In his answers to questions of the Armed Services Committee dated 27 September 2002, then-Marine Corps Commandant General James Jones made clear it is time to reconsider the Defense Department Reorganization Act of 1986 (Goldwater-Nichols). He wrote: "In our effort to standardize how we treat service members across the Department of Defense, our laws increasingly limit the flexibility required to maintain service competencies and cultures."
Under cover of jointness, we are moving toward a one-service type military. Such unification would be the worst thing that could happen. Our military strength depends on highly specialized services distinct in capability that are well trained, equipped, organized, and led. Jointness must be an extension of service capability—it never can be a substitute.
Unfortunately, Jointness has become an end in itself. It seems that, no matter what the issue, if we just include the word joint, success is ensured. Services now are sending their top officers to the Joint Staff because it is the only way for these officers to get promoted to flag and general officer.
This process has led to the dominance of the Joint Staff over the service staffs. There is no question that the quality of the Joint Staff has been improved. But to have the service chiefs subordinated to the Secretary of Defense, combatant commanders, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the Vice Chairman ignores hands-on experience and ultimately is contrary to effective war fighting. Each chief rose to head his service because of his talent and experience. The services are where war fighting capability lies; they are the experts.
Removing the service chiefs from key decisionmaking has left the services with mere administrative leaders. Imagine World War II without Fleet Admiral Ernest King and General of the Army George Marshall heading their forces. How effective could these outstanding officers have been as Chief of Naval Operations and Army Chief of Staff if they were simply advisers to President Franklin Roosevelt? Under Goldwater-Nichols, Eisenhower, Nimitz, and MacArthur would not have been answerable to King and Marshall or the Joint Chiefs.
By making the JCS chairman the sole military adviser to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council, military thought is centralized at a time when just the opposite is needed. General Jones wrote: "The roles and functions of the Joint Chiefs need to [be] reexamined and appropriately redefined to continue the tradition and expectation of being able to provide powerful military direction to Congress, the President, and the Secretary of Defense." The President should hear the separate views of Congress, the Secretary of Defense, the JCS Chairman, the individual service chiefs, and the combatant commanders. Effective policy formation and execution always are improved by considering alternative views—especially in matters as complicated as warfare.
In addition, when a military subject is discussed in the national policy area, the service chiefs should meet with the National Security Council. This ensures all options are presented and evaluated by the people with the greatest military knowledge. It also would ensure that all civilian and military leaders in the executive branch are fully informed. In the Vietnam War, President Lyndon Johnson heard primarily from his Secretary of Defense and the JCS Chairman. The outcome of that war speaks for itself.
The service chiefs must meet regularly with Congress and the President. Before the House Armed Services Committee in 1983, former JCS Chairman Admiral Thomas Moorer testified: "I don't think any President has had enough discussions with the Joint Chiefs. . . . He sees the Chairman all the time, but he doesn't see the other members." Moreover, the public and the media do not hear regularly from the service chiefs. When Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld holds press conferences at the Pentagon, the officer with him is never a service chief. In his 1946 testimony before the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, Fleet Admiral King said: "The strength of the Joint Chiefs of Staff lies in the combined knowledge possessed by the individual members and in the checks and balances that tend to prevent discrimination by any one person."
Congress must consider making the service chiefs official heads of their services in all ways, including operations. They could more effectively support the combatant commanders if they could, for example, order the movement of forces worldwide when required. Who has a better overall picture of the political and military situation than the service chiefs? Effective mission integration begins with four strong services, each headed by one officer with appropriate operational responsibility.
Goldwater-Nichols has resulted in a steady decline in the authority of the service chiefs that has gone essentially unnoticed by the public and Congress. The chiefs' practical experience and knowledge make their participation critical to the national military process. They belong on top of the individual military services, where a vacuum now exists. Goldwater-Nichols must be revised to again make the Joint Chiefs leaders, not just advisers.
Mr. Previdi writes on military and political affairs. He is the author of Civilian Control Versus Military Rule (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1988).