In September, the Australian government announced it would buy nuclear-powered rather than conventionally powered submarines to replace its six Collins-class diesel-electric boats. The announcement was surprising, because for years Australia had resisted the logic that the sheer size of the region in which its navy operates demands nuclear power. In fact, the country had steadfastly resisted any application of nuclear power, although it mines and exports uranium in considerable quantity.
The dramatic shift in submarine policy came as part of a trilateral security partnership known as AUKUS, intended to enhance the alliance among Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom. The pact reflects the growing sense of urgency to confront Chinese aggressiveness and coercion. Not surprisingly, the Chinese government strongly de-nounced the submarine deal.
The deal meant canceling an order for 12 non-nuclear submarines that would have been built in collaboration with the French Naval Group. The French boats often were described as versions of the current French nuclear-powered attack submarine, but with a diesel-electric plant in place of the nuclear-powered one. The project would have doubled the size of Australia’s submarine force, but the Australians were already unhappy about the escalating price of the French project. Not surprisingly, the French were furious at its cancellation. But once the Australians had decided to adopt nuclear power, they preferred to buy the most advanced available technology, which is British and American. The Royal Australian Navy already uses a version of the current U.S. submarine command-and-control system and a version of the standard U.S. submarine torpedo.
For the United States, the decision to join with Australia in a nuclear submarine program is equally striking. Until now, only the Royal Navy has received U.S. nuclear technology, under a 1958 agreement that gives the United States a veto over Britain transferring it to another party. For a brief period during the late 1950s, U.S. policy encouraged allied navies to adopt nuclear-powered submarines. Canada considered doing so for about a year, and it appears so did Italy and the Netherlands. The possibility of transferring nuclear submarine technology did not arise again until 1986, when the Canadians considered buying either the British Trafalgar-class or the French Rubis-class submarines, opting for the former before abandoning the project in April 1989.
The U.S. partnership with the Royal Navy in submarine development has been very close. Although the United States provided the prototype British nuclear submarine powerplant, the British made important contributions to U.S. submarine design, such as the concept of rafting for silencing and initial types of pump-jets. The significance of AUKUS is that the Australians are gaining access to the full range of U.S. and British technology, because both nations consider it essential for their Pacific partner to be as capable as possible.
For many years, the Royal Australian Navy has faced a difficult problem with its submarine operations. Submarines are a vital means of gathering intelligence. There are alternatives, but the targets of intelligence-gathering generally can tell when they—mainly aircraft and satellites—are in position. Only submarines are both effective and covert. Keeping a non-nuclear submarine on station far from home for protracted periods is challenging. As with the United States, Australian naval bases are far from areas of great interest.
Nuclear-powered boats, while more expensive than conventional submarines, can deploy great distances at high speed and achieve maximum time on station, while also providing better crew habitability. Because they spend considerably less time on passage to and from a distant area, they can do the same surveillance work as conventionally powered ones with fewer platforms. Nuclear-powered submarines also are likely to be far more survivable in the face of antisubmarine warfare measures. For example, they are often faster than surface ships hunting them.
Modern diesel-electric submarines do offer advantages. They are less expensive and inherently quiet, while nuclear-powered submarines take considerable effort to silence. Diesel-electric submarines also can safely sit on the sea floor to hide. But they cannot offer surplus power to operate sensors, and they are not fast enough (on a sustained basis) to get out of trouble if they reveal themselves. For example, many diesel-electric submarines are credited with maximum submerged speeds of about 20 knots that can be sustained for only 15 minutes to an hour. Some diesel-electric submarines have air-independent propulsion, which enables more protracted operations, but at low speed. Only nuclear powerplants have the energy density to achieve very high sustained performance.
China doubtless sees its growing fleet as a means to coerce other countries in the region. Anything that reduces the value of that fleet helps countries such as the Philippines and Malaysia resist Beijing’s maritime pressure campaign. More adversary nuclear-powered submarines operating in the region must be very high on that list.
For example, more nuclear-powered submarines place China’s new aircraft carriers at higher risk. At the very least, more nuclear-powered submarines in the region greatly increase the price China must pay to keep its fleet credible. Australia’s increased capability may well deepen its ties to countries in Southeast Asia that feel threatened by Chinese power.
Australia’s decision will add nuclear-powered submarines to a region that already has many. China operates a substantial nuclear-powered submarine fleet, which is likely to expand considerably in the near future. India already has a nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine, using Russian reactor technology, and has leased (and recently returned) a Russian nuclear-powered attack submarine. There is a serious Indian Navy proposal to build six nuclear-powered attack submarines, to replace its aging diesel submarine fleet. And to the extent that Russia is an Asian power, it has a large regional nuclear-powered submarine fleet.
For France, the loss of the large Australian submarine contract may be a hint that it should offer its own nuclear submarine technology to prospective buyers. In recent years, the French Naval Group has been successful in selling conventionally powered attack submarines, but that market may be nearly saturated. France is not under any legal constraint in selling its own type of nuclear-powered submarine; the only problem may be the cost of its nuclear technology.
For Australia, the United States probably could lend or transfer existing U.S. nuclear-powered submarines. Many Los Angeles–class boats were laid up instead of being refueled; some still exist. They could be refueled, modernized, and brought back to operational status. Australian crews could be trained to operate them. Experience with these submarines would allow Australian submariners to learn to operate nuclear-powered submarines before Australia has to man its own.