The guidance we received prior to getting under way was critical to proper execution. What some might now characterize as flaws looked all right to us at the time. Of course, at the time, we thought we were headed for the Persian Gulf.
The situation in Operation Southern Watch (enforcing the no-fly zone over southern Iraq) was very unstable as we finished our joint task force exercise. Operation Desert Fox (December 1998 U.S. and British air and missile strikes on Iraq) had recently ended, and there seemed to be a strong requirement to tone down things and reestablish the status quo in the theater of operations. Having a carrier on station was certainly an essential element of this process.
Simultaneously, tensions were building in Serbia, Montenegro, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The rapid progression to offensive strike operations by NATO forces as part of Operation Allied Force certainly captured my attention as the deployment date grew closer. Regardless, the direction remained the same: proceed at best speed for the Persian Gulf to join Commander, Joint Task Force South West Asia (JTFSWA), for Southern Watch. Given the large numbers of aircraft already assigned to Operation Allied Force, it seemed unlikely that our mission would change.
Even so, like any other prudent commanding officer, I told the squadron to study and master two sets of theater special instructions (SPINs), air space control orders (ACOs), air space control procedures (ACPs), and intelligence data on possible opposing integrated air defense systems (ADS). We remained focused on Southern Watch, but we also prepared for Allied Force. The real difficulty lay in convincing the squadron of the importance of learning the procedures for both theaters when we were tasked formally for only one.
My only response was to emphasize that it was our specific mission to be ready for combat any time, any place. Certainly, participation in Allied Force was a real possibility, and confirmed tasking might afford us only a couple of days' notice.
Transit
Transit to where? As the battle group departed the States, orders were to make best speed for the Persian Gulf. Rumor had us holding in the Ionian Sea, but planning continued for Southern Watch. Within the squadron, we had completed a layout for that operation and all briefing and reading materials were in place. With the transit-to-where question still unanswered, my direction shifted to pulling down as much Allied Force data as possible from all sources.
As we crossed the Atlantic, we gained access to Allied Force data bases and began the formal accumulation of data for building charts, briefing material, and mission flight data. With a port call in Palma de Mallorca, Spain, still in the works, some of the troops had difficulty focusing on the mission. My cynical view of the world was that there was no way we were going to pull into Palma, because there were priority national security issues at hand, and a carrier battle group is always at the forefront of the resolution. Much to my operations officer's annoyance, I talked this perspective daily (some may say hourly) and pushed for the completion of our squadron plans for Allied Force.
As we closed Palma—then passed it by—my longsuffering operations officer got to hear many "I told you so" comments, and we began to focus on how we wanted to tie into the tactical command-and-control architecture and where to place a suitable station for Hawkeye operations. From the instructions, it was easy to see that the Allied Force commander had a plethora of airborne command-and-control assets available. At any time, a minimum of three well supported tactical command-and-control aircraft were airborne. Convincing anyone that a Hawkeye was a necessary asset looked difficult; our presence was far from a necessity.
Nevertheless, I pressed on. Throughout the interdeployment training cycle, all battle group strike missions used the Hawkeye for tactical command, control, warning, and direction. As a result, the obvious reason for us to be there was that we trained that way. This was an easy sell to the air wing (CAG) and battle group commanders. Once we received orders to augment the Allied Force with naval strike forces from the sea, the CAG and the flag were sold on including the Hawkeye as a necessary part of the package.
The final step was to sell the location of the Hawkeye battle station. For the best of both worlds, detection and communications, my operations team selected an orbit that was as close as 45 nautical miles to one threat base and 65-70 nautical miles from another. I expected this to be a hard sell because of its proximity to potential air-to-air and surface-to-air threats. I believed that it was aggressive positioning by Hawkeye community standards, and I was proposing this station with no additional protection for our aircraft.
My reasoning was that the opposition had shown little proficiency using the tactics they were attempting, and I was confident that we could remain clear of any potential surface-to-air threat. Additionally, there was an overabundance of other air-to-air assets flying, and our own naval strike package was almost continuously between our proposed stations and the potential, but limited, threat.
