The Reckoning of Reform: Realigning the U.S. Navy for 21st Century

The year is 256 BCE. A Carthaginian quinquereme skims the water in the Mediterranean Sea, south of Sicily. Its crew pulls in unison, exerting maximum strength to achieve ramming speed. With a thunderous crash, the ship’s bronze ram pierces its target. The impact reverberates throughout both ships as opposing missile troops exchange fire at close range. The Carthaginian crew reverses course with a command to disentangle itself from its mortally wounded victim. Employing the periplus side-ramming tactic, the Carthaginian ship has made a fatal error by impacting too closely to the bow of the Roman ship. A pulley is released, dropping the Roman corvus, its spike penetrating deeply into the Carthaginian deck and locking the two ships into a fierce struggle.¹ The Romans have effectively turned a sea battle into a land battle, advancing in formation across the impromptu bridge to engage the outmatched Carthaginian marines with their short swords to lethal effect and swiftly overcoming their outnumbered foe. 

The Roman military was renowned for its pragmatism. In the space of just four years, they constructed one of the largest global navies, adopted the corvus, and embraced a cohesive naval doctrine that eventually overcame Carthage, the hegemonic Mediterranean power of the day. Ancient lessons of near-peer conflict remain true and provide relevant insight in application today to the U.S. military’s rising tensions with China, its primary geopolitical foe. The supremacy of innovation is a universal law of nature. To maintain naval dominance, the United States must understand and embrace the historical importance of modernization and unleash the innovative American spirit that is foundational to a free society.

The inevitable conflict between Carthage and Rome was preordained by the third century BCE. As China is now, Rome was landlocked by hostile neighbors; however, China is well suited for naval expansion due to its geographical position.² In 260 BCE, Rome built its first 120 ships, copying a beached Carthaginian quinquereme.³ The Romans would ultimately deploy a staggering 330 ships (an estimated 130,000 men) for  battle at Cape Ecnomus.⁴ Rome lacked a nautical tradition and the experience to deploy its fleet using the side-ramming techniques of diekplous and periplus.⁵ Instead, they opted for the simplistic stratagem of frontal ramming and boarding used by Corinth in their war against Athens.⁶ The frontal ramming technique was augmented by the corvus, provided to them by an unknown Sicilian inventor.⁷ The corvus, an unwieldy ad hoc bridge, was designed to interlock two ships and allowed the Romans to utilize their greatest strength: the Roman legionary infantryman. Rome leapfrogged Carthage’s naval capabilities by mimicking Carthaginian ship design and added insightful Roman modifications that leveraged their core strengths. In many ways, China may be imitating what they observe to surpass the U.S. Navy.

Unhampered by a complex tradition of naval hegemony, Rome could pick and choose the best tactics, ships, and structural command. Much like ancient Rome, China is an astute student of history, having been challenged with limited nautical experience and benefitting from observing historical lessons with a critical eye.⁸ Rome developed a unique culture of adaptation, humbly recognizing when a competing power outperformed them militarily. Following its Asian predecessor, the Empire of Japan, China has opened itself to a military culture of adaptation after its poor performance in Korea by embracing Western military doctrine. Unlike Rome, China suffers in the metric of innovation; a symptom of its repressive authoritarian regime. The authoritarianism of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has enabled rapid production and modernization but relies heavily on stolen or bought technology.

The Rising Dragon

China’s modernization in the 21st century is characterized by vast economic expansion. In comparison, the United States may be completing a cycle of complacency from two decades of counter-insurgency operations dominated by asymmetrical warfare, directly resulting in atrophy of martial preparedness for near-peer conflict. My mentor, retired Air Force Colonel Robert Newton, who served in the 8th Fighter Wing in Korea during the 1980s, commented, “We used to joke the invasion of Taiwan would be the million-man swim. We do not make that joke anymore.”

Under the directive of the “Chinese Dream,” Xi Jinping increased the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to 360 ships, a 300 percent increase from the year 2000, further projected to increase to 425 ships by 2030.⁹ This projected increase gives the PLAN the numerical edge over the U.S. Navy’s planned 355 ships by 2045.¹⁰ Regionally, these numbers look even worse for the U.S. Navy, as the fleet is further divided 60/40 between the East and West. China does not need to maintain supremacy in multiple theaters with the entirety of the PLAN concentrating off its coast. Further increasing the numerical disparity, the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) has doubled its fleet in the past decade to 130 ships.¹¹ The most positive naysayer would debate the quality of the Chinese naval forces, but quantity has a quality of its own.

