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The command ship USS LaSalle (AGF-3), shown at Ash Shuaybah, Kuwait, in March 1991 after Operation Desert Storm, used to be LPD-3âa âGator Navy amphib that was commandeered for duty as a flagship to save money.
The Department of Defense has four numbered naval fleetsâtwo on each coastâto project naval power from the sea. The Navy has five specially equipped vessels that are fully capable of supportÂing an embarked fleet commander or other joint task force commander, but all are approaching the end of their service lives. They are:
âș 2nd Fleet-USS Mount Whitney (LCC- 20), Norfolk, Virginia âș 3rd Fleet-USS Coronado (AGF [ex- LPD]-11), San Diego, California âș 6th Fleet-USS Belknap (CG-26), Gaeta, Italy
âș 7th Fleet-USS Blue Ridge (LCC-19), Yokosuka, Japan
âș Middle East Force-USS LaSalle (AGF [ex-LPD]-3), Bahrain
In addition, the USS Puget Sound (AD-38), currently homeported at NorÂfolk, served as the 6th Fleet flagship from May 1980 to August 1985 after being modified.
Much of the following information was taken from Norman Polmarâs referÂence work, The Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet, published by the Naval Institute.
The four numbered fleets had speÂcially designed and modified cruisers for flagships until the late 1970s. The LaSalleâa former amphibious transport dockâserved as the flagship for the Commander, U.S. Middle East Force, beÂginning in 1972.
The Coronado, modified to serve as a temporary flagship while the LaSalle underwent a long repair period in the United States in 1980, eventually replaced the destroyer tender Puget Sound as Sixth Fleet flagship, and was homeported in
Gaeta, Italy, from October 1985 to July 1986.
The Puget Sound had adequate phys' ical space and communications equipmen* to support the Fleet Commander, but ob' viously lacked any combat capability' Providenceâand the availability of the collision-damaged, rebuilt cruiser Bett' napâreleased the Puget Sound to W turn to the Atlantic Fleet Service Force- The Belknap then assumed duty as the Sixth Fleet flagship and the Coronad0 shifted to the Pacific and became fla?' ship for Commander, Third Fleet, in Pear Harbor.
Prior to shifting his flag to the Cot°' nado, the Commander, Third Fleet hau flown his flag ashore. The Coronado stu serves as flagship, but she is now home- ported in San Diego, California.
The Blue Ridge relieved the cruisef Oklahoma City (CG-5) as flagship of the Seventh Fleet in October 1979, and the Mount Whitney re' lieved the cruiser Albany (CG-1^1 as the flagship of the Second Fle£l in January 1981. The Mount Whd' ney did continue to share her flap' ship capabilities with the Con1' manding General, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic (FMFLant), ana Commander Amphibious Group Two until the mid-1980s, when she essentially became a full-time flap' ship for Second Fleet. Commander Amphibious Group Two has since used other amphibious ships a1, flagship, and the CommandinP General, FMFLant, does not go t° sea.
This conversionâsome Marine* would say commandeeringâoI several amphibious ships as flee1 command ships allowed planner* to save the scarce Ship-ConstruC' tion Navy (SCN) funds that other' wise would have been required t° build a fellow-on ship in the Bv^ Ridge class. Old-timers inside the Washington beltway hint th1* course of action was taken to avow risking congressional staff skep11'
c>sm over the requirement for large, exÂpensive ships to transport admirals to diplomatic events.
Thus, it was easierâpoliticallyâto convert large, high-internal volume amÂphibious vessels to flagships, than to fight it out for the funds to design and huild fleet command ships from scratch.
It was easierâmilitarilyâbecause the arnphibious Navy has not had a three-star Pr°ponent since the dissolution of the 'hree star Amphibious Type/Force ComÂmanders in 1975.
Gators as flagships: The problem "fith using versatile ships such as the fiTD and LCC as fleet flagships is that hour of the five fleet-level flagships are 'arge amphibious ships taken at the exÂPense of lift and command-and-control h)r the amphibious force. Over the years, [he use of these ships for non-amphibi- °hs missions has been a contentious issue "tith the Marine Corps and other amÂphibious warfare advocates. The tradiÂtional lift fingerprints of troop bunks, veÂhicle square, cargo cube, landing craft, Ur'd helicopter deck spots that the ships had previously contributed to the total lift requirement, were lost to the amÂphibious warfare planners.
