Crisis and conflict challenged the Navy throughout 2002 and into 2003. Operation Enduring Freedom and the global war on terrorism "red-lined" operational and personnel tempos, and underscored the nation's critical need for highly motivated and skilled people and the technologies, systems, and platforms necessary to do the jobs at hand. As the Navy wound down sea-based operations against al Qaeda and the remnants of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in early spring 2002, President George W. Bush and his advisors increasingly focused on the need for "regime change" in Iraq. By the end of the year, the Navy was poised to be a vital element in a joint and combined strategy of "shock and awe" aimed at liberating the Iraqi people from Saddam Hussein's despotism and cruelty. And, even as the prospects for war halfway around the world became more likely, the Navy remained watchful of the increasing demands for its contributions to effective homeland security and defense.
"I didn't come to the job with the idea of publishing another 'vision' document," Admiral Vern Clark, Chief of Naval Operations, admitted during a mid-March 2003 interview. "But it became apparent that I needed something to build on my top-five priorities—manpower, current and future readiness, quality of service, and organizational alignment—to mobilize and focus our energies, and to provide a 'stake in the ground' for the future."
First in a June 2002 speech at the Naval War College, and in the subsequent October issue of Proceedings, Admiral Clark outlined a challenging vision, "Sea Power 21," that sought to define the transformed Navy of the 21st century. Under this vision, innovative concepts such as Sea Strike, Sea Shield, Sea Basing, and ForceNet will integrate sea, land, air, space, and cyberspace forces to a greater extent man ever before. In such a "unified battle space," Admiral Clark affirmed, "the sea will provide a vast maneuver area from which to project direct and decisive power around the globe. . . . Future naval operations will use revolutionary information superiority and dispersed, networked force capabilities to deliver unprecedented offensive power, defensive assurance, and operational independence to joint force commanders."
Looking to operationatize the Chief of Naval Operations' vision, the service continued to make numerous hard choices in the allocation of still-scarce resources—despite record-high defense budgets—for the people, platforms, and technologies that will shape the current Navy, tomorrow's fleet, and the Navy-after-next. Indeed, much of what transpired for the Navy during 2002 seemed to be a pre-cursor (or harbinger) of its future.
Manpower and Quality of Service
"We are winning the battle for people!" the CNO enthused several times during the interview. "Last year we invested billions of dollars in retaining, recruiting, and training our sailors, to create an environment that offers opportunity, promotes personal and professional growth, and provides the kind of workforce we need for the Navy of the 21st century. Most importantly," he continued, "we developed a more responsive force—one that has the capabilities to surge forward with the right people, to the right place, at the right time to fulfill our operational requirements.
"We are enjoying the best manning I have witnessed in my career," he stated. "With few exceptions, we achieved C-2 manning status for all deploying battle group units at least six months prior lo deployment. That is unprecedented—I know of no other period in the Navy's history during which it was more ready than we are today."
The statistics are impressive. As revealed in his "Guidance for 2003: Achieving Sea Power 21!" and "Top Five Report, 2003," key areas of Navy manpower policies and programs have enjoyed unparalleled success:
- Recruiting. Navy recruiters made their goal for 16 straight months previous to the end of 2002, and the Delayed Entry Program is at the highest level ever. The Navy's recruits increasingly are of high quality as well. "Last year, we accessed 92% high school graduates—up from 90%--and nearly 6% of new recruits had some college education," said Admiral Clark.
- Retention. The Navy reduced at-sea manning shortfalls by more than 36% in 2002. Superb retention also allowed the Navy to lower recruiting goals by more than 7,500, saving millions of dollars that were applied toward fleet readiness and quality-of-service initiatives.
- Attrition. "While we still have challenges to overcome, the trend is improving," Admiral Clark said. Zone A attrition was reduced by 23%, just missing the Navy's goal of 25%. Overall drug losses were down 8%, and Recruit Training Center drug losses declined by more than 37%.