The Chinese buildup is one of the most significant peacetime increases of military forces in modern times, more than doubling its defense budget in the past decade. With budgetary increases and a keen eye toward modern naval conflict, the Chinese have focused on missile technology. The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF), the fourth branch of the PLA, has driven one of the most sophisticated long-range anti-ship missile into existence: the supersonic YJ-18. The YJ-18 boasts an impressive 290 NM range vis-à-vis the 140 NM of the U.S. Navy’s RGM-84.¹² China’s hypersonic DF-17 further affirms its accelerating modernization. The United States is scrambling to find an answer with its missile programs, suffering setbacks such as the failure of the new hypersonic AGM-183A in April. The multitude of homegrown Chinese missile programs substantiates their pragmatic-focused approach to near-peer conflict and pose a significant threat to operations in the region. Thus, it begs the question: is the United States the Carthage of the modern era?

The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) constitutes the third largest air force globally, relying primarily on fourth-generation fighters. However, the PLAAF is rapidly closing the gap with the deployment of its fifth-generation Chengdu J-20 fighter. Accurate public information on the J-20 is scarce, but worst-case scenarios assume its parity with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Luckily, only an estimated 19 J-20s are in active service compared with 196 F-35s and 178 F-22s. U.S. military air supremacy has been a reality since World War II. Nevertheless, the U.S. fifth generation programs are troubled with operational issues. The F-35 took 24 years from concept to implementation and the F-22 19 years. This is evidence of the growing incapability of the peacetime U.S. military to modernize at a similar pace to the PLAAF.¹³ The recently-announced Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) sixth-generation fighter will undoubtedly complicate the future PLAAF strategy. However, given historic U.S. implementation time and production cost, it is unlikely if the NGAD would apply to any approaching near-peer conflict and continues the inevitable trend toward Norman Augustine’s 16th law: “In the year 2054, the entire defense budget will purchase just one aircraft. This aircraft will have to be shared by the Air Force and Navy 3-1/2 days each per week except for leap year, when it will be made available to the Marines for the extra day.”¹⁴

Uniquely detrimental to Chinese sea power expansion is the first island chain, a natural barrier of islands spanning Malaysia in the south to Japan in the north. Multiple nations unfriendly to the PLAN project naval power into the first island chain and could effectively restrict their operations in the East and South China Seas if adequately supported. The first island chain region ranges from heavily populated Taiwan and Japan to the jungle terrain of the Ryukyu Islands, complicating potential defense strategies reminiscent of the World War II Pacific campaign. The United States now finds itself planning a defensive campaign.

China has grown increasingly aggressive with its newfound naval power, substantiated by its illegal creation of artificial islands beginning in 2013. The resource-rich and disputed South China Sea provides a possible catalyst for conflict between multiple regional players. China has claimed the entirety of the South China Sea with its “nine-dashed line” but has carefully avoided any action that would bolster cooperation between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).¹⁵ China, well versed in hybrid warfare theory, understands that perceived aggression has the unintended effect of reinforcing the resolve of its adversaries. Increased cooperation between ASEAN is paramount to the defense of the South China Sea. Strengthening ASEAN is a diplomatic and public relations problem that the United States must address by judiciously responding with hybrid warfare methods. 

The primary defensive front of PLAN containment is the East China Sea, hinging on the resistance of the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan. Taiwan separated from China after 22 years of civil war in 1949, growing its national identity for 72 years now. Two-thirds of the population consider themselves only Taiwanese, and 61 percent hold unfavorable opinions toward mainland China. Meanwhile, the CCP has displayed its willingness to use force in subjugating territory considered Chinese homeland with actions toward Hong Kong. The invasion of Taiwan is the most probable catalyst for triggering a regional war and is a ripe target for a Pacific breakout point for the PLAN. Successful defense of the first island chain will depend entirely on Taiwan’s willingness to conduct an asymmetrical total war.

The Illusion of Perpetual Military Readiness

Roman victory over Carthage in the Mediterranean gained it supremacy at sea and further expanded its dominance with the defeat of the Diadochi in the east. The phrase “mare nostrum” (“our sea”) extended to the entirety of the Mediterranean, comparable to the U.S. control of the Pacific post-World War II. More than a century of complacency as the hegemonic naval power led to an enormous increase of piracy in the Mediterranean. In Julius Caesar’s era, Rome—led by Pompey Magnus—built an enormous fleet of 500 ships operated by 125,000 men and swept across the Mediterranean from East to West in a campaign of annihilation.¹⁶ A similar drastic contemporary response will be required, including a complete strategic reformation of the armed forces to maintain deterrence. 

Military reforms are generally driven by wartime shortcomings rather than peacetime preconceived notions and unusually occur before fresh conflict. Rome's most famous military reform, the Marian reforms, were driven by decades of war professionalizing the legions. The scarcity of modern near-peer combat provides few examples for strategic and technological adjustments for application. Working from a peacetime posture has the inherent proclivity towards miscalculation in tactical development. The US has historically lagged in military preparedness when entering previous near-peer conflicts, facing drastic differences from peacetime and wartime readiness. 

