In August 2021 in Afghanistan, the Marine Corps was tasked with the largest noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) in history. This NEO was combined with the tactical withdrawal of troops and brought refuge to more than 123,000 evacuees. News highlights instantly drew comparisons with the withdrawal from Saigon in 1975 and Operation Gothic Serpent from Mogadishu in 1991. While the Afghanistan withdrawal presented a unique challenge because of myriad issues at the operational and strategic levels, the tactical mission was similar to both missions. While all lessons from these three NEOs have been well documented, no comprehensive Marine Corps doctrine has been created to deal with issues at the tactical level.
Marine Corps leaders have long been tasked with exploring and developing doctrine and have been successful in applying those principles to warfare. Military operations other than war (MOOTW), however, have frequently taken a backseat to new warfighting doctrines, such as the most recent ones for expeditionary advanced base operations or stand-in forces. While these warfighting concepts should remain the focus, other-than-war operations are highly probable. The joint force addresses these through numerous publications, as these operations require joint tasking with other military and governmental branches. While these publications are useful to leaders at all levels, they fail to address the necessary tactical considerations and principles required of small-unit leaders.
In any conflict, Marines look to the current doctrine relating to the operation. Unfortunately, Joint Publication 3-68: Noncombatant Evacuation Operations provides far too cursory an examination of NEO characteristics and states that “NEOs may vary greatly depending on the situation, threat, and capabilities available.” Likewise, Marine Corps Doctrine Publication (MCDP) 1-0: Operations states that noncombatant “operations are similar to raids in that they involve swift insertion of a force, temporary occupation of objectives, and end with a planned withdrawal.” These characteristics are relevant and helpful but do not provide a common baseline for tactical leaders.
Marines understand the importance of maintaining the proper security posture in any situation but are primarily trained to fight in a three-block-war environment (a term coined by then-Commandant General Charles Krulak in the late 1990s to describe a modern environment in which Marines might have to conduct full-scale military operations, humanitarian operations, and peacekeeping operations in three contiguous city blocks). Yet, while the claim that Marines trained for this can fight in any environment does hold value, the concept is not encompassing enough, especially in the case of the 19 NEOs in which the Marine Corps has participated during the past 46 years.
Recommended NEO Doctrine for Tactical Leaders
Below are seven recommended principles for an evacuation framework, offering just a piece of the much larger needed solution for the doctrine of NEOs. They could be incorporated into Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-01: Offensive and Defensive Operations, which provides a general framework.
1. Determine likely enemy avenues of approach or types of attack. While a NEO mission is inherently friendly focused, security must remain the top priority. When planning initial force employment, identifying capabilities and limitations of the terrain and enemy is crucial. Because of the fluid threat environments, leaders must produce likely courses of action for the enemy and local population, always assuming the populace could turn violent.
2. Identify friendly corridors. Leaders must observe the terrain for which they are responsible and consider the friendly mission partners, including joint forces and the State Department. Considering friendly capabilities and limitations early in this process is a fundamental shift for small-unit leaders. All U.S. embassies are required to maintain emergency action plans and emergency planning handbooks that detail their initial course of action to evacuate a large number of individuals. Request this plan and incorporate it into this step.
3. Determine security posture and position of weapon systems. In all past NEOs, regardless of the threat environment, evacuees experienced desperation and needed a strong force to ensure their safety. Most NEOs do not require lethal force, but preparation for the varying threat levels must happen. For those operations that do require a strong security presence, using defensive principles while keeping in mind the rules of engagement is vital. The identity of quick-reaction force squads or platoons and casualty evacuation teams and the location of key personnel must be known to all. The tactical leader must employ his or her Marines foremost to ensure security and be a symbol of control in the face of chaos.
4. Emplace security and marshaling forces. Task organization of quick-reaction forces, casualty evacuation teams, and administrative requirements must be at the forefront of the tactical leader’s mind when emplacing these forces. Higher and adjacent coordination must be continual to ensure these forces are being used effectively.
5. Plan and integrate cordons. A NEO’s large administrative burden has many nuances not usually found in security missions. Marines on the ground will have the best idea of where the holdups are in the chain after observing designated areas. Require debriefs from all small-unit leaders after the first rotation, with the goal of identifying critical vulnerabilities in security, processing, and procedures. That the small-unit leader understands the entirety of the strategic picture is vital to receiving constructive feedback and improvements. Eliminate chains and redundancies that detract from security.
6. Communicate a common tactical picture. Either through the terrain sketches from overwatch positions, machine gun sector sketches, or by taking the time to “walk the line” as the leader to better understand the situation, a common language for all entities involved in the NEO must be established early. Because of the desperate and short-term nature of NEOs, establishing a common language allows for easier turnover and communication with higher echelons. “Target reference points” and “minimum safe lines” are well known to Marines, but other military forces and civilian agencies will not speak that language. Be concise and use techniques frequently taught in fire-support observation in predeployment training. Medical and logistical support is made possible through this step and will allow for the flow of information from the commander to all troops in the operation.
7. Rehearse. Time on the deck is limited. Rehearse when able. Use situations from prior NEOs to do so before entering the operating area. Ensure predeployment training includes tactical NEO skills and tasks for all forces, regardless of occupational specialty.
These principles will help tactical leaders better prepare for a mission rarely discussed and trained to. In August 2021, Marine Corps General Frank McKenzie, commander of U.S. Central Command at the time, praised the “flexibility and the professionalism” of the Marines and service members on the ground in Afghanistan. While the evacuation of Afghanistan was chaotic, the core concern for tactical leaders was the mission on the ground. Incorporating these principles into an extensive doctrine for evacuation operations will allow leaders to be more capable when the next evacuation occurs.
