"Basher 52, this is Basher 11; Roger—you’re alive.” This call from the skies over western Bosnia-Herzegovina set into motion a short, focused operation to rescue U.S. Air Force Captain Scott O’Grady (Basher 52) in the early morning of 8 June 1995. The 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) and Amphibious Squadron Eight, commanded by Commodore Jerome E. Schill and consisting of the Kearsarge (LHD-3), Nashville (LPD-13), and Pensacola (LSD-38) were the prime players in the rescue, using highly trained people and standing operating procedures (SOPs) honed by months of practice from a forward-deployment posture that allowed for a successful short-notice mission.
In the mid-1980s, some visionaries in the Navy and Marine Corps foresaw the need for expeditionary forces—with the right people and special equipment and training—to respond to a long list of potential crises.
Among other things, this vision produced Marine Expeditionary Units (Special Operations Capable) [MEU(SOC)s], built around lessons learned from forward-deployed naval forces of the past. These MEU(SOC)s and the amphibious shipping in which they embark constitute mobile, self-sustaining, quick- response forces—trained for six missions:
- Amphibious Raids
- Noncombatant Evacuation
- Security Operations
- Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP)
- Direct Action
- Humanitarian Assistance/Civic Action
To support these missions, MEUs need to have 29 clearly delineated capabilities. The ultimate goal of training is to conduct an amphibious raid from over the horizon, at night, in marginal weather, within six hours after being ordered to do so. All deploying Navy-Marine teams must demonstrate all these capabilities before they can be certified as special operations capable.
Successful execution of any mission requires a thorough understanding of the Rapid Response Planning Process and unit SOPs. Preparation for the recovery of Basher 52 began in September 1994 with the formation of the units that make up the 24th MEU and Amphibious Squadron Eight (PhibRon 8). Their training philosophy employs a building-block approach to individual and unit skills, through progressively difficult missions. Such team building also requires placing the right people in each assignment.
The people. The Marines (and Sailors) of the 24th MEU-(SOC) are no different than any others in the Corps. They come with the same courage and honor expected of all Marines and are widely known for their commitment to their Corps, their unit, their mission, and to each other. As deployers, they know that their duties will take them away from home during training and overseas deployments as a matter of routine. Each of them is expected to handle several responsibilities, often simultaneously. It should not be surprising, then, that the ground combat Marines who executed the TRAP to recover Basher 52 were from Battalion Landing Team 3/8’s 81-mm mortar platoon. Over the years, we have learned that multiple mission taskings are, within reason, a good way to broaden experience and help spread the workload. Standing behind these Marines were four additional task-organized TRAP packages. More than 3,500 Marines and Sailors—from ammunition handlers, to maintenance crews, to aircraft spotters and radio operators—did what they were trained to do in carrying out the mission. On 8 June 1995, not a single member of the team slipped or faltered in doing what had to be done.
Procedures. After months of repetition, critique, and more repetition, every player’s actions were instinctive. Preparation resulted in solid SOPs that were well understood, having passed the test of constant review. Wargaming and discussions preceded actual training missions and junior noncommissioned officers ensured that drills were challenging, as well as educational and interesting. As the case with all MEU(SOC) missions, the TRAP must be executed with strict attention to detail. During training, the details are examined and analyzed repeatedly. Critiques are the most important part of this training. Self-criticism with a view toward improvement is absolutely essential. A TRAP, along with every other MEU(SOC) mission, is evaluated during a final Special Operations Capabilities Exercise (SOCEX) administered by the Marine Expeditionary Force and Amphibious Ready Group under the watchful eye of the numbered Fleet Commander. During predeployment training, Marines exercise their piece of the mission until they can do it without confusion or the need for close supervision. The ability to respond quickly requires full comprehension of individual duties and a good understanding of what others are doing simultaneously. During preparation, these same procedures are applied to all training.
Presence. The value of forward-deployed naval forces is not lost on our civilian and military leaders. These forces are extremely flexible, mobile, and responsive, free of the burden of having to secure stationing rights or landing privileges. They can remain out of sight until they are needed, with their whereabouts often unknown to potential adversaries. Perhaps their biggest advantage lies in their ability to remain at the ready, spring-loaded, for long periods. Combining this high state of readiness with an ability to move the force close to an objective area without violating security makes them relevant for any number of contingency missions. Although several rescue packages were available in theater to recover Captain O’Grady, perhaps relevancy, readiness, and proximity contributed to the selection of the three-ship Amphibious Ready Group and its embarked MEU (SOC). In today’s security environment, contingency response forces must be prepared to react within hours. The ability to make a contribution is often tied to a unit’s location and the speed with which it can respond.
