During 2011, U.S. Marines continued the fight in Afghanistan, conducting aggressive and decentralized operations that allowed them to retain the initiative in Helmand Province, generally considered one of that country’s most challenging areas. After more than a decade of continuous conflict, the post-9/11 generation of Leathernecks—which has served as courageously and faithfully as any—finally witnessed the nation’s highest award for valor presented to a living Marine recipient. While operations in Afghanistan continued unabated, the operational tempo of amphibious forces likewise remained high. Throughout the year the Navy–Marine Corps team continued to apply its amphibious capabilities in a variety of operations, even as a naval renaissance gathered increasing momentum.
Combat Operations in Afghanistan
The Marine Corps continued to commit approximately 20,000 Marines to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, with the majority assigned to Regional Command–Southwest [RC (SW)]. General James F. Amos, the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), reported to Congress, “We are seeing measurable progress along all lines of operation in the Helmand Province: security, reintegration, rule of law, governance, development, education and health. Over the past year, violence and the level of collateral damage have decreased significantly.”1
That progress was not obvious at the beginning of the year, as combat intensity spiked when Marines pushed into the previously uncontested areas of Helmand’s Sangin District. That offensive was initiated in late 2010 by then–Major General Richard Mills, the RC (SW) commander. It reflected his assessment that the purely “population-centric approach” to counter-insurgency (COIN), wherein coalition forces focused exclusively on providing a “protective bubble” over the more heavily populated areas to promote governance and economic development, had ceded the tactical initiative to the enemy. The general observed that the enemy “was able to dictate where and when the fighting would take place. . . . We decided to change that. We consolidated some bases, freed up some forces, and we went on the attack. We felt there should be no place within the province that the enemy was free to train, refit, plan and just take some time off.”2 He empowered subordinate commanders with the guidance to employ a combination of offensive combat and population-centric actions—as they deemed appropriate—within their respective areas of operation.
The 3d Battalion, 5th Marines (3/5), under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Jason Morris, drew the task of applying this approach in Sangin, where the change caught the enemy off-guard. The Taliban were accustomed to employing improvised explosive devices and ambushes by relatively small units. After inflicting casualties, they would seek to break contact and avoid becoming decisively engaged. When the Marines began aggressive and relentless patrolling into the enemy’s rural sanctuaries, the Taliban shifted to using larger formations in direct attacks. This shift played to the Marines’ strengths—especially their ability to maneuver through rugged terrain and to apply accurate and discriminate combined-arms firepower. As a result, the Marines decimated the ranks of the local insurgency.
An indicator of how badly his Marines had mauled those Taliban units was provided by General Mills in April 2011: “When we got there, it was estimated the average regimental or battalion commander—whatever you want to call him—in the insurgency was about 35 years old. When we left, he was 23. Why? Because the rest of them are dead.”3
With the local insurgency nearly wiped out, the Taliban leadership sought to regain the initiative by committing additional units from Pakistan. Unlike the locals, who avoided fighting in locations where their families, friends, and property would be at risk, the foreign fighters did not display the same restraint. Thus, the tribal chieftains began to view the Taliban not only as the enemy, but as a losing enemy, and increasingly reconciled with the Afghan government.
The upsurge in combat intensity also resulted in increased casualties among friendly forces, at least in the short term. During their initial weeks in Sangin, 3/5 and attached units incurred a casualty rate nearly double that of battalions in other areas. This caused some senior officials to recommend that 3/5 be withdrawn. However, “The Marines of 3/5 said that they wanted to finish what they had started, and Mills and Morris thought that pulling them out in the middle of the struggle would be the most demoralizing action possible.”4 Marines are ever mindful of their unit’s history; no Marine serving in a battalion whose colors carry battle streamers for Belleau Wood, Peleliu, Chosin Reservoir, and Fallujah was going to shy from a fight. During their seven months in Sangin, 3/5 and attached units suffered 29 killed and approximately 200 wounded. The bulk of those casualties came prior to February 2011. In subsequent months casualties were considerably lighter, and that trend fortunately continued when, at the conclusion of its tour of duty in April, 3/5 relinquished responsibility for Sangin to 1st Battalion, 5th Marines.
