In recent years, the United States has developed new space strategies and policies, established the Space Force, and reestablished Space Command (SpaceCom)—important achievements all, but insufficient by themselves to achieve national goals in space. Without a more active space deterrence posture, the nation risks losing in space—and, consequently, losing on Earth. China’s rise and its rapidly growing space capabilities and ambitions, in particular, make it a fierce competitor for science, profit, and pride in space.
In 2019, Chinese President Xi Jinping recognized China’s space program pioneers. These celebrated scientists and engineers worked on the country’s space program in the 1960s. In April 1970, they made China the fifth nation to independently design, build, and launch a satellite. Since then, the country has launched more than 500 spacecraft and developed more than 20 launch vehicles. China plans to carry out at least 40 space missions in 2021, a new Chinese record.1 The country is now a major space power that carries out more space missions than any other.2
This national recognition aligns with China’s 2016 white paper on space and remarks by Ye Peijian (head of China’s lunar space program) that the high ground of space bears directly on Chinese strategic interests.3 The white paper reaffirmed China’s strategic intent to use its rapidly growing (and primarily military) space program to transform itself into a military, economic, and technological power within the grand strategy of national rejuvenation (the so-called Chinese Dream).4 Ye said China views space in terms of an astro-strategic terrain, rather than merely the focus of scientific exploration, noting:
The universe is an ocean, the moon is the Diaoyu [Senkaku] Islands, Mars is Huangyan Island [Scarborough Shoal]. If we don’t go there now even though we’re capable of doing so, then we will be blamed by our descendants. If others go there, then they will take over, and you won’t be able to go even if you want to. This is reason enough.5
The United States has more vulnerable high-value space assets and is more reliant on space capabilities than other space powers. Of the 2,787 active satellites in orbit, 1,425 are owned by or affiliated with the United States. The next closest countries are China (382) and Russia (172), with the former’s assets increasing rapidly in terms of quantity, quality, sophistication, and capability. The U.S. government in particular is disproportionately dependent on space capabilities, with 381 government- or military-operated satellites.6
The question is: Does the United States have the right tools to contest the battlespace, protect U.S. national interests in space, and deter aggression by China or other rivals?
Active Space Deterrence
Former President Donald Trump unveiled the National Space Strategy (NSS) in 2018, replacing the dated 2011 National Security Space Strategy (NSSS).7 The NSS embraced U.S. space preeminence, acknowledged space as a warfighting domain, and prescribed a more assertive space deterrence posture in alignment with the more muscular and competitive 2017 National Security Strategy and 2018 National Defense Strategy.8 The aim was to have complementary deterrence policies and strategies across the competition continuum and instruments of national power (diplomatic, information, military, and economic [DIME]). But deterrence must also seamlessly apply across warfighting domains for strategic consistency, operational agility, and tactical flexibility.
The 2020 Defense Space Strategy (DSS) provides guidance to the Department of Defense (DoD) for achieving preferred conditions in space over the next ten years. The desired end state is a secure, stable, and accessible space domain, use of which by the United States and its allies and partners is underpinned by comprehensive and sustained military strength (peace through strength). The 2020 DSS outlines three defense objectives—maintain space superiority, ensure space stability, and provide space support to national, joint, and combined operations—and a phased approach for DoD to move with purpose and speed across four lines of effort. First, build a comprehensive and sustained military advantage in space. Second, integrate space into national, joint, and combined operations. Third, shape the strategic environment. Last, cooperate with allies, partners, industry, and other U.S. government agencies.9
Despite significant improvements in the 2018 NDS and 2020 DSS compared with previous strategies, the United States must do more. The overarching objective must be to make an adversary think that starting a war or escalating conflict in space would be worse than not doing so. As Henry Kissinger noted in 1961, “Deterrence is a product of three factors [intent, capability, and credibility] and not a sum. . . . If any one of them is zero, deterrence fails.”10 Washington must do more—and better—to ensure each factor succeeds.
