just the pacing threat in the Pacific, but any threat wishing to do the nation and its allies and partners harm. Force Design 2030 is a bold course correction, perhaps the boldest in Marine Corps’ history, but the service is known for this kind of audacity.
In his seminal book First to Fight (Naval Institute Press, 1999), retired Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak writes:
The Corps’ healthy and useful survival is dependent, as it was yesterday and will be tomorrow, on its being unfettered intellectually and professionally. The Corps must remain on the cutting edge of technology that will keep its specialty effective. This condition, is, in turn, dependent on there being a niche in the modern U.S. military system that allows an original, independent, and fiercely proud Corps to test new worlds on its own, in the nation’s interest.
He continues:
It makes a powerful statement of a truth the Corps must never, never forget—that their future, as has their past, lies with the Navy.
Like Lieutenant Colonel Ellis, General Berger and other key leaders of today’s Marine Corps have looked for solutions to the difficult problems where answers are hard to find, and they have realigned the Marine Corps with its natural partner, the Navy. The Navy and Marine Corps blue-green team will continue to serve as the nation’s preeminent expeditionary crisis response force and as the force of choice to meet emerging regional threats across the globe. History will judge Force Design as a concept ahead of its time but firmly rooted in its past.
