"Network-Centric Warfare Meets the Laws of the Navy"
(See S. Scarborough, pp. 30-33, May 2001 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel Gerry Nalepa, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, Office of Naval Research—What a bunch of politically correct nonsense. I take one of the author's major points to be "Just because you wear the rank doesn't mean you're the smartest person here." Well hasn't it always been that way? And in her search for a more egalitarian structure, she forgets that the first part of C4ISR is still "command and control." Someone has to command, and someone has to be in control. When decisions become communal, not only is it a recipe for disaster, but it also holds no one accountable.
Throughout military history, great commanders found success by making maximum use of the talents of their subordinates. One of the military's greatest disconnects with civilian society is the civilians' belief that our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines are in fact simply "tools and machines." Nothing could be further from the truth, yet the author attempts to reinforce this stereotype to make her point.
Networks do not decrease uncertainty. There is nothing more uncertain than the battlefield. And when the computers go down, guns, missiles, platforms, and especially people win the battle and the war. My first question whenever I'm shown the latest and greatest piece of technology is, "Okay, now what's your plan when it breaks?" In the fog of war, we have to plan for the network to break down and I'm not sure what the author intends to do when it does. L
"Seeking Heroes"
(See N. Polmar, p. 184, May 2001 Proceedings)
Senator Richard G. Lugar (R-IN)—Although Norman Polmar disagrees with my view that Admiral Raymond Ames Spruance should be awarded a posthumous fifth star, I was pleased that my proposal is being discussed by people with an interest in the Navy and its history. As a respected and prolific naval historian, Mr. Polmar's participation in this discussion is especially noteworthy.
Although we reach different conclusions, I agree with almost all of Mr. Polmar's historical observations. In fact, on several points, his citations seem aimed at disproving arguments that I have not made. Much of his article is devoted to explaining why Admiral Spruance was not the sole hero of Midway. He rightly cites the indispensable contributions of Lieutenant Commander Joseph Rochefort, Admiral Chester Nimitz, and Lieutenant Commander Clarence McClusky. To this list, I am certain that we could add other Americans who contributed to the extraordinary Midway victory.
Admiral Spruance was not solely responsible for the Midway victory any more than any other military commander on land or sea is solely responsible for a victory. But it would be incorrect to interpret a fifth star for Admiral Spruance as somehow diminishing the contributions of others, particularly the men under his command. Those who served under Admiral Spruance who have contacted me have been strongly supportive of his fifth star, not only for his Midway performance, but also for his exemplary service and conduct throughout his career.
Mr. Polmar also defends the selection of Admiral William Halsey over Admiral Spruance as the fourth five-star admiral and states: "No facts or intelligence have been revealed since 1945 that should lead Senator Lugar to believe that the Navy's leadership made a mistake in their selection." Indeed, I have not contended that the Navy made a mistake in this choice. Nor is my opinion that Admiral Spruance should receive a fifth star based on the premise that he was passed over unjustly because of Admiral Halsey. The accomplishments of Admiral Halsey were as important as those of Admiral Spruance, and the 1945 decision to give the rank to Admiral Halsey is not in question. In my Senate floor speech introducing the bill, I quoted Admiral Spruance, who wrote in 1965: "So far as my getting fivestar rank is concerned, if I could have had it along with Bill Halsey, that would have been fine; but, if I had received it instead of Bill Halsey, I would have been very unhappy over it."
On a third point, however, Mr. Polmar and I do disagree. This is whether a fifth star for Admiral Spruance can be justified given the promotion of General Omar Bradley in 1950. Originally, four five-star slots had been granted to both the Army and the Navy. General Bradley became the fifth Army five-star, but no corresponding promotion was granted to the Navy. Even if General Bradley's selection at that time reflected his role as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, there is little doubt that his World War II service made that rank possible. Subsequent Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs have not been awarded the fifth star.
The close decision between Admiral Spruance and Admiral Halsey for the fourth slot—so close that it took many months to sort out—demonstrates that Admiral Spruance was "on the bubble." He would have been the clear choice for the five-star rank, if a fifth slot were granted to the Navy. Thus, giving Admiral Spruance a fifth star in response to General Bradley's promotion hardly would be counter to history or the judgment of his contemporaries. Admiral Nimitz worked for Admiral Spruance's promotion as late as 1957, when he pressed the point with the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Carl Vinson.