The new framework must therefore focus on shortcomings in communicating intent, building credibility through redlines, deterrent language, and cross-domain options to impose costs, deny benefits, encourage restraints, and win narratives. Otherwise, an adversary may misinterpret the U.S. space posture as a perceived willingness to absorb a disabling first strike, thereby inadvertently encouraging a preemptive and destabilizing attack. The offense-inclined nature of space conflict itself means that the United States has more to lose in terms of warfighting capabilities than its attacker. For now, holding space assets at risk is far easier and cheaper than defending them, especially considering the wide range of threat vectors, targets, and (predictable) satellite orbital profiles.11
Redlines
Declaratory redlines make clear the unwanted risks, costs, and consequences of specific actions. They are an important way to influence an adversary’s risk perception and calculus, lower the likelihood of misunderstanding, and encourage restraint. They also outline the conditions of and willingness to inflict unacceptable retaliatory damage or destruction. The 2018 NSS explicitly declared that “any harmful interference with or attack upon critical components of our space architecture that directly affects this vital interest will be met with a deliberate response at a time, place, manner, and domain of our choosing.”12 The 2020 DSS forcefully reasserted the redline, stating: “The United States will deter aggression and attacks in space and, if deterrence fails, be capable of winning wars that extend into space.”13 In sharp contrast, the 2011 NSSS vaguely stated: “The United States will retain the right and capabilities to respond in self-defense, should deterrence fail. We will use force in a manner that is consistent with longstanding principles of international law, treaties to which the United States is a party, and the inherent right of self-defense.”14
Ambiguous strategic communications during a crisis or conflict can be risky. The contextual vagueness, passive tone, and political flexibility could have led adversaries to assume the United States was not fully committed to protecting its national interests in space. And if the United States had responded, the adversary could have misinterpreted the intent of the response. Ambiguity also makes crisis deescalation and conflict termination more complicated and loses the narratives by making allies and partners doubt U.S. resolve and commitment.
U.S. policymakers should privately reinforce to strategic competitors (and potential adversaries) the NSS’s assertive public statements. Make it clear that any attacks (kinetic or otherwise) on critical military space systems—missile warning, command and control of nuclear forces, and positioning, navigation, and timing—are unacceptable and will be met with dire consequences.15 Otherwise, policy ambiguity, often held up as strategically artful, could unintentionally encourage an adversary’s miscalculation and risk-taking.
People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) warfighting doctrine favors surprise and deception when conditions warrant, as per Sun Tzu’s martial teachings. Hence, the United States should take steps to introduce an element of uncertainty into the Chinese Communist Party’s decision-making and discourage the PLA from seeing advantageous conditions. Remind them of Sun Tzu: “If not in the interests of the state, do not act. . . . If you cannot succeed, do not use [force].”16
That said, in some circumstances, ambiguity is desirable and necessary, such as concealing specific consequences or capabilities. An adversary does not need to know the exact nature of how, when, and where the United States would retaliate, only that it would do so. At the same time, the United States’ almost total unwillingness to acknowledge what capabilities exist to impose costs is a reluctance rooted in Cold War thinking on strategic ambiguity and operational security.17 Attributability, the ability to trace the origin of an action, presents a similar challenge. Without reasonable certainty about the source of a hostile or malicious action, a hypothetical ability to respond seems a dubious deterrent.18
To address these challenges, selective adjustment in the U.S. secrecy approach may be appropriate. The efforts of Air Force General John Hyten, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and former Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, to loosen DoD classification standards and of Secretary of the Air Force Barbara Barrett to declassify some space programs are steps in the right direction.19 Limited but increased transparency wins the narrative by strengthening domestic U.S. support, reassuring allies and partners, and—more important—conveying to potential adversaries U.S. strength and commitment to contest the battlespace and protect U.S. national interests in space.
Deterrent Language
In space, offensive dominance scales up: “A power that strikes aggressively should be, in theory, able to get the upper hand, or at least get the greatest possible use of whatever offensive counter-space it has invested in.”20 Thus, there is value in explicitly stating that the United States is willing to use tactical preemption and active defense to keep all deterrent options on the table.21 Tactical preemption employs military power to deny an adversary specific outcomes by attacking potential or imminent threats before they can be employed. Tactical active defense is the interception and disruption of an imminent attack before it reaches its intended target.
When combined with proven offensive (impose costs) and defensive (deny benefits) counter-space capabilities, credible redlines (encourage restraints), and an assertive public diplomacy campaign (win the narratives), tactical preemption and active defense can give pause to any adversary contemplating a first strike.
Cross-Domain Options
Responses need not be limited to the same domain as the potential provocation. They can occur (or be threatened) in another domain or across multiple ones. The scope, nature, and degree of the declared prospective retaliation must ultimately strike a delicate balance between demonstrating a willingness to escalate and an imperative not to provoke unnecessary escalation. The dilemma for the United States is where, when, and how best to deter, and if deterrence fails, where, when, and how best to respond.