Mission background. As tensions rose in Bosnia-Herzegovina in late May 1995, the 24th MEU(SOC) and the Kearsarge Amphibious Ready Group steamed to the Adriatic Sea, curtailing an exercise with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies in Sardinia, Italy. The Commander, Sixth Fleet (ComSixthFlt), had ordered the force to the Adriatic to provide a presence and prepare to conduct TRAP missions if necessary. Conflict among ' the warring factions in the area was intensifying and U.N. Protection Force personnel within Bosnia were suffering increased interference with their peacekeeping efforts. Following violations of U.N. Security Council resolutions, NATO aircraft conducted air strikes against Bosnian Serb ammunition storage facilities. In retaliation, the Bosnian Serbs seized U.N. peacekeepers and held them hostage.
Mission preparation. On 2 June, during a routine flight over Bosnia in support of U.N. Operation Deny Flight, a U.S. Air Force F-16—call sign Basher 52—was shot down by a Bosnian Serb SA-6 surface-to-air missile, south of Bihac and west of Banja Luka in Bosnia. The F-16’s wing- man saw the aircraft tumble into the clouds, but did not see a parachute deploy; the fate of the downed pilot was uncertain. Unknown to those outside operational channels at the time, Basher 52 was U.S. Air Force Captain Scott O’Grady. Upon notification of the shoot-down, the Navy and Marines convened a crisis action team on board the Kearsarge to plan a possible recovery operation. As U.S. and NATO forces worked to gather information about the downed pilot’s status, MEU personnel steeled themselves for the possible task at hand. The battalion landing team commander, Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Gunther, immediately placed the largest of the MEU’s TRAP forces, the “D” package, on alert. Within one hour, transport and attack helicopters and Harrier jets were in place and loaded with ordnance. Ground troops were staged in the hangar bay, drawing and loading ammunition and preparing to execute the mission for which they had so rigorously trained during the preceding nine months.
The 24th MEU(SOC) TRAP force stayed on alert 24 hours a day for the next six days. While on alert, the unit ate, slept, and trained with all gear at hand or pre-staged, in case it received word to conduct the TRAP. During the six-day wait, watch officers on duty in the landing force operations center and flag plot on board the Kearsarge monitored radio broadcasts for information about the downed pilot’s status.
Final preparations. On 7 June, NATO aircraft searching for Captain O’Grady detected signals coming from the general area where his plane was believed to have gone down. NATO forces assigned to Admiral Leighton Smith’s Allied Forces Southern Region (AFSouth) scrambled to verify the signal. At 0230 (local) on 8 June, MEU personnel closely monitored the radio as a NATO Deny Flight F-16 pilot made verbal contact with O’Grady on the ground. The MEU staff could hear only those signals from the pilot to the ground, but it was clear that Basher 52 was alive. At 0300, ComSixthFlt and AFSouth ordered a “ready to launch” status. Commodore Schill ordered the amphibious ready group’s ships into a tight formation, and the Kearsarge, commanded by Captain Chris Cole, approached the Croatian coastline.
Execution. The Kearsarge went to flight quarters in preparation for the impending mission. Simultaneously, MEU, PhibRon and Kearsarge staff members rushed to the ship’s war room to finalize the rescue plan. A little after 0330, the MEU’s commanding officer was asked when he could be ready to execute. Analysis of the situation demonstrated a need for force protection that could be best provided by NATO aircraft, operating out of Aviano, Italy, and other European bases. This escort force could be available at 0515. TRAP force launch time was set for 0500. The MEU’s organic air assets tasked to support the rescue included three CH-53E Super Stallion helicopters, three AH-1W Cobra attack helicopters, and four AV-8B Harriers. One of the Super Stallions and one of the Cobras would serve as airborne backups. U.S. Marine Corps, Air Force, and Navy aircraft flying from Aviano joined with other NATO aircraft and aircrews to support the rescue. A NATO airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft rounded out the air package. There was a clear preference for a night operation, but the window of opportunity for such seemed to be closing for this mission. Low survival-radio batteries, an unclear picture of the ground threat to the pilot, and his uncertain physical state all argued heavily for an immediate execution. To help guarantee success of the mission and provide adequate force protection, the “D” package was selected.
