The Nightingale’s Song
Robert Timberg. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995. 579 pp. Bib. Ind. Notes. Photos. $27.50 ($24.75).
Reviewed by David C. Poyer
The young nightingale, it is said, cannot sing until it hears the song of another nightingale—at which point it bursts suddenly and flawlessly into its complex melody, following some mysteriously activated internal template.
Robert Timberg’s The Nightingale’s Song likens five graduates of the U.S. Naval Academy to the young bird. John Poindexter, Bud McFarlane, John McCain, James Webb, and Oliver North were key political players during the presidency of Ronald Reagan, and each responded to his “song” with some variant of his own. In particular, McFarlane, Poindexter, and North served on the National Security Council (NSC) staff and there helped produce some of Reagan’s major foreign-policy accomplishments. But in the end all three were dishonored, and forces were released that still reverberate in U.S. politics.
A brief review of events may be helpful. In 1985, Iranian-sponsored militias in Lebanon were holding several Americans hostage. President Reagan directed a secret effort to sell/trade arms to Iran for their release. A junior NSC staffer—Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, U.S. Marine Corps—ended up in charge of the operation. By early 186, U.S. arms were being shipped to Iran, then at war with Iraq. The Pentagon set the price; the middlemen paid it, charged the Iranians more, then transferred funds back to North. But North also had been given a “Message to Garcia” mission to keep the Nicaraguan Contras going “body and soul” (as Reagan put it), despite the barring of such aid by Congress. He decided to divert some of the arms sales’ proceeds to them. The scandal when all of this—dealing with terrorists, arming Iran, violating the Boland Amendment—was revealed rocked the Reagan administration and led to North’s firing, Poindexter’s resignation, and McFarlane’s disgrace.
Robert Timberg, a 1964 Naval Academy graduate and Washington correspondent for the Baltimore Sun, focuses on three links among these five men: Annapolis, Vietnam, and Reagan. He first recreates the atmosphere of the pre-female Naval Academy to emphasize the shared culture and mind-set: swimming to Baltimore; the grease list; never bilge a classmate; “A Message to Garcia.” He then moves to Vietnam, where he also served, recreating the experiences of Webb, North, McFarlane, and McCain in detail that nearly matches Webb’s Vietnam novel Fields of Fire in vividness.
The Vietnam War was the most divisive event of the American Century. It separated its generation from those before and after, and divided that generation into two hostile and mutually incomprehensible camps: those who fought and those who, for whatever reason, chose not to. Joseph Heller says of his service in World War II, ‘There was a feeling that you were doing something that was socially approved and esteemed.” Vietnam veterans got no such feeling on their return. In retrospect, the war was misbegotten from the moment Lyndon Johnson committed troops. But even though it was not the fault of those sent to fight, it quickly became their burden. The guilt and shame of those who evaded the call, who let poor whites and minorities be drafted in their place, Timberg says, was expiated by focusing contempt and blame on those who answered it.
Time has not erased this divide. Timberg quotes a friend of Webb’s who received the last rites seven times as a result of his wounds: “There’s a wall ten miles high and fifty miles thick between those of us who went and those who didn’t, and that wall is never going to come down.” For McFarlane, Webb, North, and McCain, “ . . . memories of Vietnam would always be refracted through a filter smeared with the blood of friends and comrades.”
Timberg argues that in the cases of Poindexter, McFarlane, and North, it was the combination of Naval Academy indoctrination, the determination not to repeat Vietnam, and the combination of ideological narcosis and leadership vacuum characteristic of the Reagan White House that led to Iran-Contra.
Much of this material has been discussed before—in the press, in Timberg’s Esquire article, “The Private War of Ollie and Jim,” and in books by those involved. Occasionally the going gets confusing. I wondered about the inclusion of McCain, for example. His experiences as a prisoner-of-war and afterward—divorce, remarriage, and a successful political career—are riveting, but the linkage is unclear. Poindexter is clearly central to Iran-Contra, but assertions such that he imbibed the Vietnam syndrome “like secondhand smoke” are suspect. Webb, too, seems out of place, unless he’s intended as a contrast—the Naval Academy grad who survived plebe year, the Marine Corps, Vietnam, and law school with his ability to think independently still intact.