Granting Admiral Spruance a fifth star does not require a reinterpretation of his career, a canonization of his Midway role, or a diminution of the military honors of anyone else. It also does not require a precedent to be set or an imbalance between the services.
Those of us who have served in the Navy undoubtedly will continue to debate interesting questions of U.S. naval history, including who we would rather have at the helm of a fleet during a critical engagement. But there is no need to debate whether Admiral Halsey or Admiral Spruance is more deserving of a fifth star. Both can and should hold this honor. L
"Build It & They Will Come"
(See R. Fox, pp. 44-47, April 2001 Proceedings)
James P. Day, Former Naval Lead Architect, Submarine Design Office, Newport News Shipbuilding—Captain Fox provides an excellent and necessarily concise overview of the initiatives and challenges he encountered as project manager of the Attack Submarine Acquisition Project from 1979 to 1985. His fine development story ends with reference to the first successful SSN-720 vertical missile launch while submerged demonstration in November 1986. The next phase of the Tomahawk Vertical Launch System (VLS)/SSN-688 class development is of such lasting consequence that it warrants inclusion in the VLS development story.
As the VLS tube nest design assumed dimension in the early 1980s, Naval Sea Systems Command (NavSea) tasked the 688 class design agent, Newport News Shipbuilding, to consult with the Navy labs and technical specialists to make comprehensive recommendations to improve the Arctic (under ice) capabilities of the class. Significant redesign of the fairwater and radical changes in the forward ballast tank design were required. The key changes were:
- Delete sailplanes, substitute British Navy type fully retractable bow planes in a low center of gravity housing in the forward main ballast tanks (MBTs)
- Accommodate the Electric Boat design VLS launch tube nest in the forward MBTs
- Delete many cylindrical air flasks and piping in the forward MBTs; substitute a few large, volumetrically efficient, spheroid-shaped air flasks
- Ensure retention of sufficient MBT reserve buoyancy capability for safe emergency ballast tank blow evolutions
- Provide an improved hovering system and better sonar for use under ice
All was done in a timely manner as a collaborative Newport News/NavSea effort. It was accomplished without increasing the forward MBTs overall dimensions and using the Newport News basic class design MBT structure. Satisfactory balancing of ship design with adequate weight and stability margins was obtained. When the refined all-digital combat system and some quieting improvements were added, the result was the improved 688 class.
As then-Vice Admiral Richard W. Mies remarked in the July 1997 issue of The Submarine Review:
We have some really positive highlights to talk about from last year. Our attack submarine program has been a great success story. Since the beginning of nuclear power with Nautilus 43 years ago, we have commissioned 189 nuclear powered submarines. The commissioning of USS Cheyenne last fall completed one of the largest and one of the most successful attack submarine programs in our history. She is our 62nd and final Los Angeles-class submarine. This is our largest class of submarines, but frankly, as most of you are aware, our 688s aren't really a single class of ship. Cheyenne is a far more capable submarine than our first 688 and we now have 23 of these quieter, Arctic capable, improved 688 class submarines.
In the 1990s, the burdens placed on the Soviet armed forces to counter the potential deployment of the U.S. attack submarines with their varied and numerous Tomahawk attack alternatives helped to bring the Cold War to a satisfactory conclusion.
The story of Captain Fox's timely initiatives to bring the Tomahawks to the 688 class warrants recognition. Of course, the Navy's vertical launch story will continue to be written.
"Being There: The Case for the Oceanographic Submarine"
(See D. Walsh, p. 87, December 2000 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander James P. Hopkins, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Mr. Walsh rightly laments the failure of a seven-year effort to produce sufficient justification and budgetary support for a dedicated oceanographic research submarine. The Navy has been making one fleet nuclear submarine available for one month each year for the past seven years for the purpose of dedicated oceanographic research, in the hope that the U.S. oceanographic community would fund the conversion of a fleet submarine to a dedicated research platform. Perhaps one reason for this failure was the relatively narrow focus of the project, which apparently was exclusively on the Arctic Ocean. Although Mr. Walsh cites "excellent scientific results" from the project, these results probably are not appreciated outside the scientific community, where governmental budgetary support must be found.
