Destroyers Deliver "Urgent Fury"

Cuban-aligned communists began turn­ing the Caribbean island of Grenada into a military base in 1979. At the time, the island’s People’s Revolutionary Army (PRA)—trained and armed by the government of Cuba—was the most powerful military force in the southern Caribbean. By 1983, Cuban troops were completing construction of bunkers compatible with Soviet bomber-launched cruise missiles and ground-launched bal­listic missiles, part of the new Point Salines airfield. Grenada was clearly being prepared as an offensive air base to transport Cuban and other hostile troops to Africa and South America. The Soviet Union’s ambassador to Grenada was even an active-duty Red Army colonel.

The USS Caron (DD-970) en­gaged in special operations in the southern Caribbean for eight days in April 1983, shortly after the Grenadian regime mobilized to repel a feared invasion. Grenada blamed the invasion scare on a U.S. naval exercise it called “Ocean Venture” 1983, but no such exercise occurred, nor did any other significant U.S. naval operation in the Caribbean that spring.¹

In mid-October that year, a Moscow-aligned terrorist faction overthrew the Grenadian Marxist leader, Maurice Bishop. Subsequently, the U.S. State and Defense de­partments considered evacuating 600 students from a U.S. medical school on the island. On 18 October, an am­phibious task force carrying the 22d Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU), composed principally of the 2d Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment, had departed from Norfolk, Vir­ginia, on a scheduled rotation to Lebanon. Facing popu­lar opposition, the terrorists murdered Bishop and other political opponents the next day and declared a 24-hour shoot-on-sight curfew.

On 20 October, the destroyers Caron, under Commander J. S. Polk, U.S. Navy, and Moosbrugger (DD-980), under Com­mander D. A. Dyer, U.S. Navy, and the cruiser Ticonderoga (CG-47), under Captain R. G. Guilbault, U.S. Navy, deployed to participate with an aircraft carrier bat­tle group centered on the USS Inde­pendence (CV-62) to cover the am­phibious force off Lebanon.

In the White House, almost si­multaneously, Rear Admiral John Poindexter convened the first of several Washington staff meetings regarding Grenada. At midday General John Vessey, U.S. Army, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ordered the Independence bat­tle group toward Grenada for a pos­sible rescue.

Late that afternoon, the Caron and the Moosbrugger received flash-prece­dence orders diverting them southward in radio silence. The Caron detached from the battle group and began a 2000-mile dash to Grenada. She carried ad­ditional van-mounted electronics on her flight deck and hence did not have a LAMPS helicopter embarked. Her Outboard (SSQ communications intelligence) system would obviously be valuable in intercepting radio traffic around Grenada and in ensuring that U.S. forces ap­proached in radio silence. The Ticonderoga, commissioned in January 1983, on her first deployment, led several other ships to the Mediterranean as a decoy force to divert So­viet ocean-surveillance satellites.

The Moosbrugger stayed initially with the Indepen­dence. Before deployment she had received the proto­type SQQ-89 modernized antisubmarine warfare system, including the SQR-19 tactical towed-array sonar, but not the LAMPS Mark III systems to support SH-60B heli­copters. Instead, she had embarked a LAMPS Mark I SH-2F Seasprite helicopter from HSL-34. On 21 Octo­ber an intelligence planning package for the Marines ar­rived on board the Independence, which transferred it by helicopter to the Moosbrugger. The destroyer raced to ren­dezvous with the distant amphibious task group, which was then steering southward, too. After 14 hours at 32 knots, she delivered the intelligence package to the Marines at sea, her Seasprite making the delivery over the horizon on the 23rd.

The Caron arrived off Grenada on 23 October and sta­tioned herself 12 miles off the coast to gather intelligence. That evening in Washington, President Ronald Reagan signed the directive authorizing Operation Urgent Fury. Its objectives were to protect Americans on Grenada, to establish a democratic government, and to eradicate Cuban and Soviet influence.

Still at high speed, the Moosbrugger headed for the An­tigua Passage and rejoined the Independence before dawn on the 24th. Anticipating a call for combat search and res­cue (SAR) services, Captain Dyer ordered ASW gear re­moved from the Seasprite to make room for stretchers and M-60 machine guns. The Moosbrugger was briefly reas­signed to the amphibious squadron, probably for surface protection, but the battle group commander had noticed that she was the only surface combat ship in the task force carrying a helicopter. The Independence sent a large SH-3H Sea King ASW helicopter from HS-15 with Ma­rine gunners to the Moosbrugger to join the Seasprite. With two helicopters, then, the Moosbrugger was desig­nated the primary combat SAR platform for Urgent Fury, and she detached from the battle group to join the Caron off Grenada. At taps, the evening prayer was “The Navy Hymn.” Hardly anyone wanted to sleep.