One has argue with Timberg on some conclusions as well. Though he pulls the punch, he clearly ascribes Iran-Contra to the fact that “the Reagan White House had too many Naval Academy guys running around in it.” Should we rather praise the straightforwardness and honesty of such non-Academy men as Robert McNamara or Henry Kissinger? Our service academies clearly teach that it is wrong for military officers to mislead, dissemble, and make policy themselves—whatever their ideological inclinations or lack of detailed direction. The errors of McFarlane, Poindexter, and North are neither the Academy’s fault nor that of history. Courageous and resourceful on the battlefield and at sea, somehow, at a decisive moment, they lacked whatever it took to knock on the door, go in, and say, “Sir, you know that thing you asked me to do? Well, I can’t do it.”
In the end what is most valuable in this book is Timberg’s careful piecing together of motivation for each actor, and his musing on the interaction of personality and chance that ultimately creates history. He’s right that we all tend to become “frozen in time.” The World War II generation saw Vietnam as Czechoslovakia. The Vietnam generation saw Nicaragua, Lebanon, the Gulf, and Somalia as Vietnam. But we are not nightingales, and easy analogies do not make good policy. Through a conscious effort, John McCain was able to grow, transcend hatred, rethink, and forgive. We all need to examine the templates from which we sing. Many will not agree with everything asserted by Timberg; nevertheless, The Nightingale’s Song deserves to be read, discussed, and pondered.
For the nightingale still calls, deep in the woods. Robert Timberg concludes, “Reagan was gone, but the music played on. And Oliver North, testing his wings, perfecting his song, had become the Nightingale.”
A 1971 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, David Poyer is the author of The Med (St. Martin’s Press, 1988), The Gulf (St. Martin’s Press, 1990), The Circle, (St. Martin’s Press, 1992), The Passage (St. Martin’s Press, 1995), and other novels. A captain in the U.S. Naval Reserve, he currently is assigned to U.S. Atlantic Command.
1901
Robert Conroy. Novato, CA: Lyford Books, 1995. 384 pp. $21.95 ($19.75).
Reviewed by Eric McAllister Smith
Few readers of history can resist posing the question: What if? What if George Washington had blundered and lost the Revolution? What if Napoleon had never risen to power? What if the Spanish Armada had conquered England? What if the United States had managed to avoid the quagmire in Vietnam?
With varying degrees of success, many science fiction writers have explored the intriguing possibilities of these alternative history scenarios. The consensus favorite is Ward Moore’s 1953 novel, Bring the Jubilee, a brooding, eerily convincing story of life in a divided America after the South won the Civil War. More recently there have been Robert Harris’ best-selling Fatherland, in which Hitler has won World War II, and What Might Have Been, a four-volume series of short stories edited by Gregory Benford and Martin H. Greenberg.
Nearly all the books in this genre focus on imaginary outcomes of wars and battles that actually took place, but Robert Conroy, a college teacher and student of military history, has chosen to create an event that never happened: a German invasion of the United States in 1901.
Jealous of our growing world power after defeating Spain in 1898, Kaiser Wilhelm II rashly decides to force President McKinley to cede the nation’s new overseas possessions to Germany by landing an army on Long Island, occupying New York City, and, if necessary, marching to Boston. But McKinley suddenly expires, and his determined successor Theodore Roosevelt must gather scattered, unready naval and ground forces to face the Kaiser’s juggernaut. Most of the action is related through the eyes of Major Patrick Mahan, an Army regular who becomes involved in various ways with the principal players and incidents.
In the hands of a lesser writer, the account of this implausible conflict might have turned into either a science fiction farce or a dry analysis of early 20th century warfare, but 1901 is neither. Rather, it has an earnest, almost Victorian, seriousness of purpose about it that propels the reader into a fascinating new reality. This is not to say, however, that Mr. Conroy doesn’t have some fun with his material. A good book of alternative history will reward readers often with clever “payoffs”—plot manipulations that play with historical ironies and present well- known personages of the past in a slightly different light. Professor Conroy serves up an abundance of these.
By setting his story in the pivotal year of 1901, the author has fashioned a literary bridge between two of America’s greatest conflicts, the Civil War and World War II. The turn of the century was a time when aged veterans of one war coexisted with young future leaders of another. Thus, Mr. Conroy is able to bring junior officers like William Halsey, Ernest King, and Douglas MacArthur together with spry old Confederates like James Longstreet and Joseph Wheeler to fight the Imperial legions—themselves commanded by classic names from German military annals like Hindenburg, von Schlieffen, Hipper, and von Tirpitz.