Amphibious force levels: As recently as 1990, and after the demise of the SoÂviet Union, the Department of the Navy amphibious-lift goal called for enough amphibious ships to lift the assault echÂelons of a Marine Expeditionary Force and a Marine Expeditionary Brigadeâ 50,000 + Marines and sailors. The Cold War is over and the lift goal has been adÂjusted downward. As part of the overall reduction in Navy ships, the amphibious force is being reduced: the former goal of 76 ships by fiscal year 1996 is now 50âincluding the two LCCs. Of course, all of this depends on amphibious ship retirement schedules and new-construc- tion delivery rates.
This number is adequate to meet the revised amphibious-lift goal of supportÂing an average of three amphibious ready groups forward-deployed and a crisis-reÂsponse surge capability of 2.5 Marine ExÂpeditionary Brigades. The five existing Tarawa (LHA-l)-class amphibious asÂsault ships and a combination of the reÂmaining Iwo Jima (LPH-2)-class and new Wasp (LFlD-l)-class, pending delivery of seven LFIDs, will provide the appropri-
The amphibious transport dock USS Ogden (LPD-5), here in Hong Kong, is scheduled to be decommissioned. The Navy should reconsider and convert her to a flagship for the Third Fleet, since she already has been removed from the amphibious equation.
ate number of big-deck aviation-capable ships for the Marines to support the uniÂfied commandersâ requirements.
Other uses for amphibious ships: Other demands for these versatile ships could affect the number available to meet these requirements:
âșÂ Unmanned aerial vehicle platform
âșÂ Airborne Mine Countermeasures (AMCM) mother ship
âșÂ Periodic relief for forward-deployed fleet flagships like the Lasalle and the Blue Ridge, and permanent replacement for the Belknap
All but one of the LPHs are scheduled for decommissioning in the next several years as the LHDs are delivered to the fleet; the Inchon (LPH-12) is scheduled for conversion into a much-needed AMCM flagship for the Mine Warfare Command. In addition, some of the Austin (LPD-4)-class ships will also be placed in the mothball fleet to meet fisÂcal constraints.
The LPD class is the long pole in the tent for the amphibious ready group equaÂtion in forward-deployment calculations. This rugged class carries many troops and vehicles, and in particular, can absorb a large volume of cargo. It has storage for automobile gasoline, a sizable flight deck, and a wet well large enough for any landÂing craft, including large air-cushion landÂing craft (LCAC). Any decision to deÂcommission additional numbers of these highly capable ships, before they are reÂplaced by the new LX should be carefully weighed. [For more on the LX, see âPickÂing the Latest Gator,â Proceedings, OcÂtober 1992, pages 91-93; and âLX: Key to the Future of the Amphibious Navy,â Proceedings, November 1992, pages 100Â102.]
Challenges ahead: The five fleet flagÂships will be approaching the end of their service lives in 10-14 years, and the overÂweight and heavily modified Belknap will go first. As the Mission Need Statement for a joint mobile command-capability ship percolates through Navy channels at the Pentagon, now is the time to review current fleet flagships and answer the folÂlowing questions:
> Do the two LCCs have a future in their original amphibious role or should they become the first two Joint Mobile ComÂmand Ships?
âș Should the Coronado or the Puget Sound return to Gaeta to replace the BelkÂnap'?
y Do the Second and Third Fleets require dedicated flagships? Are the Mount WhitÂney and the Coronado affordable in their current rolesâor should they be deployed as replacement flagships for the LaSalle and the Belknap?
y Will using one of the higher-numbered LPDs (not presently scheduled for deÂcommissioning until replaced by the LX between 2002-2010) affect amphibious lift requirements?
y Would using an LHA or LHD as flagÂship, reducing a significant lift capabilÂity, be an acceptable risk?