Pilots from Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 263 (Reinforced), commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Dennis Bartels, made final preparations while the crisis action team worked out last-minute details in the war room. In the hangar bay, the ground element of the TRAP force, commanded by First Lieutenant Martin Wetterauer, checked and re-checked their gear, loaded magazines, applied camouflage paint to their exposed skin and received final situation and rules-of-engagement briefings. Wetterauer’s 81-mm mortar platoon was augmented with communicators, a tactical air control party, medical corps- men, with a Serbo-Croatian linguist and electronic warfare specialists rounding out their task organization.
The Kearsarge's flight line was busy, ensuring that everything would be ready as soon as the order to launch was issued. Logistics and supply personnel, anticipating requirements, were well ahead of the game with ammunition staged tor rapid distribution and ordnance already loaded into aircraft. The designated aviation mission commander who had put together the profile for this mission, Captain Joaquin Malavet, was off the ship on another planning mission on 8 June. As a result, air mission commander responsibilities fell to Major William Tarbutton, who would fly the lead CH-53E along with Captain Paul Oldenburg. Once again, the value of MEU(SOC) training had paid dividends, by allowing Marines to step in for others. Nearby, AH-1W Cobras, under the leadership of the rotary-wing escort flight leader Major Scott Mykleby, stood ready to provide their firepower to protect the transport helos. Meanwhile, Major Michael Ogden, the fixed-wing escort flight leader and his AV-8B Harrier pilots prepared to launch after the rest of the force was on its way. In total, 57 Marines and 4 Sailors launched from Kearsarge on the rescue mission.
By 0505, all TRAP force helos were off the deck. The helos circled the amphibious ships, giving the NATO air- support package time to properly position itself. All the aircraft were in place at 0545 and the airborne NATO AW ACS signaled the force to go “feet dry.” At launch time the Amphibious Ready Group had closed to a position that reduced the straight-line distance to the objective area to 87 miles; circuitous routing was needed to avoid flying within range of known and suspected surface-to-air missile sites. On the Kearsarge, two reinforcement elements readied themselves for possible action. The uncertainty of the situation on the ground— created by unclear lines between warring factions—made the need for reinforcements clear. A platoon-sized “Sparrowhawk” and company-sized “Bald Eagle” reinforcement elements were prepared and staged on the ramp to the Kearsarge's flight deck, in the event additional forces were required. Reinforcement element aircrews were briefed and standing by.
In the warfighting operations centers, MEU, and PhibRon staff officers monitored radios and continued close coordination with the NATO Combined Aviation Operations Center in Vincenza, Italy. In the Landing Force Operations Center, Lieutenant Colonel Terry Moore, the MEU’s executive officer, led the battle staff. The plan unfolded before them as real-time electronic images depicted MEU aircraft in the skies headed for Bosnia and the location of potentially hostile forces within Bosnia. By 0549, the rescue force was “feet dry”—first over Croatia, then the Serb-occupied Krajina, and finally over Bosnia. The TRAP force pilots flew at low altitudes to avoid detection. A heavy cloud cover inland helped to mask the force from hostile weapons, but made the flight difficult and dangerous. At 0603, the Harriers launched from the flight deck of the Kearsarge and overtook the TRAP force within minutes. As the rescue force approached the objective area, the Cobras pushed out in front of the transport helos to provide protection and search for the pilot while the Harriers circled protectively overhead.
