The 27 April 2018 summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un and South Korean President Moon Jae-In helped pave the way to a U.S.-North Korean Summit scheduled for this month. (Photo: Associated Press)
Some reports suggest that the Trump administration may be considering using the U.S. presence on the Korean Peninsula “as a bargaining chip in nuclear negotiations with North Korea.”[1] Proposals to withdraw some or all of the more than 28,500 U.S. troops in South Korea have drawn intense, broad criticism from the U.S. foreign policy establishment. Experts who assess that such a deal would be “worrisome” and a “monumental mistake” should reconsider their positions.[2]
There is no doubt that the presence of U.S. troops in South Korea has served to deter a North Korean attack and to assure South Korea that the United States would be all-in from day one of any conflict. It has been a lynchpin of the United States’ strategic position in Asia and has cultivated an environment of peace and security that has allowed the emergence of a democratic government and an extraordinarily prosperous economy in South Korea.
North Korea’s accelerated pursuit of nuclear-armed missiles with extended ranges, however, is now the most substantial threat confronting the United States and its allies in Asia. The physical security of the American people always should be the first imperative of all national security decision-making. As the 13 January 2018 false missile alert on Hawaii so aptly illustrated, North Korea must not be allowed to mature its nuclear arsenal to directly threaten and terrorize the homeland of the United States.
The Clinton, Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations all have vowed to never accept a nuclear-armed North Korea.[3] If the United States is serious about that ultimatum, then its options are limited to successful diplomacy, limited strikes, or all-out preemptive war. Some policy analysts, including this author, have discounted diplomacy as a serious option given North Korea’s long history of insincere negotiations.
Significant Compromises Are Required
Recent events, however surprising, have brought United States and the Koreas to a pivotal moment in history. These actions call into question many previous assumptions regarding North Korean behavior. Maximum pressure, fear of attacks, and possibly the influence of China appear to be bringing Kim Jong-un to the negotiating table. As the Korean Peninsula stands on the nexus of peace and war, the stakes are high. North Korea’s release of Americans detainees and even its questionable “show trial-like” destruction of the Punggye-ri nuclear test site signal a strong desire to have talks with the United States. While history has taught the United States to remain ever-skeptical of North Korea’s intentions, this country always must be ready to negotiate in good faith. Make no mistake, negotiating an iron-clad, verifiable denuclearization of North Korea—if it is even possible—will require significant U.S. compromises.
On 24 May 2018, North Korea ceremoniously blew up the command post facilities of its nuclear test site at Punggye-ri. (AP)
It is not reasonable to expect Pyongang to exchange its nuclear arsenal for the easing sanctions and increased economic incentives alone. Short of war, its presence on the peninsula is the only major card the United States has to play. It is the only concession that likely stands any chance of bringing about an acceptable settlement. Troop withdrawals would be a small price to pay for a verifiable treaty that dismantles North Korea’s nuclear program and prohibits the hermit kingdom’s development of nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States. In fact, the price of withdrawal would be tactically insignificant although it could incur a substantial strategic cost.
South Korea Can Defend Itself
The reality is that South Korea’s defense no longer requires U.S. troops. South Korea boasts Asia’s third largest economy—more than 35 times the gross domestic product of the North’s—and spends five times more on its military than Pyongyang.[4] The North’s Korean People’s Army, while boasting more than 1,190,000 active soldiers, is armed with obsolete 1950s’ and 1960s’ Soviet technology.[5] These numbers are no match for the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army, which has 630,000 troops armed with superior technology, training, tactics, logistical support, and command and control.[6] The technological edge of the ROK maritime and air forces give South Korea an even larger advantage. North Korean forces are no match for South Korea’s modern military services—which are well-prepared to repel another North Korean invasion on their own.[7]
Even with all U.S. troops gone from the Korean Peninsula, the United States would retain sizable capabilities in the region to bolster immediately South Korea’s war efforts should North Korea move to invade the South. The United States’ ability to supply air, maritime, intelligence, and logistics support greatly eclipses the impact of removing U.S. ground troops. South Korea with U.S. support would devastate the North Korean military.