Possible solutions to the fleet flagship problem: An adequate case can be made for the continued shipboard embarkation of the four three-star numbered fleet comÂmanders. While maintaining the forward presence and crisis-response capability of the Navyâs amphibious fleet, there are several steps that can be taken in the next three years to provide a near-term soluÂtion to the Fleet flagship problem: y Reassign the Coronado to a role she has played in the pastâflagship for ComÂmander, Sixth Fleet. Large amounts of money were spent to install specific equipments; even her mooring stations were modified to line up with the pier in Gaeta.
âșÂ Â Bring home the Belknap; ifâbut only ifâfunds are available, remove unneeded capabilities, i.e., weight, and assign her as flagship for Commander, Third Fleet. y Convert the West Coast-based Ogden (LPD-5) and the East Coast-based Austin (LPD-4)âboth scheduled for decomÂmissioningâinto fleet flagships for ComÂmander, Third Fleet, and Commander, Middle East Force. The decommissionÂing of these two ships already has been considered in the amphibious lift equaÂtion and will not affect present DepartÂment of the Navy fiscal year 1997 amÂphibious-lift goals.
âșÂ Â Select additional flagships from six LPHs scheduled for decommissioning. The ship(s) in the best physical condiÂtion could be modified to embark a numÂbered fleet commander, and serve as a flagship until a new-design flagship is available.
âșÂ Modify the Harpers Ferry (LSD-49) design. Such a ship would provide sufÂficient internal volume for a flagship, thus saving lengthy development time and proÂviding a flagship for fleet commanders well ahead of a totally new design effort.
The LX-90 design could be studied to deÂtermine its suitability as a Joint Mobile Command Ship for the long-term soluÂtion to the flagship problem.
I recognize that the four ex-âGator Navy ships currently serving as fleet flag' ships can no longer execute an amphibiÂous missionâeven though the LCCs still carry the L-for-landing designation that indicates an amphibious ship. As we look for solutions to downsizing (read money) problems in the next five years, however, we must resist what appears to the easy way out and refuse to use amphibious ships for other missions.
We have a good plan to reduce the fleet to a balanced, adequate number of amphibious ships for the emerging new world order. Replacing flagships with âGators not currently on the drawdown list will add to the amphibious personnel and operational-tempo problems and take away a much-needed capability.
Captain OâNeil commands thq Naval Amphibi°uS Base, Little Creek, Virginia. He is a surface war" fare officer with extensive amphibious experience afloat and ashore in the training command and 011 the CNO staff, and a recent graduate of Industrial College of the Armed Forces. He is a frequenl Proceedings contributor.
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Watching and Waiting in the Florida Straits
By Captain James E. Smith, Jr., U.S. Coast Guard, and Lieutenant Commander Peter J. DiNicola, U.S. Coast Guard
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On a bright, sunny day in the Florida Straits, Seaman Flawkeye Jackson (nicknamed for his eyesight) reports to the captain of the Coast Guard Cutter Shearwater (WSES-3) that he has sighted a tiny floating object in the distance off the port bow. Less than 30 minutes later, two more Cuban migrants have been resÂcued in what has become routine for the U.S. Coast Guard in the Florida Keys. The migrants were drifting south of Key West in a makeshift raft constructed of truck-tire inner tubes, canvas, a few pieces of wood, and frayed rope. They were lucky.
The Shearwater operates out of Coast Guard Group Key West. Located 90 miles from Havana, Group Key West is home to four other patrol craft: Sea Hawk (WSES-2) and Petrel (WSES-4), as well as the Island-class cutters Padre (WPB- 1328) and Sitkinak (WPB-1329). Stations at Key West, Marathon, and Islamorada in the Florida Keys operate small boats controlled from Key West. Over the past two years all of these units have devoted a significant portion of their operations to recovering Cuban migrants. Navy hyÂdrofoils with Coast Guard law enforceÂment detachments on board frequently shift tactical control to Group Key West and have also responded to several Cuban rescue cases.