As it turned out, the battle group commander agreed to our choice of station in a matter of minutes, literally. It was not even an argument. After the morning staff meeting, the admiral and I stood next to a chart. I showed him the station and told him the brief version of why it was the correct station. Essentially, his only comment was "Don't get shot down,"—he was particularly concerned about the surface-to-air threat. This was about a three minute exchange.
With the station approved and the scheduling with the strike package solidified, our niche in the theater operations was well established. Our squadron's aging Hawkeye Group 0 aircraft were about to be thrust into service as the pinnacle command, control, and combat direction and detection platform for the self-contained naval strike forces that would operate within Operation Allied Force's command-and-control structure. By this time, it was just two days prior to execution of the first naval strike missions from the sea.
The First Mission
The night of 6 April 1999 was our first action. The air wing strike teams had planned the details and were prepared to employ the flexible, lethal power of the world's most mobile air force and airfield. The NATO forces had been striking hard for two-and-a-half weeks, and we had to fit our forces into the ongoing action. It was a big challenge.
Each strike team included members of our Hawkeye squadron. From our independent preparation, we brought to the Strike Intelligence Analysis Center the theater place mat. To the strike planning teams, we brought the untangling of the various SPINs, ACOs, and ACPs. In the two days proceeding the first strike, this integration of communications, tactics, and procedures proved to be a key element in achieving the desired level of integration.
The squadron was well indoctrinated in our tactical standard operating procedures (SOPs). The document served as our training tool for air wing training at Fallon, Nevada, and throughout the interdeployment training cycle. It became the essential element for our Hawkeye integration into the already mature Allied Force command-and-control architecture. The mission commanders had worked hard to learn the basics of joint-combined command-and-control architectures, and our SOP conformed exactly with the basics of Allied Force. Having studied the theater procedures and rules of engagement closely, we were ready to venture into the unfamiliar territory of Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Albania as if we had always been here.
Not surprisingly, that first strike mission was stocked heavily with squadron commanding officers and executive officers, as well as the most seasoned department heads available. The mission was going to make a statement for Navy flexibility and capability, and nobody was yawning during that first brief; the strike force was seriously pumped up. The brief focused on basic execution: No complicated tactics, remember the basics, execute per the special instructions and rules of engagement, be prepared for anything, and bring everyone back alive.
I was mission commander on the Hawkeye crew for the first strike. We launched on time, significantly ahead of the strike force. Our check-in, progress to station, systems, and theater communications were exactly as planned. The main force was on its way, as scheduled. Essentially, the prestrike fueling and progress to ingress all went as planned. I remember wondering if it really was going to be this simple. How could it be this smooth? The EA-6B Prowlers set up their suppression orbits, and the strikefighters continued on to their targets. They were in and everything was still working. Theater communications, data links, and tactical communications all were working. The strike-fighters delivered their weapons on target, on time.
The U.S. Navy had arrived. We presented a new, unpredictable force to the enemy. We added a new threat axis to the picture. We provided lethal and precision accuracy and control of the nighttime skies. We had indeed made an impact, exactly as planned.
The Ongoing Conflict
I don’t expect anyone to believe that everything from there on out was perfectly executed and all weapons were delivered successfully. It did not happen. What did happen was a successful demonstration of how proper training enabled the addition of a new force without disrupting an ongoing operation—actually adding to its lethality. Our use of standard operating procedures eliminated many normal planning requirements. Our familiarity with theater command and control made execution simple. We focused on theater specifics for integration of operations and mastering the enemy tactics. We were ready for combat.
As the conflict continued, the type of operations changed. We transitioned from independent Navy strike elements to integrated packages operating over Kosovo with significantly different objectives. For the Hawkeye crews, this meant once again proving to the theater commanders that we could handle new missions without a hiccup. Our U.S. Air Force counterparts thought of this mission as Airborne Battlefield Command, Control, Center (ABCCC); for the Hawkeye crews, it was much more.
In the classic Air Force-defined sense, the ABCCC platform merely coordinates target assignments and separates aircraft by assigning them holding locations and altitudes while they await tactical control from an airborne or ground-based forward air controller. The ABCCC crew operates from a modified C-130 aircraft that does not employ a radar for real-time monitoring; the crews use mapping displays for graphically tracking ground targets, reported threats, and aircraft assignments.