In the third and fourth centuries CE, the Roman military underwent the most significant reforms since Augustus 300 years prior. Crumbling frontier defenses and incapable interior commanders led to rampant invasions of a numerically resurgent opportunistic Germanic enemy. Teetering on collapse, the emperor Diocletian laid the groundwork for military reformation that Constantine would complete, thus reinvigorating the Empire.¹⁷ The reformations would divide the military into two cooperating branches: the limitanei border guards and the mobile comitatenses, or the traditional legionary army. The limitanei consisted of auxiliary forces made up of non-Roman recruits and garrisoned newly reinforced defenses at strategic points along the border. The limitanei acted as both border guards and a projection of Roman power, interacting with native populations to build collaboration, and operated as a static defense to delay invading forces. The comitatenses numbers were expanded and positioned as a mobile strategic reserve at vital interior points, enhancing the capability to concentrate and move to answer any threat. This pragmatic military reformation staved off the collapse of the Western Roman Empire for nearly two centuries, delaying the inevitable of an overextended power which had gone, “From a Kingdom of gold to one of iron and rust.”¹⁸

The U.S. Shifts Focus

U.S. military leaders have recognized the imminent threat of a rising China and begun a literary generation of reform in the manuals outlining future realignment goals. The Tentative Manual of Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) produces a complete remake of the Marine Corps from Middle Eastern operations to Pacific first island chain defense. Under EABO, the Marine Corps will be reformed into highly trained mobile units equipped with modern anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles to establish classification, identification, and engagement areas (CIEA) within the enemy weapon employment zones (WEZ). EABO will provide the U.S. military with a limitanei force to delay and impede enemy movements. However, by not living in their area of operations (AO), these Marines will not benefit from becoming familiar with their terrain, constructing fortifications, or developing human intelligence networks by fostering relationships with native populations. EABO will rely on the rapid deployment of Marines to key maritime terrain in the first island chain, expected to dig in and engage the enemy immediately for control of the littoral environment. The Marine Corps must urgently consider incorporating the Navy’s Seabees for defensive point hardening and generating designated AOs to increase awareness of potential deployment zones. When instituting the same delaying tactic, the Japanese had years of preparation to harden an island’s defenses, and without a relieving comitatenses force, EABO will amount to a suicide mission within an enemy’s WEZ. EABO success will be at risk without careful coordination and support.

EABO provides a transformational template for the Marine Corps to become nautical limitanei. However, this stratagem implies creating hard-hitting comitatenses. The role of comitatenses would center on the Navy’s 7th Fleet headquartered in Japan. Not numerous enough to counter Chinese aggression alone, a concentration of naval forces would need to join the 3rd and 5th Fleets to augment the 7th. In a war in which response time will be critical, the ability of naval forces to consolidate is tantamount. A proficient deployment time relies on intelligence gathering and dissemination. In this scenario, intelligence is equally pertinent to success as it was to Joseph Rochefort’s codebreakers were to the Battle of Midway; however, this time, the United States has the probable enemy target, just not the timeline or strategy.

The Deadly Innovator’s Dilemma

Two key factors caused the disastrous U.S. invasion of Tarawa during World War II: a failure to scout the littoral terrain circling the island and the inability of the Higgins boat to deploy Marines on the beach because of shoal waters. To remedy these insufficiencies, the Navy created the underwater demolition teams (UDTs) to scout landing zones and expanded the deployment of the landing vehicle tracked (LVTs), capable of driving over shallow reefs. To rectify the current strategic and technological insufficiencies, the U.S. military must enforce a culture of adaptability by encouraging the flow of feedback from warfighters and, most importantly, demanding the development/acquisition community deliver timely results. One relevant initiative is a program termed NavalX, designed to serve as “matchmaker between those with ideas and those with knowledge and resources to further those ideas.” Reaching out across the aviator community, I could not find a single pilot who was aware of the program’s existence. The nescience of NavalX’s role could easily be rectified with a touring outreach program to engage the warfighter at their operational bases. NavalX ideally should operate as a sorting mechanism to take in thousands of concepts from Marines and sailors at the vanguard to pair with the appropriate industry. Focusing the forces’ untapped cumulative brainpower and then using it would solidify a critical thought feedback loop and ensure warfighters are optimally equipped for potential near-peer conflict in the 21st century.

An estimated 80 percent of global trade by volume is transported by sea, one-third of which passes through the South China Sea. It is apparent that whoever controls the seas in the 21st century will govern trade and therefore world security. The United States stands at a crossroads. The first path codifies the Roman culture of adaptation, ensuring the ideology of freedom stands at the forefront. The second is the potential downward spiral of Carthage complacency, a slow or abrupt death that all previous hegemonic powers have suffered. In this instance, the dystopian veil of authoritarianism plausibly could spread under the guise of CCP hegemony. Few empires have surrendered power without a titanic struggle, and it is apparent that the U.S. populace is largely unaware of the encroaching threat. Alternatively, transparency of the CCP menace would bring public awareness and, in turn, demand the results of rapid action to sustain meaningful deterrence. An indefatigable defense of freedom must forever counter authoritarian aggression. “Si vis pacem, para bellum: Therefore let him who desires peace, prepare for war.”¹⁹