From the Banks of the Euphrates to the Shores of the Severn
(See D. McCawley, pp. 14-19, November 2008 Proceedings)
Gerhardt B. Thamm—McCawley, you will do well writing history. You have the talent for recording what others cannot. You can communicate with others who have endured the brutality of ground combat. With "A Hard Heart" you have touched this old Soldier's soul. You made me look into your mirror where I saw the frightened stare of a German boy soldier, and it made me cringe—once again. Continue, and you will excel in your task, telling what others can only recall in their deepest subconscious. Bravo Zulu.
The writer is the author of the 2000 book Boy Soldier: A German Teenager at the Nazi Twilight.
A Poster Child for Next-War-Itis
(See C. Hooper, pp. 22-26, November 2008 Proceedings)
Everett Ratzlaff, P.E.—As much as the Marines need an effective landing craft, I agree with Dr. Hooper that the current Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) is rapidly putting itself out of business for many of the reasons listed in the article. However, the Marines must have the capability to hit contested beaches in the near future, with quantity, and we cannot wait another ten years to field it.
One key point mentioned against the EFV is the need for a flat bottom. Why not make a vehicle with the proper anti-mine V-shaped lower hull, and then simply fill in the void to the inside of the tracks (or wheels) with flat plates forming a triangular space? This would provide a flat bottom across the entire vehicle as desired for planing on the water, but would also act as an improved mine resistant ambush protected (MRAP) hull. The space could have holes that would allow it to flood, thus aiding stability in the water, and then the water would self-drain on reaching land. The space could even be used for additional supplies or lightweight armor once ashore, with access via panels or flaps between the track or wheels. These would provide even more protection for the hull and crew.
What is wrong with bolt-on inflatable rings like many rigid inflatable craft use? Multiple tubes or rings would be attached, and filled with continuous air pressure from the engine or a battery pump (so even if punctured they will still retain most of their buoyancy). These could simply be deflated on land, or detached if desired, but could also provide an excellent planing hull vehicle when in the water. If needed, a special bow ramp would also be inflated, greatly reducing the complexity and weight of the entire vehicle design.
Another requirement would be two small water-jets for high-speed propulsion. These could also be attachments (and even include fuel) or a slightly larger main engine could power motor driven water-jets. A hybrid vehicle could use the battery/fuel cell supplemental power for the race to the beach.
The rest of the craft would be a standard light armored vehicle (LAV), MRAP, or other armored assault vehicle for most of the design effort, cost, and schedule. If it was a Stryker variation of the LAV with the metal grill work around it (anti-RPG), the inflatable bladders might even fit inside the box.
If the Marines could think a little outside the box, yet use the KISS approach, such a truly versatile, survivable, and affordable high-speed landing craft could be a reality soon.
Vietnam, Revisited
(See T. V. Draude, pp. 42-46, November 2008 Proceedings)
Colonel Ken Jordan, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)—I am very impressed with the most recent Marine Corps issue of Proceedings, and most touched by Brigadier General Tom Draude's impressions cited in "Vietnam, Revisited." Ironically, I just returned from Vietnam in late October so his words, observations, and opinions were very timely. While my experience during this trip was limited to the northern I Corps sector where my detachment of 3d Force Recon Company spent most of our time, I was exposed to the southern sector during a visit ten years ago. I too was touched by the favorable treatment we received from the Vietnamese people, and I saw no evidence of rancor or bitterness toward us, even though we were obviously U.S. Marines, as evidenced by our hats and shirts displaying the Globe and Anchor.
We had several very special experiences, the first as we paid tribute (again) to one of my officers who lost his life in 1966, in a ceremony at Phi Bhi in which his son—who was 3 years old when he lost his dad—participated.
We also visited the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command in Hanoi and received a thorough briefing from the Marine major assigned to the unit, during which he emphasized the support they receive from the Vietnamese armed forces in conducting searches to locate the remains of missing American warriors. Finally, we were accompanied by a former Vietcong major for a day as we trekked the extraordinary Vinh Moc tunnel complex in the (former) North Vietnam and reviewed the four-day battle of Dai Do, where he commanded the enemy force that joined with the NVA 320th Regiment against the 2d Battalion Fourth Marines (the "Magnificent Bastards").
Tom Draude is correct. Vietnam has changed and is an excellent place to visit, as well as a game-changer for those who still carry around some demons from their personal experience there. I've never been more proud of being a Marine, and the Proceedings special issue reinforces that feeling. Semper Fi.
Lieutenant Commander Paul E. Cornelius, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Just a small counterpoint to Brigidier General Draude's article with respect to religious freedom in today's Vietnam, in particular where he discussed attending a Catholic mass and that he "sensed no Big Brother watching or taking names."
