With the Chinese Communist Party as that country’s leading force, its military theory is heavily influenced by Marxist-Leninist ideology and the military thoughts of Chairman Mao Zedong. This is the main reason for which, in contrast to the West, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) theorists consider military art primarily as a science. The PLA distinguishes three components of military science (or art in Western terms): strategy, campaigns (operational art), and tactics. Within each of these are sought and developed, respectively, laws of conduct, guidance laws, and basic principles. Chinese thinkers believe that by applying the Marxist-Leninist methodology, it is possible to identify these laws of war and military affairs.
In Russia and the West, the approach is also to use scientific methods to develop and study each aspect of military art. But its application necessitates a commander’s experience, judgment, skill, training, and creativity. Thus, Russia and the West see more of a fluid situation where the Chinese try to identify the correct rule to be followed.
This is a basic difference in military doctrine: a service’s set of commonly held, concisely stated, and authoritatively expressed beliefs, fundamental principles, organizational tenets, and methods of combat-force employment that aim to guide the planning, preparation, and execution of objectives. Doctrine serves as the basic document for conducting combat training. A service doctrine provides broad guidelines for using service numbered and theater forces to accomplish operational objectives.
Science of Strategy
PLA theorists define the science of strategy as the “military science to study laws of war, laws of conduct of war and laws of strategic evolution.” To complicate matters, their understanding of this includes strategic maneuver, strategic air raid, and defense against air raid. In the West those elements properly belong to the domain of operational art. According to the features of the physical medium, the Chinese also distinguish between ground, air, sea, and outer-space strategies.
The PLA’s strategy has undergone several major changes: from Mao’s People’s War in the late 1940s and 1950s, to the People’s War under Modern Conditions in the early 1980s, to Local Wars and later Local Wars under High-Technology Conditions, and, more recently, the People’s War under Informationization Conditions.1 Concurrently, the country’s naval strategy evolved from near-coast defense in the late 1960s to active offshore defense in the early 1980s (or near-seas active defense) to the more recent far-seas defense.2 Until the early 1960s, the principal missions of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) were “to safeguard China’s independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty against imperialist aggression, prevent the sea blockade, and provide support to PLA’s ground and air forces.” The strategy of near-seas active defense was based on the need to protect the country’s economic lifelines with overseas and natural resources within the exclusive economic zone. The PLAN was to defend maritime interests in the near seas, specifically the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea, the area of the “first island chain” stretching from Japan’s home islands to Borneo. The far-seas defense encompasses the second island chain area, stretching from the central part of Japan’s home islands to the Bonins, Marianas, Carolines, and easternmost part of Indonesia’s archipelago. This concept is designed to project the PLAN’s power more than 1,000 nautical miles from the mainland’s shores.
The PLAN’s strategic concept is to consider the sea/ocean areas in the first and second island chains as akin to land, hence needing to be fully controlled. In many respects this resembles the former Imperial Japanese Navy’s concept of a defense perimeter to protect its Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in 1940–45. But realistically, the Chinese cannot hope to have full and permanent control of any sea area within the first island chain; even less so in the second and beyond. They are probably capable of obtaining local and temporary sea control in the Taiwan Strait and its approaches, and in other areas closer to the country’s shore.
Operational Art by Any Other Name
The Chinese define the science of campaign as “a discipline that reveals and studies campaign laws, and forecasts campaign developments. A campaign consists of several battles.”3 The idea of inserting the concept of “campaign” between those of strategy and tactics is attributed to Chairman Mao.4
In the West, this would be called a major operation—a series of major and minor tactical actions aimed to accomplish an operational (and in some cases partially strategic) objective. For Western thinkers a campaign consists of a series of major operations and many tactical actions conducted on land, at sea, and in the air, aimed to accomplish a single strategic objective. Both major operations and campaigns are planned and executed according to a common idea by a single commander.
