"Why I Am Failing My Junior Officers"
(See K. O’Neal, pp. 40-42, July 2003 Proceedings)
Ensign Nathan T. Van Schaik, USS De Wirt (FFG-45)—Lieutenant O'Neal presents a haunting image of the future of the wardroom that is entirely debatable. Lieutenant O'Neal has the numbers straight, and on this I have no argument. But his portrait of the officer-manning situation on board a guided-missile frigate doesn't reflect my experience.
We also have 165% manning in the wardroom. We too have more junior officers than division-officer billets available. We see opportunity, however, where he only sees despair. All newly reporting ensigns on board my ship are assigned significant division-officer jobs. It is recognized by my chain of command that the responsibility for leading sailors is intrinsic to our development as officers. Chief petty officers assume a critical role in this development, but interaction between division officer and division still is as prevalent as ever. And what do we do with salty lieutenants (junior grade)? Already proven fleet assets, these senior members fleet up to "super JO" jobs. The bottom line is the command gets dedicated and experienced officers for high-interest areas and the lieutenants get the opportunity to mentor the ensigns, better preparing them to be department heads down the line.
What Lieutenant O'Neal fails to express is the overall value of the young junior officer to the command. Sure, the focus should be on qualifications and divisional responsibilities. On my ship, it is clear that talented, motivated, and well-educated junior officers are viewed as valuable assets, not management liabilities. Contrary to wardrooms billeted at or below strength—in which officers are slammed with divisional work while trying to qualify willy nilly—today's first-tour officer can now seriously and thoroughly dedicate time to both.
Lieutenant O'Neal's article is a prediction of a future that is narrow, pointless, and downright grim for officers. But from a command's perspective, how could an abundance of talent be a drag on mission accomplishment? We division officers are aware of the realities of junior-officer manning. We are working hard to qualify and at divisional officer jobs. I can speak for the seven other nonqualified ensigns in my wardroom when I say we're putting in challenging days and are integral players in the command's mission accomplishment. We are not babbling parasitic idiots rotting away in our overflow staterooms, tainting Navy leadership and organization, as Lieutenant O'Neal might have you believe.
"Where Is the Really New SSN?"
(See T. Jacobs, p. 77, June 2003 Proceedings)
Captain David J. Kern, U.S. Navy, Commanding Officer, Precommissioning Unit Virginia (SSN-774)—Captain Jacobs, the really new nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) is under my feet. Her name is Virginia. Although able to carry out open-ocean antisubmarine warfare and antisurface warfare operations, the Virginia is not a Cold War submarine. She is optimized to thrive in the world's littorals, making her a completely new breed of SSN for 21st-century threats.
The Virginia's hull size—smaller than the Seawolfs (SSN-21)—was set entirely by optimizing what was needed to outfit the front end of the submarine for unprecedented littoral warfare capability, maintain the stealth characteristics of the Seawolf, and facilitate the innovative modular construction techniques that are achieving production man-hours that are two-thirds of those for the Seawolf. The nuclear propulsion plant was designed to support this optimal front-end hull size, is the simplest of any modern SSN, and represents a smaller portion of the overall ship than any previous SSN design.
The capabilities allowed by the Virginia's innovative design are precisely those that the author identified. Her ship control station has been redesigned for automatic pilot operations to better control ship's depth in shallow water and at periscope depth. SEALs and other special operations forces can sustain prolonged operations from the Virginia, using the enhanced capabilities of a nine-man lock-in/lock-out chamber, a reconfigurable torpedo room, and compatibility with the advanced SEAL delivery system and dry-deck shelter (DDS). The Virginia has modular masts that can be rapidly reconfigured and which house enhanced intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and communication capabilities, and more acoustic sensors for littoral access. Add to that 12 vertical launch system tubes that can be used for rapid land strike, plus more internal weapons than improved Los Angeles (SSN-688I)-class submarines, and you have a submarine that packs tremendous amounts of firepower and special-operations capability that can be positioned for maximum effect.
