The Republican-controlled Congress is increasing defense spending, and the Navy’s submarine program could be one of the beneficiaries. Indeed, Representative Newt Gingrich (R-GA), the Speaker of the House, has become personally involved with the submarine issue.
Led by Representative Duncan Hunter (R-CA), chairman of the powerful procurement subcommittee of the House National Security Committee, Congress has proposed sweeping and innovative changes to the submarine program in the fiscal year (FY) 1996 defense authorization bill. Highlights of recent congressional action include: (I) $700 million for construction of a third Seawolf (SSN-21)-class submarine;1 (2) $704.5 million for long-lead and advanced construction costs for an attack submarine to be authorized in FY 1998 and to be built by Electric Boat/General Dynamics; and (3) $100 million for long-lead and advanced construction costs for an attack submarine to be authorized in FY 1999 and built by Newport News Shipbuilding.
In addition, the FY 1996 defense authorization bill specifies that the Secretary of Defense shall prepare “a detailed plan for development of a program that will lead to production of a more capable, less expensive submarine program than the submarine previously designated as the New Attack Submarine.” As part of this plan, the Secretary is to provide for the construction of four nuclear-powered attack submarines that will be authorized and funded in FY 1998 through 2001, "the purpose of which shall be to develop and demonstrate new technologies that will result in each successive submarine of those four being a more capable and more affordable submarine than the submarine that preceded it.”
This exceptional effort is a result of congressional concern over the confusion in the existing U.S. submarine effort and continuing Russian submarine technology advances. For almost a decade, the attack submarine (SSN) program has been under heavy fire from the press. Congress, and even the administration. By the late 1980s, the Seawolf was being criticized for its size and cost. During that period the Navy was building three or four Los Angeles (SSN-688)-class submarines per year. The cost of the Seawolf in series production would be about twice that of a Los Angeles, meaning that with the same share of the shipbuilding budget, submarine procurement would be cut to 1.5 to 2 boats per year, too few to maintain the force level goal of 100 attack submarines approved in the early 1980s.
The situation was exacerbated in the early 1990s with the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. On 13 August 1990, after a four-month Department of Defense major warship and threat review, Seawolf procurement was reduced from a planned 29 units to 12 submarines to be authorized through FY 2000. The design of a lower-cost, less-capable submarine—initially called Centurion, now the New Attack Submarine (NSSN)—was rapidly begun. This scaled-back version of the Seawolf would supplement the Seawolf to provide adequate SSN numbers. Smaller and slower, with fewer weapons and torpedo tubes (albeit with 12 vertical-launch tubes), the NSSN would have the Seawolf (i.e.. mid- 1980s) level of quieting.
In January 1992, DoD announced that the entire Seawolf program would be canceled, with only the first unit to be completed. The submarine became a political issue when during the 1992 presidential primary campaign, candidate Bill Clinton told Connecticut voters that he would continue production of the Seawolf class beyond the first unit. Candidate Paul Tsongas observed that Clinton, a Democrat, was supporting a defense program that the Republican president did not wish to continue.
Although the Seawolf program was canceled, the hard-core nuclear community—led by Admiral Bruce DeMars, director of Naval Nuclear Propulsion, and the congressional delegation from Connecticut, where the Seawolf was being built—lobbied for continued production. A second unit, the SSN-22, was authorized in FY 1991, mainly to keep the submarine production line “hot” because the NSSN was not ready for construction. Similarly, and to use components that already had been ordered, a third unit, originally authorized in 1992 and canceled, was reauthorized in FY 1996.
This disarray, combined with the revelation last year that the improved Akula-class SSNs being built by Russia were quieter than the improved Los Angeles class, led Representative Hunter—with the full support of Speaker Gingrich—to take direct action.2 After seeking data from the Congressional Research Service and General Accounting office and discussing the situation with Navy leaders and other knowledgeable persons. Hunter called for a special subcommittee hearing. This followed a full-blown hearing on attack submarines in March 1995, making this second session by the procurement subcommittee an extraordinary meeting, held just before the House and Senate went to conference.
