Consider how easy it would be for a hostile Third World nation with a little wherewithal to close down the Strait of Hormuz. Not only would the United States and our allied/coalition navies lose their freedom of maneuver, the entire world economy would suffer if the free flow of crude oil from the Persian Gulf stopped. A relatively small investment in boats, personnel, and mines is all it would take to impede this vital strategic choke point and hold maritime sway in that region. There is little argument that a mine is one of the most asymmetrical weapons ever introduced in warfare, and its availability through black market proliferation is ominous.
Now, consider how easily the mine threat could be defeated by an expeditionary maritime nation that had a mine countermeasure capability forward deployed on a continuous basis. Not a fleet of single-mission minesweepers or air capable counter-mine assets; rather, a system that is integral to a multinational maritime force or to a U.S. Navy carrier or expeditionary strike group. Imagine an organic system that could be launched and recovered in a relatively short time, a system that could operate over the horizon independent of other mission areas and obviate any need for fly-away teams, special mission modules, or force protection.
That system is the U.S. Navy's Remote Minehunting System (RMS) and it can be installed in an Arleigh Burke-class Aegis destroyer. The destroyer-mounted RMS (DDG-RMS) offers a tremendous niche capability for independently deployed ships or units and fills the mine countermeasures gap in the U.S. Navy's strike group forces. When mines are discovered, there may be little time to wait for a dedicated mine force to arrive on the scene and then commence the drawn-out process of minehunting. Conversely, the DDG-RMS will be on station and working the problem with little delay, while remaining ready to conduct all other missions.
Of course, any discussion about minehunting must include a debate about the likelihood of mines in the waters through which the U.S. Navy travels. The question then becomes, should the Navy dedicate limited fiscal resources in the area of mine countermeasures? With even the most rudimentary analysis of the global security environment, any reasonable person will conclude that minelaying in the world's critical maritime shipping lanes is both feasible and possible. To think otherwise would be to assume away an enemy capability and would violate good military planning principles.
International Role
The primary RMS system component is the remote minehunting vehicle (RMV). The RMV is a semi-submersible, semi-autonomous, unmanned vehicle that tows a variable-depth sonar (VDS) to detect, localize, classify, and identify undersea threats at a safe distance from friendly ships. It uses advanced communications equipment and software to integrate into the Aegis combat system through the Remote Minehunting Functional Segment of the SQQ-89 V15 antisubmarine warfare suite. In conjunction with the variable-depth sonar, the RMV transmits real-time mine sonar images to the destroyer over a data link system. And since the RMS is unmanned, nobody will go into a minefield; this feature adds more value to the system than all the technology listed, combined.
In early 2007, my ship, the USS Bainbridge (DDG-96) completed a technical and operational evaluation of the RMS at the South Florida Test Facility in the vicinity of Port Everglades.
Subsequently, as the sole destroyer equipped with the RMS, the Bainbridge operated in the Mediterranean Sea, Red Sea, and Indian Ocean as the flagship for Standing NATO Maritime Group One. The system operated in the waters off Malta and Spain with great success and in the presence of allied mine warfare officers who showed deep appreciation for and interest in this capability. This deployment presented a great opportunity to demonstrate an organic minehunting capability for the alliance and to satisfy our long-standing commitment to NATO mine countermeasures forces. Historically, NATO navies are accustomed to operating in littoral environments near their home nations. And, because they are familiar with the lethality of warfare close to shore, a mine countermeasures system plays to this vested interest in keeping choke points and shipping lanes free and clear.
Additionally, now that NATO forces do not necessarily operate in the European theater, safe passage of war materiel to NATO ground forces, such as the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, is essential. Since ground force equipment must pass through vulnerable and potentially hostile regions, there has been a greater interest in mine warfare, where just like the U.S. Navy, an allied capability gap exists. Finally, if the United States will depend on our alliance and coalition partners for their contribution to the Global Maritime Partnership, the United States must offer niche capabilities that benefit the entire global maritime protection effort. Offering more ships may not always be the answer or even possible due to other commitments, but offering a capability package like RMS that amplifies the combat power of already deployed naval forces will be very attractive to nations that we rely on to fight today's enemy in the maritime domain.
A DDG-RMS allows for a greater U.S. contribution to NATO naval forces and helps to further our partnership initiatives for world naval primacy. But at the same time the U.S. Navy would retain the expertise in remote minehunting, a huge benefit that should not be overlooked. The protection of U.S. strike groups and the multitude of other American military vessels should not be left to chance. Nobody deploys like the U.S. Navy so it is within our best interest to take ownership of the problem. Do we really want to rely on others to fund, develop, and maintain proficiency in mine countermeasures? In the long run, that may not be a good bet. The U.S. Navy should guide the further development of mine countermeasures so that it satisfies our unique and demanding expeditionary needs.
