The future of Navy ship-based helicopters presents some issues of concern and controversy for many in the U.S. Navy.1 Previously, the Navy operated SH-60B Seahawks from surface combatants in the antisubmarine warfare (ASW) role, SH-60F helicopters from carriers for ASW, and the HH-oOHs from carriers for combat search and rescue and to support SEAL operations. In addition, UH-46 Seaknights and MH-53E Super Stallions were employed for vertical replenishment operations, and the MH-53Es for mine countermeasures (MCM). The latter helicopters are based ashore. In the future, all of these helicopter roles are to be flown by the multipurpose MH-60R Seahawk and MH-60S Knighthawk helicopters.
The MH-60R combines both types of helicopter ASW as well as the surface surveillance and attack roles. The MH-60S performs MCM, SEAL support, combat search and rescue, and vertical replenishment. Both the MH-60R and the MH-60S can be armed with Hellfire guided missiles, guns, rockets, and machine suns.
Unlike the P-3 replacement situation, the MH-60 acquisition program currently is on track. The original MH-60R program provided for the "remanufacture" of existing SH-60B LAMPS III, SH-60F ASW, and HH-60H search-andrescue helicopters.2 Subsequently, in 2001, the Navy made the decision to manufacture new MH-60R helicopters, and 240 are being produced through about 2014. The MH-60S program calls for the production of 237 helicopters. (Nine older helicopters were remanufactured to H-60R prototypes.)
Like the P-3 Orion force, however, there is concern and debate over the roles of these helicopters. Those who advocate arming all Navy H-60s with forward-looking infrared, machine guns, and missiles cite the role of these helos in providing significant defense against "swarming small boats" that threaten U.S. naval forces in forward areas.3
When coupled with the other missions tasked to these helicopters, and the normal use of armed helicopters in some forward deployed areas-"armed passenger/mail/cargo flights and latenight carrier inner-zone radar-surveillance missions"-the availability of these helicopters to practice and train for ASW is very limited.4 The situation is further exacerbated because of the very different ASW operating environments for helicopters. The SH-60B LAMPS helicopter was specialized for a passive environment, employing sonobuoys and other sensors to detect submarines at long distances from battle groups or other naval forces.4 The SH-60F was optimized for ASW in the relatively noisy environment of a carrier battle group, using active dipping sonar as its primary sensor.
Thus, not only is the MH-60R force being giving multiple roles, all of which will detract from ASW, but the merger of the active/passive detection concepts will further inhibit specialization. At the same time, the removal from aircraft carriers of the S-3B Viking fixed-wing ASW capability means helicopters will be the Navy's only ship-based ASW aircraft. (The Northrop Grumman RQ-8A Fire Scout drone is intended for the ASW role-among others-but this system still is in the development stage.)
The ASW capabilities of the Navy's P-3 and H-60 communities are being marginalized at the same time that Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Vern Clark and other officers are calling for greater ASW effectiveness, especially in the littoral areas.5 The solution to this dichotomy is not simple, but it must be addressed, and quickly. A balance of some sort is needed, but a rational balance, not one decided on by the ability of one or another advocacy group to be more articulate.
1 See N. Polmar, "Airborne ASW: A Critical Issue (Part 1), U.S. Naval institute Proceedings, Aprii 2004, p. 88.
2 LAMPS = light airborne multipurpose system.
3 Sec Capt. Wayne A. Tunick, USN, and Lt. Michael J. Weaver, USN, "Arm all Navy Helicopters," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 2003, pp. 36-39.
4 Cdr. Jeffrey Barta, USN, comment on "Arm All Navy Helicopters," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 2004, p. 10.
5 Sec, for example, Cdr. Richard E. Farrcll, USN, "Revitalize ASW," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 2003, pp. 40-43. This article immediately follows the above cited piece arguing for arming all Navy helicopters by Captain Tunick and lieutenant Weaver.