American Soldier
Tommy Franks and Malcolm McConnell. New York: ReganBooks, 2004. 590 pp. Photos. Index. $27.95.
Reviewed by General Joseph P. Hoar, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)
American Soldier connects with the reader at several different levels. For most of us, we want to hear the inside view of both the Afghan and the Iraqi campaigns—what did the President say, and when did he say it? Did he have a clear vision of the threat? What role did the President's advisors have?
It is all here. But there is a great deal more. Growing up in a working-class family in Oklahoma and Texas and disillusioned with college, Tom Franks joined the Army and reached four-star rank by way of Officer Candidate School and all the tough challenges of war and peace. The picture of the past four decades of military service in the U.S. armed forces is a great one as portrayed in this book. For those of us of Franks's generation, we can relive the tremendously satisfying but almost always difficult lives and service of the career military person and his family. Franks 's narrative about Vietnam, family life, and peacetime soldiering will cause many to experience the emotions of that period all over again.
The reader will see the evolutionary thinking of the artillery officer who tried again and again to improve the command and control of his units over the years. We can see those early efforts to master command and control as Franks moved through Desert Storm to the Afghan and Iraqi campaigns. He gives us an extraordinary view of the contingency planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom. We learn of the guidance received from Washington and the iterative sequence of the plan's development. We get some views of secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, but I would have preferred to see more.
We learn that Rumsfeld's management style was difficult, but we do not learn much more than that. The reader will get a detailed accounting of the deception plan that caused the Iraqis to misjudge the timing and the direction of the ground attack—an extraordinary achievement to gain operational surprise given the lengthy buildup of forces. This success was possible because Coalition ground forces were perceived by the Iraqis as not strong enough to commence combat. More troops could have been sent in, but operational surprise would have been sacrificed. Some readers might remain unconvinced there was no way to bring more ground forces into the fight earlier.
My only disappointment with the book centers on the narrative related to "Phase Four"—the reconstruction of Iraq after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime. We are insiders to the stories of the planning for deployment, the deception, and the conduct of offensive operations. There is no parallel discussion of the plans for reconstruction, however. It is apparent that much of it was done in Washington, but we never learn who was making the decisions. Retired Army lieutenant General Jay Garner is portrayed as having a limited role with little chance of success in the planning phase. We do not learn what was to be the role of Central Command forces in Phase Four, nor do we hear about retired Marine General Anthony Zinni's plan for Phase Four developed in the late 1990s, while Franks was the Army component commander of Central Command. Was the planning conducted at the Army War College at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, considered or used? Franks acknowledges that Phase Four was the most difficult portion of the operation, but he lets readers down by not describing the planning that took place on his watch.
As you might expect, jointness is an important theme throughout the telling of Franks's stewardship at Central Command. He is very much in favor of jointness, as are all the combatant commanders. He is very tough on the service chiefs' role as the Joint Chiefs. All the service chiefs save the Chief of Staff of the Army take a hit. I had hoped he would have devoted more space to the naval services' contributions in both the Afghan and Iraqi campaigns. The uninformed reader would be surprised to learn that the Navy, apart from the SEALs, was there at all.
The book is, however, a great contribution to understanding the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is most of all a memoir, and, as such, it tells a story about an authentic American hero—a patriot who served his country with skill and courage. The definitive book on these two campaigns, however, will be written at a later time.
General Hoar served as Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Central Command, in 1991-94 in the aftermath of the first Gulf War.
Abandoning Vietnam: How America Left and South Vietnam Lost Its War
James H. Willbanks. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2004. 384 pp. Photos. Maps. Notes. Bib. Index. $39.95.
Reviewed by Lieutenant Ted Carlson, U.S. Navy
On 30 April 1975, North Vietnamese Army tank number 843 crashed through the gates to Independence Palace in Saigon and within hours the Republic of Vietnam ceased to exist. What went wrong in those preceding days and years long has been a source of contention. Contrary to President Gerald Ford's announcement that the fall of Saigon "closes a chapter in the American experience," chapter upon chapter continues to be written regarding the subject.
Using a vast number of sources, coupled with his own combat experience in Vietnam, James Willbanks presents a detailed depiction of the less-explored later years of the Vietnam War. He analyzes the period from after the 1968 Tet Offensive until the fall of Saigon in 1975. Similar to the path taken by Lewis Sorley in A Better War (New York: Harcourt, 1999), Willbanks scrutinizes the policy and strategy shifts of this period. Sorley focuses on the personalities of the triumvirate of General Creighton W. Abrams, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, and Ambassador William E. Colby, but Willbanks concentrates on the policy issue of "Vietnamization." He explores all aspects of the debacle: the military, domestic politics, and foreign relations, not only of the United States, but also of the Republic of Vietnam and to a lesser extent of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
Willbanks's assertion is that President Richard M. Nixon's policy of Vietnamization, combined with other factors, failed. But the blame is not placed solely on Nixon. As Willbanks points out, Vietnamization was a good idea, but one that should have started long before Nixon took office. The U.S. armed forces are not absolved. U.S. military leaders bear the responsibility for not initially constructing the South Vietnamese armed forces in a way appropriate to the threat and the needs of their own country, and instead created a force whose existence depended on U.S. heavy firepower and technology. In addition, the political and military leadership within the Republic of Vietnam often was inadequate, corrupt, and weak willed.