Practical Application
In the immediate future, the U.S. Navy will conduct maritime presence operations with both carrier and expeditionary strike groups in the far reaches of the globe, and those forces will have to travel through strategic choke points to get there. To protect global commercial shipping or to shape international diplomatic conditions, the uninhibited use of the sea is essential. Unfortunately, something as simple as a mine can disrupt that effort in very little time and at very little cost to an adversary. For a strike group to travel from Norfolk, Virginia, to the Persian Gulf, it must transit through five "mineable" choke points.
Just for argument's sake, think about this hypothetical scenario. There are indications that the Bab al Mandab Strait has been mined. An American carrier strike group is headed south in the Red Sea on its way to the Persian Gulf to conduct presence operations. Political rhetoric with Iran has escalated to a point where the President is considering military operations. Saudi Arabia wants no part of this, so consequently, the carrier strike group will have no overflight rights allowing for operations from the Red Sea. In other words, the mission has ceased before it has begun because the carrier strike force is trapped in the Red Sea.
The Bab el Mandeb Strait is just over 2,000 nautical miles from Bahrain. At 15 knots, it will take the mine forces from Bahrain five days to get there. Perhaps an MH-53 would be available to sweep, but that helicopter, with its mine countermeasures equipment, will likely not be supportable within the carrier force for any significant period of time. This all assumes that the mined choke point is not covered with offensive weapons such as coastal launched cruise missiles or fast attack craft/fast inshore attack craft.
The bottom line in this scenario is that, when considering transit time for mine countermeasures vessels and lengthy mine warfare operations, the carrier strike group will be delayed from getting on station by more than a week. On the other hand, if that same strike group had a single RMS-configured destroyer, the situation would be different. At the first indication of mines in the Bab el Mandeb, the ship can sprint ahead of the strike group and begin her work. And, she can protect herself with the most sophisticated air defense system afloat—Aegis. In fact, when considering today's coastal defense cruise missile and transportable erectable launcher threats in the Middle East, one could argue that for air defense alone, an antiair warfare-capable surface combatant is the optimal warship for minehunting in a contested choke point.
What about the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)? The current thinking about the future of mine warfare is that the rapidly deployed LCS will arrive on station with a mine countermeasures package to contend with the threat. This is a concept still in development but will most likely be validated in the future. However, it remains to be seen how the LCS will deploy and how it will fit into a maritime force. Is it part of a strike group or will it be an independent deployer? Will it take shape and be organized like the mine countermeasures force or the patrol coastal squadron, forward deployed but integral to a standing task group? Until then the DDG-RMS fills that void. And even when the LCS does deploy, it will have only single mission capability and require the integration of additional LCSs to operate with full-spectrum, multi-mission warfare capability, something already neatly packaged within the destroyer.
Unresolved Issues
With all of that said, the DDG-RMS is far from perfect. As with every other high-tech combat system in the infancy stage, there are growing pains. Although it is only a matter of time until these issues be resolved, some critical concerns must be addressed now.
The first of these is Rules of Engagement (ROE). What would happen if the RMS was challenged or approached by a belligerent force while the destroyer is over the horizon? Is the commander obligated to defend it, thus placing his/her ship in danger? And if so, how? One of the major selling points for the RMS is that nobody will have to go into a minefield. Is this the exception to that rule? Or should some type of (yet-to-be-developed) standoff defensive measure be employed? Since the RMS is defenseless and is a costly extension to the destroyer's combat system, this question must be answered with a very realistic and practical understanding of ROE. Otherwise, we will figure it out as we go, and mistakes are inevitable. Also, there is the International Law of the Sea to comply with even though the United States is not a signatory. Consider our scenario about mining the Bab al Mandab Strait: can the RMS operate continuously in such a strategic choke point where the rules of transit passage apply without causing unwarranted political unrest? Violation of such agreements when mining is merely suspected may add fuel to an already smoldering diplomatic fire.
In addition to operational concerns, several technical bugs remain to be worked out such as the RMV launch and recovery system. The hardware associated with handling the RMV performs adequately in calm seas but leaves to chance the loss of the vehicle in anything greater than sea state three. This one-of-a-kind, davit-type equipment is unstable when recovering the RMV. It is a device that relies on precision timing and luck for the operator to "catch" the vehicle with a small probe (connected to an unstablized crossbar that is suspended by two independent payout cables) that must be inserted into a coupling on top of the pitching/rolling (and surfaced) vehicle. There is simply no work-around for this. This retrieval configuration is much more aptly suited for the calm waters of a test facility rather than the world's oceans or international choke points.
