The Navy’s capability to deliver long-range, accurate, naval surface fire support (NSFS) for Marines or conventional naval operations is inadequate. The millions of dollars the Navy has invested in missiles and guided projectiles has not been focused on key operational realities, both on the ground for the Marines, and at sea for the Navy.
The Navy has not provided a cost-effective alternative to expensive weapons such as the Tomahawk land attack missile (TLAM). This lack of alternative was illustrated in 2011 during Operation Odyssey Dawn in Libya when the Navy expended almost $500 million worth of TLAMs against 320 targets within 20 nautical miles (nm) of shore. Although the Navy successfully executed its tasking, it constituted inefficient and costly weapon-to-target pairing. The Navy’s limited ability to provide efficient, effective fire support from the sea is unprecedented in our nation’s history. The Navy may have silver bullets, but a smart and determined enemy will empty the Navy’s magazines quickly.
The requirement for the Navy to provide supporting fires for the Marines and other combat operations ashore has been around as long as the Navy-Marine Corps team. Historically, gunfire has been the main form of that support. The requirement for gunfire support generally was accepted as a “standing requirement.” The problem with a standing requirement is that technology evolves and corresponding changes in operational concepts result in an operational disconnect between the customer (the Marines) and the provider (the Navy). The requirement as viewed by the Marine Corps under the concept of Operational Maneuver from the Sea has differed substantially from the view of the surface navy.
In a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, specified exactly what the Marine Corps wanted in naval fires and it was more than just gunfire support. The terminology used in the subject line is revealing: “Naval Surface Fire Support Requirements for Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare.” Naval surface fires are to be an integral part of, and support of, an overarching revolutionary operational concept. Here is an important excerpt from that letter:
NSFS requirements can only be met by complementary, overlapping and redundant fire support systems. Fires involve more than the mere delivery on target. Volume and precision are equally important to achieving the desired effects on an enemy.
There is more to NSFS than just naval gunfire support (NGFS). NSFS is a triad of tactical air (TacAir) support, organic Marine artillery ashore, and NGFS. NSFS is supposed to provide the equivalent of Marine artillery until that artillery is in place, with follow on support as necessary.
The Navy’s cruiser-destroyer force—the traditional provider of surface fires—spends most of its time, money, and training on air defense and ballistic missile defense (BMD), with some emphasis on antisurface, antisubmarine and strike warfare. For the traditional cruiser-destroyer crew, U.S. Marine Corps Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare doctrine is as foreign a language as Aegis techno-babble is to the average Marine.
In addition, the proliferation of long-range antiship missiles pushes the
Navy’s NGFS ships to operate farther from adversary shorelines. This fact, coupled with the limited range of the existing 5-inch gun, ensures that the Navy’s current NGFS platforms will not be able to support combat operations ashore with anything other than expensive missiles. The two-gun and two-magazine ships of the USS Spruance (DD-963) class have been replaced with the single gun and magazine of the USS Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class, significantly diluting the volume of fires available. Given these limitations can the Navy modify traditional fire support and improve NSFS at the same time? The answer will depend on: (1) how NSFS is provided and by whom; (2) what weapon(s) are used; and (3) who is in charge? This is where distributed lethality comes in to play and may provide a means to the end.
Distributed Lethality
The Navy has significant experience adding fire support capability to almost anything that floats—especially amphibious ships. During World War II, fire-support capability was added to amphibious ships all the way down to rocket launchers on landing craft. During the Vietnam War, the Navy used in-shore fire-support ships, riverine craft, and even brought back the battleships.
In October 2017, the Navy and Marines demonstrated firing a high mobility artillery rocket system (HIMARS) from a heavy vehicle on the flight deck of the USS Anchorage (LPD-23). While that demonstration technically was a success, from a practical standpoint placing a heavy vehicle on the flight deck to fire an expensive rocket may not be the best solution. However, this demonstration did show that an amphibious ship, with little modification, could support the launch of a precision weapon.
