Marine Corps Essay Contest Winner
Manpower-intensive close-combat forces are neither affordable nor compatible with the new emphasis on maneuver warfare. It is time to shift to a new era, where the purpose of our infantry is to locate the enemy and bring indirect firepower to bear.
There is a growing debate regarding a possible radical transformation in the nature of warfare as a result of revolutionary technologies and ideas.1 These grand theories should engage the professional curiosity of warriors, but it is far more important that we understand and deal with specific challenges that promise to have a profound impact in the near term. A few Marines have begun to consider these problems, but so far the Corps as a whole has not given much attention to preparing itself for a decidedly difficult era.2 To remain competitive in the 21st century, the Marine Corps must alter its organization and doctrine to reduce manpower needs and increase combat effectiveness without infusions of exotic technologies.
Near-Term Challenges
The most threatening military challenges on the horizon are weapons of mass destruction, precision-guided munitions, and unconventional warfare. Weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons) have been around for years, but they are more threatening now because of the proliferation of production means and of the long-range systems to deliver them.3 If Iraq had tipped its SCUD missiles with nuclear, biological, or chemical warheads during the Gulf War, it could have created havoc among Coalition forces. As it was, a single conventional SCUD inflicted 21% of all U.S. combat casualties.4 Our current system of warfare, which generally involves a massive buildup of forces through a few major ports and airfields, is particularly vulnerable to such threats.
We tend to think of precision-guided munitions as a one-sided affair, with our enemies always on the receiving end of our high-tech weapons. But proliferation is a growing problem here, too, and an opponent does not need stealth aircraft or command of the sky to deliver precision-guided munitions.5 Small cruise missiles flying at treetop level likely will penetrate air defenses, and even mortars now can fire guided rounds. We can try to keep ahead of the game by improving armor or other countermeasures, but that often imposes a severe penalty on mobility and logistics. The M-l Abrams is the finest tank in the world, but it guzzles fuel and requires a C-5 cargo plane to move just one vehicle to the war zone.
Unconventional warfare continues to take on new names, but it is a very old problem. Poorly armed slaves defeated the vaunted Spartans at Sphacteria during the Peloponnesian War by refusing to engage in the well-drilled, close-quarters fighting at which the Spartans excelled. Modern guerrillas and terrorists also avoid conventional battle and instead attack soft targets, such as rear-area installations or national will. Our ability to dominate a conventional war in the Gulf and our failure to impose order in Somalia will only reinforce that trend; we can expect future enemies to fight us in ways that make our present military superiority irrelevant.
To complicate matters, the American public demands limited military spending and minimal casualties. The armed forces also face a looming budget crisis when the bills come due for new systems such as the F-22 and V-22.6 We can afford readiness or modernization, but the General Accounting Office predicts that planned Defense budgets will fall $150 billion short of what is needed to fund both at the same time.7
The Marine Corps can address these problems by moving toward sea-basing and a style of warfare built around indirect firepower. Sea-basing keeps the maximum slice of a military force at sea, where it is much less vulnerable. Placing increased emphasis on indirect firepower makes sea-basing practical, reduces the cost of the force, and makes our ground forces much more effective.
The Demise of Close Combat
Infantry often has been the dominant combat arm throughout history, but not always. Some challenges to the premier role of foot soldiers have been fleeting, such as Hannibal’s temporary success with elephants against the Roman legions. At other times infantrymen have taken a back seat for an entire era; during the Middle Ages, knights on horseback ruled the battlefield until English archers at Crecy restored the ascendancy of the man on foot. The range of projectile weapons increased with time, but it remained line of sight for centuries. It was not until the world wars that indirect firepower established itself as a significant player on the battlefield, but even then close combat with direct-fire weapons still generally decided the outcome.
The role of Marine grunts has changed very little since the world wars—an infantryman from 1944 could step into a battalion in 1994 and recognize the weapons, organization, and mission. We have better rifles, machine guns, mortars, and missile launchers, but they are present in roughly the same mix, and we still rely on the 13-man squad to defeat the enemy through a combination of fire, movement, and close combat.