Rain obscured star sights, and both ships were in radio silence, but good navigating brought them together at mid­night. The force ran to Point Salines, the southwest tip of the island, at 25 knots in wide line abreast to arrive at first light on the 25th. At that time, Army Ranger para­troopers were to land on the airfield. Special Forces commandos (Navy sea-air-land [SEAL] and Air Force combat controller [CCT] teams) had parachuted into the sea off the coast late on the 23rd. Four heavily-loaded SEALs were lost. A boat from the frigate Clifton Sprague (FFG-16) took the other Special Forces men closer to the beach. It turned away to avoid a defender’s patrol and was swamped in the surf, killing the engine. For more than 24 hours the boat crew and commandos drifted out to sea on an offshore current. At 0430 lookouts on both destroyers spotted a red signal flare. The Moosbrugger s SH-3, airborne for SAR duty for the Ranger jump, iden­tified men in the water. The Caron recovered them by boat.

Urgent Fury had been put together very quickly, and neither the Army nor the Navy units had radio-commu­nications doctrine to follow. The Caron may have iden­tified Army helicopter radio frequencies with her Out­board installation. Helicopters, reportedly Army UH-60A Blackhawks, rendezvoused with the Caron, picked up the SEAL platoon, and lifted it to the politically important Government House. There, the SEALs protected an im­portant ally, Governor-General Sir Paul Scoon, whose re­sponse to the terrorists’ call to mobilize against invasion had been to put a “Welcome U.S. Marines” sign on the lawn for the next 25 hours.²

The destroyers were two miles south of Point Salines at 0600 when Army paratroopers hit the silk from C-130s over the airfield. Offshore, the Moosbrugger had both her helicopters airborne to rescue anyone who ditched at sea. She nearly ran aground at 25 knots, while her young con­ning officer watched the paratroopers and enemy machine gunfire ashore in fascination, missing the navigator’s no­tice to slow down and turn. Captain Dyer gave the nec­essary order.

In the critical first eight hours, enemy forces outnum­bered U.S. troops two to one, and they enjoyed an ad­vantage in armored vehicles and strong defensive posi­tions. Cuban troops and the Cuban-led PRA fought fiercely. But better leadership, aircraft, amphibious flex­ibility, and the destroyers’ guns offset them.

At 0615 Army Delta Force counter-terrorist comman­dos attempted to rescue political prisoners at the Rich­mond Hill prison. Their helicopters ran into intense anti­aircraft fire, and two UH-60As quickly diverted to the Moosbrugger. Their pilots signaled by hand that they needed to land on her flight deck. The Moosbrugger im­mediately waved the first Blackhawk aboard. Riddled by .50-caliber fire, it had seven wounded men on board, in­cluding the helicopter pilot and two commandos with se­rious chest wounds. Corpsmen in the Moosbrugger set them up in the hangar bay and worked on their wounds. The copilot explained the radio frequencies the Army used. The UH-60A took off in an impressive demonstration of the aircraft’s combat survivability. Army practice is to move forward on takeoff, and the Blackhawk barely missed the superstructure of the ship. As the Moosbrug­ger' s radiomen tuned to the Army frequencies, they heard the pilot telling the other Blackhawks to take off verti­cally. A second shot-up Blackhawk landed, unloaded its troops, including two more wounded, and literally went backward as it took off. The Moosbrugger's Seasprite—“Moose’s Grey Goose”—brought the destroyer squadron medical officer over from the Caron. A large Marine CH-46E Sea Knight helicopter landed with a medical team at 0659 and evacuated the wounded men to the amphibi­ous assault ship Guam (LPH-9) at 0725; all survived. The 1967 decision to enlarge the DX specification to operate helicopters of this size was paying off—in a big way.