- Force shaping. "We are growing a more senior force to lead and manage the increasingly technical 21st-century Navy," Admiral Clark emphasized. "This is a critically important factor as we continue to move into an era of knowledge warfare." The number of E-4 to E-9s (the Navy's "Top 6" focus) increased by 1.7% to 71.4%, and the Navy is working toward a goal of 75.5% by fiscal year 2007.
"We invested in our most valuable asset-our people," Admiral Clark affirmed. Although this phrase sometimes is dismissed as little more than a slogan, clearly he means it. Last year "witnessed continued improvements in compensation, operating facilities, information technology, spare parts, and educational initiatives, leading to an improved environment for mission accomplishment. If we don't give our people the proper tools and a good place to do their jobs and live," he asked, "how can we expect them to achieve mission success?"
- Compensation. "Pay and benefits continued to improve," Admiral Clark noted, and "everyone earned at least a 5% pay increase in 2002." Targeted pay increases were as high as 6.5% for officers and 10% for enlisted personnel. Average out-of-pocket housing expenses were reduced to 11.3% in 2002, and will be reduced even more, to 7.5%, in fiscal 2003. "These improvements put more money in the pockets of our sailors and provided the opportunity for many of them to own their own homes."
- Investment in Navy families. "New and expanded programs are helping our sailors and their families invest in their future," Admiral Clark said. In 2002 the Navy implemented the Thrift Savings Plan, and at year's end had the highest enrollment of all the services—nearly 90,000 members. "We also increased the number of customers served by the Spouse Employment Assistance Program by 29% and increased our childcare capacity by more than 10% last year."
- Housing. During the past two years the Navy spent more than $2 billion on family housing, a trend that is accelerating. "More than 4,900 homes are to be constructed, replaced, or improved in 2003," Admiral Clark stated, "almost double the number funded in 2002."
As the Navy charts its future course, care is being taken to ensure that the service's design and engineering communities take into account human beings as integral warfighting elements in the design, engineering, acquisition, maintenance, and operation of the service's ships, aircraft, and weapons. Indeed, the areas of human-centered engineering and human systems integration are becoming increasingly critical to mission success.
This approach marks a sea change almost as radical as "Sea Power 21" itself. Until recently, very few resource sponsors or program managers took the long view in systems acquisition—that is, looking out beyond the research-and-development and acquisition phases of a program. This is a critical challenge, as Navy research shows that as much as 70% of a program's total ownership costs are locked in before a system reaches its first acquisition milestone, a point at which no more than 5% of the program's total ownership cost typically has been spent. The service traditionally has allocated less than 3% of a program's total budget to human-centered engineering and human systems integration needs, despite the prospects for long-term, and substantial, savings. "Not on my watch," seems to have characterized the business-as-usual approach.
Recognizing this challenge, in September 2002 Vice Admiral Phillip Balisle, Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command, announced the creation of a new Human Systems Integration Directorate (NavSea-03). This division will serve as Naval Sea Systems Command's single point of contact with the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet Forces Command, Naval Air Systems Command, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, and other Navy and joint-service activities for all human systems integration and human performance-related strategic planning, policy, acquisition issues, future research-and-development investment, and technology insertion into existing and future surface ship and submarine training systems.
While maintaining adequate force levels and ensuring that the human factor is taken into account in engineering the Navy's systems are critical, putting the right people in the right place at the right time is an equally important task. The Chief of Naval Operations' Sea Warrior program strengthens the Navy's commitment to the growth and development of its people. "As optimal manning policies and new platforms such as the DD(X) and littoral combat ship reduce crew size further, the Navy will increasingly need sailors who are highly educated and expertly trained," Admiral Clark pointed out.
"Because of these needs, we are transforming the way we learn," he explained, "and Task Force EXCEL is our primary vehicle for this transformation." Begun in July 2001, the Navy's Task Force EXCEL (Excellence through Commitment to Education and Learning) is applying information-age methods to accelerate learning and improve proficiency, including advanced trainers and simulators, tailored skills training programs, improved mentoring techniques, and more effective performance measurement and counseling tools.