Although this style of fighting may have been the best available during that period, it is ill-suited to our current situation and our emphasis on maneuver warfare. First, close combat directly pits our weakness in terms of aversion to casualties against enemies who often are willing to die in large numbers. Our 58,000 dead in Vietnam pales beside the 1,100,000 sacrificed by our opponent, but we lost the war.8
Second, it allows even a relatively impoverished enemy to confront us in a medium where he often will have techno parity; his rifles, grenades, and mines will be- as good as ours, while his cover and concealment will undercut our edge in night vision devices and other sensors. In Mogadishu, Somali militiamen chewed up highly trained Rangers and shot down helicopters with nothing more sophisticated than AK-47s and rocket-propelled grenades.
Third, our use of infantry for close combat creates a target-rich environment for the enemy at the same time that many of our people are not in a position to strike back. In a Marine infantry company of 175 men, only a half dozen call in mortars, artillery, and air, and generally only a handful of others can bring their direct-fire weapons to bear effectively at any given time.
Fourth, when we fight an opponent face to face we give him some hope that he can inflict a significant amount of damage on us. It is psychologically more devastating to engage him with indirect fire, because he will feel powerless to respond and always will be worrying about when the next blow will fall.
Finally, manpower-intensive close-combat forces are a luxury we can no longer afford. The Corps spends about 70% of its budget on personnel, 25% on operations and maintenance, and just 5% on procurement.9 In the coming years we simply will not be able to pay for both 800-man infantry battalions and the systems we need to implement operational maneuver from the sea.
A New Model Marine Corps
Given these facts, it is time for us to shift into a new era where the purpose of our infantry is no longer to engage an opponent with direct-fire weapons, but to locate him and bring indirect firepower to bear. (Although an airborne forward air controller can perform the latter functions, men on the ground provide unique capabilities: they are not weather dependent, they are less likely to be fooled by decoys or other ruses, and they can draw the enemy out from cover in ways that aerial systems cannot.) Precision-guided munitions, new communications and target-designation technologies, and computer-simulation training systems will enable grunts to take over responsibility for controlling artillery and close air support.10 Infantry would become a supporting arm and indirect-fire assets would assume the decisive role, a style of warfare that would allow us to make better use of maneuver warfare doctrine and our strength in technology.
The new infantry would be a combination of our current reconnaissance and air-naval gunfire liaison outfits and would borrow many features of their organization and methods. The basic operating unit would be just large enough to call in all types of indirect firepower and provide local security for itself. Figure 1 illustrates one possible organization, a platoon composed of two sections, each with two security squads and a fire-control squad. Sections normally would work alone, but they could be employed as part of a platoon or larger task group for a specific mission.
The section would operate on foot or from vehicles, depending on the terrain and the situation. Helicopters, V-22s, and air-cushion landing craft (LCACs) must be able to lift the vehicle, thus providing operational mobility to the section. HMMWVs might be the initial choice because of their availability, but eventually the Corps should acquire a small vehicle optimized for the mission.11 The light armored vehicle (LAV) is not a particularly good candidate because it is too heavy for the V-22 and its armor provides too little protection to justify the tradeoff in weight. Security squad vehicles should mount a mix of heavy automatic weapons (e.g., GAU-19/A .50 caliber gatling guns) and fire-and-forget antiarmor missiles (e.g., Javelin), as well as smoke dischargers. This would allow a section to defeat a small threat or rely on suppressive fire, obscurants, and speed to break contact with a stronger force. The infantry would possess no indirect fire assets below the division level, but would be well-supported by division, wing, or other-service assets.
A section would operate like a reconnaissance patrol—seeking to locate the enemy without becoming directly engaged. Taking maximum advantage of our maneuver warfare doctrine and the initiative of our Marines, patrols generally would operate independently and with wide latitude, thus complicating an opponent’s attempts to determine what is happening. Our objective would not be the control of terrain but the physical or psychological destruction of the enemy force by indirect fire.12
Marine artillery needs to change almost as radically as the infantry. We presently plan to acquire a lightweight 155-mm piece. Although it will be more mobile than the current model, it will have the same range—a severe shortcoming given that many threat systems can shoot much farther.13 Tube artillery is also manpower intensive and takes too much time to displace. An excellent alternative is the high-mobility artillery rocket system (HiMARS), a six-tube multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) pod on a five-ton truck. The Army already is developing this system for its lighter forces; given the maturity of the technologies involved, it can be available soon at a cost similar to the lightweight howitzer.14
The basic MLRS rocket far outranges the 155-mm howitzer (32 km versus 18 km); extended-range versions are in development; and the larger Army tactical missile system reaches out more than 120 kms. New MLRS warheads also incorporate greater accuracy and smart antiarmor munitions.15 The launcher’s on board computers allow it to fire within moments of pulling into a position. A volley of six rockets from a single HiMARS crewed by three men provides the same destructive effect as several 155-mm artillery batteries manned by hundreds.16
HiMARS would revolutionize Marine artillery doctrine. Instead of moving large batteries in close trace of a linear front line, HiMARS launchers would operate in pairs. They might be protected by an infantry section, but they generally would depend on their range, small footprint, and ability to shoot-and-scoot to keep out of harm’s way. Given the accuracy and destructiveness of the rockets, as well as the reduction in personnel and vehicles, resupply requirements would be a fraction of that for tube artillery. A five-ton truck should accompany each launcher to carry immediate reloads, but V-22s and helicopters making runs directly from the ship to the launchers would be the primary source of supply. The expense of rockets would be offset by reductions in manpower, in live-fire crew training, and in the procurement and transportation of massive quantities of artillery rounds. (See Figure 2.)