The 1980 Mariel boat lift was the best- known maritime mass migration in recent U.S. history; the 1991 Haitian crisis ranks next. Lost to sight has been the increasÂing flow of Cuban migrants to the shores of South Florida. During 1991, 1,872 Cuban migrants were rescued within the Groupâs area of responsibility. During 1992, Coast Guard and Navy units, comÂmercial ships, and other units recovered 2,147 migrants, with 397 in August and 416 in Septemberâmaking these the two biggest months of Cuban migrant activÂity since the Mariel exodus. On 29 AuÂgust 1992, a record 67 Cuban migrants were recovered by Coast Guard Group Key West units, less than a week after Hurricane Andrewâs rampage through South Florida. Group Key West handles approximately 90% of all Cuban migrants rescued by the Coast Guard. Figure 1 disÂplays annual Cuban migrant activity for Group Key West since 1986. The Coast
Guard is setting a record pace in 1993- Initial contacts stem from various sources: Coast Guard aircraft and surface units, recreational boaters, commercial craft, and Hermanos al Rescale (BrothÂers to the Rescue), a civilian volunteer organization made up primarily of Cuban- Americans. Some, veterans of the Bay of Pigs, are known among Key West Coast Guard patrol boat captains for their darÂing aerial maneuvers.
The Hermanos have been in operation for more than two years, and were the initial reporting source to Group Key West on more than 40 Cuban rescue cases in recent months. In May of 1992, one of the groupâs aircraft had to ditch in shalÂlow water just six miles from Key West, but all on board were rescued. Migrants with serious medical problems require evacuation by HH-65A helicopters from Coast Guard Air Station Miami or Navy SH-3s from Naval Air Station Key West- Units also have encountered apparent Cuban hijacking schemes, alleged alien smuggling, and politically convoluted inÂcidents where Cubans are discovered in Bahamian territory. Although each case
â ----- | Â | Â | Â | Â | Â | Â | ||||
 | Figure 1: Cuban Migrants Rescued by Group Key West Units |  | ||||||||
 | 2,000- | - ⹠⹠⹠| ⹠| ⹠| 1,872 | 1,933 |  | |||
 | 1,800- | - ⹠⹠⹠|  |  |  |  |  |  | ||
 | 1,600- | - ⹠⹠⹠|  |  |  |  |  |  | ||
a g | 1,400- | Â | Â | Â | Â | Â | Â | Â | ||
* | 1,200- | - âą âą âą | Â | Â | Â | Â | Â | Â | ||
1 | 1,000- | - . . . | Â | Â | Â | Â | Â | Â | ||
a | 800- | - . . . | Â | Â | Â | Â | Â | Â | ||
5 1 | 600Â 400- | - . . âą | 363 | Â | 335 | Â | Â | Â | Â | |
 | 200- | 24 25 62 i---- l i > 1 i |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
 | 0 | 1986 1987 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | ||||
 |  | Calendar Year |  | As of 11/15/92 | ||||||
 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
ls different, alleged hijacking incidents dually involve a group of migrants who Persuade a vessel master to depart a Cuban port, typically under the guise of a leisurely fishing trip. Once offshore, the migrants take over the vessel, and proÂCeed toward Florida. At least six susÂpected hijacking incidents have occurred ln the past 18 months.
A few Cuban rafters have arrived in s°und physical condition without a trace °f sunburn or exposure, which arouses Suspicions of smuggling. Recently, on three separate occasions, Cuban migrants, ftinus any raft or boat, were discovered °n Sand Key, a small, sandy spit of land adjacent to the coral reef just six miles Iforn Key West. The U.S. Border Patrol has investigated these incidents and seized a boat and a van involved in smugÂgling aliens during March 1993.
All Cuban migrants are transported to Group Key West where they are deÂbriefed and then paroled into the United States by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. DurÂing their time at Key West, the miÂgrants are treated for minor medÂical problems such as exposure or dehydration, provided meals and clean clothes, and are under conÂstant supervision from Coast Guard security personnel.
Considered political rather than economic migrants, Cuban defecÂtors are processed by the ImmiÂ
gration Service and then quickly released into the South Florida community. Until recently, immigration agents conducted a preliminary debriefing of Cuban migrants in Key West and then transported them to Krome Detention Center southwest of Miami where they were placed into the community via voluntary relief organizaÂtions in Miami. After Hurricane Andrew wreaked havoc on South Florida operaÂtions, however, the Immigration Service began paroling Cuban migrants from the arrival point in Key West. As a result, the migrants, with only the clothes on their backs, were stranded in Key West, 150 miles from any real voluntary relief or support infrastructure in Miami.
