A reduced Royal Netherlands Navy looks toward the maritime action group concept of operations to allow it to play in multinational operations.
Command of the sea means that a nation can guarantee its own sea lines of communication and deny the use of these routes—which Mahan described as “well-worn paths”—to its adversary. To be more specific, it means that a nation can move with acceptable risk between its home waters and the areas where it wants to achieve its military political objectives. Command of the sea does not entail that the sea area be totally controlled, as once practiced in early 20th- century strategies that regarded the battle-fleet as the prime instrument to achieve command of the sea. Contemporary maritime strategy, as developed by the U.S. Navy since World War II, attempts to achieve command of the sea by making use of the immense potential provided by the carrier battle group (CVBG). Force reductions and the necessity to concentrate forces when local conflicts occur, however, led to the formation of the maritime action group (MAG) concept of operations.
The maritime action group concept of operations tries to optimize the balance between a minimal number of assets needed to exercise regional command of the sea and the price that an adversary has to pay to obtain that regional command of the sea from the MAG. To exercise its regional command of the sea, the MAG consists of at least an antiair-antisurface warfare unit, an antisubmarine-antisurface warfare unit, a nuclear-powered attack submarine, and a detachment of maritime patrol aircraft. The antiair-antisurface warfare unit provides the MAG, apart from its antisurface warfare capabilities, with a layered air defense and command facilities. The antisubmarine-antisurface warfare unit provides extensive antisubmarine warfare sensors and weapons. The nuclear-powered attack submarine may be used for defense in depth, covert antisubmarine-antisurface warfare, or intelligence gathering and early warning operations. The maritime patrol aircraft detachment provides long-range surveillance and can be used to augment the MAG’s punch in the warfare area with the highest perceived threat.
To operate the MAG efficiently, the units should all be LINK and SATCOM capable, and high-quality logistic support is essential to ensure maximum flexibility to the MAG in conducting its operation. This support will be simplified immensely if a maritime logistic base is available close to the area of operations.
The Royal Netherlands Navy has been reduced in size because of budget cuts as part of the peace dividend, but it is committed to maintaining a full naval capability across the spectrum of maritime warfare, with the exception of carrier aviation. It chose to downsize on the numbers of all type commanders rather than stripping itself of either the submarine service or maritime patrol aircraft squadrons. The current inventory includes: 2 Tromp-class antiair warfare guided-missile frigates, 2 Jacob Van Heemskerck-class antiair warfare guided-missile frigates, 4 Kortenaer-class antisubmarine warfare frigates, 8 Karel Doorman-class antisubmarine warfare frigates, 4 Walrus-class submarines, 1 Zuiderkruis- class fast combat support ship, 1 Amsterdam-class fast combat support ship, 13 Lockheed P-3C Update II.5 Orion maritime patrol aircraft, plus mine countermeasures ships and auxiliary units.
The Dutch Antilles are a good example of where the MAG concept of operations could be put to use to exercise regional command of the sea. The Royal Netherlands Navy traditionally is tasked with securing the political and economical aims and objectives in this part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. During peacetime, this is executed by the deployment of one frigate and two Fokker F-27 maritime patrol aircraft. The Royal Netherlands Marine Corps is tasked to defend the islands in cooperation with the territorial defense forces, which frequently are augmented by other navy units for specific missions. One example is the forward deployment of Royal Netherlands Navy P-3C Orion aircraft to augment the area surveillance capability in the currently conducted antidrug operations. This part of the Dutch territory—six islands dispersed in two groups of three islands—is most threatened by a maritime blockade in times of tension. While a deployment of a full task group may be prudent in times of war, the navy cannot conduct such an effort for an unlimited period of time during the tension phase of a prolonged conflict. The adoption of the MAG concept may well enable the Royal Netherlands Navy to exercise regional command of the sea during this period.
The U.S. Navy maritime action group emphasizes its antiair warfare capability. While the Royal Netherlands Navy does not have a unit equipped with the Aegis air-defense system, its new LCF (air-defense and command frigate) is equipped with the SM-2ER Block IV and can be used to serve as the antiair-antisurface warfare component of a Dutch MAG in a regional scenario.
To exercise regional command of the sea, the MAG must be able to operate in all of the warfare areas, but because of its limited size, an opposing submarine could easily end such capability. That is why a credible antisubmarine warfare capability is so important. A well-equipped antisubmarine warfare unit with one or two helicopters can serve in both antisubmarine and antisurface warfare roles, provide an extra layer in the defense of the MAG, and provide an extra attack axis. Helicopters also can be used to fill gaps in maritime patrol aircraft coverage. The Royal Netherlands Navy can use its towed array-equipped Karel Doorman- class frigates to serve in this role along with their embarked helicopters.
A conventional submarine lacks the strategic mobility of the nuclear-powered attack submarine, but it is able to contribute to the MAG concept of operations. A well-equipped submarine with SAT- COM and LINK 11 can provide early warning and covert surveillance. During offensive operations, its heavyweight torpedoes increase the risk for the opposing maritime forces. The quality of the sensor, weapon, and command system of the Walrus-class submarine is comparable to that of a nuclear-powered attack submarine—apart from the nuclear-powered attack submarine’s more extensive communications capabilities, the high-power, low-frequency active sonar, and strike capability. The encapsulated Harpoon underwater-to-surface missile gives the Walrus-class submarine—and therefore the MAG—more tactical versatility, while even a limited strike capability could be provided with the development of the submarine-launched land-attack version of this missile.
A good long-range surface surveillance capability is necessary because of the limited sensor range of the other assets of the MAG. The maritime patrol aircraft also could provide an extra antisubmarine warfare platform and over-the-horizon targeting for offensive antisurface warfare operations. The size of the detachment should be large enough to provide around-the-clock air cover in the area of operations, with enough spares to fill gaps created by unserviceable aircraft. The Royal Netherlands Navy P-3C update 11.5 Orion aircraft are suitable for MAG operations, and retrofitting the aircraft with the APS 137 ISAR radar would enhance their capabilities to perform all tasking within the MAG concept of operations.
The logistic support operation will considerably influence the MAG’s effectiveness, because whether or not continuous tanker support is necessary depends on the availability of a nearby logistic support base. The limited size of the MAG means that the actual deployment time in the area of operations needs to be maximized.
The Royal Netherlands Navy needs frigates, submarines, and maritime patrol aircraft to execute its tasking. Maintaining such an inventory will enable the Royal Netherlands Navy to make national use of the MAG concept of operations and provide the Dutch government with a maritime military option—somewhere between sending a single ship or an entire task group—to support a multinational operation.
The Royal Netherlands Navy could adopt its own version of the MAG concept, with minimal changes to its current inventory. The mid-life update program for its P-3C Orion and the new air-defense and command frigate program will enhance the Royal Netherlands Navy MAG and allow it to grow into a credible maritime military instrument.
Lieutenant de Groot is Executive Officer of the Walrus-class Dolfijn (S-808).