About 0640, the Cobras made voice contact with Basher 52, who, using his survival radio and guiding on the sound of the helos, helped vector them to his position. After Captain O’Grady had popped a smoke signal to mark his position, Major Nicholas Hall and Captain James Jenkins II, flying one of the Cobras, opened their canopy and dropped a yellow smoke grenade to mark the position for the transport pilots. The other Cobra, flown by Major Mykleby and Captain Ian Walsh, circled the area to ensure it was safe and then guided the transports into the zone. The landing zone (LZ) was on the side of a hill in what appeared to be a pasture, strewn with large rocks and smaller pine scrub. A tall pine tree line surrounded the LZ and a primitive fence divided it in two. Heavy fog hung just below the treetops over the LZ as the CH-53Es landed as close to the mark as possible. As soon as Major Tarbutton’s aircraft landed, First Lieutenant Wetterauer’s Marines debarked to establish perimeter security and prepare for their search. Lieutenant Colonel Gunther initiated the communications setup on the ground to link with the landing force operations center. The second CH-53E, piloted by Captain Paul Fortunato and Captain James Wright, initially landed on a fence, making it impossible to lower the tail ramp. Captain Fortunato relocated the aircraft a few meters forward in the zone, let down the ramp, and let out more Marines.
Simultaneously and unexpectedly, Captain O’Grady came running from the tree line. Wearing an orange watch cap and carrying his 9-mm Beretta pistol, he was wet and caked with mud. Sergeant Scott Pfister, crew chief for Captain Fortunato’s CH-53E, jumped from the helo to grab Basher 52 as he approached and pushed him into the aircraft through the starboard gunner’s hatch.
With O’Grady safely aboard the second transport, the security element from the lead helo swiftly reboarded and conducted a routine head count. The two helos lifted off, heading due west toward the coastline. On board, MEU Sergeant Major Angel Castro wrapped the exhausted pilot in a blanket while Marines on either side squeezed close to O’Grady to help warm him with body heat. Castro gave his canteen to the dehydrated pilot who took a long drink before he handed it back. O’Grady also managed to eat part of a pre-packaged field ration en route to the safe haven of the Kearsarge.
About 0650, word was passed over the ship’s loudspeaker system that the TRAP force had recovered the pilot and was on the way back. Ten minutes later, while still over Serb-held territory and about 30 miles from the coast, the TRAP force was taken under fire. After crossing the mountains to the east, the force was flying over a large, open area resembling a large bowl. The lack of terrain and ground cover forced the aircrews to drop to the deck—flying at 150 knots at an altitude of 20-30 feet, popping up only to avoid houses and tall power lines crisscrossing the plain. Small-arms rounds slammed into both transport helos, hitting one in the main rotor and the other, with O’Grady aboard, in the tail rotor and upper cargo door. At least one round ricocheted inside of the second helo, losing most of its velocity before finally hitting Sergeant Major Castro’s canteen. Castro felt the impact and turned to see Corporal Anthony Parham pick up the spent round from the deck. As the hostile forces below attempted to bring down the aircraft, the helos began evasive maneuvers. Lance Corporal Swayne Koceja, a door gunner, returned fire with his M-2 .50 caliber machine gun. Almost immediately, surface-to-air missiles and antiair-artillery (AAA) fire erupted. The Cobras, flying at tactical five and seven o’clock positions to provide protection to the transports, called warnings as three missiles passed directly under the helos. Captain Walsh, flying the Cobra on the left of the CH-53Es, stated, “I saw one of the missiles come from my left rear, pass under our aircraft and directly beneath the lead CH-53. Major Mykleby, flying with Walsh, observed a flash from the ground to the right, saw the plume from the missile and watched it pass under the rear CH-53E. Captain Jenkins, flying the Cobra to the right of the transports, said he heard the unmistakable double-thumping sound of a twin-barreled antiaircraft-artillery weapon. Looking to his right, he saw the alternating muzzle flashes of a AAA weapon system a short distance from the helos. Jenkins described the rounds exploding near the TRAP force as resembling, “big orange baseballs coming up at us.” The mission commander decided that delivering retaliatory fire—after clearing this ground-fire threat zone—was unnecessary. Rather than turn the Cobras back for another pass into the hostile fire, he directed the entire flight to press on toward the safety of the Adriatic.
At 0730, two-and-one-half hours after launch, the force returned without loss to the Kearsarge.
Brigadier General Berndt has commanded two infantry battalions and a headquarters and maintenance squadron in addition to the 24th MEU(SOC). A graduate of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College and the Army War College, he now serves as the Senior II MAF Liaison Officer in Norfolk.
Major Jordan is the 24th MEU(SOC) Staff Judge Advocate and Public Affairs Officer. He also has served as a United Nations military observer and as a provisional rifle company commander at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.