To address lesser targets, the Corps eventually should acquire a smaller rocket system with less punch but similar accuracy. It should mount on the same chassis as the infantry vehicle and operate in much the same way as HiMARS units. It would complement HiMARS by being V-22 transportable and having greater mobility in rough terrain.
Marine aviation would require minimal change. The planned rotary-wing force of V-22s and CH-53Es will provide unparalleled operational mobility to the ground forces. The Corps is also actively pursuing an advanced vertical landing aircraft (ASTOVL) to replace both the Harrier and the F/A-18. The resulting all-ASTOVL fixed-wing force will possess remarkable, unique flexibility. It will be able to operate from amphibious ships or transition ashore even when there are no airfields. The planes can be widely dispersed on land in small detachments that make frequent shifts to new locations, thus greatly reducing the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction.
A V-22 gunship variant might be useful, though the AH-1 Cobra is eminently suitable for the near term and the ASTOVL may meet all requirements in the future. The Corps needs to ditch the F/A-18E/F, however, and funnel those billions toward faster acquisition of the V-22 and ASTOVL, and possibly to an expanded AV-8B and CH-53E fleet for the near term.17 Although F/A-18s can operate from shorter runways, there is no reason to spend huge sums on a modestly upgraded version of a platform that is not as flexible as ASTOVL.
The Navy could assist us by adapting a version of the Army tactical missile system to provide surface fire support during initial operations ashore.18 In turn, the Corps’ new style of warfare might benefit the Navy, because reductions in landing force personnel and logistics requirements might alleviate the shortfall in amphibious shipping.19 The current three-ship amphibious ready group probably could carry an entire new-style regiment and all its associated units—a quantum increase in capability over the present Marine expeditionary unit configuration.
Logistics, combat support, and command and control will alter their methods of operation, too. With vastly smaller numbers of men and machines ashore, helicopters, V-22s, and LCACs can deliver supplies from ships directly to the using unit, instead of creating large dumps that become a target to be protected. Headquarters elements generally will remain at sea, where they will not be a target or a logistics burden. The tactical chain of command would be vastly compressed, with independently operating sections reporting directly to the regiment. (The primary purpose of the company command element will be to train the sections, assist the regiment in its control and logistics functions, and groom mid-level officers for higher assignments.)
Some engineers will be vital to support the operation of ASTOVL detachments ashore, but there will be little call for them to improve beaches and build/maintain roads, bridges, and large airfields. The tank and its ability to fight armored close combat would be unnecessary in this style of warfare. Medium- and long-range ground-based air defense systems would be irrelevant, as well.
The advanced assault amphibian vehicle (AAAV) presents a tougher question. Its projected mobility at sea and on land is an attractive capability, but the vehicle would hold an entire new section, which places too many eggs in one basket. The design also would not allow the infantry squads to perform their security and fire-control missions from the vehicle. An AAAV sized and configured to support a new squad might be less expensive and more useful.
The New Corps in Action
The value of sea-basing and indirect combat become apparent when one looks at specific scenarios. In operations against a mechanized opponent, our infantry and dispersed firepower would find easy targets in his massed armor, artillery, and logistics, while presenting little of substance for the enemy to target. If the enemy dug in, we would have increased freedom to roam the rear areas destroying his logistics and command nodes. If he sought us out, he would only make it easier for us to target him. Our tactics would be the same whether we were on the offense or defense at the operational or strategic level.