Rear Admiral John D. Butler, U.S. Navy, Program Executive Officer (Submarines)—As the Navy's principal submarine acquisition officer, I find Captain Jacobs's mistaken assertions concerning the Virginia (SSN-774)-class attack submarine program quite troubling.
In designing the Virginia, the Navy threw out all preconceived notions about submarines and started with a clean sheet. In response to winning the Cold War, we reexamined military-specific equipment and migrated to commercial-off-the-shelf systems to reduce costs and make our combat weapon systems easily upgradeable. We designed the class to dominate the littoral battle space with all of the Seawolf's (SSN-21) key warfighting capabilities at 75% of the cost by cutting back on the Cold War mandates to go faster and dive deeper. This effort also included designing a simplified, modular nuclear propulsion plant. The Navy instituted a design/build program that relied heavily on computer designs and reduced costly change orders to a historical low. Furthermore, we brought our two remaining submarine constructors together to stabilize the industry.
At the time of writing, the contract for the next block buy of Virginia-class submarines is in final negotiations. To help reduce costs, this contract has an option for multiyear procurement that could save at least $115 million per submarine. If we order six to eight Virginia's at a time, the Navy will see substantial savings and the ships will be delivered more quickly to the fleet.
The Virginia class will be the world's best submarine and that equates to a significant price tag—simply put, the Navy is paying to build the very best for our sailors to ensure undersea and antisubmarine warfare superiority for our nation. By buying only one ship a year, however, the Navy is paying an even higher premium. To get per-unit costs down, we need to build submarines in a multiyear procurement arrangement. Over the long haul, this is a financially sound and wise investment for the Navy.
For the first time in 15 years, we are in a period of stable submarine construction. Indeed, the submarine community as a whole has implemented some of the most innovative approaches to defense affordability, including forward-deploying ships to Guam to reduce transit times and maintenance costs, and our acoustic rapid commercial-off-the-shelf insertion program that has inspired the Navy to follow our lead in combat systems commonality. Rest assured that the submarine community is working to control costs and that the Virginia class is a really new fast-attack submarine that will dominate the 21st-century's seas.
"What Shall It Profit a Man?"
(See K. Eyer, pp. 42045, May 2003; K. Hagner, p. 12, June 2003; C. Faust, pp. 20-22 July 2003 Proceedings)
Master Chief Torpedoman’s Mate (Surface Warfare/Air Warfare) M. R. Vimislik, U.S. Navy—Commander Eyer was right on target with his discussion of leadership. Routine priorities and administrative concerns seem to focus on everything but combat preparedness. Worse still, commanding officers frequently are hamstrung by higher echelons to redirect emphasis away from the business of preparing for war and to focus manpower and fiscal resources on areas such as retention and quality of life. These distractions are coupled with a creeping tendency on the part of leaders to be well-liked and popular.
Commanding officers, executive officers, and command master chiefs are required to have fitness report statements attesting to superhuman efforts at retention. In addition, all officers, chief petty officers, and leading petty officers are required to have statements regarding effectiveness in supporting retention/advancement/mentoring in accordance with NavAdmin 213/02. I submit that leadership based on mission accomplishment naturally will ensure our sailors are provided with the training, guidance, and motivation to succeed professionally and will, in turn, sustain efforts to advance and retain quality personnel. While investments of time and energy must be made with respect to developing sailors, too often the specters of retention and advancement outweigh necessary harsh appraisals of individual personal and professional performance. As Captain Eyer suggested, the desire of leaders to be popular with subordinates and well liked by the crew diminishes the effectiveness of performance counseling and the personnel evaluation system. Leaders seem to be hesitant to firmly state, when necessary, that some sailors simply are not ready for advancement or continued service in our Navy.
Decisive leadership is often framed in the context of what is easiest to accomplish or which course is safest to navigate. Consider some of the increasingly draconian liberty policies now in place for our sailors. Worries over negative liberty incidents and the resultant potential for "bad press" have abrogated the idea of holding individual sailors strictly accountable for their actions and instead "punish" the aggregate. Harsh liberty restrictions do work to diminish liberty incidents and are a relatively easy solution for the problem—but is this "fix," and the underlying message it conveys to our sailors, the right one?