Chaired by Hunter, the open session was held on 7 September 1995, with five “outside” witnesses and two Navy flag officers invited to testify: Anthony R. Battista, formerly a senior staff member of the House Committee on Armed Services; Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., former director of Defense Research and Engineering and a member of the Defense Science Board; Rear Admiral Robert E. Frick, program executive officer for submarines at Naval Sea Systems Command; Rear Admiral Dennis A. Jones, director of the Submarine Warfare Division in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations (N87); Ronald O'Rourke, senior analyst in the Congressional Research Service; Norman Polmar, naval analyst and author; and Dr. Lowell Wood, visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace at Stanford University.
Foster and Wood had been members of a special panel on submarines and antisubmarine warfare that the House Armed Services Committee convened in 1988-1989 to look into the implications of rapid advances in Soviet submarine quieting.3 That panel had recommended (1) the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OpNav) be reorganized to limit the power of the three warfare communities or “unions”; (2) more funding—and more important, stable funding—be provided for longterm work on modern submarines and antisubmarine warfare (ASW); and (3) competing organizations should continue working on submarine and ASW research and development.
OpNav was reorganized in 1992. The former three-star deputy chiefs of naval operations for air, surface, and submarines were downgraded to two-star positions; the Commander, Naval Air Force Atlantic, became the senior aviator; the Commander, Naval Surface Force Atlantic, the senior surface officer; and the Commander, Submarine Force Atlantic, the senior submariner. But the submarine “union” still had a four-star officer in Washington, the Director of Nuclear Propulsion, who, on a practical basis, manages submarine matters.
And, although more funding became available for submarine technology, the increasing costs of the Seawolf program have reduced their impact on submarine research and development.
Reacting to the House panel. Congress initiated a major submarine technology program in the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA). That program, which tapped into a broad spectrum of submarine-related research and development, has since been “folded back” into the Navy, defeating the congressional intention of having three or more agencies work in this area.
With this background, the special session called by Representative Hunter began with O’Rourke presenting a summary of the views of the other non-Navy witnesses and data he had assembled at the request of the subcommittee. He noted that the current U.S. Navy approach to the NSSN “may not be sufficient to counter Russian fifth—or even fourth-generation—[submarines], especially if Russians improve these designs . . . .”4
An alternative to the Navy’s NSSN plan: “Start a national- priority program to develop a sub design for series production that is more affordable and more capable than the [NSSN].” Such a plan would provide a structured effort to build a submarine that “will regain U.S. undersea superiority.”
The other civilian witnesses addressed technologies available in the near-term that are not being applied to the NSSN design. Several noted that today, with the demise of the Soviet Union and the large number of Los Angeles submarines available, there was a window of opportunity to take risks in developing advanced submarines. Among the technologies discussed were automation, fiber optics, active quieting, placing systems external to the pressure hull, electric drive, advanced hydrodynamics, and off-the-shelf electronics for some subsystems. But the focus of an advanced technology program would be the design and construction of advanced prototype submarines, rather than rushing to design and build the NSSN as the lead ship for series production. Further, competitive prototypes are proposed to be built by both General Dynamics/Electric Boat in Connecticut and Newport News Shipbuilding in Virginia. Under current Navy plans. Electric Boat would build the Seawolf and the subsequent NSSN class; the Newport News yard, which built submarines as early as 1904, would cease building submarines.
Several of the civilian witnesses mentioned the potential value of including non-nuclear submarine designs in the competitive prototype effort. There is advanced technology available in this area and there are missions that they can carry out effectively at considerably less cost than nuclear submarines, especially with the U.S. Navy’s emphasis on littoral operations.5
Admirals Jones and Frick opposed such a prototype program. “I am satisfied—ultra satisfied” with the NSSN design efforts, said Admiral Jones. He defended the NSSN design: it is more capable than previous U.S. submarines, maintains U.S. submarine superiority, incorporates major new technologies, and is affordable. Admiral Frick also supported the NSSN effort: “the right balance” between advanced technology and affordability, and “there are no new technologies on the horizon that warrant the delay in the new attack submarine," he declared.
The civilian witnesses strongly opposed those and other statements by the two flag officers, demonstrating the wide gulf between opinions in this area. Other proposals put forth by the civilian witnesses included:
Restart the SubTech Program. Congress should immediately reinstate the ARPA Submarine Technology (SubTech) program that Congress initiated in 1987 and continued for several years until it was absorbed by the Navy in 1991. SubTech was one of the most innovative technology efforts undertaken by the U.S. defense establishment. This effort is needed because, as the House Armed Services Committees ASW report of 1989 stated, “the Navy establishment—like many organizations of comparable size and age—is burdened with traditional, deeply rooted, and powerful vested interests that encumber innovation on the scale required" to counter Soviet-Russian developments. This situation remains true today, although some progress has been made by the Office of Naval Research under its current directors.