Another concern is the issue of manning and training personnel who will operate and maintain the RMS and all associated systems. On the Bainbridge, the sonar technicians own the RMS and the current manning level does not allow for simultaneous antisubmarine and mine warfare operations. One school of thought is that the RMS-configured destroyer's complement should be expanded with the appropriate number of personnel possessing all applicable classroom training. The other school of thought suggests that the size and composition of the crew should remain unchanged while a partial LCS mine warfare detachment will augment existing shipboard personnel. Other detachment personnel will remain on standby at a shore facility awaiting orders to fly out to a theater of operations when needed. However, this concept presents a whole new set of challenges when considering the assumed availability of LCS personnel and the cumbersome logistics associated with fly-away teams.
RMS Myths vs. Reality
There are varying opinions about the fate of the RMS. Some say it has no future in destroyers and was conceived under the misconception of doing more with less. In fact, when one considers its shaky beginning and near cancellation, it is not surprising that just one ship remains equipped to operate the system. Originally, DDG-91 and above were planned to be RMS configured, but when the program started running into technical difficulty, its feasibility became questionable. That is when the decision was made to keep the Bainbridge as the test ship and channel all future RMS initiatives toward development of an LCS mission module. In the case of the LCS-mounted RMS (LCS-RMS), it will sprint from one location to the next hunting for mines and identifying mine danger areas. It will be manned at minimal levels and have a high degree of automation, thus providing cost efficiencies while maximizing warfighting effectiveness. Although this has yet to be validated, there is little doubt that the LCS will prove its mettle in strengthening the U.S. surface fleet.
On the other hand, the real-world mine threat exists in the here and now. The LCS is a future weapon system and still some years away from the tip of the spear, while the DDG lives as the nation's point man for maritime supremacy. Destroyermen pride themselves on being 24/7, multi-mission, ever-ready combat mariners. If we want an expeditionary minehunting capability that will be there when we need it, the DDG-RMS delivers. Until the LCS is in the Fleet, this capability gap in U.S. maritime forces can be filled with the RMS deployed in the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. When the LCS-RMS reaches full operational capability, it should work hand in hand with the DDG-RMS to multiply the effect. Notionally, the RMS-configured destroyer would be first on the scene until an LCS arrives for the long and laborious process of follow-on mine countermeasures operations.
One may suggest that a destroyer won't be available for RMS operations while it is occupied with other missions. If a DDG is on station conducting maritime interdiction operations, positioned for strike tasking, and occupied with air/surface surveillance requirements for a given geographical region, will it really have time to get involved in the mine warfare business? Pose this question to those who have been there and the answer would be yes, without question.
The reasons for this are simple. Once the destroyer is in a position to launch the RMV, which takes on average about 20 minutes, there are few restrictions to other operations. The sole limitation is to remain within over-the-horizon communications range, typically about 20 to 25 nautical miles. And, if communications are lost, the RMV will automatically shift to autonomous mode and continue on its mission. The real-time data feed would be lost for that period but post-mission analysis would occur as normal when the vehicle is retrieved. If the ship is delayed and cannot reestablish communications with the RMV, the RMV will finish its mission and proceed to a predetermined rendezvous point and wait for the destroyer to arrive. It will conserve fuel and battery power by operating in a "sleep" mode until reenergizing systems when it is time to be recovered. So, with the exception of launch and recovery operations there is little impact on the multi-mission capabilities of our DDG fleet.
Seize the Moment
Although many tough questions about the DDG-RMS remain unanswered, it is fair to conclude that its capability should not be ignored. A strong argument can be made for its utility in either a carrier or expeditionary strike group as a means for protecting the vulnerable sea lanes of communication through which those forces must pass. This capability also offers tangible value to our allies and coalition partners when promoting a global naval effort. The DDG-RMS will be on the scene first with the ability to conduct mine countermeasures missions in addition to all the other tasks that a multi-mission surface combatant performs while remaining defendable and survivable.
Minehunting expertise would remain the forte of the U.S. Navy, whose expeditionary requirements are unmatched by any of the world's navies. And, until the LCS has a chance to take hold as the platform of choice for littoral operations, the DDG-RMS is the gap-filler to contend with readily available mines that could be employed by hostile regimes. If the threat of that most-asymmetric weapon goes unaddressed in the near term, the entire balance of maritime power could change at a moment's notice, giving way to conditions created by the radical adversaries of democratic governance. With the DDG-RMS in our Fleet today, the U.S. Navy will remain the vigilant guardians of the world's republics and the protectors of the global economy on which our lifestyle depends. This is an opportunity that must not be lost. Preservation of maritime supremacy is worth every penny invested in the destroyer-mounted Remote Minehunting System.