In the same era, U.S. naval giants like George Dewey, Richmond Hobson of Santiago Harbor fame, Robley “Fighting Bob” Evans, and Alfred Thayer Mahan were at their prime. And the author takes full advantage of their presence in his narrative, giving readers a chance to see how the heroes of the recent war with Spain might have fared against a vastly more sophisticated enemy.
There are interesting reflections of both past and future campaigns in 1901’s carefully depicted battle scenes, too: World War I trench warfare, sieges from the Crimean War, high-seas capital ship engagements from the Russo-Japanese War and World War II, and frontal assaults from Gettysburg and San Juan Hill. We even get an advance look at the devastating effectiveness of submarines.
1901 also functions as a cautionary tale of the catastrophic consequences of military, particularly naval, unpreparedness. Although it is a work of fiction, this book s premise that the United States was quite vulnerable at this time to invasion from the sea is true. Robert Conroy is not the first to conjecture about what could have happened if German aggression had gotten out of hand early in this century. 1901 is thematically related to The Riddle of the Sands by Erskine Childers and H. H. Munro’s novella When William Came, as well as a number of other pre-World War I speculations. But Mr. Conroy is easily among the finest of the modem practitioners of the alternative history craft. He spins his engrossing yarn in clear, straightforward prose and with such a wealth of period detail that readers will forget temporarily that the Kaiser’s invasion of America is only something that might have been.
Mr. Smith is a columnist and political cartoonist for The Capital, a daily newspaper in Annapolis, Maryland, and the author of Not By The Book: A Combat Intelligence Officer in Vietnam (Ivy Books, 1993).
Lost Moon: The Perilous Voyage of Apollo 13
Jim Lovell and Jeffrey Kluger. New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1995. 384 pp. Append. Illus. Ind. Notes. Photos. $22.95 ($20.65).
Reviewed by Jeffrey P. Rhodes
Although the Apollo program is fading rapidly from public memory, two radio transmissions from its astronauts still stand out vividly. The first—Neil Armstrong’s “Houston. Tranquility Base, here. The Eagle has landed”—signaled the triumphant first landing in July 1969. Apollo 13’s Jack Swigert's transmission—“We’ve got a problem here”—just ten months later signalled the start of four days that, as Jeffrey Kluger writes, “nearly gave NASA a permanent orbiting memorial to the manned space program.” Lost Moon is the detailed and highly readable story of that ill-fated Apollo 13 mission, woven throughout with the personal story of its commander, Jim Lovell.
Jim Lovell, a Navy captain in 1970, had the kind of life most people can only dream of: an Annapolis graduate, a naval aviator who became a test pilot, an astronaut who flew four times into space, a man with a loving wife and four children. However, the incidents related in the book give the impression that he tended to be an aerospace Joe Btfsplk, the character from the Lil Abner comic strip who always had a black cloud over his head. Things never seemed to go right the first time for Jim Lovell.
Financially unable to go to college, he looked to the Naval Academy. He was turned down on his first try to gain admission, but was accepted two years later. The delay wasn’t all bad, though; he met his future wife, Marilyn, during that time.
His first assignment in naval aviation almost became his last when a home-built lighted kneeboard shorted out the electrical system of his F2H during a night flight. He was accepted into Test Pilot School—the career high point for most aviators—just as the Soviets lofted Sputnik into orbit. Despite graduating first in his class, he was assigned to Electronics Test, the least-wanted branch of the test community. But his class rank got him selected as a candidate for Project Mercury, the then-secret U.S. space flight program. True to form, Jim Lovell was not one of the first seven astronauts selected; but was accepted in the second class.
Early in his NASA days, he literally drove by the still-smoldering wreckage of fellow astronaut Ted Freeman’s T-38. Because he was the first there, Jim Lovell was assigned the task of investigating the accident. Later, Frank Borman—with whom Lovell would fly on Gemini 7 and Apollo 8—received the public honor for leading the NASA team investigating the Apollo 1 fire that killed “Gus” Grissom, Ed White, and Roger Chaffee. However, because of his experience in this grim field, Jim Lovell led the team that did the spadework to find the accident’s cause.
The oddest twist of the whole story—in which there are many odd coincidences—though was that Jim Lovell was not supposed to be on Apollo 13. Alan Shepherd had been grounded for years because of an inner ear problem, but had recently been returned to flight status. He felt he needed more training to shake off the rust, and it didn’t much matter to Jim Lovell when he got to the moon, just as long as he got there. So, the two mission commanders switched missions.
