The fight against terrorism must be prosecuted by taking it to the enemy preemptively using the strategy of "total asymmetry." In January 2002, the Israel Navy did just that when it seized the Karine-A, which was carrying 50 tons of weapons and explosives allegedly destined for the Palestinian Authority. These arms never reached their intended users.
The terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 marked the beginning of a new era in what is now called asymmetric warfare. It has turned global, become a mass-destruction threat, and involves the fanatic adherents of religious holy war. With all its complexities, this new challenge requires a counterbalancing asymmetry to defeat it.
In fact, some initial steps toward total asymmetry already have been taken. The most important has been the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. Establishing a clear link of culpability between a hosting regime and the terrorist groups it harbors set the basic ground rules in Afghanistan, and a frame of reference for the entire international community. Another step was the removal of Saddam Hussein. That move, again, was about establishing ground rules. In this case it was the legitimacy of nation-states in their pursuit of power and dominance.
The signal is clear and simple: tyrants who threaten both their neighbors and their own people with weapons of mass destruction will not be tolerated. The threat of multinational terrorism, however, stretches far beyond the fate of the Iraqi despot or the end of the Taliban. It will be a long and difficult path that will be painfully relevant for years to come.
Structuring the total asymmetry required to confront terrorism will require that a number of operational concepts, force structures, and combat capabilities be redefined and deployed effectively before we can expect to make satisfactory headway.
The Question of Retaliation
There is a long and gruesome history of retaliation for guerrilla or terrorist attacks by military forces. Gathering an entire village or town to be executed in the main square unfortunately remains a possibility in certain places around the globe. These atrocities achieve little, even in the eyes of their perpetrators. Instead of deterring the population, such actions only harden the will to resist. These are unthinkable courses of action for militaries in the Free World.
The notion of retaliation is irrelevant under the unique circumstances of war against the shapeless web of multinational terrorism. We need eradication—not retaliation. Rather than setting us apart, retaliation makes us captives of exactly the kind of vicious circle of violence the terrorists desire.
It is essential, therefore, to maintain at all times a clear line that discriminates noncombatants and innocent civilians from the enemy, and that limits as much as possible collateral damage to unrelated property. Total asymmetry should be marked by a sharp and unmistakable contrast between the terrorists' indiscriminate mass-murder mind-set, and the decisive but carefully calculated and surgical means we use.
As of now, our quiver of arrows is not yet fully adapted to these requirements.
Precision Is Not Enough
Fighting multinational terrorism on a global scale means using deadly force within a peaceful and largely civilian environment—in other words, practically anywhere on the planet. Too often, however, there is a painful price tag of unintended victims and destruction.
Precision alone is not enough anymore. As long as we are unable to guarantee no noncombatant casualties or collateral damage, launching a strike runs the risk of damaging the effectiveness of the entire campaign. On the other hand, the mass-murder capacity of our opponents defines the much higher potential price in innocent lives that will result from an unsuccessful interception or if we refrain from action altogether.
Thus, selectivity is one of the most critical parameters of total asymmetry. It is crucial for the cumulative effect of the campaign that a wide and adaptable array of guided munitions and incapacitation solutions be developed to match the means we use for each specific case.
Selectively attacking terrorist targets such as a headquarters or safe house or a car they drive requires an optimized means to balance between decisive effects and a clean shot. You do not want to demolish the entire building or set off the explosive belt or chemical substances stored in the safe house when attacking the terrorists. Nor do you want to set their car ablaze at a busy open marketplace in the middle of the day. Too often, the current inadequate state of interception means we are faced with the painful task of deciding how many lives might be lost on our side, before we decide to act on a lesser level of selectivity to eliminate a source of continuous murder.