U.S. policymakers and defense planners should prepare a broad set of flexible and dynamic cross-domain responses to threats of space attack or the attack itself. The responses should be part of a broader menu of policy options to manage tensions and escalation before hostilities begin, identify off-ramps during hostilities, and reinforce the strategic narratives throughout the continuum of conflict. The decision on whether, when, and how to implement these responses should be considered through the lens of cost and risk imposition, proportionality, strategic consistency, and escalation dominance.22
Some argue that cross-domain actions are destabilizing and will escalate a situation. The argument diminishes as Washington commits and prepares to respond in kind—or over respond—to make a deterrent point.23 Cross-domain deterrence is the best way forward.
Active vs. Passive Deterrence
A comparative analysis of key national security policies of the last two U.S. administrations highlights the sharp contrast between active and passive deterrence in terms of intent, capability, and credibility. The Obama administration largely pursued passive deterrence during its eight years in office, while the Trump administration mostly practiced active deterrence. The policy outcomes underscore the importance of communicating intent and building credibility to persuade and compel competitors, adversaries, or bad actors. Today’s strategic environment—great power competition—suggests that active deterrence is more effective than passive.
In 2012, the Obama administration warned Syria that the use of chemical weapons would draw U.S. retaliation. A year later, Washington did not follow through when Damascus disregarded the warning and launched chemical attacks on Syrian civilians. Although the reasons for President Obama’s change of course are complex, the net result was a perception that the administration backed down, and in deterrence, perception is reality.24 The Syrian regime did not believe the U.S. redline credible, despite the United States having more than enough DIME capabilities to threaten and undermine Syria’s national interests.
Also in 2012, the Obama administration responded ambiguously to China’s illegal seizure of the Philippines-claimed Scarborough Shoal and largely accepted the Chinese fait accompli.25 The United States subsequently did little to counter the subsequent militarization of the South China Sea or Chinese gray zone operations, even after a landmark 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling invalidated China’s excessive maritime claims. Beijing correctly assessed that Washington would not risk the all-important bilateral economic relationship.
When Syria again conducted chemical attacks on its citizens in 2017, Damascus encountered a much different U.S. response from the new administration. A U.S.-led coalition promptly launched punitive missile strikes against Syrian military targets and expanded U.S. military presence and activities in Syria.26 By the end of that year, Washington released a new National Security Strategy, announcing that the United States will place U.S. national interests first and will not hesitate to protect and advance them. Washington followed up the words with actions through the maximum pressure campaigns against Pyongyang and Tehran, a trade war with Beijing, and the killing of Iranian General Qasem Soleimani.27
In each case, the adversary tempered its response in the face of active (and occasionally violent) responses. North Korea and Iran moderated their brinkmanship.28 China signed the “Phase One” trade deal and agreed to negotiate a second phase.29 And Iran has thus far exercised relative restraint for the killing of Soleimani.30 In April 2020, in response to harassment of U.S. Navy vessels by Iranian gunboats in the Persian Gulf, President Trump warned he had “instructed the U.S. Navy to shoot down and destroy any and all Iranian gunboats if they harass our ships at sea.”31 No further Iranian naval provocations against U.S. Navy vessels have occurred, though Iran stepped up its harassment of merchant shipping of U.S. friends and allies, the most recent being the seizure of a South Korean cargo ship in early January 2021. Iran also increased its uranium enrichment in the final days of the Trump administration.32
Unchanging Nature
Like space warfare, the character of space deterrence may change over time, but human nature remains constant. The United States should apply the enduring deterrent principles of intent, capability, and credibility in space by defining redlines, declaring a willingness to fight in space preventively and preemptively, and threatening to respond not just in space but in any or all domains. The Space Force and SpaceCom must, therefore, adopt an active deterrence model to fully deter any adversary. Otherwise, the United States risks losing in space—and on Earth.
1. Crystal Tai, “China’s Plan to Conquer the Moon, Mars, and More,” The Wall Street Journal, 17 July 2020.
2. Zhao Lei, “Xi: Build Great Space Power,” China Daily, 25 April 2020.
3. China’s State Council, “White Paper on China’s Space Activities in 2016,” english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2016/12/28/content_281475527159496.htm; Malcolm Davis, “China, the U.S., and the Race for Space,” Strategist–Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 12 July 2018; “Space, the Next South China Sea,” Maritime Executive, 13 July 2018.
