Nobody Asked Me, But...The Revolt of the Generals Is Coming

The headlines are sadly familiar: personal animosity arises between the Secretary of Defense and a service chief; a major weapon system is canceled; a service secretary resigns; and a campaign of “leaks” is orchestrated to resurrect the system. The time was 1949, and the events came to be called the “Revolt of the Admirals,” a struggle to define the roles and missions of a military faced with technological change, increasing commitments, and fiscal constraints. The new technology then was nuclear weapons.

Shortly after taking office, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson canceled the United States (CVA-58), the first big-deck carrier, without the courtesy of informing Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Louis E. Denfield. Navy Secretary John L. Sullivan resigned in protest. To counter Air Force propaganda, Navy officers leaked negative reports on the Air Force’s new bomber, financial conflicts of interest by the Secretary of Defense, and plummeting morale in the fleet. The House Armed Services Committee began an investigation. The new Navy Secretary, Francis Matthews, testified that the leaked information on morale did not reflect the opinion of most naval officers. Admiral Denfield and other senior Navy officers later directly contradicted Secretary Matthews. Navy careers were ended, including Admiral Denfield’s. Only the Korean War ended the revolt.

Today, as in 1949, we have a strong-willed Secretary of Defense willing to make radical changes. Donald Rumsfeld fired the former Secretary of the Army Thomas White, in part over the latter’s opposition to the cancellation of a major Army procurement program and a resulting campaign of leaks. Former Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki, who also had a stormy relationship with Secretary Rumsfeld, had his replacement named 15 months before his retirement, truncating his influence. More telling, the officer named as General Shinseki’s replacement, General John Keane, later refused the position, as did several other senior officers. To staff the position, the Secretary of Defense called General Peter Schoomaker out of retirement. In February of this year, yet another Army program, the advanced Comanche helicopter, was canceled.

Today, precision-guided munitions generate doctrinal questions almost as trying as those raised by the introduction of nuclear weapons 60 years ago. The roles and missions of the services are under discussion at a level not seen since the 1940s. The roles of the Secretary of Defense, service chiefs, and senior military leaders also are changing—not through formalized reviews, but by the actions of the Secretary of Defense himself. Not since the days of Robert McNamara has a Secretary of Defense brought such a faith in technology and business practices. In business, redundancy is waste; in the military, redundancy is depth. This conflict in approach might be the foundation for a future “Revolt of the Generals.”

Secretary Rumsfeld is a man with a mission, willing to take personal charge and reach down and manage issues at a level traditionally left to the service secretaries and senior officers. He reportedly vets all flag and general officer nominations made by the service secretaries—an unprecedented level of micromanagement. Should we see a “revolt,” the need for transformation will not be the issue—it will be defining future capabilities, the path to reach those goals, and managing risk. All the services are affected by transformation, but the Army has the most at risk.

General Shinseki developed a transformation plan defined by an objective force, interim force, and legacy force. While defining a radical goal in its objective force, the plan mitigated risk through the development of an intermediate capability and the retention of legacy forces built around the M1 Abrams tank. Although controversial in the Army, the approach was generally accepted.

Secretary Rumsfeld also has a vision for transformation, though less articulated. Prior to Iraq, this was rumored to involve reducing the Army by two to four divisions. Technology would be leveraged to increase lethality within a smaller force. This approach was seen in Afghanistan, where Army forces deployed without artillery, relying instead on air power. This might illustrate the Secretary’s business approach, with its need to eliminate duplication. For the Army, it represents increased risk. Efficiency in the business world equates to reduced cost; in the Army it equates to fewer body bags. The approaches are not synonymous.

We are at something of a transformation operational pause. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, coupled with funding plus-ups, could be delaying some of the hard decisions—but force structure and missions will have to be addressed eventually. Very soon, the willingness of our military leaders to acquiesce silently to a plan imposed from the top will be tested.

Commander Denny serves with Commander, Eastern Atlantic, Detachment 108, a unit supporting NATO. He works for the DIA.