With communications established and the wounded off­loaded, the Moosbrugger became an advance base for the Army helicopters to refuel and to receive orders through her multiple radio systems. She brought the Army heli­copters in to refuel and gave them, without hesitation, more than 25 tons of JP-5. Unwounded commandos re­grouped and boarded helicopters to go back into action. At 0730 two Marine AH-IT Sea Cobra gunship helicopters escorted the Moosbrugger's SH-3H to a hot landing zone ashore, where it picked up 11 more wounded commandos and took them to the hospital-equipped Guam. Upon the SH-3H’s return to the Moosbrugger for refueling, a crew­man handed down a penciled note for Captain Dyer:

CO WE JUST PULLED 11 WOUNDED OUT OF ZONE FLEW EM TO GUAM ALL ALIVE WHEN WE GOT ‘EM THERE

The reverse side of the note was coated with blood. The wounded Blackhawk pilot stayed in his aircraft and re­portedly was killed approaching Richmond Hill again. Further attacks were canceled. The Moosbrugger made 43 landings of Army helicopters by 1300. Her Seasprite flew from the Clifton Sprague, since the larger Blackhawks and Sea King needed the Spruance (DD-963)-class flight deck.³

The Rangers’ parachute drop to seize the Point Salines airfield went better. The Cubans blew up their radios, lest their codes be captured, so a Cuban freighter—Vietnam Heroico—anchored in the harbor relayed radio messages between Cuba and the terrorists. The Caron's, Outboard crew no doubt was listening, and the Caron promptly or­dered the Vietnam Heroico to leave Grenadian waters. The freighter did so that morning but stood 12 miles offshore in international waters for the rest of the U.S. operation.⁴

That afternoon, enemy rocket fire from Fort Frederick, an ancient harbor defense work, shot down two Marine AH-IT Sea Cobras that were repelling a PR A counterat­tack on the SEAL platoon holding Government House. A Sea Knight helicopter from the Guam recovered the Independence and opened fire on the PRA force with her 5-inch guns. The enemy unit retreated into defilade under this barrage, giving the entire SEAL platoon a chance to break out from the station. With two men (including their commander) badly wounded, they escaped into conceal­ment up the coast.

After dark, the Caron approached silently within barely a ship’s length of shoal water to pick up the SEAL pla­toon. Her fast-reacting gas turbines and controllable-pitch propellers made this risky maneuver feasible. If discov­ered, she would likely draw enemy attention away from her boat, and she could withstand rocket and gunfire hits better than any helicopter.

Explosions ashore indicated that fighting continued. Linking up took time and made it a long swim. Ten SEALs swam out to the Caron's boat, eight towing the wounded crew of one Sea Cobra, but the Caron s boat searched for the other’s two crewmen in vain. The destroyer stood in so close to shore to provide cover that enemy infantry fired at her with mortar rounds. Fortunately, all missed.

Farther north along the coast, a PRA platoon under ter­rorist command counterattacked the SEAL commando pla­toon, which had captured the Radio Free Grenada propa­ganda transmitter station at Beausejour Bay. The SEALs had killed four and captured ten Grenadian troops that morning, but this new PRA force was larger. A big So­viet BTR-60PB armored personnel carrier with them fired 14.5-mm cannon shells right through the walls of the trans­mitter building where the SEALs had taken cover. The SEALs had no weapon that could penetrate the person­nel carrier’s armor. With assault clearly imminent, the SEAL force called for support. The Caron, nearby, re­sponded. In coordination with the SEALs, she set up and controlled strafing by two A-7E bombers from the Inde­men from the radio station action. On board ship, Caron's medical team treated their wounds. Confident that the coast was clear, the Caron vectored Army UH-60As to pick up the last two SEALs, a rear guard, from the beach.⁵ All the SEALs had been recovered safely. Despite stories, the Caron's gunfire and the air strike were neither pro­longed nor aimed at the radio station or mast. They were a prompt, coordinated, fully successful fire support mis­sion to cover the SEAL platoon’s escape.⁶

Both destroyers stood on ready-fire alert for gunfire support all night. The Moosbrugger linked up by radio with a ground unit and fired several star shells to illumi­nate its patrol area for spotting. She fired one high-ex­plosive round upon request and received a report of “enemy squad destroyed,” then requests for four more il­lumination rounds. Her officers suspected they were shooting at shadows in the dark, but if they bolstered the ground troops’ fortitude, the shells were well spent.