I am fortunate to be a member of a vibrant Catholic church in Florida where our assistant pastor is Vietnamese. He was a "boat person" who escaped and eventually made it to the United States and became a citizen. He subsequently attended college and the seminary where he became an ordained Catholic priest.
Recently, using his U.S. passport he returned to Vietnam to visit some of his relatives who still live there. On arriving in Vietnam he was told by the authorities that he could not say mass. However, his relatives begged him to say a mass for them while he was in country. He did so, was arrested, and only after his parents paid what amounted to a ransom was he released and allowed to return to the United States. So much for religious freedom in Vietnam! Big Brother is watching.
The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in Iraq
(See D. Kidwell, p. 62, November 2008 Proceedings)
Bing West—In her review of my book, The Strongest Tribe, Dr. Deborah Kidwell wrote, "West credits three decisions—Bush's surge strategy, Odierno's broad attack and Petraeus's decision to disperse U.S. forces within neighborhoods—with . . . success."
Actually, my book explained that these three decisions in the eastern Baghdad region in 2007 occurred six months after the Sunni uprising in Anbar Province in the west. In the fall of 2006, the Sunni tribes in Anbar Province came over to the American side against al Qaeda. Yet Anbar, according to conventional wisdom, was ranked as the last province to be pacified, if ever. That conventional wisdom didn't factor in that the Marine Expeditionary Force was sending the same battalions back to the same cities on seven-month tours. Over the years, the Americans and Iraqis grew to know one another, while Marine tactics improved. They persisted in small patrols as the population went through a cycle of opposing them (2004), resenting them (2005), and seeking their protection (2006) after experiencing al Qaeda's reign of terror.
The tribes swung due to the persistence in small unit patrolling—the essence of counterinsurgency—of the Marine Expeditionary Force. Two fronts—Anbar in the west and the Baghdad region in the east—accounted for about 80 percent of all U.S. casualties during the war. The key to the turnaround in the west was bottom-up partnership between local leaders and U.S. battalion commanders. The locals knew who were al Qaeda in Iraq; the Americans brought the hammer. The public face of the turnaround was Sheik Sattar, leader of the Sunni Awakening. His partner was Colonel Sean McFarland. In Tal Afar, the partnership was between McMaster and Sheik Najim; in Haditha, between Tracy and police chief Farouk; in Qaim, between Alford and Sheik Kirdi; in Ramadi, between Jurney and police chief Salaam; and in Fallujah, between Mullen and police chief Faisal. By the fall of 2006, such local partnerships were springing up across the west.
The turnaround on the eastern front (Baghdad) followed in 2007. The same bottom-up partnerships eventually emerged, shaped by the three decisions at the top cited by Kidwell. Iraq was never a top-down war that could be won by generals. The message of The Strongest Tribe is that insurgencies are local, and have to be fought from the bottom up.
It's important we understand the reasons for the turnaround in Iraq, lest we draw the wrong lessons. Afghanistan cannot be turned around by appointing a new general, no matter how brilliant, or by a surge of American soldiers. It will require breaking U.S. brigades down into small units partnered in outposts and villages with Afghan soldiers, police and local sub-tribes. Do we know how to do that? Yes, but it runs higher risk than sallying forth in large units from firm bases, and it takes time (as in years).
Special Operations Need Their Own Ships
(See R. E. Duyos III, pp. 72-74, November 2008 Proceedings)
Chief Warrant Officer 3 Michael W. Carr, U.S. Army—In response to Lieutenant Duyos' appeal for ships to support U.S. Navy special operations, the vessels he proposes already exist in the U.S. Army watercraft fleet in the form of tugs, landing craft, and logistic support vessels (LSVs).
As I have mentioned in previous Proceedings articles, the LSV's ability to self deploy, conduct amphibious landings, support 2,000 tons of deck cargo, and use stern and bow ramps to deploy and retrieve small boats, makes these vessels highly suitable for special operations missions.
According to their system performance requirments, logistic support vessels were conceived and designed by the Army to operate over "long distances either independently or autonomously for extended periods . . . in undeveloped or degraded areas." Though conceived to haul cargo within the traditional Army transportation field, the new challenges and responsibilities of joint operations, counterinsurgency, and stability and support operations requires a paradigm change in the use of Army watercraft.
These vessels are now capable of supporting special operations missions, and with some modifications, such as the addition of helicopter pads and dynamic positioning systems, would become even more potent. The Philippine Navy's Bacolod-class LSVs, modeled after the U.S. Army's, are equipped with flight decks and a partially covered well deck, providing a versatile and multipurpose maritime platform.
LSV-7 and -8 are the Army's newest vessels, fielded in 2007, and normally assigned the traditional roles and missions of hauling cargo. LSV-8, home-ported in Baltimore, Maryland, is ideally located to support and train with U.S. Navy Special Warfare Groups out of Little Creek, Virginia, and LSV-7, home-ported in Pearl Harbor, could easily support Special Warfare Groups from San Diego and Hawaii.