The PLA differentiates between service and joint campaigns. The former concerns itself with the laws of the service in question, the task organization and missions of large formations, and the principles and methods of carrying out respective service campaigns. They are predominantly conducted by the forces of a single service with other participating services and paramilitary forces. This is why the PLA distinguishes army, navy, air force, and Second Artillery Corps campaigns. The science of joint campaigns studies the “essence, characteristics, and laws” of each, along with their related disciplines and methods of organization and execution. A joint campaign (or campaign in Western terms) is conducted by large formations of two or more services under joint command and normally consists of a series of service campaigns.5
Naval Campaigns and Doctrine
Chinese naval strategy is to be executed by applying the tenets of what they call naval campaigns: “the sum of a series of interconnected battles and supported activities conducted by a large formation alone, or with the coordination and cooperation of their service arms, in order to achieve a certain strategic [in the West this would be operational] or campaign objective, per a unified intention and plan, within a certain sea area or certain time.”6
Large- and small-scale campaigns are distinguished. A large naval campaign has decisive influence on the war’s overall situation, and for this the PLAN’s main forces or even its entire strength would be employed. They are organized directly by the PLAN’s high command. In contrast, a small naval campaign (or naval operation, in Soviet/Russian terms; or major naval operation, in Western terms) aims to move what the Chinese call a “campaign situation” in a certain direction to achieve a war’s partial objectives.7 It also has a certain effect on the war’s overall situation. A similar distinction is made between sea campaigns on the open ocean and littoral campaigns (binlu haiqu).8
Chinese naval science differentiates among the following types of “independent” naval campaigns:
• Sea force-group campaign to eliminate the enemy (what we would call a “fleet vs. fleet major naval operation”) is aimed to take out the opponent’s “main operational strength,” change the balance of forces in the sea theater or in a campaign, obtain sea dominance in a certain area, and improve the sea battlefield posture to create favorable conditions for the smooth execution of follow-on campaigns. In any Chinese effort to obtain or deny sea control, these major operations would be the principal method used.
Currently, the PLAN has significant capabilities for conducting sea force-group campaigns by using large surface combatants, submarines, and land-based naval aircraft to dispute control in the first and second island chains. In the littorals, modern missile craft, coastal missile and gun batteries, and sophisticated mines would be used to deny access. Additionally, the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and short- and medium-range ballistic missiles of the Second Artillery Corps could play decisive roles in destroying basing areas and logistical infrastructure within their effective ranges. The Chinese probably have adequate capabilities to successfully deny control of the surface in large parts of the sea area in the first island chain.
• Offensive campaigns against coral island reefs: Conducted predominantly by naval forces, these major operations require the cooperation of other services and maritime civilians against island reef areas far removed from the mainland shore. The chief aim is to recapture enemy-occupied island reefs, improve the military situation in the area, protect national sovereignty, and uphold oceanic rights and interests. In practical terms, this type of operation would be conducted by PLAN-led forces against disputed islands in the East China and South China seas. The Chinese have sufficient capabilities to successfully execute such operations.
• Sea-line interdiction campaigns (major naval operations vs. an enemy’s maritime trade) aim “to block and interdict the enemy sea transport and to weaken his military and economic strengths and war potential.” The PLAN could interfere with the flow of an enemy’s maritime trade in the first and second island chains. Submarines and land-based naval and air force strike aircraft plus the Second Artillery Corps would play the most important role in such operations.
• Sea-line guarding campaigns (major naval operations vs. the enemy’s maritime trade) are defined as “defensive campaigns waged to ensure the safety of, and free passage along sea lines having strategic campaign significance.” The main objective is to ensure the safety of loading and unloading ports, sea routes, and transport activities, as well as free passage along sea lines.