Also, Apollo 13’s Command Module (CM) pilot, Ken Mattingly—who would be the CM pilot for Apollo 16—was indirectly exposed to the measles. So, less than one week before liftoff—and for the first time in the history of the U.S. manned space program—a backup crew member, Jack Swigert, was promoted to the “first team.” As it turned out, Ken Mattingly never got sick.
The 13th flight in the Apollo program got under way on 11 April 1970. On 13 April, at a time so coincidentally perfect that the hairs on the back of your neck can’t help but stand up—i.e., 55 hours, 54 minutes, 53 seconds into the trip— all hell broke loose: an oxygen tank in the service module of the command ship Odyssey exploded. There would be no lunar landing, and there was a good chance there would be no return to Earth.
As happens so often, the cause of the accident was a series of minor screw-ups. In addition to having the wrong switches, the oxygen tank was dropped on a metal rack as it was being switched out of Apollo 10—only four inches, but enough to damage it—and its thermostat was fused shut during a pad test on Apollo 13. Taken together, these “glitches,” as NASA is fond of calling them, nearly killed the crew.
Although Jim Lovell’s personal story is woven throughout the first two-thirds of the book, the last third deals exclusively with Apollo 13’s struggle to get home. Lovell is the central character, but he and Jeffrey Kluger take great pains to include many more voices. Because so many people were involved, by necessity, a list of the principal characters is included.
The narrative is written in third person, and often moves along through the eyes of people who are not part of the crew. For example, Marilyn Lovell finds out just how serious things are when ABC News science correspondent Jules Bergman gives an exceptionally gloomy report.
This story is all-encompassing and is filled with an incredible amount of detail. Readers are taken to Room 210 at the Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston as Flight Director Gene Krantz’s Tiger Team comes up with solutions to how to make the air and electricity last through Apollo 13’s return. The scene then shifts to Long Island, New York, as engineers at Grumman try to see if their Lunar Excursion Module (LEM) really can serve as a lifeboat for the crew.
Meanwhile, Jack Swigert is shown to be somewhat out-of-place after the explosion. Forced into the LEM Aquarius with Lovell and Fred Haise, the LEM’s pilot, he becomes an unwilling passenger in a spacecraft he doesn’t know much about. Therefore, he eagerly takes any opportunity to go back into “his” CM— to carry out a mid-return power-up check or to fetch food packets.
As detailed as the descriptions are of just about every other phase of this mission in this book, there are a couple of events, one fairly major and one minor, that oddly are left sketchy. First, it is clear that Fred Haise is ailing on the return flight, but how serious his urinary tract infection really was is never talked about. One photograph’s caption notes that Haise was unable to make the post-mission ticker-tape parade because he was still sick, but that is all that is ever said.
Second, in the midst of the anxious planning—on the ground and in space— for the power-up of the dead service module prior to reentry, the authors include a humorous passage describing how Grumman engineers sought to relieve some of the stress: they drew up a bill for “towing charges” to send to Rockwell, the maker of the Command Module. Although it is intimated that the bill was sent, it is never stated directly nor is the reaction of the Rockwell engineers recounted.
These are very minor nits, to be sure. But, any flaws are out of character for this remarkable volume. Both nontechnical readers who just appreciate a good story and good writing and the most ardent space buffs will like Lost Moon.
Mr. Rhodes is the former aeronautics and book review editor for Air Force. He now works in the aerospace industry.
Books of Interest
By Lieutenant Commander Thomas J. Cutler, U.S. Navy (Retired)
The Admiralty Chart: British Naval Hydrography in the 19th Century: A New Edition
Radm. G. S. Ritchie, RN (Ret.). Edinburgh, Scotland: The Pentland Press, 1995. 444 pp. Bib. Ulus. Ind. Maps. Photos. $31.60 ($28.43).
Among the world’s mariners, British Admiralty charts are renowned for their trustworthiness and accuracy. How they earned this sterling reputation is depicted in this at once entertaining and instructive book. Drawing on newly released and discovered documents, the author—the former Hydrographer of the Navy—has revised and completely updated his 1967 work. Happily, new scholarship has not dulled his descriptions of the events, the locales, and the personalities—e.g., George Vancouver, Sir John Franklin, and Charles Darwin—associated with these scientific and exploratory expeditions. As one British reviewer put it, “It is a story as exciting as the best novel of adventure.”
