When Xi Xinping became China’s leader in 2012 he set two ambitious goals. The first was for China to double its 2010 per capita gross domestic product to $10,000 by 2021; the second was to become a “fully developed, rich, and powerful” nation by the 100th anniversary of the People’s Republic in 2049.[1] If it meets those goals, China’s economy will be three times the size of the U.S. economy by mid-century. Think about what that means relative to the United States in terms of future economic, military, and political influence.
The Chinese already have spread their economic power in South America and Africa and are increasing their economic presence in Europe. Even in the United States, China’s economic influence has grown beyond the importance of the products it exports for U.S. consumers. Politically, Beijing’s influence on nations in Asia and beyond is growing, and that influence is aimed at getting the region and the world to recognize and accept the Chinese political and economic models. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is unquestionably the strongest military in Asia, and it continues to expand its operations outside the Indo-Asia Pacific region. Development of an indigenous aircraft carrier with fourth-generation fighters is but one facet of the PLA’s expanding military capability. And China’s construction of military facilities on disputed islands and reefs in the South China Sea is but one effort to manufacture sovereignty. If not checked, China’s claims will expand far beyond the nine-dash line in the future.
There are two basic elements that must be recognized when dealing with China: face and time.
Face is important to most Asians but even more so with the Chinese. In private, one can be very blunt, frank, and open with them; but chastising, humiliating, or berating the Chinese in public will result in retaliation because they cannot lose face. A former Chinese Minister of Defense once said to me, “Friends can be friends and still have disagreements.” This is telling of their attitude and desire to create non-adversarial relationships.
In the United States, time is measured in days, months, or years. At the extreme, Americans formulate five-year plans; though the U.S. government rarely carries those out to completion. Time in China is measured in generations. The buildup in the South China see did not start a year of two ago. The Communist Party lay claim to the area bounded by the “nine dash line” in 1949. China started building structures on South China Sea atolls in the 1960s. It seized the Paracel Islands from the Vietnamese in 1974. The ongoing effort to build and militarize atolls in the South China Sea—something the former Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral Harry Harris referred to as “the great wall of sand”—must be seen as part of a long-term strategy to build power and exert influence. And it must be countered consistently, over the long term, by the United States and its allies, politically, militarily, and economically.
A map of China's "nine dash line" (in red). (U.S. State Dept image)
So, what does that mean for U.S. foreign policy and military planning? How can the United States work within and outside the Chinese framework?
Foremost, the United States must not back down with China. Standing up for U.S. interests, friends, and allies must be done without resorting to military force or public, argumentative rhetoric. Neither country wants armed conflict; nor is war in the best interests of Washington or Beijing. U.S. Navy freedom-of-navigation operations (FoNOps) in the South China Sea are an important aspect of a strategy to tell the Chinese, quietly but firmly, that their territorial claims are illegitimate. China knows its claims conflict with international law, but it continues to push to establish legitimacy based on custom. In other words, if the Chinese coerce other nations to accede to their excessive claims, those claims will become recognized over time.
FoNOps demonstrate U.S. commitment to its allies in the region. As those countries in South East Asia look north they see China as a large, powerful, potential enemy. They cannot stand up to China alone. They need U.S. military presence and political and diplomatic support. Washington should not expect Beijing to agree with its position, but the United States must execute these operations and encourage allies to follow suit. It is unlikely that U.S. Navy FoNOps will be met with any PLA military force; rhetoric yes, but force no.
In addition, the United States could strengthen its position that China’s claims are excessive by ratifying the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The United States is one of the few nations in the world that has not ratified this treaty. “So even as it invokes UNCLOS to assert freedom of navigation and challenge excessive maritime claims, Washington has no seat at the table…within the treaty’s institutional framework… remains on the outside looking in as the international community moves forward in defining the legal landscape affecting over 70 percent of the world’s surface.”[2] China plays on this inconsistency when the United States objects to its activities in the South China Sea.
In the immediate future, China will continue to act like friends with the United States, up to the point where they believe they are superior in all three spheres, making the friendship even more tenuous than it is. China and the United States never will be allies, but they can coexist peacefully if they understand and acknowledge each other’s legitimate rights and concerns. In places where they disagree, the United States must be firm in its position, willing to accept friction, and aware of the importance of face to the Chinese.
Working with the Chinese in all three spheres while maintaining U.S. beliefs and values will be difficult, but reasonable minds should be able to find areas of agreement as a basis for non-hostile relations. The military-to-military relationship has progressed well for a period of time. It should be nurtured and not destroyed by precipitous actions on either side. The U.S. Coast Guard works closely with China on fisheries and environmental protection and stopping illegal smuggling; that cooperation may be a model to emulate. The United States also has the advantage of having real allies and friends in the region. China has many nervous business partners; but the United States has true friends.
No one knows what the future will hold, but China aspires to be the most powerful nation in Asia—perhaps in the world—by mid-century. Chinese leaders are tenacious and dedicated. They plan meticulously with a long-term time horizon. For the United States and China to co-exist in this big, wonderful world, it is critical that the United States maintain—or even build—its military, economic, and political influence. It is also critical that U.S. leaders pay attention to the long term and the importance of face.
[1] Graham Allison, “What Xi Jinping Wants,” The Atlantic, 31 May 2017, www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/05/what-china-wants/528561/.
[2] R. G. Almond, “U.S. Ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention: Measuring the Raison D’Etat in the Trump Era,” The Diplomat, 24 May 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/05/u-s-ratification-of-the-law-of-the-sea-convention/.
Admiral Macke was a single-seat naval aviator who flew A-4s, A-7s, and F/A-18s. He served as the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, from 1994 to 1996.
Photo: The USS Mustin (DDG-89) conducts an underway replenishment with the USNS Walter S. Diehl (T-AO-193) in the South China Sea in March 2018. (U.S. Navy)
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