Task Force EXCEL's revolution in training was proofed last fall by the Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) battle group and the Saipan (LHA-2) amphibious ready group. The ships implemented and tested the Sailor Continuum, which includes incentives to increase performance and productivity, in an operational environment. In addition, both task groups demonstrated a new learning-management system, Navy Knowledge Online, that allows each sailor to track his or her progress and accomplishments. "The acid test has to be the waterfront," Rear Admiral Harry Ulrich, Director of Surface Warfare, noted in September. "This is the best opportunity to put these ideas and programs to the test."
Current Readiness
"We are taking the fight to the enemy," Admiral Clark stated. "Eight carrier battle groups, six amphibious ready groups, and nearly 100,000 sailors and Marines deployed around the world in support of the global war on terrorism in 2002. Also, two attack submarines established home port in Guam, with a third on the way—all to ensure that we are ready to respond." The only way this was possible, he underscored, was because of the attention paid and resources allocated to today's Navy.
"We have the most ready force in our history," Admiral Clark reiterated. "During the past year, our investment in training, spare parts, ordnance, and fuel accounts enabled our fleet to be ready earlier, deploy at a higher state of readiness, and build a more responsive surge capability. These investments were vital to sustaining the war on terrorism and assuring friends and allies with our global response capabilities."
During 2002, the Navy reduced major ship depot maintenance backlogs by 27% and aircraft depot-level repair back orders by 17%; provided 32 additional ships with depot availabilities; ramped up ordnance and spare parts production; maintained a steady mission-capable rate in deployed aircraft; and fully funded aviation initial outfitting.
Two incidents, however, brought into sharp focus the need for adequate resources to ensure readiness. A December 2001 inspection of the John F. Kennedy (CV-67) revealed significant readiness shortfalls that spilled over into 2002, frustrating Navy plans to shorten the 33-year-old carrier's interdeployment cycle by two months to relieve the Theodore Roosevelt. More than 5,000 discrepancies, including 3,000 items considered "critical" for "safe operations at sea"—including inoperable catapults—were attributed to an estimated $300-million shortfall in maintenance funding for the ship since 1995. Then, in early September 2002, the Kitty Hawk (CV-63) failed at-sea tests and was declared not sea-ready. Only round-the-clock efforts by the ship's crew got the carrier back on schedule. In both instances, the ships' commanding officers were relieved (although in the John F. Kennedy's case, a senior Navy officer commented that maintenance was "systematically underfunded'').
Since 1998, the total number of gapped billets in the Navy has been reduced by almost half. Within that improvement there is an even more significant trend, in which at-sea billet gaps have been reduced from more than 17,000 in 1998 to fewer than 4,000 last year. "One clement in our attempt to close these gaps is our Sea Swap experiment and other optimal-manning initiatives," said Admiral Clark. Following a year of study and analysis, the Milius (DDG-69) was the first in-service guided-missile destroyer to deploy using a reduced-manning program. "New technologies and great deckplate leadership in Milius produced innovative shipboard watchstanding practices, reduced ship's manning requirements, and focused sailors on their core responsibilities,'' Admiral Clark noted. The result was a reduction of 53 billets that will translate into "a revolution against free labor," according to the Milius's commanding officer, Commander Jeff Harley.
"And in Sea Swap, the Fletcher [DD-992] crew was relieved on deployment by the crew of Kinkaid [DD-965] as a means to extend unit on-station time and capitalize on transit savings to the Persian Gulf," Admiral Clark said. It normally takes 45 days for a West Coast ship to steam to the Persian Gulf, and another 45 days to return, leaving less than 100 days on station. Sea Swap will increase significantly the ability to remain in theater. Last summer, the Fletcher departed Pearl Harbor for an 18-month deployment, three times longer than normal, and will stay forward deployed until the ship is decommissioned in 2004. During that time, the destroyer will have three crews. "Everyone agrees we need more ships than we have right now," Vice Admiral Timothy LaFleur, Commander, Naval Surface Forces, Pacific, commented in a published interview. "But the reality is that it's going to take a while for our force structure to grow where we need to be. Until then, we need to explore other options."