American Neutrality in the 20th Century: The Impossible Dream
John N. Petrie. Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1994. 165 pp. Notes. $6.00 ($6.00). Paper.
One of a series of monographs published by the National Defense University as the “McNair Papers,” this work examines the prospects for American neutrality. Contending that strict neutrality requires an impartiality that is difficult to maintain whenever a nation perceives it has global interests, Dr. Petrie reviews U.S. interventions during the 20th century. He concludes that these interventions are not an aberration and will continue in the future.
Battles of the Revolutionary War: 1775-1781
W. A. Wood. New York: Da Capo Press, 1995. 315 pp. Bib. Gloss. Illus. Ind. Maps. $13.95 ($12.55). Paper.
In a careful analysis of the strategy, tactics, and leadership of selected battles of the American Revolution, Wood concludes that the Americans did not simply outlast the British, as is often believed, but won the war by employing superior strategy and tactics at critical times during the conflict. The author clears up a few other misconceptions as well. Among them, as Wood puts it. “the delusion that the British army did nothing but line up in rows and advance in parade formation, while the Americans hid behind bushes and trees and potted the redcoats.”
The Bunker Hill Story
Irv Udoff. Paducah, KY: Turner Publishing, 1994. 144 pp. Illus. Ind. Notes. Photos. $49.95 ($44.95).
This book’s purposes are to commemorate the golden anniversary of the USS Bunker Hill (CV-17) and to serve as a written monument to this famous ship and the men who served in her. It is full of photographs, biographies, citations, action accounts, anecdotes, records and statistics, and assorted other materials. From Rabaul to Okinawa, “The Grey Ghost” fought her way across the Pacific Ocean, earning 11 battle stars and a Presidential Unit Citation, as well as hundreds of individual decorations for her crew.
Canada’s Naval Strategy: Rooted in Experience
Nicholas Tracy. Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada: Dalhousie University, 1995. 92 pp. Gloss. Maps. Notes. $6.00 ($6.00). Paper.
A product of the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies at Dalhousie University in Halifax, this monograph reveals the evolution of Canadian naval strategy. Although the Canadian Navy has faced some of the same challenges as the U.S. Navy, it also has had its unique problems. This study will prove enlightening to those interested in the formulation of naval strategy and particularly to U.S. planners who may need an objective case study to use as a model or point of departure.
The Defense Policies of Nations: A Comparative Study: Third Edition
Douglas J. Murray & Paul R. Viotti. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994. 635 pp. Append. Bib. Figs. Gloss. Ind. Maps. Notes. Tables. $25.95 ($23.95). Paper.
In this updated edition of a previously well-received book, the defense policies of many different nations are discussed by experts in their respective fields. These informative and analytical essays scrutinize the policies of such countries as the Republic of Korea, the People’s Republic of China, India, Israel, the United Kingdom, Sub-Saharan Africa, Japan, Canada, Germany, and the republics of the former Soviet Union.
Hellcats Over the Philippine Deep
John F. Smith. Manhattan, KS: Sunflower University Press, 1995. 210 pp. Append. Bib. Illus. Ind. Maps. Photos. $21.95 ($20.85). Paper.
Retired Commander Smith recounts the exploits of the men flying F6F Hellcats from the escort carrier USS Suwannee (CVE-27) during World War II. As a participant in them, he combines his own experiences with information gathered from documentary sources. The many accomplishments of this ship, her air complement, and the men who made it all happen are all recounted. Of particular interest is her participation in history’s greatest naval battle, which occurred in October 1944 in and around Leyte Gulf in the Philippines.
Official Privilege
Capt. P. T. Deutermann, USN (Ret.). New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995. 392 pp. $23.95 ($21.55).
This thriller begins with the discovery of a mummified corpse of a Navy lieutenant bolted inside the boiler of a deactivated Navy battleship in the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard. This bizarre discovery brings together a Navy commander and a civilian investigator whose quest for the truth is the vehicle for what author Nelson DeMille describes as “a powerful human drama” in a “first-rate, riveting novel of suspense.”
Persian Gulf War Almanac
Col. Harry G. Summers, Jr., USA (Ret.). New York: Facts on File, 1995. 320 pp. Bib. Gloss. Ind. Maps. Notes. Photos. Tables. $35.00 ($33.25).
