Throughout World War II, the South Pacific was of great importance to U.S. forces as they fought to maintain maritime superiority. Should conflict come to the Indo-Pacific today, the Navy will need to establish sea control and denial throughout the area. Amphibious ready groups (ARGs) bring Marine Corps landing forces, as well as capable strike platforms such as the F-35B, as part of the embarked Marine expeditionary units (MEUs). However, ARG/MEUs have no organic airborne platforms capable of providing a sufficient recognized maritime picture (RMP) out to the distances necessary to mitigate risk from surface-to-surface fires or subsurface attacks. MH-60R Seahawks, with capable sensor suites and tactical datalinks, can provide the situational awareness that ARG/MEUs need to conduct amphibious and littoral sea-control operations.
Littoral Space
The Seventh Fleet area of responsibility (AOR) includes large expanses of water, islands, reefs, and archipelagos. ARGs are primarily designed to bring Marine forces ashore, whether by insertion from the air or an amphibious assault. This mission requires the ARG ships transition from open ocean to littoral regions. Currently, aircraft within ARGs lack sufficient capabilities to clear the water space ahead of the assaulting force. Aside from an MH-60S Knighthawk detachment on board an ARG’s amphibious assault ship (LHD or LHA), the remaining aircraft embarked are part of the MEU’s air combat element—a mix of UH-1Y Venoms/AH-1Z Vipers, CH-53 Sea Stallions, and MV-22B Ospreys, none of which possess the sensors, communications suite, or endurance to conduct a true sanitization of the assault lanes and build an RMP.
According to Milan Vego’s “On Littoral Warfare,” the littoral is defined as the “region . . . seaward (the area from the open ocean to the shore that must be controlled to support operations ashore) and landward (the area inland from the shore that can be supported and defended directly from the sea).” Even if ARGs use their organic aircraft to conduct visual intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) in the littorals, there is no tactical datalink on the aforementioned aircraft (except the MH-60S) to push tactical data. This leaves surface ships largely blind to anything that exceeds the ranges of their own sensors. Not only would MH-60Rs resolve this problem, but the platforms also provide additional mission capabilities that would enhance ARG lethality.
In addition to serving as the primary ARG ISR platforms, MH-60Rs would provide organic defensive antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capability with their dipping sonars, active and passive sonobuoys, and radars’ periscope-detection modes. An MH-60R detachment could pounce on an enemy submarine that has penetrated theater defenses or provide ASW screening operations as the ARG transits littoral waters. In addition, with their multimode surface-search radar, MH-60R detachments would be better strike-coordination and reconnaissance platforms for command and control during restricted water transits and maritime interdiction operations, while also providing long-range maritime targeting for any fixed-wing strike platforms embarked. Multimission MH-60R aircraft could significantly increase the battlespace awareness of the amphibious squadron and MEU commanders, yet they still are not regularly deploying assets among these units.
MH-60Rs and Organic Defense
The 2020 triservice maritime strategy, Advantage at Sea, calls for littoral operations in a contested environment, expeditionary advanced base operations, and distributed maritime operations. For ARG/MEUs to execute these missions, they need to organically defend themselves while distributed and detect inbound threats in enough time to formulate a defense with other units. MH-60Rs can provide the detection needed through their active and passive sensors; however, MH-60Rs embarked on destroyers or cruisers are not consistently present with ARGs, nor are these ships frequently assigned directly to amphibious squadron commanders.
In addition to having an LHD/LHA, an ARG has two additional ships that can be either two amphibious transport dock ships (LPDs) or an LPD and a dock landing ship (LSD). None regularly embark MH-60Rs during unit-level training, nor are they equipped with a common datalink antenna to download mission data from an MH-60R embarked on a nearby destroyer or cruiser. The only way ARG ships can ingest tactical data from MH-60Rs is through the Link 16 tactical datalink. While limited, this can still afford enough situational awareness of the surrounding water space for decision-makers on ARG ships.
In 2020, the Makin Island ARG, which consisted of the USS Makin Island (LHD-8), Sommerset (LPD-25), and San Diego (LPD-22), deployed to both Fifth and Seventh Fleet AORs, off the coast of Somalia and in the South China Sea, respectively. What was unique about this deployment was that the Makin Island embarked a two-plane MH-60R detachment. This minor change to the force composition provided the ARG with an organic ASW capability, an airborne maritime ISR platform, and aircraft capable of providing over-the-horizon targeting for strike platforms.
The capability enhancement greatly outweighed the minimal effects on MEU force structure, making room for the two aircraft and additional MH-60R-specific torpedoes and sonobuoys. While in this instance the MH-60Rs were embarked on board the LHD, that is not necessarily the best or only option. Embarking on board the LPD would provide MH-60R crews the ability to directly plan and brief with the ARG sea combatant commander, who is often the LPD commanding officer. Another option could be operating from an attached littoral combat ship, destroyer, or cruiser. This option would be the easiest to execute, as these ships are built and certified to embark Seahawk detachments.
As the Navy’s concepts of operations evolve to fulfill requirements for a peer conflict, the ability to operate disaggregated becomes even more important. The MH-60R has a proven track record for operations in complex operating environments and can draw from its history deploying on board frigates, destroyers, and cruisers. The surface warfare community should consider the best options to equip ARGs with these aircraft. Furthermore, Marine Corps expeditionary force commanders should consider how MH-60Rs could enhance their assault forces, especially as their force structure transforms based on the Commandant’s Force Design 2030. Using a capable and proven asset is often easier than acquiring a new aircraft, unmanned system, or weapon.