The Army's watercraft training command and school, located at Ft. Eustis, Virginia, is just across Hampton Roads from the Navy's Little Creek amphibious base. Again, both are ideally located for joint support of training operations. Army vessels have, in the past, supported Naval Special Warfare, and with a refinement in training and doctrine, could provide reliable platforms for Navy special operations missions.
Non-government organizations such as Blackwater USA have developed maritime operations divisions, and have fielded vessels equipped with flight decks, rubber inflatable boats, and other adaptable, versatile configurations. The recent stand up of U.S. Africa Command increases the need for attention to amphibious and remote operations as well as joint operations with Naval Special Warfare.
The Army's extensive fleet of small and large tugs, landing craft, and LSVs are an ideal resource for supporting Lieutenant Duyos' call for increased effectiveness in "facing the challenges of both regional adversaries and global terrorism."
Four-Star Flagship
(See T. J. McKearney, p. 8, October 2008 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Brian Waite, U.S. Navy—Commander McKearney's commentary accurately identified the numerous challenges facing the United States' newest combatant command, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), specifically with regard to the geographic location of its headquarters. His recommendation to solve these problems with a sea-based staff deployed on board a U.S. Navy command ship would, as he suggests, provide the AFRICOM commander with a unique level of mobility, flexibility, and access throughout the area of responsibility (AOR). Unfortunately, I humbly submit that basing AFRICOM at sea would likely result in the fledgling command's failure, until it could be redeployed ashore. This would waste valuable time in a region where we are already coming late to the game.
Today's military families are stretched beyond tolerance as service members face multiple overseas deployments away from loved ones. Placing a joint staff at sea only serves to extend these periods of separation. This has implications not only on the family life of the individual Sailor, Soldier, or Marine, but also on the ability of the command to recruit elite civilian and military personnel with the skills to solve the difficult problems AFRICOM faces. Shipboard life away from home would likely serve as a deterrent to these individuals.
Given the existing difficulties of finding a location on the African continent for AFRICOM, it may prove equally difficult to find a port willing to accept the families and infrastructure required to support the staff. If the command ship maintains a home port elsewhere, the staff will spend significant time away from the AOR, defeating the intended purpose of sea-basing.
Further, modern military theater security cooperation (TSC) initiatives require close and continuous collaboration between the combatant command and other Defense Department entities, foreign militaries and governments, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations. Shore-based commands already find it difficult to bring these capabilities to bear when conducting TSC, despite the critical role they play in developing partner capabilities. An afloat AFRICOM, although able to quickly reposition to a single location, would find it difficult, if not impossible, to build these relationships by traveling to or hosting members of these organizations whose members span the globe.
Advanced communication and remote collaboration tools may be able to mitigate some of these concerns should AFRICOM someday find its home at sea. Perhaps a better alternative would be to follow the model of U.S. Central Command, whose headquarters is thousands of miles away from its AOR, and yet is able not only to execute both Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, but also to conduct TSC engagements with partner countries throughout Central Asia and the Middle East.
Wherever AFRICOM ultimately finds its home, I am confident that it will provide the Sailors, Soldiers, and Marines stationed there with the unique opportunity to see this amazing continent and to partner with the proud military professionals who work to make their respective nations safe and free to the benefit of the global community.
Robert A. Goley—I was struck by Commander McKearney's comments in the October issue. As an employee of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency's Maritime Domain, I have had some knowledge of the establishment of AFRICOM. But I was not aware of the amount of resistance the United States has had from African nations regarding the establishment of a home for the command on African soil. I can easily understand it, but find it unfortunate.
Commander McKearney's suggestion of having a flagship take on that role is innovative. Using the USS Coronado (AGF-11) may well be the best bet. But I would like to nominate two other ships for the role. First up: the SS United States.
This noble ship is currently in private hands but would be ideal in several ways. She was originally built with military needs in mind. It may be relatively easy to re-fit her as a flagship. She was very fast and this capability would be helpful if there was a need to move the command closer to a developing situation. She was a civilian symbol of the United States among the seafaring nations. Though she would probably have to be re-done in haze gray, her lines denote anything but "military presence." She would be more palatable to a host nation than a military vessel.
My second nominee has similar qualities but would be more problematic: the NS Savannah. This ship is still in Maritime Administration hands. However, her reactor has been decommissioned if not totally removed. The expense of reactivating it may make her unsuitable for the purpose at hand. But, if it were done, she might be relatively efficient at moving about the continent. As a former cargo ship with an unusual amount of cabin space, she could be converted with relative ease.
Both of these proposals would be expensive. But I believe their availability and qualities make them good candidates for consideration.