The purpose of the Chinese naval-base-defense campaign (major naval operation to defend a naval base) is to ensure normal functioning of the base, secure free transit of ships in and out of it, prevent the enemy’s sea blockade, and defeat his attempt to capture it.9
Joint Campaigns
Based on their overall aim, these types of campaigns are differentiated for blockade, landing, anti-landing, border-area retaliation, urban offensive and defensive actions, and anti–air raid. The PLAN would participate in all of those. In an at-sea and air-blockade offensive against an enemy entrenched on an island or ashore, a large-scale campaign would be normally planned and conducted by a joint campaign commander with the participation of large formations of the navy, air force, and Second Artillery Corps and the cooperation of the army and armed police-force units and militia.
Landing campaigns (major amphibious operations) are “sea crossing offensive campaigns” conducted against an enemy entrenched on an island or ashore. In contrast, anti-landing campaigns (major anti-amphibious operations) aim to repulse an enemy amphibious landing on the Chinese coast or islands. These actions also would be carried out with force compositions similar to those listed above for at-sea and air-blockade offensives. The Chinese have modest amphibious capabilities, but they could conduct large-scale landings on an opponent’s shore. By using submarines, advanced mines, and massive strikes by land-based aircraft and short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, they could isolate an area, creating conditions for landing troops.
Anti–air raid campaigns (major defensive air operations) are defensive actions aimed at countering the enemy’s air offensive. The air force would be the main component. The army, navy, and Second Artillery Corps would also take part, plus units of civilian air defense. In addition, the PLAN might participate in border area retaliations and urban offensive campaigns if those were conducted in coastal regions.10
The current trend in the PLA’s doctrine is a shift from coordinated joint campaigns to a new concept called “systemic integrated joint campaigns for the information age.”11 The White Defense Paper of 2010 highlighted that these aim to enhance considerably the capability of conducting operations along China’s mainland and maritime peripheries. An important aspect of them is an increased focus on integrating the doctrine and training of all three PLA services.12
PLA doctrine envisages the full integration of information warfare into all phases of joint and service campaign offensive and defensive aspects. The Chinese emphasize the need to seize and maintain this advantage in the early phases of war to obtain air and sea superiority.13 The term “campaign information warfare” is used in referring to the “comprehensive quality of operational activities on the battlefield directed against the enemy’s information warfare capabilities.” Aside from seizing and keeping information superiority, the Chinese aim to disrupt enemy information-control capabilities while protecting PLA information-warfare capabilities.14
Additionally, Chinese theorists give considerable importance to the use of stratagems, or deception, in planning and executing a naval/joint campaign.15
Combat Training
Chinese naval doctrine forms the basis for implementation of combat training. Although we can only speculate about the quality of this training and the state of combat readiness, we know from public sources that in the past few years, training has become increasingly complex and realistic.16 Currently, the main document used for this in the PLAN is the revised Outline of Military Training and Evaluation issued in January 2002. Exercises are more often conducted in unfamiliar sea and ocean areas and farther from territorial waters. Naval aircraft are routinely deployed to unfamiliar airfields for short periods.
In the past, naval exercises were conducted in what the Chinese call “known conditions.” Opposing force commanders exchanged information about their movements and intentions before deploying to sea or conducting air engagements. Current combat training is conducted under “unknown” conditions, with opposing sides knowing only the general operating area, but not being pre-briefed about each other’s intentions and movements.17
Blue-water training is the key prerequisite for preparing the PLAN to obtain control of the sea and ocean areas far beyond the maritime borders of the country.18 In addition, great emphasis is placed on the employment of naval forces with other services, in particular the PLAAF. Opposition-force training is practiced during the PLAN’s exercises, and very often the PLAAF’s aircraft simulate attacks on surface ships or are used for target practice by the PLAN’s air defense.19
Special focus is devoted to exercises aimed at practicing amphibious landings on the opposition’s shore. For example, in 2009 the PLA reportedly developed plans to seize islands in the South China Sea by force using aerial bombardments followed by amphibious landings. The Jia Long amphibious assault exercise in November 2010 highlighted the PLAN’s ability to seize islands and project military power far beyond its shores.20
Chinese naval strategy and operational art are based on an all-encompassing and systematically developed theory. However, their “science of campaign” is poorly defined and articulated, and apparently they consider warfare largely as a science. The problem is compounded by the pervasive influence of Marxist-Leninist ideology and Mao’s military thoughts, which can only result in a lack of flexibility and creativity in thinking.