In amphibious operations, helicopters, V-22s, and, possibly, AAA Vs and LCACs would launch from far out at sea and carry infantry sections to widely dispersed locations. This would make it much easier to achieve surprise, avoid the threat of sea mines, and confuse the enemy. At the same time, we would retain maximum flexibility for the insertion of subsequent waves—the landing force would not be committed to a single beachhead or landing zone. Nor would there be a requirement to quickly seize ports or airfields to accommodate follow-on forces; that would allow the landing force to avoid dangerous urban areas. Unlike Tinian, where it was risky (but effective) to land and supply two divisions through two tiny beaches, the new force would spread itself out over a large number of even smaller, less hospitable landing sites. As the situation warranted, Marine rocket units and aviation detachments would phase ashore to add their firepower to that of naval air and surface forces.
An enemy hoping to counter our conventional superiority with weapons of mass destruction would find no significant military targets ashore to shoot at and would have a hard time striking mobile targets at sea. Our new doctrine would be especially useful where an opponent uses weapons of mass destruction to blackmail our potential ally. In a rerun of Desert Storm, an Iraq with chemical Scuds might convince Saudi Arabia to refuse us entry to its territory, but we could still retake Kuwait directly from our sea bases, without having to make a bloody frontal assault against a heavily defended coastline.
A guerrilla war presents a tough challenge, but the new doctrine replicates two of the most successful Marine tactics of the Vietnam War. One was the use of small reconnaissance patrols backed by indirect firepower to strike the enemy when he least expected it. Another was the Combined Action Program (CAP), which placed a rifle squad in a village for long-term security.20 The only difference is that a new section performing the CAP function would be better able to defend itself with indirect firepower. Attaching infantry sections to host-nation forces also would provide an ally with better access to our fire support. With these tactics we avoid placing large formations at the mercy of booby traps, mines, and ambushes.
The new doctrine eases our budgetary problems, too. We would need many fewer Marines in the divisions and fewer supporting personnel. We could relieve the shortage of adequate housing and close a recruit depot.21 We probably would spend no more on weapon acquisition than we already hope to, but freeing up manpower dollars would allow the Corps to maintain high readiness and invest in this modernization without depending on a pie-in-the-sky increase in our future budgets. As an added bonus, taking in fewer recruits would inevitably raise the average quality of the force, with beneficial effects on performance, discipline, and first-term attrition.
This style of warfare is not the perfect response to all situations, but the same could be said of our current methods or those of any force in the world. At first blush, this doctrine and organization might seem to relegate us to the role of a commando group, but in actuality we retain all the positive attributes of a self-contained, combined-arms task force. In terms of roles and missions, we will not be duplicating any other element in the U.S. armed forces, while there is little risk that other services will be able to emulate us. The Army is not about to discard the tank, nor will the Air Force focus on ASTOVL and close air support. If anything, adoption of these new methods will reinforce our reputation as a cost-effective force of innovators playing a critical role in national defense.
Getting There from Here
The Marine Corps can transition quickly to the new doctrine. All of the equipment is currently available or in development, and none of it depends on uncertain technological leaps. In the coming academic year, the Marine Corps schools should focus their war games and student research projects on developing and evaluating the tactics and organization. The Corps then would send some of the instructors and students to assume key billets in a task group composed of a new-style regiment (reorganized from a current battalion) and supporting units such as CH-53E and AV-8B detachments. (In the spirit of jointness, we should be able to borrow a battery of MLRS launchers from the Army as an interim substitute for HiMARS.)
Following a year of training and tests to refine the concept, the unit would deploy at sea for six months. With that much experience, the Corps could finalize the new doctrine and implement it before the end of the century.
Military leaders have faced similar situations before. In the aftermath of World War I no one wanted to repeat the bloody stalemates of the western front or the failed amphibious assault at Gallipoli. But two decades later, only a few military services had solved the problems. The Germans developed blitzkrieg for land warfare, and the Marine Corps made the amphibious assault a practical option. The remarkable thing in both cases is that they created these concepts on extremely tight budgets, using the same equipment available to their competitors. The Marine Corps wrote its new doctrine and established the Fleet Marine Force long before it had the resources to produce revolutionary systems such as the tracked landing vehicle.
Today’s Marines, with their history of innovation and ties to the sea, are uniquely suited to meeting the fresh challenges of the 21st century. We simply need to realize that we already have the wherewithal to make the future happen now.