Population-Centric Practices Pay
The offensive combat actions described above were complemented by revised population-centric practices. Rather than dispensing development aid widely in hopes of encouraging the population’s loyalty, the Marines provided it only to those who had demonstrated their allegiance to the Afghan government. Once aid was dispensed, project sites were routinely visited to ensure that allocated resources were being used as intended. Similarly, casualty and property damage compensation claims were not paid without first verifying the facts. In essence, the measures reduced the ability of unscrupulous actors to fraudulently enrich themselves or the Taliban. The Marines also focused on strengthening partnerships with local officials, who are crucial to arbitrating tribal disputes and establishing local policies. Likewise, Marine commanders assigned advisers from their own units to Afghan forces in order to strengthen military partnerships and improve operational effectiveness.5
Collectively, the integrated application of enemy-centric and population-centric measures yielded the desired results, as increasing stability led to improved governance, economic opportunity, and societal development. General Mills reported that independent polling recorded a significant shift in public opinion: “Nearly 80 percent of the Afghan population in Helmand province [was] asked, ‘What’s your number-one concern?’ Last year, overwhelmingly, [the response was] security. This year, education. . . . That is success.”6
In July 2011 historian Dr. Mark Moyar published an assessment of the operations in Sangin in which he noted that, “Small-unit leaders received great latitude in selecting and implementing the mix of enemy-centric and population-centric methods, and success depended heavily on their leadership capabilities, earning this hybrid approach the moniker of leader-centric COIN. With roughly the same number of troops as the forces they had replaced, the Marines gained control over the entire operational area in a period of three months and largely suppressed the insurgency by the time their seven-month tour ended. During this time, they also captured or killed a substantial number of high-value individuals who had eluded special operations forces.”7
The Marine Corps’ ability to conduct such decentralized operations is a testament to the maneuver-warfare philosophy it developed in the 1980s and codified in the 1990s. That philosophy has shaped Marine Corps training and education, so Marine leaders have become accustomed to giving subordinates “mission-type orders”—tasks and the overarching intent (or purpose) of what they are expected to accomplish without specifying how it is to be done. In his study, Moyar posited that this approach—which he calls “leader-centric”—has wider applicability across Afghanistan. Recent changes to U.S. Army doctrine appear to be promoting the same approach.8
A Medal of Honor
At the White House on 15 September 2011 former Sergeant Dakota Meyer was presented the Medal of Honor, becoming the first living member of the post-9/11 generation of Marines so recognized. Sergeant Meyer received the award for his actions on 8 September 2009 when he was a corporal assigned to a combined unit of U.S. Army and Marine Corps advisers and Afghan troops under the operational control of 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment (1/32) of the Army’s 10th Mountain Division. On that day, lead elements of the unit were ambushed and pinned down while en route to a meeting with village elders in Ganjgal near the Pakistan border. Realizing that they were in a desperate situation and in danger of being overrun, they radioed the 1/32 command post requesting fire support. According to the official investigation into the incident, an Army artillery NCO and Air Force liaison within the command post “took action to provide immediate support,” but both “were overruled.”9 Two Army officers eventually were reprimanded for negligent leadership, including failing to provide timely air and artillery support, during the battle.
At the time the ambush was initiated Corporal Meyer was situated in a supporting position. Recognizing the plight of those in the kill zone, he and two other Marines, then–First Lieutenant Ademola Fabayo and Staff Sergeant Juan Rodriguez-Chavez, left the relative safety of their position and made numerous trips into the kill zone to help their comrades. They rescued several dozen members of the unit, but three Marines and a Navy corpsman remained missing. It was on his fifth trip into the kill zone that Meyer, who was wounded, located and retrieved the remains of First Lieutenant Michael Johnson, Gunnery Sergeant Edwin Johnson, Staff Sergeant Aaron Kenefick, and Hospital Corpsman Third Class James Layton. A month later a fifth American, Army Sergeant First Class Kenneth Westbrook, died of wounds received at Ganjgal.
Captain Fabayo and Staff Sergeant Rodriguez-Chavez were awarded Navy Crosses in a ceremony at Quantico, Virginia, on 10 June 2011. Additionally, Gunnery Sergeant Chad Miller, who had manned an overwatch position for six hours spotting targets and directing fire— once air support finally arrived—was presented the Bronze Star with Combat “V” in a ceremony at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, on 29 June 2011.
Flexible Responsiveness . . . from the Sea
As in previous years, the geographic combatant commanders’ demand for amphibious forces far exceeded capacity. The USS Kearsarge (LHD-3) Amphibious Ready Group (ARG)/26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) once again demonstrated flexibility and utility across the range of military operations. On 27 August 2010 it had deployed a month early to reinforce the Peleliu (LHA-5) ARG/15th MEU conducting flood-relief operations in Pakistan. As the new year dawned, events started to accelerate dramatically. On 6 January, in response to a request by the commander of U.S. Forces Afghanistan, U.S. Central Command ordered the MEU’s ground combat element ashore in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. The mission for the battalion landing team (BLT) built around 3d Battalion, 8th Marines (3/8) was to establish and maintain security in portions of Helmand province not previously occupied on a persistent basis by the International Security Assistance Force.