The Hawkeye, on the other hand, obviously did not throw away its sensors. The crew of five on the E-2Cs executed all the administrative functions of the ABCCC while providing tactical input and direction to aircraft as the situation dictated (as presented on its displays through on-board sensors, reported data and data links). For Hawkeye crews, airborne warning and tactical control is a primary mission. This easily added a new dimension to a standard ABCCC mission. Essentially, we became a self-contained Airborne Warning/Tactical Control-ABCCC platform. In addition to handling marshaling and airborne forward air controller (AFAC) coordination for target execution, the E-2C controllers frequently provided threat vectors and early warning of ground threat systems, enabling accurate targeting and execution of suppression of surface-to-air systems by F-16CJ and EA6B aircraft. We were able to provide the comfort of additional threat-detection support for the strikefighters attacking ground targets under AFAC direction.
For our Hawkeye crews, this meant that their capabilities were in high demand over Kosovo, where situational awareness was a high priority. On any particular mission, crews were responsible for coordinating as many as 40 aircraft at a time. They were a popular asset (and one frequently requested, even when scheduled only as a backup or early-warning aircraft). This is no criticism of the Air Force ABCCC crews. No one should expect their C-130s to provide the same services; they lack the organic sensors to build the picture and therefore cannot do the same thing. They were more than capable of very professionally performing the mission for which they were equipped and trained.
I cannot claim that we were as well trained as we would have liked for the ABCCC aspect of the mission. Although this type of control is in our training matrix, we do not emphasize it. We had only one training event during the Fallon weapons detachment that came close to simulating the mission. During our joint fleet exercise, we should have received this training while working with the amphibious readiness group. Unfortunately for us, the 'Gators did the controlling, and we missed out.
We spent many hours reviewing tactical doctrine for ABCCC missions as defined by the U.S. Marine Corps direct air support center (airborne) [DASC(A)] mission and Air Force ABCCC doctrine. Combining the essential elements of these doctrines, we conducted training on the mission and its principles and wrote a tactical SOP for ABCCC/DASC(A). Once again, an SOP was the key that enabled crews to ramp up quickly for the new mission.
Crew pass-downs quickly eliminated any rough edges; the crews never let up. Even as back-ups, they maintained accurate tactical plots and real-time situational awareness. This paid off on several occasions when the C-130 communications suite failed in the middle of large strikes in Kosovo; the Hawkeye crews were able to assume control almost immediately, and the offensive action continued unimpeded. The HawkeyeGroup 0 system is not a thing of beauty, but some very skilled aviators and technicians made this aging system work when it had to.
There remained some classic strike targets as the Kosovo campaign unfolded. Here, too, the Hawkeye crews were able to deconflict Navy strike packages from other NATO air operations occurring simultaneously. On several occasions, probably unknown to the NATO or French airborne warning and control system (AWACS) controllers, friendly fighters were vectored on Navy aircraft—and Navy fighters were sent to intercept NATO aircraft. It required the concentrated efforts of our most skilled crews to sort out these fratricidal scenarios.
At the End of the Day
The Navy flew more than 3,000 combat sorties, contributing nearly one-third of the offensive firepower delivered during the conflict. This lethal strike force demonstrated the great flexibility of our mobile airfields. We delivered from the sea, as advertised. The Hawkeye crews, in many ways, contributed to this flexibility with superb crew coordination and tactical maturity. Their old Hawkeyes proved flexible command, control, and detection platforms.
Of course, it would have been easier if we had known where we going to fight when we left home. We would been better prepared to execute the combined ABCCC/AEW mission. We could have used a lot more training for the mission, but dedicated crews and maintenance personnel rose to the occasion. Their commitment to influencing the tactical battle using the picture built before their eyes in the aging Hawkeye Group 0 system was total. Hindsight or more training would not have made this commitment any stronger.
The Hawkeye Group 0 aircraft have served us well, but they are at the end of their service life. Improved platforms would have enabled the crews to do a better job. While this was not a consideration for the battle just ended, it is for the battle of the future. The improvements provided by the Group II variants and Hawkeye 2000 and beyond are absolutely essential if naval strike forces are to retain the flexibility and tactical edge they brought to the conflict over Kosovo.
Commander Sharer is the commanding officer of VAW-124 assigned to Carrier Air Wing Eight on board the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71).