1 Thomas Ricks, “How Wars Are Fought Will Change Radically, Pentagon Planner Says,” Wall Street Journal, 15 July 1994, p. 1.
2 The Marine Corps Combat Development Command has launched a small-scale test program for infantry tactics similar to those presented in this paper, but it has barely begun to grapple with other combat arms or far-reaching changes to the structure and future acquisition plans of the Corps. See LGen. Charles E. Wilhelm. USMC, “View From the Foxhole,” Marine Corps Gazette, August 1995, p. 29; Col. Gary Anderson, USMC, Implementing OMFTS: Infestation and Investation,” Marine Corps Gazette, April 1995, p. 57; Chris Lawson, "If It Had To Be Done All Over Again . . .” Navy Times, 27 February 1995, p. 12.
3 See, for example, Greg Gerardi and Joseph Bermudez, Jr., “An Analysis of North Korean Ballistic Missile Testing,” Jane's Intelligence Review, April 1995 p 184.
4 The 25 February 1991 Scud attack on Dhahran killed 28 and wounded 97. Total U.S. casualties in the Gulf War were 148 killed and 458 wounded.
5 See, for example. Jack Anderson and Michael Binstein, “A Red Flag on Technology Sale to China,” The Washington Post, 20 February 1995, p. BIS.
6 Chris Lawson, “Hardware Everywhere and No Cash To Buy It,” Navy Times, 10 October 1994, p. 4; Eric Rosenberg, “Navy Officials Seek Billions In Long Range Plans,” Defense Week, 24 April 1995, p. 1; Robert Holzer, “U.S. Navy, Marines Foresee Modernization Gap,” Defense News, 17-23 April 1995, p. 4.
7 Rick Maze, “Even Tighter Times Ahead,” Navy Times, 5 December 1994, p. 3.
8 “1.1 Million Troops Died, Vietnam Says,” Baltimore Sun, 4 April 1995, p. 5.
9 LGen. Charles E. Wilhelm, USMC, Prepared statement to the House National Security Committee, 7 March 1995.
10 Capt. Scott J. Medeiros, USMC, "Anyone Can Call In Air,” Marine Corps Gazette May 1995, p. 50.
11 The HMMWV must be sling loaded under a V-22 or CH-53E, thereby retarding the flight characteristics of the aircraft.
12 For an example of a forerunner of such operations, see the use of British Special Air Service and U.S. special operations forces in the Gulf War as described in Rick Atkinson, Crusade (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1993), p. 387.
13 Chris Lawson, “Outgunned and Outranged,” Navy Times, 21 November 1994, p. 14.
14 Chris Lawson, “MLRS: Helping Hand or Army Crutch?” Navy Times, 21 November 1994, p. 16; MGen. John Dubia, USA, “Future Fires for Force Projection,” Field Artillery, April 1995, p. 1.
15 In addition to the bomblet and smart antiarmor versions, a unitary warhead would be useful to destroy hard targets. The U.S. Army Modernization Plan, May 1994, pp. 7-12; MGen. Edward Anderson, USA, "Deep Battle: An Army Perspective,” Army, March 1995, p. 9.
16 FM 6-60 MLRS Operations, 1993, pp. 4-1 and 4-2.
17 Maj. Joel P. Kane, USMC, makes an excellent recommendation for a near-term expansion of the CH-53E fleet in “Another Look at Helicopter Lift,” Marine Corps Gazette, August 1995, p. 14.
18 The Navy is already evaluating such a move. Robert Holzer, “An ATACMS Aboard a Sub?” Navy Times, 26 December 1994, p. 32; Eric Schmitt, “Navy Chief Wants Ship With Lots of Missiles, Tiny Crew,” News & Observer, 4 September 1995, p. 7A.
19 Rick Maze, "Even Tighter Times Ahead," Navy Times, 5 December 1994, p. 3.
20 Charles Smith, U.S. Marines in Vietnam: High Mobility and Standdown, 1969 (Washington: U.S. Marine Corps, 1988), p. 17, 291-292.
21 Neff Hudson, “Housing Needs A Fix,” Navy Times, 13 March 1995, p. 7.
Major Hoffman is a reserve field historian for the Marine Corps Historical Center. As an active-duty infantry officer, he made three deployments with Marine expeditionary units. A four-time Heinl Award winner and recipient of the Greene book award, he is author of Once a Legend, a biography of “Red Mike” Edson of the Marine Raiders (Presidio, 1994).