Shortly thereafter the tumultuous events of the “Arab Spring” began to unfold in North Africa. The Kearsarge and USS Ponce (LPD-15), with the remaining embarked elements of 26th MEU, were directed into the Mediterranean Sea in order to provide 6th Fleet the capability to conduct noncombatant evacuations and humanitarian assistance. Initially postured off of Ismailia, Egypt, to support U.S. interests during unrest there, the increasing chaos in Libya generated a new priority. The two ships were sent to Souda Bay, Crete, on 4 March to embark 400 Marines from 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, who had been flown in from Camp Lejeune to reconstitute some of the MEUs ground-combat element in the absence of BLT 3/8. From there they headed toward Libya for what then was an undetermined role in the clash between Libyan dictator Moammar Gadhafi and the rebels attempting his overthrow.
That role was clarified on 20 March when the MEU’s AV-8B Harriers began conducting air strikes in support of Operation Odyssey Dawn, the purpose of which was to enforce U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973, calling for the establishment of a no-fly zone, an arms embargo, and the protection of Libyan citizens from the Gadhafi regime. Eventually, Odyssey Dawn became part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization–led Operation Unified Protector.
At approximately 2330 on 21 March, a U.S. Air Force F-15E operating out of Aviano, Italy, crashed in Libya about 25 miles from Benghazi. Both the pilot and weapons officer successfully ejected. Kearsarge ARG/26th MEU launched a tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel (TRAP) package consisting of two MV-22 Ospreys carrying a recovery team, two CH-53E Super Stallions with a quick reaction force, and two AV-8B Harriers to provide close-air support. A Marine KC-130J Hercules operating out of Sigonella, Sicily, provided tanker support. The TRAP force picked up the downed pilot, Major Kenneth Harney of the 494th Fighter Squadron, at 0238 on the 22nd and delivered him aboard the Kearsarge less than 3½ hours after he had ejected. His weapons officer, Captain Tyler Stark, made contact with Libyan rebels who assisted in his safe return.
Meanwhile, on the other side of the globe a different sort of crisis was emerging. On 11 March Honshu, Japan, was rocked by the fourth-largest earthquake in history and the largest in that country since instrument recordings began in 1900. The magnitude 9.0 quake generated a tsunami observed throughout the Pacific and caused a nuclear power-plant accident and leaks in three reactors. Japanese officials recently estimated the toll at more than $200 billion in damage, 15,854 known dead and another 3,203 Japanese citizens missing.10 When the earthquake occurred, the Essex (LHD-2) ARG/31st MEU was disaggregated. The Essex had just begun a port visit in Malaysia following an exercise in Cambodia. The Germantown (LSD-42) and Harpers Ferry (LSD-49) were both in Indonesia. All three ships immediately sortied for Japan to support Operation Tomodachi (Friends).
As the ARG/MEU was en route, eight Marine KC-130Js from Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 152 (VMGR-152) and eight CH-46E Sea Knights from Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 265 (HMS-265) deployed from Okinawa to the Japanese mainland to begin relief operations. The Essex ARG/31st MEU arrived off the coast of Akita, Japan, on 17 March and began flying aerial surveys along 200 miles of affected coastline. In the weeks that followed, it provided disaster relief in Hachinohe and Miyako as well as on Oshima Island, removing debris and delivering critical supplies to isolated areas. The evacuation of almost 8,000 American citizens was facilitated at the same time. To accomplish those tasks, Marine aircrews often flew through a radioactive environment.
As Tomodachi unfolded, back in the United States the Bataan (LHD-5) ARG/22d MEU was getting ready to deploy in support of operations off Libya. It set sail on 23 March—three months ahead of schedule—and relieved the Kearsarge ARG/26th MEU in the Mediterranean on 27 April. By the time the latter arrived home on 16 May, it had compiled 262 days at sea, including a four-month stretch without a port call. In the 8½-month deployment the Kearsarge ARG/26th MEU participated in historic events in both the 5th and 6th Fleet areas of operations (AOs). Unbeknownst to them at the time, the sailors and Marines of the Bataan ARG/22d MEU would exceed that deployment duration by a considerable margin.