There is at least one oceanographic puzzle, however, with considerable public interest and the potential to generate widespread support for research. Many Americans, and even larger numbers of people in other countries, are wondering when the next El Nino/La Nina weather cycle will begin. They are wondering because of the economic dislocations associated with this cycle. The 1997-98 El Nino produced an estimated $32 billion of property damage worldwide. A single New England ice storm caused an estimated $200 million in property damage. Scientists are unable to predict the onset of the next El Nino accurately. They do, however, know that increased sea surface temperatures in the eastern Pacific are one of the first indicators that an El Nino event has commenced. The ability to predict the onset of an El Nino would improve resource allocation in affected industries, and any research that offered this potential likely would attract public support.
The basic idea of occasionally using fleet units for oceanographic research should be continued. The Navy has a long history of supporting basic scientific research with operational units and personnel. As Mr. Walsh indicates, the best opportunity for acquiring a dedicated oceanographic submarine disappears with the retirement of the USS Mendel Rivers (SSN-686). However, even if the concept of an oceanographic submarine is in doubt, other naval units could be employed on non-Arctic missions. Such a variation might involve periodic short-term oceanographic deployments of surface vessels and patrol aircraft to those areas of the world of interest to El Nino researchers. Such deployments might be conducted as part of a transit to an overseas deployment. Many Navy ships, submarines, and aircraft have an environmental collection capability related to their principal deployments. There is a global oceanographic community, and the
U.S. Navy should continue to play an active role in it.
"Books Belong in Seabags" (See K. Licup, pp. 91-92, April 2001 Proceedings)
Dr. Edward J. Marolda, Senior Historian, Naval Historical Center—Lieutenant Licup is right on the money when she calls for greater emphasis in the Navy on the development of a sense of professionalism through a readings program. She relates how some officers regard their service "as a job rather than a way of life," who have lost the appreciation of the mission "in their daily grind," and forgotten why they "joined the Navy in the first place—to be part of a great institution." The Navy's literature is filled these days with concerns about recruitment, esprit de corps, retention, and the relevance of the fleet in the post-Cold War world. Professional readings will help answer all of these concerns.
As Lieutenant Licup relates, our sister services, recognizing the connection between the health of their institutions and the broadest professional development of personnel, enthusiastically support reading programs. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy also publishes a guide to works on history and heritage. Lieutenant Licup might have added that the Royal Navy, Royal Australian Navy, and other allied navies encourage professional reading. The Naval Historical Center has posted on its website (www.history. navy.mil) an annotated and periodically updated list entitled "Professional Readings in U.S. Naval History."
Why does the U. S. Navy need a professional readings program? There are many reasons, some obvious and some not.
- Recruitment and Retention: to highlight the distinctive attractions of serving in the Navy.
- Core Values: to enhance our understanding and provide examples of honor, courage, and commitment throughout the Navy's proud history.
- Leadership: to shed light on the qualities of leadership that are as relevant today as they were when John Paul Jones, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Grace Murray Hopper, and Boatswain's Mate First Class James E. Williams made their marks in the Navy.
- National Mission: to familiarize personnel with the Navy's contribution to U.S. victory in war and the maintenance of peace throughout our more than two centuries of existence as a nation.
- Overseas Responsibilities: to arm our sailors with greater understanding of the United States' role in the world, its friends and allies, as well as potential or actual enemies.
- Maritime Power: to enlighten naval personnel about the special characteristics of naval warfare and the strategy, tactics, and doctrines of sea power.
- Technology: to enhance understanding of how modern technology, science, and industry further development of the ships, aircraft, and weapons that are the tools of our Navy.
- Naval Heritage: to foster greater appreciation of the U.S. Navy's unique heritage, traditions, culture, and history.
There is a pressing need for a Navy-wide program, championed and promoted by the Chief of Naval Operations, that identifies for our officers and enlisted personnel the best current works available on naval history and heritage, leadership, and ethics. Furthermore, the Navy should consider providing a few good books to naval personnel at the senior enlisted, junior officer, and commanding officer levels. The cost for such a program would be minimal, and the benefit to our sailors, in terms of their professional and intellectual development, as well as pride in their service, would be immeasurable.