The HIMARS experiment also raises the question of distributing a serious measure of lethality to the amphibious ships. Would it make sense for the Navy’s amphibious ships to be a contributor to the NSFS triad? There are advantages and disadvantages to examine.
The first advantage is availability. If the Marines are conducting operational maneuver from the sea, the amphibious ships will be there and will remain at least until the Marines and their equipment are ashore. The same may not be true for cruiser-destroyer forces—or at least not in the numbers desired.
The next step is to select a weapon system. Perhaps a precision-guided projectile could meet the need. Having sufficient conventional gun ammunition to meet the volume of fires required would mean significant numbers and would impact space, weight, and lift on the amphibious ships. A solution would be smart munitions that could be added with little impact. Precision-guided projectiles are available and have been successfully tested.
A disadvantage with a projectile is that it requires a gun to fire it. Adding a gun to an amphibious ship would mean major modifications to the ship and significant cost. It also would impact space, weight, and lift allocated to Marine equipment. But an entire gun system may not be required. Everything aft and below the barrel is overhead. Would it be possible to have boxes of preloaded barrels? The technology to manufacture low-cost, lightweight composite barrels preloaded with long-range guided projectiles is feasible. These would be like a vertical launch system (VLS) and would give a precision weapon a range of about 50 nm. Properly sized and configured, a cell of gun barrels could be placed on available topside areas of an amphibious ship without impacting Marine cargo spaces. If the projectile had the capability to engage moving targets—a capability under development—amphibious ships also would gain a potent weapon capable of countering a swarm of small boats.
The next factor to consider would be people. A box of preloaded barrels might not require additional manning or training if it had no moving parts and required no on-board maintenance. The employment of the system could fall to the Marines. Put the “box of barrels” directly under the control of the supporting arms coordination center or the fire support coordination center. All the ship would need is a safe-to-fire function.
The next employment factor to consider is what happens after the ship departs. The requirements document says NSFS is to provide support as necessary after the Marines are ashore. Because they are part of the overall lift requirement, amphibious ships may need to depart to move more Marines. Here is another opportunity to apply an old lesson. In 1899, the Royal Navy helped relieve the siege of Ladysmith, South Africa, by removing 4.5-inch guns from the HMS Terrible and Powerful and transporting them ashore. If boxes of barrels could be detached from ships, and were capable of being airlifted ashore, they could be used much like Marine organic artillery. The box of barrels could be sized to comply with a CH-53’s lift capability. Once in place ashore it would again be under the remote firing control of the fire support coordination center. The result would be a ship’s guns without the ship.
The “box of barrels” concept puts the Marines directly in charge of NSFS from amphibious ships, which could provide a large portion of the required precision fires. The requirement for volume of fires could be left to the cruiser-destroyer force.
Who should oversee NSFS resources and requirements? Historically it has been the surface navy branch of the OPNAV staff, and NSFS has never been high on their priority list. Why not make a home for NSFS in the expeditionary warfare branch where it can be properly defended across the wide spectrum of Navy requirements and resources? It is the expeditionary warfare branch that is the principal interface between Navy and Marine Corp requirements.
The cost of a box of barrels would be significantly less than a present missile system of comparable range and volume. The associated command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence networks to support the box of barrels are the same as those required to support any strike weapon—including the Navy’s current 5-inch gun. Requirements creep can and must be avoided. The above system is simple, secure, and lethal. The guns-in-a-box concept could be fielded across the entire Navy-Marine Corps team for less than the cost of the TLAMs expended in Odyssey Dawn. It is time to make amphibious ships more than cargo movers. Make them lethal!
Captain Phillips is a retired surface warfare officer whose career included command of the cruiser USS Vella Gulf (CG-72) and the destroyer USS O’Bannon (DD-987). He presently is a shiphandling instructor at the Navy Surface Force Atlantic simulator.
Dr. Wells is the author of A Tale of Two Navies: Geopolitics, Technology, and Strategy in the United States Navy and the Royal Navy, 1960–2015 (Naval Institute Press, 2017). He is a visiting senior research fellow in the Department of War Studies, King’s College, London.