With her embarked Harrier squadrons, VMA-542 and 223, the Bataan (LHD-5) became a strike platform, joining with the Bonhomme Richard (LHD-6) in the Arabian Gulf to add fire power and flexibility to naval forces.
War is a catalyst for innovation. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, large-deck amphibious ships adapted to a new mission for which they had never trained-acting in an aircraft carrier role by conducting expeditionary strike warfare. These "Harrier carriers" increased the Navy's warfighting options. Their mission modification capitalized on the ships' multifaceted capabilities and recognized that naval expertise on board large-deck amphibious platforms, combined with Marine air assets, is a powerful force multiplier.
The Harrier carrier concept proved quite successful during Iraqi Freedom despite numerous operational challenges. Because this mission was never part of the interdeployment training cycle, amphibious airspace, ordnance sustainment, intelligence, and meteorologic and oceanographic issues all had to be addressed. How the Navy overcame these operational realities can point the way for future Harrier carrier operations.
Genesis of the Concept
The Harrier carrier concept was conceived in December 1990, as U.S. forces were preparing for the first war in Iraq. Twenty AV-8 Harriers embarked on the Nassau (LHA-4) and six on the Tarawa (LHA-1) deployed to the Persian Gulf for Operation Desert Shield. Lieutenant General Walter Boomer, Commander, U.S. Marine Forces Central Command, agreed to offload the Tarawa's Harriers in Saudi Arabia, but opposed offloading the Nassau's, arguing they would have better maintenance support and flexibility if left on board. The general understood the Harrier carrier at sea would be a force multiplier for the Marine air-ground task force.1
Some were reluctant to rely on this unorthodox concept, and more traditional, proven strike assets-the carrier air wings' A-6s and F/A-18s-were chosen to provide close air support. As a result, the Nassau's Harriers did not participate until an amphibious raid was planned for Faylakah Island. On 20 February 1991, the Nassau finally launched her Harriers, and Marine Attack Squadron 331 flew 240 combat missions and dropped more than 900 bombs in support of battle area interdiction and close air support. During the final week of Desert Storm, the Nassau became the first LHA used as a Harrier carrier, with up to 60 sorties per day.2
Twelve years later, with war in Iraq again on the horizon, Amphibious Task Forces (ATF) East and West were stood up for deployment to the northern Arabian Gulf. Two amphibious assault ships were designated as Harrier carriers and equipped with 24 Harriers—the Bataan (LHD-5) and the Bonhomme Richard (LHD-6). In March 2003, the two task forces, which included seven amphibious big decks, unified under Rear Admiral W. Clyde Marsh, Commander, Task Force 51, in the Arabian Gulf.
This time the Harrier carrier met with more enthusiasm, and technological improvements made the LHD more versatile. On 19 March 2003, after receiving President George W. Bush's execute order, the Bataan launched her first AV-8 mission in support of Iraqi Freedom.
Operational Realities
The Bataan had to overcome several key challenges while operating as a Harrier carrier. Coupled with the chaos of a short-notice surge deployment, her crew had never trained for this mission. The only historical information came from a 1991 Center for Naval Analyses report on the Nassau's short stint as a Harrier carrier during Desert Storm. The report provided bomb stats and advocated increasing the number of Harriers on the flight deck from 20 to 24, but little else was applicable. In particular, there were few standard operating procedures for handling amphibious air space, ordnance sustainment, and intelligence and meteorological and oceanographic needs.
* Overcoming Amphibious Air Space Constraints. During war, maritime air space often is at a premium, and flight safety is paramount when ships are operating in a confined space such as the Arabian Gulf. When all the East Coast large decks were on station in their assigned operating areas near Kuwait, the air boss and air traffic controllers discovered they had to expand the amphibious cartrier's air space when she is operating in close proximity to other amphibious ships flying Harriers. ATF East's three large decks (the Bataan, Kearsarge [LHD-3], and Saipan [LHA-2]) were operating within ten nautical miles of each other during the transit. Both the Bataan and Kearsarge carried a complement of Harriers, often resulting in overlapping traffic patterns. To alleviate this problem, all ATF East Harriers were consolidated on board the Bataan. When more than one amphib must conduct joint Harrier flight operations, a physical separation of at least 20 nautical miles must be established for air space deconfliction. In addition, a coordination frequency between all helicopter direction centers and air operations coordination centers is necessary to maintain safety of flight.
* Sustaining Ordnance Resupply. The Bataan's personnel understood the criticality of ensuring sufficient ordnance to sustain the Harrier carrier mission. Based on expected continuous heavy bombing, the ship's goal was to maintain a week's worth of aviation ordnance on board. By late February 2003, there were two fast combat support ships and one ammunition ship in theater, but they were tied to carrier battle groups and their ordnance was earmarked for air wing use.