At a recent luncheon marking the 75th anniversary of the Naval Historical Foundation, Vice Admiral Edmund P. Giambastiani Jr., U.S. Navy, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Warfare Requirements, and Assessments, related the following: "When I was in middle school I hadn't heard about the Naval Academy and knew very little about the Navy. Once while in my dentist's office, the dentist and I started talking about my future. He gave me lots of books about the sea, the Navy, and the Naval Academy. I was riveted! Naval history not only fired my imagination—it interested me in the Navy as a career and the Naval Academy as a route to that career."
Michaele Lee Huygen, Reference Librarian, Naval Postgraduate School—The correct web address for the Chief of Naval Operation's reading list is www.cnet. navy.mil/cnet/nlpg/pdf/reading-list.pdf.
"Regaining the Trust"
(See S. Tangredi, pp. 38-41, May 2001 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Michael Junge, U.S. Navy—Some of Captain Tangredi's observations require comment. He quotes one researcher as saying that "today's military personnel 'are holding their superiors to far higher standards than in the past."' I take exception here. Junior officers are not holding seniors to a higher standard—simply the same standard that those leaders themselves taught us was important. When the ideas of honor, courage, and commitment are espoused we naive juniors believe them and necessarily suffer when our teachers, mentors, and leaders fail to live up to their own standards.
Captain Tangredi is correct that the impotent gloss of the Navy public affairs organization should not be involved in the candid discussions with the fleet. I further challenge that they should not involve the Judge Advocate General's Corps and should not be given at the captain and above level for further dissemination of the message. This requires personal attention from our leadership-including the unified commanders. These officers employ the Navy that Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Vern Clark provides for them. They, too, have an obligation.
The point of the captain's message on aides also could use some clarification. The availability of a personal dog-robber reduces the efficiency of the individual officer. The admiral sees no reason not to pore over the smallest detail of an insignificant report because his driver is driving, his executive assistant is running the office, and his aide is making sure the time table is followed and the laundry picked up. This extra time has bred the zero-defect staffing that sent the zero-defect mentality to the fleet. Too often the 80% solution is abandoned for the perfect plan. I blame this on the availability of the aides.
Finally, I was witness to a sad conversation in which one of the officers charged with the Navy's strategy mentioned that the Maritime Concept needed revision. His comment, "At least it could use a new name and more current date," at first made me laugh and over time saddened me. Captain Tangredi's apparent adherence to a similar notion almost ruined the remainder of his article. The revision of strategic documents should be accomplished as the strategic landscape changes, not simply because the issue date is falling to the past. Regardless, it must be updated, simplified, and sung from the highest mountains. A recent presentation by some bright young officers charged that the Navy has failed to articulate its mission. "Have you read the Maritime Concept and the Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (NSPG)?" I challenged. The answer was yes, and the explanation was that the documents were fine staff work but could not be effectively communicated to naval personnel. A later poll of these officers showed that prior to reading the Maritime Concept and the planning guidance they had many views of the Navy's mission—to fight and win the country's wars, to take a gun to sea, etc. What these officers called for was a simple, complete message that could be spoken clearly by many voices. I believe that if the Navy leaders can articulate this mission, and then evaluate our operations in the context of our mission, their credibility will make great forward strides.
Captain Tangredi's article is philosophically on point and bears immediate action from all leaders-including those of groups as small as divisions. Sadly, I suspect that it will be read by few and discounted by many.
"Tall Tales of the Civilian World"
(See M. Lisi, pp. 92-94, March 2001; E. Figuli, pp. 20-22, April 2001 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Jeffrey E. Hoyle, U.S. Navy (Retired)—All of the pros and cons concerning such things as relative benefits, opportunities, and career development in military and civilian life are ultimately irrelevant. Like death and taxes, your transition to the civilian workplace is inevitable. I would like to add my personal insights into this transition.
I loved my career as a naval officer and surface warrior, and I absolutely would do it all again. In fact, I would be diligently serving my country at this writing had the Soviet Union not had the bad manners and poor taste to collapse. During that dark time of "right-sizing," I was faced with the career imperative of executive officer screening in the face of fewer available executive officer billets. As the competition became more fierce, I realized there were two options: a holding pattern billet or retirement. I eventually reached the conclusion that it was time to go. This was not an easy decision, but it was the correct one. It was also very scary.