In the same tradition established by his other almanacs of the Korean and Vietnam wars, Colonel Summers now provides a comprehensive reference work on the Gulf War. Frequently seen on NBC News as a military analyst during the war, Colonel Summers has compiled a great deal of information that will prove valuable to researchers or to anyone who is trying to understand the complexities of this short but complicated war. The four sections of the book provide the historical background, a detailed chronology, a rich bibliography of books and magazine articles, and an A-to-Z compilation of entries dealing with the various aspects of the war, including the key personalities, weapons, important issues, and the military units participating in the conflict.
Reference Guide to United States Military History: 1945 to the Present
Charles Reginald Shrader, Editor. New York: Facts on File, 1995. 340 pp. Bib. Ind. Maps. ' Photos. $50.00 ($47.50).
Part One of this guide to recent U.S. military history covers armed forces organization and a chronologically organized historical summary. Parts II and III cover biographies of key personalities and an alphabetical compilation of battles, events, treaties, strategies, and policies. This is the fifth and final volume in a series covering the whole range of U.S. military history.
Selected Readings in Naval Leadership for NJROTC Students
Richard R. Hobbs, Ed. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995. 110 pp. Append. Bib. Gloss. $17.95 ($14.36). Paper.
Designed as a leadership text for NJROTC cadets in their senior year, this book focuses on “Fundamentals of Leadership,” “The Responsibilities and Qualities of Leadership,” and “Achieving Effective Communications.” Some of the included materials are the thoughts and writings of Admiral Hyman G. Rickover and Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost as well as the U.S. Naval Academy’s Department of Leadership and Law.
Submarine Admiral: From Battlewagons to Ballistic Missiles
Adm I. J. Galantin, USN (Ret.). Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1995. 345 pp. Append. Ind. Notes. Photos. $24.95 ($22.45)
A submariner for most of his 47-year career, the author gives a colorful first-hand account of the tumultuous era that saw U.S. submarines transformed from a faint afterthought of the battleship admirals to a front-line force and a pillar of the nation’s nuclear deterrent. Admiral Galantin vividly describes the international, interservice, and intraservice rivalries that influenced this change; provides a wonderful description of the men who were key players; and describes the life of submariners and the intense camaraderie it bred.
Ship of Courage: The Epic Story of HMAS Perth and Her Crew
Brendan Whiting. St. Leonards, New South Wales, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1995. 192 pp. Append. Ind. Notes. Photos. $34.95 ($31.45).
Many Americans are familiar with the USS Houston (CA-30) and how she fought gallantly to stem the Japanese tide in Southeast Asia in late 1941 and early 1942. One of the many Allied ships that fought with the Houston— and was sunk with her at the Battle of Sunda Strait—was the Royal Australian Navy’s cruiser HMAS Perth. The son of a chief petty officer lost on this courageous ship, Mr. Whiting blends his father’s letters and diaries, interviews with survivors, and solid research into a forthright and moving account of a proud ship’s history, the wartime sacrifices of her crew, and the many desperate campaigns in which the Perth was involved.
Tailspin: Women at War in the Wake of Tailhook
Jean Zimmerman. New York: Doubleday, 1995. 355 pp. Bib. Ind. Notes. Photos. $24.95 ($22.45). Exploring the link between the infamous “Tail- hook” scandal and the legal ban on women serving in combat roles, Ms. Zimmerman has written a sure-to-be controversial book about one of the most significant issues in the history of the Navy. In her preface, Ms. Zimmerman writes of her surprise that the Navy Department was supportive of her research, of her desire not “to slight the challenge that Navy men must now face, as women enter their heretofore closed culture in increasing numbers,” and of the “contradiction between an officer and a gentleman and the beast of Tailhook.” Whether a confirmed traditionalist, a proponent of radical change, or a seeker of equitable compromise, anyone caring about the future of the U.S. Navy will be interested in this book.
The Story of the U.S. Naval Academy
Clara Ann Simmons. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995. 96 pp. Bib. Illus. Photos. $16.95 ($13.56). Written for young readers, ages 8 through 13, this well-illustrated account is closely tied to the history of the nation as it describes the development of this famous school “by the Severn.” Reflecting the high standards and meaningful contributions of the U.S. Naval Academy and the superb service of its graduates, this book focuses on people and the significance of tradition while also describing many of the physical aspects of this important national monument.