Logistical staff officers explored several alternatives for resupply, including using stockpiled ammunition from ashore sources and resupply using Military Sealili Command break-bulk ships. Although connected replenishment from an ammunition ship was an option, the cramped deck space configuration at the single station available on an LHD is not conducive to rapid ammunition delivery. Another option tried was delivery using a dock landing ship (LSD) shuttle and air-cushion landing craft (LCACs), and this became the preferred means of resupply.
Acting as shuttle ship, the Pearl Harbor (LSD-52) received several ordnance replenishments from both the Cape John (T-AK 5022) and the Cape Gibson (T-AK 5051). The Bataan used an embarked MH-60 helo to support the vertical replenishment from the T-AK to the Pearl Harbor.
The ordnance typically then was moved from the shuttle ship's flight deck to her well deck, and loaded on an LCAC from there. LCACs carried up to 50 pallets of aviation ordnance, and tarps were used to keep the ordnance dry. Bringing two aviation ordnancemen and two fork trucks with them to expedite loading, the LCACs then shuttled the ordnance to the Bataan. Because delivery through the well deck did not affect flight operations, ordnance supplied by LCACs gave the Harrier carrier the greatest operational flexibility.
* Solving Intelligence Issues. Because they were designed to facilitate amphibious ready groups, LHA/LHD joint intelligence centers (JICs) are not concerned with strike operations. However, in choosing the Bataan to embark the AV-8s, the Navy serendipitously chose the JIC best suited to support a Harrier carrier.
Prior to reporting to the Bataan, the ship's intelligence officer had completed a tour at the Naval Strike and Warfare Center and was head of its Strike Cell Division. She already was advocating strike warfare on board amphibs and had obtained a Tactical Operational Scene 400 unit specifically for the JIC. She also had portable flight planning software installed on computers in the JIC and trained the majority of her intelligence specialists (ISs) on its use. Quite coincidentally, the Bataan's, JIC already had a plan in place to stand up an expeditionary strike intelligence cell (ESIC) approved by the commanding officer. This plan, Tactical Operational Scene, and portable flight planning software were critical to quickly establishing an ESIC capable of meeting the needs of Marine AV-8s. Most important, the Bataan was able to rapidly establish an ESIC because of the federation of intelligence among the JICs of ATF East.
The federation among the JICs proved vital to successful Navy/Marine intelligence support of the war. To mitigate information overload and duplication of effort, collection and reporting taskings were shared among all seven of Task Force 51's JICs. This solidified the team concept, reduced Fifth Fleet overhead, and eased the burden of daily intelligence requirements for undermanned JICs (such as those on board the Bataan and Saipan, which were not yet plussed up to 24 ISs). Imagery requirements also were federated to distribute the exploitation workload. Briefs, complete with notes, were pushed to the Bataan's JIC throughout the day. In addition, any significant threat information was passed via e-mail and chat. These processes ensured timely and pertinent information was briefed during the commanding officer's daily operations/intelligence brief. They significantly lessened the Bataan JIC's workload and ensured it could monitor threats to the ship instead of committing hours to research and building PowerPoint briefs.
To establish a strike cell, 6 of 15 intelligence specialists were carved out of the JIC and integrated with 6 Marines, their captain, and the ship's intelligence officer to man the ESIC. Cooperation was key since no one had worked together before, and hardly anyone had conducted real-world targeting. Because of time constraints, it was not possible to send personnel to schools prior to deployment. Personnel received on-the-job training on writing mission reports, debriefing pilots, and reading ground order of battle from imagery and Lightning Pod video. There was a steep learning curve, but effectiveness improved over time. One of the advantages the JIC had was that the majority of its ISs had completed a combat deployment just eight months earlier during Operation Enduring Freedom. They were seasoned veterans, which made them more flexible in dealing with both new mission requirements and the extra workload brought on by the ESIC and war. The Imagery Processing Intelligence Center became the heart of the ESIC. Its analysts became adept at providing imagery, selecting targets, and mensurating them via the Joint Service Imagery Processing System-Navy. They also analyzed AV-8 Lightning Pod video and provided bomb hit assessment, which was critical to battlefield commanders.
* Minimizing the Effects of Wind and Visibility Problems. Accurate forecasting was vital to getting aircraft safely on and off the flight deck, and technology and experienced weather forecasters on board the Bataan greatly mitigated the effects of weather on flight operations. The most critical meteorological parameter for the Bataan during Iraqi Freedom was visibility: 103 combat missions on five days were canceled because of reduced visibility. On these occasions, the Bataan was engulfed in dust storms so dense it was impossible to see beyond a few feet. While operating in the northern Arabian Gulf, weather forecasters discerned two patterns: frontal passage from February through April produced 11 dust storms; and southwesterly winds and remnants of afternoon thunderstorms over central Saudi Arabia advecting dust over the northern Gulf. Dust storms were accurately forecasted and briefed, resulting in zero weather-related mishaps and no aircraft being stranded at divert fields.
