The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), accompanied by the defense budget for fiscal year 2007, is now complete and has been dispatched to Congress. But this milestone does not so much mark the end of a long and rigorous process as it signals the beginning of a much lengthier and even more difficult period of executing and implementing the directions set by the QDR. Furthermore, as we will see, four external factors will also largely influence the shape and breadth of America's future military capability.
Both Deputy secretary of Defense Gordon England and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Edmund Giambastiani, the two co-chairs supervising the development of the QDR, caution that the document is about policy direction, not specific programs and budgets. The intent is to "emphasize" the continuing transformation of the military into a joint and integrated capability with greater lethality, precision, speed, and agility. In addition to defending the homeland and fighting conventional-style wars, this joint capability must be expanded in conducting irregular warfare and influencing other states at strategic crossroads, such as China, to follow policies that lead to peace and comity rather than tension and conflict.
Yet how U.S. military capability can induce China to move in these directions remains unanswered. How the military can improve "strategic communication"-meaning public and preventive diplomacy in winning the war of ideas in the fight against "violent extremism," the Pentagon term for the war on terror-is also deferred. And how the "stovepipes and ruts" of a Department of Defense originally organized in a vertical and unintegrated manner can finally be eliminated is crucial. Meanwhile, initial funding for these and other shifts in emphasis, such as fielding more special forces and special operations capabilities, is in the latest budget.
Four real-world realities loom large. First, there are limits on how long defense spending can continue increasing. With swelling budget and trade deficits approaching a combined annual amount of $1 trillion, even with a gross domestic product of more than $12 trillion, at some stage the nation's wallet will shrink, with profound effects on programs that already push fiscal limits.
Second, turmoil and uncertainty in the greater Middle East, from Iran to a West Bank and Gaza now under the control of Hamas, will surely build. And new hot spots, whether in Latin America or Africa, will emerge to place demands on U.S. capability, regardless of how much or how little forces in Iraq are drawn down.
Third, the congressional-defense industrial base consortium will be even keener to protect the big-ticket items regarding ships, aircraft, and C4I/space systems, putting further demands on an already jam-packed budget.
Fourth, at some stage, the extended honeymoon between the public and the military will likely sour. The Pentagon has been very fortunate in the high esteem that its fighting men and women are held. Sadly, that admiration is not in perpetuity.
Hence, each of the services will simultaneously have to deal with winning the fight against terror and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; address the unanswered questions in the QDR; implement its policy directives; and contend with the effects of these four powerful external forces.
But is the Pentagon organized to achieve this daunting agenda? The senior naval leadership no doubt is mulling whether a largely vertical Cold War structure and a separate acquisition and operational chain of command, along with a weak interagency process, is up to the task of taking all of the necessary horizontal actions that cut across the Navy and Marine Corps.
Industry has solved slices of this problem with integrated product teams. DoD has experimented with and uses joint program offices. And other alternatives have been proposed. A high priority is to convene a task force with a very short time frame to determine what new or revamped type of organization is needed to deal best with these most demanding, concurrent challenges. The QDR can be a near-perfect document in its directions and priorities. But naval officers know well that execution counts most.
Transformation has been the centerpiece of the Bush administration's defense thinking. But that transformation has not yet been fully translated into the Pentagon's organization. This may prove the greatest challenge of all.
Mr. Ullman is a columnist for Proceedings and the Washington Times. A television commentator, his newest book, due out in June, is America's Promise Restored: Preventing Culture, Crusade, and Partisanship from Wrecking Our Country.