Chief Warrant Officer Steve Kabick solved what was turning out to be a major problem for the Coast Guard and the miÂgrants. Group Key West personnel, unÂwilling to release the migrants to the streets in Key West, began making phone calls to the migrantsâ families, friends, and support organizations in Miami to arrange transportation. The migrants were staying at the Group for extended periÂods of time under constant Coast Guard security watch. Kabick linked a Key West Cuban support group with World ReÂlief, Incorporated, and the Community Relations Service of the Justice Depart-
PHOTOS BY U.S COAST GUARD (SMITH)
The stream of Cuban refugees using makeshift craft to leave Cuba began to increase dramatically in 1991. Cuban vessels like this former Soviet Zhuk- class patrol craft have little fuel to expend chasing them.
ment to establish a facility where the miÂgrants could be taken while awaiting sponsorship.
Within weeks the concept took on a life of its own. Now Cuban migrants are brought to Key West, debriefed by Coast Guard personnel, paroled by the Immi-
Cuban refugees are even using rowboats to flee across the Gulf Stream, potentially hazardous waters when the wind kicks up. The Shearwater (WSES-3) makes a typical rescue.
gration and Naturalization Service, and turned over to a transit cenÂter that provides food, clothing, and shelter while placing the miÂgrants more comfortably into the South Florida community.
In rescues made to date, the migrants have come from all walks of life. EveryÂone from judges to military officers to journalists to engineers to lawyers to entire familiesâgrandmother through grandchildâhave been brought to safety in Key West. The rafts used to make the treacherous journey across the Florida Straits and the Gulf Stream, are testimony to both the resourcefulness and the desÂperation of the Cubans making the risky voyage. One particular raft, designed by a Cuban engineer, had an outboard enÂgine that was a converted weed whacker. Using a household drill as the reduction gear, this remarkable engine powered a group of migrants away from Cuba and into the Florida Straits where they were rescued by a Coast Guard patrol boat. Also amazing are two documented cases of Cuban migrants successfully windÂsurfing to safety.
Because Group Key West personnel are the first AmeriÂcans to speak to the migrants, debriefers gain tremendous inÂsight into the situation in Cuba. Information gained during the debriefings is disseminated to the national intelligence-gatherÂing community via detailed inÂtelligence information reports.
Recent protests against the Castro regime fortunately have not provoked any military reÂsponse. On 18 July 1992, the âFlotilla for Cubaâs Freedomâ left Key West headed for a poÂsition 13 miles off the coast of Havana, just one mile outside Cuban territorial seas. With an Hermanos aircraft escort, 30 vessels, including everything from luxury yachts to charter boats and sailing vessels, made
the voyage in a loose formation. Arriv ing on station at 1300, the group held ; brief ceremony dedicated to their broth ers and sisters remaining in Cuba as wel as to those who have perished trying tc escape. Although Cuban gun boats were seen in the vicinity, the Flotilla was never challenged and all vessels returnee safely to Key West. Twice in the lasl year Cuban gun boats have come close aboard the Sea Hawk, but there have been no incidents.
Also in July 1992, the Coast Guard sailed into Cuban territorial seas under âRight of Assistance Entry,â to assist a U.S, vessel in distress. The USCGC Maui (WPB-1304) brought the disabled boat to Key West where it was discovered that the operator of the vessel was associÂated with an anti-Castro organization, and that the vessel had weapons on board. More recently, the USCGC Padre, reÂsponding to a distress call near Anguilk Cay in the Bahamas, found weapons and explosives in trenches on the island.
The desperate situation continues to fuel speculation. Castro, now in his mid" 60s, has led the Cuban Revolution f°r more than three decades, but Cubaâs ecoÂnomic infrastructure is appalling, and aid from the former Soviet Union is all but gone. Castro, refusing all reforms, has inÂcreased economic hardship and political repression. General Arnaldo Ochoa Sanchez, executed in 1989 on charges of cocaine smuggling, was an extremely popular leader and a member of Castroâs inner circle. His execution shook the Cuban populace.