Yet despite these weaknesses, the PLAN has made great efforts to systematize the theory of “naval and joint campaigns.” Another significant development that should greatly concern the U.S. Navy is in information warfare, which the Chinese are integrating into every phase of major naval operations. Obviously, the real test of naval strategy and operational doctrine is combat. The PLAN’s lack of experience in this area does not necessarily mean it would perform poorly, as the example of the Imperial German Navy in 1914–18 amply illustrates.
Implications for U.S. Navy Doctrine
The rise of Chinese naval power poses great challenges but also many opportunities for the U.S. Navy, which is long overdue in fully understanding the critical importance of operational art in the conduct of war at sea. Hence, as discussed at length and in detail in previous issues of this magazine, most recently “Thinking Between Strategy and Tactics” (February, page 62), the Navy should make considerable and consistent efforts to improve the education and training of future commanders and staff officers in operational art. A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower needs to be revised and refocused from its emphasis on operations short of war to fighting and winning a high-intensity conventional war at sea. Naval Doctrine Publication 1 Naval Warfare (March 2010) also should be rewritten so both become true capstone documents on how to fight at the operational level of war at sea. All existing naval-warfare publications pertaining to the tactical employment of U.S. naval forces should be rewritten and fully in consonance with the revised NDP-1.
The Navy also needs to make a much greater effort—without various arbitrary political constraints—to realistically evaluate Chinese anti-access/area-denial capabilities. In responding to the Chinese challenge, it should find a solution similar to that of the interwar years against the potential threat of the Imperial Japanese Navy. This means developing new operational concepts (in cooperation with sister services), conducting operational and tactical war and planning games and large-scale exercises.
1. Ka Po Ng, Interpreting China’s Military Power: Doctrine Makes Readiness (London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 20–21.
2. Srikanth Kondapali, “China’s Naval Strategy,” Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis 23, no. 12 (March 2000), p. 2, www.idsa-inidia.org/an-mar00-3.html.
3. Zhang Yuliang, The Science of Campaign (Beijing: National Defense University Press, May 2006, 2nd printing, September 2006), pp. 1, 4.
4. Peng Guangqian Yao Youzhi, ed. The Science of Military Strategy (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, Academy of Military Science of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, 2005), pp. 9–10, 103.
5. Yuliang, The Science of Campaign, pp. 16–17, 23.
6. Ibid., pp. 16–17, 23, 571.
7. Ibid., 574–75, referring to the Soviet Navy’s manual Provisional Instructions on the Conduct of Naval Operations (Vremenoye Nastavlenie po Vedenyo Morskikh Operatsii).
8. Yuliang, The Science of Campaign, pp. 5, 573.
9. Ibid., pp. 597, 603–17, 627.
10. Ibid., pp. 307–11, 571–617, 627.
11. Ka Po Ng, Interpreting China’s Military Power, p. 146.
12. Kevin McCauley, “PLA Developing Joint Operation Capability-Part One: Joint Task Force Experimentation,” the Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, 20 May 2011, p. 1, http://www.jamestown.org.
13. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2010, p. 30.
14. Yuliang, The Science of Campaign, pp. 175–76.
15. Ibid., p. 141.
16. Office of Naval Intelligence, A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2009), p. 35.
17. Office of Naval Intelligence, China’s Navy 2007 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2007), pp. 87, 89, 90.
18. Srikanth Kondapalli, “China’s Naval Training Program,” Strategic Analysis 23, no. 8 (1999), p. 1342.
19. Office of Naval Intelligence, A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics, pp. 41–42.
20. Jim Thomas, “China’s Active Defense Strategy and Its Regional Implications,” testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 27 January 2011, p. 3.