The destroyers spent the second day at Grenada, 26 Oc­tober, on call for gunfire support, looking for small boats that might be carrying fleeing terrorists or infiltrating Cubans, and searching for Cuban submarines in case any were around.⁷ The Caron detected a chartered sport fish­ing boat approaching from the north to land a television news crew. After the Vietnam War, many military com­manders did not trust the press (and vice versa) so, on the fleet commander’s direct order, an A-7E bomber from the Independence drove the boat off with warning shots.⁸ The Moosbrugger's crew called the sea off Grenada’s north­west coast the “CBS Patrol Zone” after that. That night, the Caron fired three star shells (two were duds) to illu­minate Fort Frederick for a Marine assault. Although no one could have known it then, this assault was the last op­posed action on Grenada. Later, the Caron picked up 11 Rangers, who paddled out to her in a raft salvaged from a downed CH-46. They had stayed behind to guard the evacuation of 224 students (mostly), and then escaped, de­spite enemy patrols.⁹ Outboard probably contributed to the success of this rescue.

The Moosbrugger rounded Point Salines so often that her crew began calling it “Moose Point.” She often oper­ated on one engine to save fuel; fast light-off of the gas turbines for full power, if needed, was a big advantage. Down to 39% of fuel and less than that of JP-5 for heli­copters, she refueled on the 27th for the first time since leaving Charleston a week earlier. That afternoon she supported an Army 82nd Airborne helicopter assault against the Calvigny barracks on the southeast coast. Naval gunfire doctrine with the Marines is to keep shooting right until the helicopters land, so that shell bursts keep enemy heads down. The Moosbrugger fired rounds to seaward for ranging and to warm up the 5-inch barrels (preaction calibration fire [PACFire]). She located precise naviga­tional reference points ashore with her Mark 86 gunfire control system and calibrated range to the PACFire shell falls. These procedures would give very good shooting accuracy.

Authentication (validating that only the correct units are on the radio net) and deconfliction took three hours. An A-7E air strike scheduled to follow the naval gunfire mis­sion happened beforehand. Finally, the Moosbrugger fired one high-explosive round at a barracks called out by an 82nd Airborne spotter in an Army helicopter. The shell went right through the roof of the target building. Such single-shot accuracy greatly impressed the spotter. Con­cerned that Army-Navy communications and deconflic­tion were weak, however, off-scene task commanders or­dered naval gunfire support at Calvigny to stop 10 minutes before the landing and pulled the spotter helicopter to de­conflict from another air strike. When the eight Black- hawk assault helicopters came in to land 10 minutes later, long enough for possible defenders to set up weapons, one pilot thought he saw muzzle flashes. He swerved to dis­rupt enemy gunners’ aim but collided with another heli­copter, killing three Rangers, seriously wounding six oth­ers, and destroying both helicopters. This forced a third Blackhawk to veer off so sharply that it, too, crashed and was destroyed. The base was deserted. A Naval War College analysis in 1986 hinted that this disaster showed that the Navy and the Marines, who were well practiced at coordinating supporting fire, were more skilled at air­borne assaults than was the Army.¹" A later version of the Naval War College study deleted mention of the Calvi­gny assault.

During the following days, both destroyers covered the Marine advance north along the coast. One night the Moosbrugger searched by active sonar for a Cuban Fox­trot submarine until an assault ship in the harbor, where many were probably getting their first sleep in days, called her and demanded: “Knock off the noise!” Her heli­copters dropped psychological warfare pamphlets, and she supported a SEAL mission. On 1 November, she cov­ered the Marine landing on Carriacou Island, which turned out to be unopposed, so no firing was required. Mean­while all the terrorists were caught and imprisoned at Rich­mond Hill.

Two days later, the Caron and the Moosbrugger de­parted for Lebanon. Their 5-inch guns had been the heav­iest and only naval artillery employed in Operation Urgent Fury. The Caron fired 17 5-inch rounds; the Moos­brugger fired two high-explosive 5-inch shells plus illu­mination and PACFire rounds." This may seem light, but the operation order required the invaders to avoid unnecessary damage to Grenada. Despite the initial lack of coordination, Army helicopters and Navy destroyers had found each other very useful. Wider knowledge of this might have cooled subsequent disputes over joint op­erations. Months later, when the Moosbrugger was on a routine gunnery exercise near Puerto Rico, 82nd Airborne spotters attended and had her fire 200 rounds for them to practice spotting and coordination.¹² The liberation of Grenada has been criticized for inefficiency, but it stands as the most strategically successful U.S. combat operation since Vietnam, Operation Desert Storm not excepted.