Operation Desert Storm began the night of 17 January 1991, with naval aircraft launching on a strike mission into Iraq from several aircraft carriers stationed in the Persian Gulf. Since then, carriers and their embarked air wings have been almost continuously in the Gulf, executing missions in support of a long list of operations. They have done this for nearly three decades using organic recovery tanking, in which a select number of fighter aircraft are configured to carry gas and be available to tank aircraft running too low on fuel to safely land on the carrier.
But because of new technology and the unique airspace geography of the Persian Gulf, naval aviation should cease this inefficient practice. Carrier air wings operating there will be more capable warfighting units if they implement divert operation flying procedures, whereby aircraft low on fuel divert to a nearby airfield. This would permit the carrier air wing to free fighter aircraft for other missions and save both fuel and flight hours. Furthermore, carrier air wings using divert operations would be more flexible in supporting combat missions, particularly large-force strikes.
Needless Fuel Waste
Naval aviation always operates in a fiscally constrained environment, and thus its resources are precious and must be used as efficiently as possible. During the Carrier Air Wing 17 (CAG-17) 2017–18 deployment, Strike Fighter Squadrons 22 (VFA-22) and 113 (VFA-113) were the designated tanking squadrons. Three of the 12 F/A-18E/F Super Hornets from each squadron were configured as tanking aircraft. CAG-17 was in the Persian Gulf from 1 December to 19 May. During this time, designated VFA-22 tanking aircraft dumped approximately 118,000 gallons of gas. A Super Hornet flying a tanker mission will take off from the carrier with approximately 28,500 lbs of fuel and land with only 4,000 lbs to meet the airframe gross-weight landing limitations. It is standard practice to discard excess unused gas before landing on the carrier. At a cost of about $2.50 per gallon, this amounted to more than $300,000 dumped by one tanker squadron during one Persian Gulf deployment—and hundreds of millions of dollars of gas dumped into the ocean over nearly 30 years of carrier air wing operations in the Persian Gulf. There is also a cost in flight hours as dedicated tankers have to fly more frequently than traditionally configured fighters. During the 2017–18 CAG-17 deployment, VFA-22 aircraft flew approximately 986 hours of tanking missions in less than four months. These increased flight hours drive aircraft more quickly into the maintenance phase, reducing the number of planes the squadron has at its disposal. Flight hours for fighters performing tanking missions are hours not spent on combat missions.
Freeing the six VFA-22 and VFA-113 aircraft from tanking duty would have been beneficial to the carrier air wing in at least three important ways. First, during operations in Iraq and Syria, there would have been more spare aircraft for combat sorties. Second, when asked to execute a large-force strike (a strike with more than eight aircraft), the carrier air wing would have had a greater capability to configure aircraft for various roles on the strike. Finally, with more autonomy in scheduling and configuring their aircraft, Super Hornet squadrons would have been better able to support unit-level training (ULT). More ULT flights allow squadron aircrew to better maintain proficiency in all required missions and more quickly gain tactical flight qualifications. For these reasons, reducing the number of tanker-configured aircraft means squadrons and carrier air wings are more proficient, tactical, and lethal.
A Better Solution—with Caveats
A confluence of factors makes divert operations possible in the Persian Gulf. The introduction of precision-landing mode (PLM) technology to the fleet has significantly increased the rate at which carrier pilots land on the deck on their first attempt, reducing the need to divert. In addition, the Persian Gulf is now a mature theater with established operating procedures for transiting the area, and several airfields are located a relatively short distance from where aircraft carriers typically operate.
VFA-22 aircrew in 2017–18 used PLM almost exclusively to land on the carrier, yielding a 96.9 percent boarding rate and a 3.775 landing grade point average (GPA). In comparison, during VFA-22’s previous combat deployment to the Persian Gulf before the introduction of PLM, it had a 94.3 percent boarding rate and a 3.536 landing GPA. Soon, using PLM will be the default landing mode. As pilots become more proficient flying PLM, boarding rates likely will improve, and there will be fewer instances of aircraft needing to divert.
There are two main arguments against executing divert operations in the Persian Gulf. First, security concerns arise when an aircraft diverts to a foreign field. However, in the Gulf, the two primary divert airfields are Sheik Isa Air Base in Bahrain and Ahmad al-Jaber Air Base in Kuwait. Both regularly host coalition aircraft with the same security concerns as the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet. Thus, the necessary security procedures and personnel are in place for Navy aircraft.
Second, there is the fear that carrier air wing tanking system failures will be more prevalent if the systems are rarely used. A lack of confidence in the carrier air wing’s tanking systems could potentially slow the air wing’s shift to blue-water operations where it must rely on organic tanking. To prevent this, the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet tanking systems should be exercised periodically to ensure they remain operational. Also, designated tanker aircrew should occasionally fly to maintain basic proficiency with all organic tanking operations. How often air wings need to launch tanking aircraft and exercise the various systems can be determined over time. But using all tanking systems at regular intervals will ensure the carrier strike group can rapidly deploy to a different area of operation and smoothly transition to organic tanking operations.
Organic tanking is a valuable and necessary air wing asset, but it must be thoughtfully employed. Flight hours and money for jet fuel are limited, and every time a tanking aircraft launches from a carrier, it is not training for or executing a combat mission. With the Navy struggling to maintain a baseline readiness level, precious flight hours must be allocated to missions that deliver the highest rate of return.
One great strength of naval aviation is its ability to adapt when the battlefield environment changes. Both the warfighting environment and the economic landscape have shifted dramatically since Operation Desert Storm in 1991, and it is long past time for naval aviation to adjust accordingly. Ceasing routine organic tanking in the Gulf is one important step in doing so.