With respect to retention, sailors faced with separation should be counseled by their leaders as to the merits of continued service (in most cases), but the increasing emphasis on unrelenting pressure to ensure attrition is lowered might actually be counterproductive. I suggest sailors who are determined to separate and have carefully considered the merits of their decision shouldn't be subjected to extraordinary efforts on the part of their chain of command to retain them. If sailors need to be cajoled, persuaded, and browbeaten, perhaps they shouldn't remain in the Navy.
If every leadership decision was made with regard to improving operational readiness or combat effectiveness, we almost certainly would be faced with a spike in attrition and grumbling from the deckplates, but we would be moving in the direction of a more effective combat force. The sailors we would be advancing and retaining would stay because of leadership that holds them accountable for their actions and molds them into combat-ready warriors, even if their leaders are not universally well liked or popular.
"Projecting Biomedical Security"
(See C. Hooper, pp. 63-67, July 2003 Proceedings)
Captain Robert P. Kozloski, U.S. Marine Corps, Chemical Biological Incident Response Force—A focused-mission ship (FMS) dedicated to biomedical security might provide for medical treatment and patient isolation. Some considerations need to be taken into account, however, that were not mentioned by the author.
Should the ship deploy in response to a credible threat or wait for an incident to occur and then respond? In the former option, intelligence would drive the deployment and the credibility of the information would have to be extremely high. In the latter option, deploying a ship to the area could take weeks, which would allow the conditions to spread extensively throughout a region. A third method of deployment would be continual presence in multiple areas. This would require the purchase of several ships and the associated equipment to accompany them.
Personnel and equipment would be far more useful if deployed by air. The response time would be decreased and far fewer support personnel would be involved. The only advantage to a seaborne staging area is to quarantine infected victims or if the local populace is hostile to a U.S. presence.
Multiple ships would be required to be effective. This would create a personnel and training problem to man a ship fully. Serving as "first responders" would require a large operational detachment.
The more cost-effective solution is to integrate those assets already in existence within the Department of the Navy. Each Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) deploys with enhanced nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) equipment and trained personnel. In addition, NBC specialist and medical personnel receive advanced training prior to deployment from experts from the Marine Corps Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF).
This unit would be ideal for expedient sampling and detection. If security is an issue, then a battalion of reinforced Marines could answer the call. Aviation assets organic to the MEU could facilitate rapid movement to the objective area.
The 120-man initial response force from CBIRF could be deployed overseas within four hours of notification. Because all members of the response force are fully vaccinated, they can go into a contaminated area to perform other functions such as distribution of medication, vaccines, or supplies.
Integrating existing capabilities is a more cost-effective solution to fighting the war on terrorism than independently reinventing the wheel.
"July 2003 Cover"
Editor's Note: The photo of the USS Enterprise (CVN-65) on the cover of the July issue should have been credited to Lieutenant Commander Steven P. Davis, U.S. Navy.
"Marine Engineer Group—A Force for the Future"
(See K. Ross, pp. 84-86, July 2003 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Charles R. Kubic, Civil Engineer Corps, U.S. Navy—Kirk Ross was one of many superb embedded media representatives with the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) during Operation Iraqi Freedom. His report on the Seabees, Marines, and Army engineers who served with I MEF is well written, but appears to have been influenced by the "fog of war" in a few instances.
First, the I MEF major subordinate command, which included the Seabees and other engineers who were nonorganic to I MEF, was called the "I MEF Engineer Group" or "I MEG," not "Marine Engineer Group"—a subtle but important distinction. Second, it was the bridge over the Euphrates to the west of An Nasiriyah that fell without significant resistance. The fight for control of the two bridges near An Nasiriyah was east of the city.