Other options clearly would have helped, as last year the Navy was a key—and perhaps somewhat overextended—player in the President's strategy for a worldwide antiterrorism campaign. As 2002 dawned, a multinational force remained in place in the Arabian Sea in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, with two aircraft carriers and associated battle group warships constantly on the line since October 2001. The Afghan campaign proved to be a test bed of change and innovation. The ability to use sea-based forces in the earliest phase of the campaign to generate strategic strikes on Taliban and al Qaeda forces was correlated with strategic and tactical U.S. Air Force assets. From their sea bases in the northern Arabian Sea, U.S. Navy and Marine Corps tactical aircraft from carrier battle groups flew more than 12,000 tactical sorties (approximately 72% of all sorties through early spring 2002), and naval forces accounted for more than half of all precision weapons employed. Both Marines and Army special forces units operated from aircraft carriers and amphibious assault ships some 400 to 700 miles distant from land-locked objectives.
From the Afghan experience, and other high-tempo operations throughout the world in 2002, the outlines of a new global military model could be discerned that, all things held equal, looks to underscore the asymmetrical advantages offered by sea-based forces. It would be tested, perhaps all too soon, in combat against Saddam Hussein's regime.
The Theodore Roosevelt battle group's deployment to the Middle East came to an end in March 2002, exemplifying the "persistent presence" capabilities of the Navy and what might become the new model for warfare—even if the extended tour was partly a result of the John F. Kennedy's readiness problems. The former had been the lead carrier in Operation Enduring Freedom ever since deploying eight days after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington. In the process the carrier broke a record, on 19 February, after spending 153 days at sea without a port visit—more than five months of near-constant flight operations and strikes. The Theodore Roosevelt's Carrier Air Wing One flew more than 10,000 sorties, logged more than 30,000 flight hours, and dropped some 1.7 million pounds of ordnance. (The longest post-World War II deployment record belongs to the Coral Sea [CV-43], which logged 329 days during a 1964-1965 western Pacific deployment.)
In April, the U.S. Central Command announced that the two-carrier presence in the region would end, but the decision did not mean the war on terrorism was over. "Naval forces will remain on station for as long as power-projection capabilities are needed," a spokesman underscored. Indeed, in November the Navy announced it was deploying the Mount Whitney (LCC-20), a command-and-control ship that normally serves as a command ship for the U.S. Second Fleet in Norfolk and hardly ever deploys, to the Middle East. The Mount Whitney was to serve as a sea-based headquarters off the coast of Djibouti, "looking for Al Qaeda," according to then-Marine Corps Commandant General Jim Jones, "looking for terrorist cells and dealing with them expeditiously and directly." At the time, the buildup for "Gulf War II" already was under way.
Future Readiness
The "Sea Power 21" strategy paper outlines a new global concept of operations "that will provide our nation with widely dispersed combat power from platforms possessing unprecedented warfighting capabilities . . . to respond swiftly to a broad range of scenarios and defend the vital interests of the United States."
In a response to the "quality versus quantity" dilemma of significantly reduced force structure and continued constrained resources relative to total need, the new global concept of operations will disperse combat striking power by creating additional independent operational groups capable of responding simultaneously around the world: carrier strike groups that provide the full range of operational capabilities in all threat regimes; expeditionary strike groups of amphibious ready groups augmented with strike-capable surface warships and submarines, for operations in lesser-threat situations; missile-defense surface action groups that will provide security to allies and joint forces at sea and ashore; specially modified Trident guided-missile submarines that will provide covert striking power with cruise missiles and the insertion of special operations forces; and a modern, enhanced-capability combat logistics force that will sustain the widely dispersed fleet.
The issue of quality versus quantity will not go away, however. The new global concept of operations will require a fleet of approximately 375 ships that will increase the Navy's striking power from today's 12 carrier battle groups and 12 amphibious ready groups to 12 carrier strike groups, 12 expeditionary strike groups, and numerous missile-defense surface action groups and guided-missile submarines. "This will allow the Navy to create a force with as many as 37 independent groups of ships," Admiral Clark explained, "as opposed to the 15 or 17 groups we have today." That said, with new ship procurements likely to average just eight or so each year, the 375-ship fleet looks to be a far-future goal.