While on station with the 6th Fleet, Bataan ARG/22d MEU spent several months supporting Operation Unified Protector and conducting bilateral exercises and military engagement with forces from Italy, Spain, Greece, France, and Romania. Eventually it sailed into the 5th Fleet AO, and on 13 August relieved the Boxer (LHD-4) ARG/13th MEU. The latter had been engaged in a variety of operations during its seven-month deployment, including contingencies off the Horn of Africa, maritime-security operations, major exercises in Oman, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Kuwait, and numerous smaller security-cooperation events with regional partners. Bataan ARG/22d MEU assumed similar duties until relieved by the Makin Island (LHD-8) ARG/11th MEU on 6 January 2012. The Bataan ARG delivered its shipmates from the 26th MEU to Morehead City, North Carolina, on 5 February and arrived home in the Norfolk, Virginia, area two days later, having spent nearly 11 months at sea conducting operations in support of U.S. European, African, and Central Commands. The 322-day deployment was the second-longest since the end of World War II, exceeded only by a 327-day deployment by the Midway (CVA-41) in 1973.
The ARG/MEU flexibility evident in the events described above did not go unnoticed. During an April breakfast meeting with reporters, Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus “highlighted the role amphibious ships play in enforcing the no-fly-zone over Libya, an operation with air support from Marine AV-8B Harriers and helicopters but not a single flight from a carrier.”11 Some independent observers concurred with that praise but expressed concern about the paucity of amphibious ships. Naval blogger Raymond Pritchett pointed out that the amphibious fleet “is in high demand because they are the most flexible ships in the U.S. arsenal, but is seen as and is given a low priority.”12 He observed that the “Bataan ARG represents a visible data point regarding the need for more. . . . When amphibious ship deployments start breaking modern deployment length records . . . that means the Navy has not built enough.”13 In an op-ed published in The San Francisco Examiner, national security expert James Carafano put it more colorfully with an anecdote that likened amphibious ships and Marines to mules: “They get fed last, even though they do all the work.” He cautioned that “if we don’t maintain a robust amphibious force, the barn could be empty when the next crisis comes.”14
Title 10 Matters
The year began with a programmatic decision that some pundits had predicted—perhaps hoped—would sound the death knell for the Marine Corps. On 6 January then–Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced, “Today, I am also announcing my agreement with the recommendation of the Secretary of the Navy and the Commandant of the Marine Corps to cancel the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle.” He explained that “recent analysis by the Navy and Marine Corps suggests that the most plausible scenarios requiring power projection from the sea could be handled through a mix of existing air and sea systems employed in new ways along with new vehicles.” To ensure that the prophets of doom fully understood his message, he added, “Let me be clear. This decision does not call into question the Marines’ amphibious assault mission.” Mr. Gates then went on to explain that funds would be budgeted to develop a more affordable amphibious tractor while providing interim upgrades to the existing vehicles.15
In light of the foregoing, during 2011 the Marine Corps conducted a comprehensive systems-engineering review of amphibious-vehicle operational requirements, such as water and overland mobility, lethality, and protection. Having identified the essential requirements in an effort to drive down costs, the Marine Corps began conducting an analysis of six amphibious combat vehicle (ACV) options. The ACV analysis effort is taking place within the larger context of a Ground Combat Tactical Vehicle Strategy that also includes the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle being developed in conjunction with the Army and a wheeled Marine Personnel Carrier.
To provide even broader context for capability development, General Amos chartered an Amphibious Capability Working Group (ACWG), composed of sailors and Marines, to assess the challenges and opportunities for amphibious operations in the 21st century. Although the ACWG report has not yet been made public, one of the key insights was discussed extensively at the Marine Corps’ most recent Title 10 war game. Noting that the maritime domain includes the landward portion of the littoral—and understanding that the increase in modern land-based threats to maritime access generates even greater emphasis on the historic interplay between sea control and power projection—the ACWG advocated closer integration in the application of Navy and Marine Corps capabilities, both at sea and ashore. The group refers to this as fighting a “single naval battle.”
While the ACWG was formed as a temporary body, the Marine Corps has initiated the establishment of a more permanent organization to explore naval issues. Called the “Ellis Group,” it is named in honor of Lieutenant Colonel Earl H. “Pete” Ellis, whose prescient 1921 study, Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia, anticipated the Central Pacific Campaign in World War II and guided subsequent capability development. The Ellis Group will work in partnership with a similar body being established by the Navy.