Finally, all assault bridges, such as armored-vehicle-launched bridges, were placed by Marine combat engineers assigned to the 1st Marine Division. In the order of battle, Task Force Mike (Mobility) traveled in close trace of 1st Marine Division with the primary mission to improve roads and to place nonstandard Mabey-Johnson bridges. Task Force Charlie (Construction) followed in trace of Task Force Mike, with primary mission to provide expanded road and forward operating base construction capability and logistics convoy support. Task Force Echo (Endurance) had the primary mission to initiate civil-military reconstruction operations in the rear as the battle pressed forward to the north.
As for the reported organizational confusion, I will defer to others for any further comment. From my perspective, I MEG, which grew to nearly 5,000 with the addition of Army and Korean engineers, performed magnificently. A follow-on article has been submitted to Proceedings to chronicle the further achievements of the Seabees, Marines, and soldiers of I MEG following Mr. Ross's departure.
"Friendless Fire"
(See D. Walsh, pp. 58-64, June 2003; N. Polmar, D. Smyth, pp. 16-18, July 2003 Proceedings)
Commander John D. Alden, U.S. Navy (Retired)—I can understand that survivors of the attack might like to believe they were the victims of a deliberate act of the Israeli government. I have read A. Jay Cristol's book—actually an exhaustive and somewhat tedious legal brief—and found it persuasive. I believe that many of the points raised by Mr. Walsh were thoroughly explored and definitively answered by Cristol in reaching his conclusion that the attack was not ordered by anyone in the Israeli government.
I have no doubt that Israeli intelligence and higher authorities knew or should have known that the Liberty (AGTR-5) was a U.S. ship. This does not mean the attack was deliberate. The real question is what the pilots and motor torpedo boat officers who carried out the attacks and their radio controllers knew or were told at the time. Cristol focused his investigation on this question in exhaustive detail. As for theories based on purportedly suppressed photos, unrecorded radio messages, doctored records, whitewashed investigations, and the like, the less said, the better.
The clinching factor that was not mentioned in Mr. Walsh's article is that nobody has ever come up with a credible reason why any responsible Israeli official possibly could have wanted to antagonize the United States by attacking one of its naval ships. The supposed motives advanced by those who believe the attack was deliberate are carefully examined and dismissed in Cristol's book. It does not take a doctorate in international relations to understand that Israel, at war with Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, had absolutely nothing to gain and everything to lose by such an action.
Commander Thomas W. Schaaf Sr., U.S. Navy (Retired)—It is disappointing that Norman Polmar did not disclose that he is collaborating with Judge A. Jay Cristol in the promotion of his book, The Liberty Incident (Brassey's, 2003). This book certainly is not a "landmark study."
The weight of the evidence that it was a planned and deliberate attack in which the Israelis knew exactly whose ship they intended to sink is overwhelming. I would add that the day before the attack I was with Chief of Naval Operations Admiral David L. McDonald at the morning briefing. As we were briefed on the disposition of the Sixth Fleet in the area east of Crete, the briefer mentioned that the USS Liberty (AGTR-5) was steaming toward the position where she was subsequently attacked. Admiral McDonald literally leaped out of his chair, let fly a salty expletive, and shot out of the briefing room.
The snafu of routing the messages that the Chief of Naval Operations tried to send is carefully explained in the real landmark study of the attack, Assault on The Liberty (Reintree Press, 2002) by James Ennes, who was an officer on the bridge of the Liberty when the first wave of jets commenced firing. The point is that there was no question that the Israelis were not going to permit any U.S. ship to listen to their radio transmissions.