Another parameter for launching AV-8s was wind. To launch, combat-loaded Harriers require up to 30 knots of relative wind down the deck. Accurate microscale wind forecasts were critical to timely launches and enabled the officer of the deck to set up launch and recovery patterns in advance, to anticipate and account for changing wind conditions and thereby optimize the finite sea room assigned. Distractions in the assigned operations area, including heavy vessel traffic, anchorage areas, shoal water, and oil platforms, made it vital for the ship to get the required winds to launch the aircraft on the straightaway. In April, thermal heating of land had more of an effect on winds, as sea breeze and land breeze circulations developed. When the sea breeze conditions set up, the winds on the western side of the operational area were different from the eastern side. This forced a change in course and/or speed, reducing the already small 12 nautical mile leg even further.
Striking Power of the Harrier Carrier
The Harrier carrier concept is intriguing, but is it an option for providing more fire power for the Navy? The numbers speak for themselves. The Bataan's Harrier squadrons dropped more than 122 tons of ordnance, most of which was laser guided. More than 470 targets were eliminated, helping to defeat three Republican Guard divisions. Together, the Bataan and the Bonhomme Richard's squadrons expended more than 250 tons of ordnance, damaging, destroying, or removing from the fight some 1,200 targets.
Another advantage of the LHD is her inherent flexibility and adaptability to meet evolving missions. Before launching Harriers into battle, the Bataan carried major combat elements of Regimental Combat Team II from the East Coast to the fight, including 1,900 Marines, 175 vehicles, 270 tons of cargo and equipment, and hundreds of pallets of ground ammunition. She proved an LHD can deliver a Marine expeditionary unit, then rapidly reconfigure into a Harrier carrier for added strike capability. Both missions were done successfully in a wartime environment without loss of life, aircraft, or equipment.
Recommendations
* Harrier Carrier Relevance to the Expeditionary Strike Group. Combat proven in two major conflicts, the Harrier carrier is vital and relevant to the expeditionary strike group (ESG). Although the Navy and Marine Corps likely will continue to have a mission to maintain a traditional Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable) capability, the Harrier carrier concept should become a mission-essential training task and a required operational capability for all ESGs.
Amphibious ready groups have been required to practice certain contingency operational capabilities during predeployment training (such as emergency landing of a Harrier on an amphibious transport dock or dock landing ship; amphibious assault ship refueling alongside; LCAC safe haven in amphibs, etc.). In addition, each ESG amphibious assault ship should practice loading out and operating as a Harrier carrier so she can be an option for forward-deployed expeditionary forces, should the need arise. A pack-up kit to support a Harrier carrier also should be developed for deployed ESGs.
* Future Weapon Development. To ensure the Harrier carrier capability is executable while new technologies are being developed, it should become a practiced mission for both the Amphibious Assault Ship (Replacement) and the Joint Strike Fighter. By making it an objective requirement, inserted into the operational requirements document for both platforms, the concept will not fade away and both programs will include it as is a serious possibility for future conflicts and plan accordingly.
* Future JIC Support. Because of the many missions a JIC must support, an expeditionary strike intelligence cell is not a viable permanent element. It is more a capability among other competing capabilities that JICs must be able to perform whenever the need arises. Unfortunately, it is also a perishable capability that must be constantly trained and honed. Doctrine and operating procedures for JICs must be developed and implemented. West Coast JICs already have done this, and the East Coast must follow suit. Because platforms and forces from both coasts may one day operate together again, doctrine and procedures should be standardized.
Iraqi Freedom was a sneak preview of a mission that is fast becoming a requirement for JICs-supporting strike operations. JICs must continue to train and equip their personnel with the latest strike technology. Early training and integration with their Marine air counterparts is paramount for further success. If they follow these recommendations, JICs will be ready to establish and support another strike cell on short notice in defense of U.S. interests.
Final Thoughts
Transformation recognizes the need for a meaner, leaner military to respond to emerging threats. Using large-deck amphibious carriers as strike platforms undoubtedly adds flexibility to a Navy hard-pressed to face a larger number of volatile threats in the post-Cold War era. Harrier carriers also can reduce the load borne by today's heavily tasked aircraft carriers. To capitalize on this capability and ensure its flawless execution, doctrine should recognize and incorporate the Harrier carrier concept. Training should be modified to reflect this new capability, and it should become standard procedure for future operations. This will ensure amphibious carriers are prepared to carry out this vital new mission the next time it is needed.
1 Marvin Pokrant, Desert Shield at Sea (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999), pp 207-8.
2 William F. Morgan, "USS Nassau (LHA 4) and VMA 331 Strike Operations during Operation Desert Storm," CRM 91-140 (Alexandria, VA; Center for Naval Analyses, June 1992), p 1. Document is now declassified.
During Operation Iraqi Freedom, Commander Lobree, a surface warfare officer, served as C5I officer; Commander Dachos, a surface warfare officer, served as operations officer; Lieutenant Commander Rodriguez, an intel officer, served as the ship's intelligence officer; and Major Manzer, a CH-46E pilot, served as air operations officer.