On 13 June, the United States formally withdrew from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which marked a turning point in the Navy's programs to defend naval forces at sea and critical assets ashore. That day, the Pentagon's Missile Defense Agency conducted a test on board the Lake Erie (CG-70) of the sea-based midcourse defense interceptor, the SM-3 Standard missile, designed to destroy incoming ballistic missiles midway through their flights and more than 100 miles above the earth. Such a system would have been prohibited under the old treaty regime, as would the use of ship-based radars to cue ground-based or other missile defenses against intercontinental ballistic missiles.
The test also underscored the Navy's commitment to the Sea Shield concept, which "will protect our nation's interests with layered global defensive power based on control of the seas, forward presence, and networked intelligence," according to Admiral Clark. "It will use these strengths to enhance homeland defense, assure access to contested littorals, and project defensive power deep inland.
"Perhaps the most dramatic advancement promised by Sea Shield will be the ability of naval forces to project defensive power deep overland, assuring friends and allies while protecting joint forces ashore," he explained. "The next-generation long-range SM-3, modernized E-2 Hawkeye radar, and Cooperative Engagement Capability will combine to extend ship-based missile defense far inland. This will reinforce the impact of sea-based ballistic missile defense and greatly expand the coverage of naval area defense."
Looking a bit further into the future, in April last year the Navy awarded a $2.9-billion contract to Northrop Grumman Ship Systems and Raytheon to begin the design of the DD(X) surface warship, generating a rare protest by General Dynamics' Bath Iron Works, which ultimately was rejected by the General Accounting Office. The DD(X), a successor of sorts to the proposed DD-21 destroyer, will be the land-attack member of a "Family of Ships" that will include the littoral combat ship and a future CG(X) cruiser. "The DD(X) is critical to the Navy's future," Admiral Clark underscored in the interview. "Our future cannot unfold without it. DD(X) is the heart of our Family of Ships."
Both the DD(X) and CG(X) are likely to be large, multimission warships that share a common hull form, propulsion system, and integrated power systems, with emphasis on land-attack/strike for the DD(X) and theater missile defense for the CG(X). The issue of size continued to follow the DD(X) design, although attention on tonnage alone is focusing on the wrong characteristic. Requirements drive size, and the more that will be asked of the DD(X) and CG(X), the larger they will be. "The laws of physics won't change, in this regard," a Navy engineering duty officer noted. On the other hand, the much-smaller littoral combat ship is intended be a fast, agile, and stealthy "focused-mission" warship that concentrates on doing a few things well. It will be the Navy's ultimate "SUV"—surface utility vessel.
"I saw a test of the RMS [remote mine-hunting system] that will provide organic mine countermeasures capabilities in our Aegis destroyers." Admiral Clark said, "and I came away convinced that a smaller warship was what we needed to provide critical warfighting capabilities in the littoral." Modular weapon systems, focusing on littoral antisubmarine warfare, antisurface warfare, and mine warfare, supported by an open-architecture computing environment, will make the littoral combatant ship a "netted system," according to Admiral Clark, who envisioneds a fleet of some 65 of such SUVs to fill out the various strike groups.
Organizational Alignment
Achieving the "Sea Power 21" vision and operationalizing the new global concept of operations will require a long-term commitment. A key element is the Sea Trial initiative, which will continue if not accelerate the process of naval innovation. "Our enemies are dedicated to finding new and effective methods of attacking us. They will not stand still." Admiral Clark warned. "To outpace our adversaries, we must implement u continual process of rapid concept and technology development that will deliver enhanced capabilities to our sailors as swiftly as possible.
"In 2002 we put the fleet at the center of all we do," Admiral Clark noted, "creating a single voice for fleet requirements, streamlining organizations, and eliminating redundancies. Better alignment enhances mission success and reduces costs through organizational and process efficiencies," he noted. "To enhance alignment, we expanded the fleet's authority to determine requirements, influence resource decisions, and direct experimentation. We will continue to strengthen organizations and eliminate redundancies to make our Navy more effective and efficient."