"Using Anonymity Is Dysfunctional"
(See J. van Tol, p. 48, April 2003; Anonymous, R. Beauchamp, C. Bush, M. Boettcher, pp. 16-22, June 2003; J. Huber, July 2003 Proceedings)
"Publisher's Page: Anonymity"
(See T. Marfiak, p. 8, February 2003; G. Schultz, W. Morgan, W. Holland, pp. 14-16, March 2003; V. Addison, M. Collins, D. Richardson, pp. 10-14, April 2003; R. Dunn, J. Mazzafro, P. Hall, pp. 18-20, May 2003; Anonymous, R. Beauchamp, C. Bush, M. Boettcher, pp. 16-22, June 2003; J. Huber, July 2003 Proceedings)
Captain Sam J. Tangredi, U.S. Navy—"I am committed to fostering a military culture where intelligent risk-taking and forward thinking are rewarded not dreaded." Those are the words of President George W. Bush, speaking—appropriately enough—at the U.S. Naval Academy in May 2001. The President went on to say that "creativity and imaginative thinking are the great competitive advantages of America and America's military," and that he is committed "to ensuring that visionary leaders who take risks are recognized and promoted . . . [including] officers willing to think big thoughts and look at problems with a fresh eye [and who] are sometimes wrong."
Coming from the Commander-in-Chief, those words should be considered an order, which is why the implication of the current debate on the need for anonymity in Proceedings should be distressing to all Americans.
Like the Anonymous Serving Naval Officer of the June Proceedings, I, too, intended to sit out this debate. After all, most readers are well aware that I "voted with my feet" long ago on the issue of open publication versus career risk. I am very much in agreement with Captain van Tol that the use of anonymity is dysfunctional for a professional journal—if it is to remain a true professional journal. Even with the most scrupulous editorship, anonymity can always be used as a cover for personal agendas and easily encourages reckless use of so-called facts. Conversely, when a name is attached to an article it encourages accurate and civil debate, and allows the readers to decide for themselves whether there might be a bias or agenda. As Captain Mazzafro notes, it helps to make the author's motivation clear to the audience.
I also am in agreement with Admiral Dunn—although I might not use his exact words—that, ultimately, it is up to every author to decide whether the issue he is discussing is important enough to the Navy and the nation to accept a degree of personal career hazard if a powerful senior takes offense. If the issue does not stir his passion to the point that he is willing to "risk in order to win"—to paraphrase the man we point to as our naval "father," John Paul Jones—then it probably is best he files his unsubmitted manuscript away under the category "risk management."
But I am also willing to concede the points of the Anonymous Serving Naval Officer that there indeed is always a career risk, and ideas might be swiftly disparaged or ignored merely because of authorship. I have unscientifically and mostly unintentionally conducted similar "experiments" in forwarding ideas up the chain with and without the author identified. And, yes, the "loyalty" of the author was sometimes the initial factor used in judging the value of the idea. I also found, however, that ideas submitted "anonymously" rarely gained enough traction to be implemented. Without an identifiable "author," there was no one to effectively argue the case when questions arose, when further explanations were required, and when passion was needed to push the ideas to the top. Ideas need champions if they are to succeed, and there is no better initial champion than an identified author willing to take the credit or the blame. Anonymity cannot provide that—at most it can get an idea up but one rung of the ladder.
Another slice of the pro-anonymity argument that I personally find distressing is the concept that naval officers should stay silent and avoid putting their careers at risk until they "rise to the level where they can do something effective about it." So what is the level they wait for—Chief of Naval Operations? My observation is that those who stay silent most of their careers for such a purpose also stay silent when they arrive at a "high level" because they arrive with absolutely no experience at speaking out or at personally trying to improve things through articulating and implementing innovative ideas. Also, there always is yet a higher level to (silently) strive for.
If we reward silence with promotion, we will never have innovation. And if we use anonymity as a substitute for silence, not only do we reward those seniors who are shooting their messengers, but we also create an atmosphere where they are more likely to shoot wildly at almost anyone who could be the "anonymous critic." Instead of dealing with the disease, we attempt to treat but one symptom, as Commander Addison points out, while causing an even worse symptom: the witch hunt. Anonymity ultimately will bring witch hunts—and such a poisonous atmosphere will hurt much more than the career of one identified author.