The recurring problem throughout was time. When the United States withdrew in 1973, Vietnamization was incomplete. A cease-fire and peace treaty were achieved, but the reversal of the Americanization of the war was not. Under Abrams, the South Vietnamese forces did improve as U.S. forces withdrew, but selfreliance never was achieved. This was demonstrated in the Parrot's Beak Operation (Cambodia, 1970), Lam Son 719 (Laos, 1971), and the Nguyen Hue Campaign (Easter Offensive, 1972). South Vietnamese performance was poor or mediocre, but occasionally valiant, as at An Loc and Kontum. The one constant was the ubiquitous use of U.S. air support, firepower, and advisors.
Nixon attempted to assist the Republic of Vietnam as he tried to vacate the country. The United States dumped military equipment into Vietnam under the "enhance plus" plan and conducted Operations Pocket Money and Linebacker, but Congress constrained these efforts. Mounting political pressure, combined with domestic problems at home, eroded the credibility and bargaining power of National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger in the Paris peace negotiations with North Vietnam.
In the wake of the emerging Watergate scandal, the 1973 Middle East Crisis, and the passage of the War Powers Act, Nixon's inability to honor his pledges of support to President Nguyen Van Thieu was cemented. In the end, whether or not Nixon and Kissinger conspired to use the Paris peace accords to reenter the Vietnam War, as alleged by Larry Berman in No Peace, No Honor (New York: Free Press, 2001), the truth is the United States sat by idly while the Republic of Vietnam succumbed to North Vietnamese forces.
At a time when the United States once again finds itself trying to withdraw with honor from a foreign military entanglement, this book is an excellent read for the professional military officer, diplomat, politician, and academic who hope to ensure that past mistakes are not repeated.
Lieutenant Carlson is a student at the Naval Postgraduate School.
Warfighting and Disruptive Technologies: Disguising Innovation
Terry C. Pierce. New York: Frank Cass, 2004. 265 pp. Notes. Bib. Index. $105.00.
Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Frank G. Hoffman, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Retired)
The George W. Bush administration came into office committed to significant military reforms under a concept called "transformation." Regrettably, the Department of Defense's initial efforts focused predominantly on the technological dimension of conflict despite its reduced relevance to today's dynamic security environment. The Pentagon's early transformation efforts overlooked what King's College professor Lawrence Freedman aptly called the "revolution in strategic affairs." The tragic events of 11 September 2001 underscored this dichotomy and punctured the illusion that U.S. security could be ensured by technology alone. Events in Afghanistan and Iraq further highlight the narrower nature of the original transformation agenda.
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his team eventually grasped the gap between their initial military agenda and today's true challenges. Technology remains an important element, as it should. However, a broader program promoting agility, flexibility, and speed against irregular threats has emerged. Shaping a more adaptive military to win a global war against unconventional adversaries is a key pillar of the Defense Department's transformation strategy.
The shortcomings of the early approach go beyond just a misappreciation of the political, social, demographic, and ideological elements swirling around us. The Pentagon also lacks a sophisticated understanding of military innovation. Despite highly regarded studies, such as Williamson Murray and Allan Millet's Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), today's defense leaders lack an overarching theory about how best to establish new approaches to war fighting.
This history makes Navy Captain Terry Pierce's contribution timely and relevant. He counters the various schools of military innovation that focus on top-down hierarchy, technology, or inter- or intraservice rivalry as the impetus for change. Building on concepts developed by clayton Christensen in his best-selling business book, The Innovator's Dilemma (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School, 1997), Pierce shows that major innovations are managed differently from efforts to extend previously successful innovations (what he terms "sustaining cases"). Using a number of naval innovation case studies, Pierce demonstrates that successful "disruptive" breakthroughs usually are disguised by successful military leaders as merely sustaining endeavors or extensions of the current paradigm.
As Machiavelli noted centuries ago, bringing about a new order of things is perilous, and Pierce shows that successful innovators understand this and mask their innovations along accepted paths until the appropriate combination of conceptual, technological, and organizational changes have matured. Since disruptive innovations usually are not appreciated immediately by the mainstream service culture or Pentagon budgeteers, the innovations' proponents create small innovation cells as incubators to manage the integrated architecture that can bring them to operational fruition.
With Navy and Marine case studies, including maneuver warfare and the development of the carrier, Pierce demonstrates clearly that successful naval innovation frequently has been achieved by disguising a potentially revolutionary breakthrough and employing a small innovation group to work through the messy details of refinement and implementation.
The book is not without anomalies. The title itself is one; neither Christensen nor Pierce's own examples limit major innovation to technology alone. Obviously, maneuver warfare or naval organizational options are not technology dependent. On the other hand, more discussion on the role technology did play in introducing amphibious warfare as an art form is warranted. In particular, the Higgins boat is a case study worth further exploration.
The aircraft carrier case study is disappointingly stunted, especially in light of its critical role in naval history. For a more complete assessment of U.S. carrier efforts, readers should see American and British Aircraft Carrier Development by Thomas Hone, Norman Friedman, and Mark Mandeles (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1999). In contrast, the Marine maneuver warfare case study has more depth and originality. This is an area where serious historical study is considerably lacking, and Pierce's primary research has appreciably extended the literature. That said, however, the application of his model does not appear to hold together well in this particular case. Maneuver warfare was not disguised by its advocates; there was much heated debate about this topic throughout the 1980s and into the early 1990s after it had become official Marine Corps doctrine.
This book is an extremely insightful and timely product blending both military history and organizational theory. Its strength is its historically grounded approach that accounts for both external factors and the myriad internal realities that promote or retard adaptation within large bureaucracies. Despite its stiff price, Waifighting and Disruptive Technologies will prove useful to senior officers and those national security professionals concerned with the intricacies of institutional reform and the politics of implementation.
Lieutenant Colonel Hoffman, a frequent contributor to Proceedings, is employed by EDO Professional Services at the Marine Corps' Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities at Quantico, Virginia.