4. U.S. Congress, “Hearing Before U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (China’s Space and Counterspace Programs),” 114th Congress, 1st Session, 18 February 2015; Project 2049 Institute, Prepared for U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (China’s Space and Counterspace Capabilities and Activities), 116th Congress, 1st Session, 30 March 2020; “Chinese Dream,” China Daily, www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/Chinese-dream.html.
5. Davis, “China, the U.S., and the Race for Space.”
6. Union of Concerned Scientists, “Satellite Database,” www.ucsusa.org/resources/satellite-database#.WCq2ZOYrKM8.
7. White House, “President Donald J. Trump Is Unveiling an America First National Space Strategy,” (Washington, DC: 23 March 2018), hereafter 2018 NSS; Department of Defense and Director of National Intelligence, National Space Security Strategy (Washington, DC: January 2011), hereafter 2011 NSSS.
8. Secretary of Defense James Mattis, National Defense Strategy (Washington, DC: January 2018), hereafter NDS.
9. Department of Defense, Defense Space Strategy (Washington, DC: June 2020), hereafter 2020 DSS.
10. Quoted in Adam Hebert, “21st Century Peace through Strength,” Air Force Magazine, 26 August 2016.
11. Michael Krepon and Julia Thompson, eds., Anti-satellite Weapons, Deterrence and Sino-American Space Relations, Stimson Center, September 2013.
12. NSS.
13. 2020 DSS, 8.
14. 2011 NSSS, 10.
15. Krepon and Thompson, Anti-satellite Weapons.
16. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel Griffith (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1980), I, VI, XI, XII:15.
17. Col. Mark Bigley, USAF, student, U.S. Naval War College, discussion with the author, 27 January 2020.
18. John Klein, “To Deter Attacks on Satellites, United States Needs Strategy to Identify Bad Actors,” Space News, 5 June 2020.
19. Aaron Mehta, “Unbelievably Ridiculous: Four-star General Seeks to Clean up Pentagon’s Classification Process,” Defense News, 29 January 2020.
20. Krepon and Thompson, Anti-satellite Weapons.
21. Krepon and Thompson, Anti-satellite Weapons; Karl Mueller et al., “Striking First: Preemptive and Preventive Attack in U.S. National Security Policy,” RAND Corp., 2006.
22. Krepon and Thompson, Anti-satellite Weapons.
23. Bigley, discussion with the author.
24. Anthony H. Cordesman, “U.S. Options in Syria: Obama’s Delays and the Dempsey Warnings,” CSIS.org, 23 August 2013; Ben Rhodes, “Inside the White House During the Syrian ‘Red Line’ Crisis,” The Atlantic, 3 June 2018; James Taranto, “Obama’s Red Line Debacle from the Inside,” Wall Street Journal, 28 June 2018.
25. Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, “Counter-coercion Series—Scarborough Shoal Standoff,” amti.csis.org/counter-co-scarborough-standoff/.
26. Jonathan Marcus, “United States Plans Open-ended Military Presence in Syria,” BBC, 28 January 2018.
27. Kathy Gilsinan, “Two Nuclear Problems, One Policy: Maximum Pressure,” The Atlantic, 11 May 2019; “Timeline: Key Dates of U.S.-China Trade War,” Reuters, 15 January 2020; Qassim Abdul-Zahra and Zeina Karam, “United States Kills Iran’s Most Powerful General in Baghdad Airstrike,” Associated Press, 2 January 2020.
28. Stephen Sorace, “U.S. Ambassador Surprised North Korea Did Not Send Threatened Christmas Gift as Nuclear Deadline Closed,” Fox News, 18 January 2020; Peter Goodman, “Iran’s Grim Economy Limits Its Willingness to Confront United States,” The New York Times, 13 January 2020.
29. Jonathan Garber, “United States, China Sign Historic Phase One Trade Deal,” Fox News, 15 January 2020.
30. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, “The Restoration of Deterrence: The Iranian Example,” speech in Palo Alto, California, 13 January 2020.
31. Courtney Kube, “Trump Tweets Order to Destroy Iranian Gunboats, Pentagon Calls It Warning,” NBC News, 22 April 2020.
32. Jon Gambrell and Isabel Debre, “Iran Starts 20% Uranium Enrichment, Seizes South Korean ship,” Associated Press, 5 January 2021.