Another comment I cannot let pass is the repeated observation that because of his writing, "Edward (Ned) Beach retired as a captain"—which implies that achieving flag rank is the sole criteria for a successful career in the naval service. I suggest that, as a prolific author as well as great leader, Captain Beach had a much greater effect on America's security than a whole list of flag officers whom no one can remember. Also—and this is the supreme irony—the very existence of the powerful, world-dominant Navy that we have today is primarily due to the writings of an officer who was content to retired as a captain, Alfred Thayer Mahan (later promoted rear admiral in retirement by Congress). Through his writings—which clearly angered some of his seniors—he articulated our concept of sea power and helped to spur the movement toward a globally capable U.S. Navy.
Anonymity is the wrong direction to go if we want a naval service that rewards individuals who are innovative and bold. Instead, the flag officer leadership should be actively encouraging every naval professional to read and write (openly) for Proceedings and other professional journals. That is what will really help generate new ideas. Sadly, I am told that there are many flag officers who are not even members of the Naval Institute, their premier professional organization.
But members or not, all naval leaders are effectively under orders to encourage the innovative thought that is best developed through the freedom of open publication. I'll defer to the current author of this concept, President Bush: "New ideas don't always work. If you pick up this mantle, some of your ideas may fail. But we need to give you this freedom and we will."
"Combat Fleets"
(See A.D. Baker, p. 106, July 2003 Proceedings)
A.D. Baker III, author of “Combat Fleets”—Mention is made in my column of a Chinese destroyer under construction at Shanghai that has two helicopter hangars. That conclusion was made on the basis of a Web site photo that turns out to have been altered so that a stern-on shot of the second of the new ships in a graving dock (taken some time earlier) shows two hangars where only one exists. The fourth of the new destroyer series is now believed to be a duplicate of the third ship, the DDG-170 shown in the illustration. If nothing else, this unfortunate error points to the ease with which digital photography can be changed, either for official security or policy reasons, or, as seems to be the case here, just for the perverse fun of it.
"Sea Power 21 Series"
(See V. Clark et al., October 2002-June 2003 Proceedings)
Commander Tyrone G. Martin, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Since October 2002, Proceedings has presented a series of seven articles, all written by flag officers, uniformly indoctrinating us with the wonders of the new age of joint and naval warfare wherein all desired systems, weapons, facilities, and personnel are always available, perform perfectly together, and are affordable; where intelligence is always complete, correct, and timely; where research-and-development projects always reach maturity as scheduled; and where no enemy can do anything to degrade this marvelous state of affairs in the least. The authors, in their hype, have done Madison Avenue proud, but credibility is left wanting.
I would point out that we have fought two wars in recent years using at least the earliest versions of "Sea Power 21" systems and methods, wars against nations of little sophistication and military power, and we have failed to achieve our stated objectives in both while spending lives and enormous sums of money. Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda continue to exist and exert tremendous influence over our daily lives with little or no diminution. And we have been unable to find either Saddam Hussein or his weapons of mass destruction, leaving the United States with an image as "Quickdraw McGraw." What is worse, in the aftermath of each, we have left the destabilized countries thus targeted—Afghanistan and Iraq—struggling to form democracies, a form of governance foreign to their basically tribal cultures, within artificial boundaries that ignore ethnic and religious realities.
I am reminded of a children's fable about a powerful and vain monarch who is victimized by some scamming tailors. The cowed citizens of his country go along with how beautiful his new clothes allegedly are until a child has the gall to announce in a loud voice, "He's naked!" Is there nobody in today's naval leadership to gainsay the "pie in the sky" that the net-centric transformation has thus far proven to be? Where is the independent forum?
