The nuclear attack submarine USS Montpelier (SSN-765) operates under its own power on 14 October 2012, the day after its collision with the USS San Jacinto (CG-56). (U.S. Navy/Mike DiMestico)
In the wake of the serious incidents suffered by surface forces in 2017, several commentaries and analyses, including Admiral Phil Davidson’s “Comprehensive Review,” have held the submarine community up as an example for best practices. Although the submarine force has a well-earned reputation for procedural compliance and proficiency, submariners should take care not to be smug. The collisions in the western Pacific offer lessons to the whole naval force.
The submarine force has had several incidents of its own in recent years, though without loss of life or public attention. At periscope depth during a 2012 exercise, the USS Montpelier (SSN-765) collided with the guided-missile cruiser USS San Jacinto (CG-56), damaging a main ballast tank and compromising the ship’s buoyancy. Another shallow-water incident between a smaller vessel and the USS Jacksonville (SSN-699) in 2013 relieved the latter of its periscope. In November 2015, the USS Georgia (SSGN-729) hit a navigation buoy and ran aground while returning to port, causing $1 million in damage. And in 2016, the USS Louisiana (SSBN-743) collided with its offshore support vessel escort. Four events in as many years does not necessarily a trend make, but common themes include failure to recognize developing dangerous situations, watch-team failures, and questionable decision-making by commanding officers.
In the “Comprehensive Review,” Admiral Davidson found a force-wide case of “reduced training and increased workload for sailors.” Submarining is difficult. Subs handle unusually on the surface; after all, they were designed to sink. Beneath the waves, they are blind and mute, relying on their crews’ perishable skills to interpret data and navigate safely. But maintaining and honing those skills are compromised by the volume of tasks and the relatively small number of officers and senior enlisted to perform them. Tactics and seamanship often draw the short straw at training time.
A colleague remarked before he left the Navy, that “I spend my day approving maintenance, hanging tags, standing duty, tending to the division, but I’m ultimately evaluated on employing the ship, which is something I never, ever do.” Commander, Submarine Forces (SubFor), continuously should review requirements set upon submarine crews and cull those that contribute least to warfighting and material readiness.
This author sings harmony in the chorus calling for less administrative burden, but there are grander concerns, as well. Among others, Admiral Davidson identified a “can-do culture” and force-generation issues. Submarines, too, suffer from oversubscription by combatant commanders. This shortens in-port periods, compresses maintenance schedules at the expense of pierside tactical training, and, most concerningly, cuts at-sea commanding officer discretionary time (CODT), during which the most fruitful training occurs. A result is that pre-mission immediate-superior-in-command (ISIC) assessments often are conducted on the first days under way—after more than a month without any relevant training and without opportunity for follow-on remediation. With a “can-do” culture like that of the surface forces, ISICs have a disincentive to assign a failing grade, and submarine COs have little leeway to ask for help.
SubFor should support Secretary of the Navy Richard Spencer’s call for a more supply-based method of resource allocation in combatant commanders’ areas of responsibility (AORs) by providing improvements to work-ups, such as protected CODT. This will allow for better investment in training and readiness during lengthened deployment cycles that becomes even more critical as the National Defense Strategy names adversaries that can search and shoot back in the undersea domain.
Thankfully, 2017 was a silent (pun intended) year for submarine forces, but periods of deficient performance and major failures tend to be cyclic and long-developing. Celebrate the accomplishments of submariners but continue to scrutinize the force and its priorities to ensure it is well positioned for the future. That would be a best practice to emulate.
Mr. Kerr is a 2009 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy and served as a submarine officer, including a tour on the USS Georgia (Gold) from 2011–2014. He currently works as an operations analyst.
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