This vital effort could be initiated for as little as $100 million per year in an Advanced SubTech program jointly directed by ARPA and the Office of Naval Research. The actual research and development activities would be undertaken by the Navy’s laboratory complex, the Los Alamos and possibly Livermore national laboratories, and private contractors.
Red Team Review. U.S. Navy submarine programs must be reviewed by an objective, non-Navy group to bring a non-institutional review to these important efforts before they are formally proposed for Milestone O review. The effectiveness of this scheme has been demonstrated by reviews of various Navy programs by the Defense Science Board, the Naval Research Advisory Committee, and Chief of Naval Operations Executive Panel.
This concept is also similar to the B-Team set up by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1975 to obtain objective reviews of its estimates of Soviet strategic force development. A submarine-oriented Red Team should be comprised of non-submarine specialists, from multiple disciplines, and should be established for a period of at least three to five years. The team should report directly to the Secretary of the Navy and Chief of Naval Operations.
A Structure Conducive to Progress. Congress and the Navy’s leadership should review the current structure within the Navy for designing submarines. The Naval Nuclear Propulsion Directorate (code NavSea-08) was established in the late 1940s, with the director, then-Captain H. G. Rickover, double-hatted to the Atomic Energy Commission (now Department of Energy). That organization served the Navy and the nation well for many years, developing an enviable safety record for naval nuclear propulsion and for personnel training.
However, both safety and training have been fully institutionalized within the Navy. Having a four-star director of safety/training, who has direct influence on submarine design—in some respects, more than the Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command (three stars), the senior submarine Force Commander (three stars), or the submarine program manager (two stars)—must be carefully and objectively reviewed.
The incumbent Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion, Admiral DeMars, is scheduled to retire in 1996 after an eight-year tenure, thus there is an opportunity for Congress and the Navy’s leadership to review this structure.
The Defense authorization bill does provide for a top-level review panel, to consist of three members of the Senate Armed Services Committee and three from the House National Security Committee, to be annually briefed by the Secretary of the Navy on details of the submarine program. Also, ARPA will be provided an initial $100 million to develop and demonstrate advanced submarine technologies, including electric drive, hydrodynamic quieting, automation, solid-state power electronics, wake reduction technologies, superconductor technologies, torpedo defense, advanced propulsors, and fuel cells.
Thus, Congress has put forth an ambitious and far-reaching program to ensure U.S. submarine superiority. The Navy Department already has reacted, with a special panel to access available submarine technologies established by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition. The panel, to report its findings in mid-March 1996, is chaired by retired Vice Admiral Albert J. Baciocco, Jr., a former Chief of Naval Research and head of the research and development office in OpNav, as well as a submarine commander. The 13 other panel members are retired military and civilian personnel, including representatives of the two shipyards. Vice Admiral Dan Cooper, a former Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for submarines, and Rear Admiral Robert Wertheim, a pioneer in the development of strategic missile submarines.
The end of the Cold War has raised serious questions about the kind of navy the United States should have as it enters the 21st century. At the same time, the cost of the Seawolf class, the retirement of many attack submarines with more than a decade of service life remaining, Russian submarine developments, and the failure of the U.S. submarine community to put forth an “saleable” program demand that a new direction be taken in U.S. submarine development. Congress is attempting to provide a compass for that new direction.
1 Total cost of the third unit, the SSN-23, will be approximately $3 billion, plus Department of Energy costs related to the reactor and fuel.
2 See N. Polmar, “The Quest for the Quiet Submarine," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, October 1995, pp. 119-21.
3 Among the other members of that 1988-1989 panel were Dr. William Perry, now Secretary of Defense, and Dr. Paul Kaminski, now Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology.
4 The Akula SSN and the Oscar cruise-missile submarine (SSGN) were third-generation submarines; the Severodvinsk SSN, now under construction, is considered a fourth-generation submarine; the Malachite engineering bureau in St. Petersburg is now designing the fifth-generation SSN.
5 See, for example, RAdm. Julian S. Lake, “The Case for the Diesel-Electric Submarine,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, October 1995, p. 18.