"Faster Is Not Always Better"
(See D. Goward, pp. 70-72, April 2003; M. Trevett, p. 24, June 2003 Proceedings)
Captain Dana Goward, U.S. Coast Guard, Chief, Office of Boat Forces—Some of Commander Trevett's comments concerning Coast Guard boat operations are misinformed. Rigid-hull inflatable boats (RHIBs) are not as susceptible to being disabled by small-arms fire as he contends. Even if they were, the contracts we recently let for a total of 800 Defender-class boats were for boats with closed-cell foam collars, not inflatable ones. These collars are virtually impervious to small-arms fire. Only wholesale removal of entire sections of the collar would begin to affect a Defender's performance, but even then would not disable it. In addition, the Defenders can mount automatic weapons both fore and aft. While the Defender does not have ballistic protection, our crews do. This was a decision on our part as such protection for the boat would be so heavy that performance would be degraded. Defenders are being operated by our Maritime Safety and security Teams and will become the standard trailerable boat operated by all Coast Guard response units. I can guarantee that Coast Guard boat forces are protected by and protecting with boats that are widely recognized as the world's best in class.
"Net-Centric Fogs Accountability"
(See C. Johnson, pp. 32-35, May 2003; A. Bruski, p. 12, June 2003; W. Morgan, p. 18, July 2003 Proceedings)
Chief Quartermaster Peter G. Wyatt, U.S. Coast Guard Reserve (Retired)—Captain Johnson's winning essay caught my attention on three levels. As a quartermaster afloat, accountability was something I carried with me every time I went up to the bridge to stand a watch. I was accountable to my commanding officer and to my shipmates below decks: you can't ask for much greater accountability than that. Later, as an assistant duty officer in the Coast Guard Headquarters Command Center, I was situated up the chain of command, where Captain Johnson sees "control of a ship's destiny" migrating relentlessly. Occasional pointed comments from local operational commanders reminded us that as the Commandant's watch Standers our role was strictly to keep him informed in order to support the fleet. Even the questions we asked in order to brief senior officers, however, could be construed in the field as "leading." Now, as a writer for Notices to Mariners for the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), I have arrived at "the periphery of the network" described by Captain Johnson. I am well ashore and keenly aware of the impact my work has on the operations and safety of Navy, Coast Guard, and civilian ships. Occasionally I refer to this as "navigating by proxy," and I'm not trying to be funny.
Notice to Mariners was part of a worldwide network for more than a century before the net-centric concept came into being. It always has been compiled, though, with a wary eye toward the ills cited by Captain Johnson: remote from the scene and totally beyond the commanding officer's control, care has been taken to keep the Notice accurate and relevant. Former mariners with an acute sense of the impact of their work traditionally have been employed to analyze source material for navigational safety and pertinence to the navigator. But we aren't working in a vacuum, and some of the same technological trends cited in the essay also are blurring the boundaries of our work. Increasingly, we work with cartographers, geospatial analysts, regional analysts, intelligence analysts, and contractors to give the Navy the definition and description of the battle space. This integrated and collaborative approach, coupled with my increasing distance (both in terms of time and nautical miles) from the navigational watch on the bridge, has only sharpened my sense of a requirement to focus on the needs of the navigator. I didn't sail everywhere; I dare not guess at how our charts might be used in every circumstance; and I certainly haven't had the opportunity to see post-1986 navigational equipment in use.
Perhaps a partial remedy to shortfalls in accountability can be drawn from an entirely different realm. The practice of "embedding" reporters during the recent conflict in Iraq was seen, at least by the military services, as a great success. Living with the troops, observing exactly what they had to do and how they had to do it, created a considerable appreciation of what things were like "at the point of the spear." That appreciation was communicated to the public at home.
As it has always worked with the Notice to Mariners, isn't the first step to accountability a keen appreciation of the job at hand, a rapport with the people driving the ships? The periphery vanishes when the actual performance of tasks on board ship, in heavy weather, under red light, affected by fatigue, and driven by operational requirements, can be seen and evaluated by that "unfathomable cast. . . that affect the ship's ability to succeed and stay safe."
It would certainly assist me in my work (as it would others on the periphery of the support network) to be "embedded," even if only briefly, to get a refresher in how things really work out there. If there was room for it for limited purposes during the war, can we also make room for it now to help bring accountability to the periphery? A two- or three-week slice of life during refresher training or the work-up period prior to refresher training could do more to cut through the fog of net-centricity then any number of after-action reports and briefings.