Important realignment milestones in 2002 included:
- Establishing the Commander, Fleet Forces Command, as the lead agent for the Sea Trial initiative, to formalize experimentation and fully integrate concept development and technology insertion in the fleet; Fleet Forces Command also was designated as NavNorth, the maritime component of the U.S. Northern Command.
- Aligning the Navy Warfare Development Command and naval warfare centers of excellence under Commander, Fleet Forces Command, to stimulate concept development and enhance technology insertion.
- Establishing the Naval Network Warfare Command as the fleet's coordinator for information technology, information operations, and space activities.
- Consolidating Navy Recruiting Command and Naval Reserve Recruiting Command to achieve total force recruiting.
"We put the fleet in charge of experimentation," Admiral Clark said. "Joint wargames, experiments, and exercises coordinated by [Commander, Fleet Forces Command] are developing new operational concepts and capabilities—the Joint Hires Network and high-speed vessels." Looking at the problem of effective anti-submarine warfare in the littorals and how to link more closely submarines and platforms such as the littoral combat ship, "we established the Undersea Experimentation Working Group to more fully integrate submarines into joint experimentation programs. We 'raised the bar' in experimentation last year, which will allow us to speed the delivery of new concepts, technologies, systems, and platforms to the operating forces."
Deja Vu All Over Again
Global tensions spiked in the late fall and early winter of 2002. Concerns over North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic-missile programs brought into sharp relief the intense focus in the United States for regime change in Baghdad and Iraq's full disarmament in line with United Nations' resolutions. To make ready for possible action, the President ordered U.S. forces to augment other assets already in forward areas, and began to call up Reserve and National Guard units for homeland-security and crisis-response duties.
In January 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld ordered the Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) battle group to move from its holding area near Australia to the Persian Gulf. The battle group had been returning home from a six-month Middle East deployment, but was directed to stay in the region just in case. The Theodore Roosevelt battle group, completing a Caribbean predeployment workup, received orders to move as quickly as possible to reinforce two other carriers: the Constellation (CV-64), already in the Gulf, and the Harry S. Truman (CVN-75), in the eastern Mediterranean—for possible strikes against Iraqi forces.
A fifth battle group, centered on the Carl Vinson (CVN-70), moved into the western Pacific to provide a stronger presence and to complement other U.S. forces—two dozen long-range Air Force bombers sent to Guam and F-15E Eagle strike aircraft and reconnaissance assets moved to Japan and Korea. This was to enhance stability and underscore U.S. interests in Northeast Asia, as the Navy's Japan-based carrier, the Kitty Hawk, received orders to deploy to the Gulf. The Nimitz (CVN-68) battle group got under way in mid-January from San Diego to complete a highly compressed three-week training exercise, after which the Nimitz and her escorts deployed to the western Pacific. Finally, the George Washington (CVN-73) battle group, which returned to East Coast home ports in December after a six-month deployment that saw combat operations in support of the no-fly zones in the skies above Iraq, was placed on 96-hour standby, ready to return to duty.
In mid-January, the Kearsarge (LHD-3) amphibious ready group and the 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade at Camp LeJeune, North Carolina, were ready to deploy. They soon linked up with more than 4,000 sailors and Marines from the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit embarked in the Tarawa (LHA-1) amphibious ready group that had departed San Diego on 6 January. Later in the month, the Saipan (LHA-2) group deployed from Norfolk, headed for the Middle East.
These developments underscored the tension among meeting current operational requirements, sustaining readiness, and making the investments needed for the future. Throughout 2002 and into early 2003, operational and personnel tempos remained high—whether conducting strikes against Taliban and al Qaeda targets in Afghanistan, maintaining the sanctity of no-fly zones in the skies above Iraq, or in combined antipiracy operations with Indian and other regional navies in the Malacca Straits—with some 55% of the Navy's assets under way in support of national strategies at the beginning of the new year.
"We are at war," Admiral Clark emphasized, "and winning the global war on terror is our number-one priority." This reality and numerous tough decisions that lay ahead indelibly etched the outlines of tomorrow's fleet.
Dr. Truver is group vice president for national security studies at Anteon Corporation in Arlington, Virginia. Amy Palmer of Anteon’s national security programs division provided research assistance.