Denuclearization Deal Is Worth the Risks
While U.S. ground forces are no longer required from a tactical viewpoint, the United States has much to lose from a strategic perspective to pull its military forces from South Korea.[8] Withdrawal from the Korean Peninsula could signal an inevitable waning of U.S. influence in Asia. Leaders of Asian nations—governments of which are prone to take the long-view—may see the loss of U.S. troops in South Korea as the logical next step after U.S. abandonment of Vietnam and its ouster from the Philippines.
China stands the most to gain politically from a United States’ withdrawal. Beijing could seize the opportunity to attempt to draw South Korea closer into its sphere of influence. Left with only a significant U.S. military presence in Japan, China likely would seek to foment divisions between the American “imperialists” and their “hated” Japanese allies versus China and the rest of Northeast Asia. A diminished U.S. position is the worst-case scenario. It is more likely, however, that U.S. strength and values—despite the withdrawal of troops from the peninsula—would continue to prevail over a Chinese policy that lacks authenticity, leans on coercion, and comes from China’s political leaders who ultimately look down on their neighbors as tributary states.
Irrespective of any strategic consequences, removing North Korea’s capacity to conduct nuclear war against the United States and its allies must be the highest priority. The risk of diminished U.S. influence in the Pacific is more than worth the gain of freeing the American people from living under a shadow of North Korean atomic threats.
Any chance for success will depend upon the United States’ ability to hold talks while sustaining maximum political and economic pressure on North Korea. At the same time, a credible threat of limited U.S. strikes must remain.[9] Whether at the 12 June summit or during follow-up talks the United States should be prepared for hard-nosed negotiations that are open to the withdrawal of U.S. troops in exchange for the complete and verifiable dismantling of North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Trading U.S. presence for North Korea’s nukes may be the last—and best—hope for peace on the Korean Peninsula.
[1] Hal Brands, “Monumental Mistake to Pull U.S. troops from South Korea,” Gulf News 2 June 2108, gulfnews.com/opinion/thinkers/monumental-mistake-to-pull-us-troops-from-south-korea-1.2230595
[2] Ibid.
[3] Kelsey Davenport, “Chronology of North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy,” Arms Control Association, June 2018, www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron
[4] Prableen Bajpai, “North Korean vs South Korean Economies,” Investopedia, 04 May 2015, www.investopedia.com/articles/forex/040515/north-korean-vs-south-korean-economies.asp
[5] John-Paul Tooth, “North Korea's Military: How Does It Actually Stack Up?” Forces Network, www.forces.net/news/north-koreas-military-how-does-it-actually-stack
[6] Ibid.
[7] David Majumdar, “Can South Korea Fight North Korea Without America,” The National Interest, 7 January 2106, nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/can-south-korea-fight-north-korea-without-america-14837
[8] Steven Metz, “If the U.S.-South Korea Alliance Goes, Does America’s Strategy in Asia Go With It?” World Politics Review, 4 May 2018, www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/24671/if-the-u-s-south-korea-alliance-goes-does-america-s-strategy-in-asia-go-with-it
[9] Captain David Allan Adams, U.S. Navy (Retired), “Limited Strikes on North Korea Are Past Due,” Proceedings Today, December 2017, www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017-12/limited-strikes-north-korea-are-past-due
Captain Adams retired from the Navy in 2016 and is a contributing editor to Proceedings. He commanded Provincial Reconstruction Team Khost, Afghanistan, the USS Santa Fe (SSN-763), and the USS Georgia (SSGN-729B). As Director, Commander’s Initiatives Group, U.S. Seventh Fleet, he led a team to formulate solutions to some of the nation’s most difficult Pacific warfighting challenges.
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