The mainstream military research-and-development mind-set is driven by a hardware superiority paradigm. We strive for superior ships, tanks, aircraft, and missiles. These are not the relevant dimensions in fighting multinational terrorism. This must change. We need instead much better sensors for remote identification of explosives and chemical warfare substances. We need the means to diffuse charges remotely, nonlethal means to incapacitate suicide bombers, and devices that remotely neutralize a car bomb. We must be able to operate these means from the sea and the air, and from great distances.
This will have an effect on our combat suite. Ships will have to be modified for total asymmetry. It will mean more remotely controlled assets, more intelligence-gathering and -monitoring capabilities, more dedicated communication channels with much larger throughput for uplinks and downlinks, and more specialists such as controllers and intelligence experts. Some ships will have to be designed afresh as dedicated intelligence and information warfare assets. A great deal of the ground work required can be done more effectively from the sea.
Total asymmetry is about creating an environment of preemption. There is a definite upgrade phase here, and resources must be allocated. It will not be easy, but we do not have many choices. Without it, the Free World likely will pay too high a price.
Environment of Preemption
Multinational terrorism is a civil threat, not a military one. Civilians and societies are its targets. The total asymmetry campaign will be first and foremost a concerted effort to preempt the operatives of multinational terrorism by intercepting the links in the chain of a terrorist action. These are the money handlers, explosive experts and their laboratories, the planners and coordinators, and the operational leaders with their subordinates. These chains should be disrupted continuously, keeping the terrorists on the run and their plans in disarray.
To some extent, however, these are only symptoms of a more serious malady. To confront multinational terrorism effectively we will have no choice but to pull it out at its roots. The total asymmetry strategy inevitably will force us to deal also with the preacher who preaches the suicide bombing of innocents or issues a death decree on an author or journalist for publishing what he deems blasphemous. This step, which we have been unwilling to take, represents a whole new set of implications, extremely problematic for both sides—but we have no choices.
The prospect of pressing a host society to disinfect itself of terrorism always is a very difficult proposition. Trying to impel people to act against their own flesh and blood—often their very teachers and spiritual leaders—usually results in more misery and despair than effective actions. Trying to do it where the terrorists are praised as heroes is even more hopeless.
The chances may be slim, but a wide array of "soft" means and the decisive use of force, if executed selectively and consistently for a long period of time with an open ear to the host society, will have some probability of success.
Global Arena
Multinational terrorism is spread over the globe as a network of cells, but it does have a center of gravity in the Middle East. An operationally ready set-up for a total asymmetry campaign in this region would be based to a large extent on assets of maritime power.
The key for such a campaign is effective intelligence. In fact, the word campaign is somewhat misleading. In terms of force structure it probably means a web of maritime, space, and airborne assets linked to central and regional shipborne and land-based intelligence infrastructures. What should make the difference are orientation, presence, and reaction time. We need accurate and relevant preemptive intelligence that will feed surgical kill capabilities based on the stationary assets around the perimeter. We need these assets to be on station in full readiness for an unlimited timeframe, for months if not years.
We are looking at an unprecedented campaign of the gathering, assessing, disseminating, and monitoring of intelligence. Its end-game capacity will be used rather sparingly, if decisively, on carefully calculated windows of interception. Selectivity, time-to-target, and an extremely low error rate will be our critical parameters.
Global multinational terrorism requires a global multinational answer. As was the case with piracy, an effective campaign must utilize everything the free world has at its disposal. It will not be easy to come up with the required operational capabilities. The coordination and interoperability of coalition partners for a multinational total asymmetry campaign will be great challenges.
Final Words
A strategy of total asymmetry can diffuse the eruption of another great world conflict caused by terrorism. It is a question of will, determination, and the clear appreciation of the future and the lessons of the past. Preempting the actions of the self-appointed sultans of mass destruction is possible.
Maritime power will be a key factor in this campaign and we need to make it fit for the challenge; it is our ultimate test of professionalism and operational wisdom. Moreover, it is the ultimate test of our commitment to the future of the human race. Failure cannot be an option.
Admiral Ya’ari is the Commander-in-Chief of the Israel Navy.