There were several additional indicators of increasing naval unity last year. In March 2011 Admiral John C. Harvey, Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, published a “personal for” message to all commanders and command master chiefs titled “Amphibious and Expeditionary Operations Reading Program.” Harvey noted that large-scale amphibious operations are both a core competency and unique capability provided by the Navy–Marine Corps team. In an effort to reinvigorate the ability to conduct such operations after a ten-year focus on Iraq and Afghanistan, he designated Bold Alligator 2012 (BA 12) as a major effort for the entire Fleet. “I want to emphasize that BA 12 will be a major fleet exercise. . . . Ask yourself how your unit, command or specialty fits into the framework of an amphibious operation. . . . How would an amphibious task force tie into a carrier strike group and execute composite warfare? . . . Over the coming year, I encourage you to read, to think about what you read, and then to apply what you’ve learned.”
On 22 May General Amos and then–Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Gary Roughead signed a charter establishing a Naval Board to provide a regular forum for senior leaders to consider naval policy and guidance affecting warfighting issues. They tasked the board to examine issues selected by the CNO and CMC as well as those raised by the commanders of the unified combatant commands, Navy and Marine Corps component commanders, and their respective Fleet and Marine Expeditionary Force commanders. The board will assess operational requirements and develop integrated guidance to drive concept development, experimentation, and coordinated capability development.
In November, Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard announced that U.S. Marines would start deploying to the Northern Territory on a rotational basis. The new CNO, Admiral Jonathan Greenert, later explained that he was working with General Amos “to determine the support and the lift needed for Marines to effectively operate forward in Darwin, Australia, in the future.”16 These naval developments foreshadowed the U.S. strategic shift toward the Pacific unveiled in early 2012. The first Marine detachment—about 200 strong—landed in Darwin on 3 April, 2012. The U.S. presence will grow to a full Marine air-ground task force of 2,500 within six years.
In 2011 Marines added new luster to their operational record but were not content to rest on their laurels. A reinvigorated Navy–Marine Corps team appears eager to take on the challenges of an era that, by all indications, will place a premium of the creative application of American seapower.
1. GEN James F. Amos, “2012 Report to the House Armed Services Committee on the Posture of the United States Marine Corps, 16 February 2012,” p. 1, www.mca-marines.org/files/16%20Feb%2012_CMC_HASC_Posture%20Statement.pdf.
2. MAJ GEN Richard Mills, remarks at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 27 April 2011, http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/04/27/major-general-richard-mills-on-afghanistan/49q.
3. Mark Thompson, “Afghan Body—Make That B-day—Count,” Time, 27 April 2011, http://battleland.blogs.time.com/2011/04/27/afghan-body-make-that-b-day-count/.
4. Mark Moyar, “The Third Way of COIN: Defeating the Taliban in Sangin,” (Orbis Operations: July 2011), p. 46, http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/moyar-3rdway_in_sangin_jul2011.pdf.
5. Ibid., pp. 2, 40–44.
6. Mills, Carnegie Endowment remarks.
7. Moyar, “The Third Way,” p.1.
8. Those changes, however, attempt to redefine the term, “mission command” in a manner that is at odds with its long-established joint definition.
9. Dan Lamothe, “Report: Army denied aid to team under fire,” Marine Corps Times, 3 March 2010, www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2010/03/marine_ambush_030310w/.
10. Data obtained from the National Geophysical Data Center, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, www.ngdc.noaa.gov/hazard/tsunami/pdf/2011_0311.pdf.
11. Joshua Steward, “SECNAV: 11 carriers ‘about right,’” Navy Times, 30 April 2011, http://www.navytimes.com/news/2011/04/navy-mabus-11-carriers-about-right-043011w/
12. Raymond Pritchett, “Whither the Flexible Force,” Information Dissemination, 4 October 2011, www.informationdissemination.net/2011/10/whither-flexible-force.html
13. Raymond Pritchett, “The Makin Island Deployment—Another Reminder the US Needs More Amphibs,” Information Dissemination, 16 November 2011, www.informationdissemination.net/2011/11/makin-island-deployment-another.html
14. James Carafano, “Government should maintain amphibious abilities of Marines,” The Examiner (San Francisco), 11 July 2011, http://www.sfexaminer.com/opinion/op-eds/2011/07/government-should-maintain-amphibious-abilities-marines
15. Robert M. Gates, “Statement on Department Budget and Efficiencies,” Pentagon speech, 6 January 2011, www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1527.
16. ADM Jonathan Greenert, opening remarks to the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations, Defense Subcommittee, 1 March 2012, www.navy.mil/navydata/people/cno/Greenert/Testimony/120301%20HAC-D%20posture%20hearing%20openning%20statement.pdf.