The first step was figuring out what I wanted to do. I had absolutely no clue because it had never occurred to me that I would have to retire so soon. I took a year off to think about it. As I gradually took stock of my skills and experience, the management track seemed the right answer. Great! Managing what? Materials? Manufacturing? Hotel? Office? Administration? Fast food joint? There were so many choices, and I didn't have an inkling of how to do any of them. That had never stopped me before, so I put together what I thought was a good resume and started eagerly faxing it around the classifieds. I even got a few initial interviews, but never a second one, let alone an offer. Needless to say, the first six months of job searching were not successful. Despite numerous accusations to the contrary, I am not as dumb as I look. It finally occurred to me that I needed help.
It turned out that I had a lot of managerial skills and experience that translated directly to the civilian sector. The problem was to get them into civilian terminology and learn the tactics of success in that theater. This led me to research and select a professional placement service that also educated me on things such as skills and experience assessment, resume preparation, effective job search strategies, and interviewing techniques. There are several excellent ones available. Just look in the classified section of any major newspaper. They are pricey, so be prepared to part with several thousand dollars. For the novice getting their first baptism in the professional civilian workplace, this assistance is essential. You could muddle through alone, but it is much less painful to part with the bucks. Just as it was useful to be groomed and guided while you were coming up the Navy ranks, the professionals will save you a lot of time and frustration while simultaneously helping you avoid bungling opportunities.
The next step is to think like a civilian. Put your uniform in the closet. Leave it there. Let your hair grow out a bit. Be proud of your career, service, and accomplishments, but do not obsess on them. Do not dress people down, Navy-- style. That is a great way to get to know the human resources director, if you are not personally sued. It is time to move forward. You will find that most of your new colleagues have absolutely no clue concerning the Navy, but most have a lot of preconceptions. Indeed, you are providing a great service to the Navy by dispelling the myths and showing them what a great opportunity they themselves missed. Whenever there is an international incident or significant military event, you will be sought out as the resident expert. They are also surprisingly curious about your former life, but keep the sea stories to a minimum until asked.
You will have to start over. Despite your 20 years of service and experience, you are starting a new career, and will enter whatever field you choose at or near the bottom of the hierarchy. Expect a significant pay cut and lots of long hours. My first manufacturing management position was with a relatively modest operation in which management skills were valued over technical or industry experience. A good analogy is that of buying your first home. Once you are in the market, you can trade up as time passes. The same is true of your civilian career development. It takes four or five years and two job changes to regain your former military pay level, and you will pay a lot more in taxes because those things that previously were allowances are now basic compensation.
The last step is to divorce yourself from the retiree support structure as soon as you can. The pension is great, but you all know by now that you can't live on it. You will find that the exchange and commissary system is no match for civilian stores. At almost every position worthy of your background and experience, the medical, dental, vision, and insurance benefits leave your retirement package in the dust. Do not waste your time with them. Do maintain your ID, location, and marital status with the local personnel support detachment and Defense Finance and Accounting Services office, as it greatly simplifies tax form, pension payments, and when the time comes, death stuff.
I have been "retired" now for seven years, and I have established myself in a successful and lucrative electromechanical manufacturing career. I am a valued and respected member of the management team of my current company, and ultimately seek a directorship. I will not mislead you: it was not and is not easy. Nothing worth doing ever is. At times it is disheartening, unfair, frustrating, and downright scary. It is also challenging and rewarding, and, if you are doing it right, fun. What did I know about manufacturing when I left the Navy? Not a damn thing. You learn by doing. I did it, and because of the determination, persistence, confidence, and courage that are your heritage as Navy leaders, so will you. At some point, you will have to.
"Assigning Blame to the Greeneville"
(See K. O'Connor, p. 22, April 2001; J. Byron, pp. 18-20, May 2001 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander James S. Tierney, U.S. Navy (Retired)—In my opinion, Commander Scott Waddle beat the system and got away with murder. He hazarded his ship, endangered the lives of his officers and crew, collided with an unsuspecting merchant ship, and killed a number of people. For this he was "punished" with an early retirement from our Navy.
The civilian world that I live in just does not understand how our Navy has gone so very wrong. I also do not understand how our Navy has gone so very soft. For similar reckless behavior resulting in loss of life in the civilian world, Commander Waddle would be a felon behind bars.
Where are our standards that we can assume command, enjoy the privileges, and take responsibility (in the eyes of our seniors) so very lightly? I am appalled. He was derelict.
I wonder what fate will befall the executive officer, the officer of the deck, and other members of the crew.