Castroâs revolution has come full cirÂcle. He seized power by rejecting Ful" gencio Batistaâs oppression of the pooF tourist facilities that excluded Cubans, and widespread prostitution. Today, tourists are catered to shamelessly and segregated from Cubans, prosÂtitution flourishes, and poverty is everywhere. Castro has reÂcreated the inequities that hts revolution sought to destroy. His days appear numbered, and U.S. firms are making preparations for a post-Castro Cuba and eagerly awaiting that countryâs entry into free marÂkets. Cuba has no deep demoÂcratic traditions, however, and the political future may he marked by instability. The exile community may seek power, but they may be regarded as foreigners. Race will be a comÂplicating factor since, over the Castro decades, Cuba has beÂcome darker-skinned. Afro- Cubans will not be pushed back into pre-1960 conditions.
When and how will Castro fall? Take your pick. Whatever happens, Coast Guard personnel are aware of the potenÂtial threat. One of the lessons learned from the Mariel experience of 1980 was that Castro, who exercises absolute conÂtrol over the population, undoubtedly wih time a future exodus attempt to come when the attention of U.S. leadership >s distracted, as in the case of the current threat of a second Haitian migration criÂsis. Something big may be about to hapÂpen in Cuba.
In the meantime Hawkeye keeps his eyes peeled for those faint dots of life in the distance.
Captain Smith commands Coast Guard Group Key West. Lieutenant Commander DiNicola is the opef' ations officer at Coast Guard Group Key West.
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Halt! Bang! Who Goes There?
By Commander George Cornelius, U.S. Navy (Retired)
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At sea, in the air, or on land, friendly fire can kill you if the friend thinks youâre an enemy. If he believes you to e a foeâyou are one, and youâll be just as dead as those six unlucky U.S. Marines lr> their armored vehicle holed by a Mav- ertck from an A-10 on a close air support uussion during Operation Desert Stormâs ^ar'y hours. Those U.S. ground-combat atalities were quickly joined by nine ^0re, this time British, also hit by Jiendly fire from the air. A good identi- â cation friend or foe (IFF) system might ave saved them.
These are shocking incidents; ironi- Ca"y, IFF for ground combat has conÂsistently been rejected by armored war- r'ors on the grounds that it is complex to Maintain, takes up room better used othÂerwise, and its emissions can reveal a uuitâs presence. Some pioneer aviators ejected parachutes, too, because they were uncomfortable and cumbersome, and they were only for sissies, anyway.
Aviators and air-defense experts have °ng accepted IFF, but there is still a perÂvasive, widespread misconception that 11 's only a question-and-answer device analogous to the venerable ship-to-shore V|sual challenge-and-reply identification jnethod of time-related code n°°k signals: three-letter chal- enge, three-letter reply from ae\v letters for verification.
Electronic interrogation and rePly differs from those proÂCedures only by compressing ^e time required to millisec- °nds or, in a modern system, nanoseconds.
Computers have added a neW dimension to IFF: math- eniatical processing of sensory a°d related identification data, deluding information provided by the question-and-answer c°niponent of the identifica- ll°n system. The output beÂanies an identity probability, never the perfect number 1.0, but much âetter than other limited means of iden- hfication, such as the human eye and brain.
Beyond visual range (BVR) means "'hat it says. The eye cannot detect, let al°ne identify a target beyond visual range. Rounds cannot wantonly be fired a§ainst unidentified targets beyond visual 'ange, which is why identification must âe performed by a battery of different sensors, active and passive, whose indiÂvidual outputs are fed into a computerÂized system integrating all identification information. The man-in-the-loop must recommend whether or not to fire or, if authorized, pull the trigger himself. ElecÂtronics, however marvelous, can never reÂlieve humans of the awful responsibility of the final, lethal decision to fire.
That the system cannot be perfect acÂcounts for a certain uneasiness concernÂing IFF, but reason dictates careful weighing of the alternatives.
For more than 20 years, the U.S. armed forces have participated in the regÂular meetings of the NATO Project Group that wrote NATOâs IFF Standardization Agreement (STANAG) 4162, which sets forth the basic principles governing deÂvelopment of the NATO Identification System. Representatives from 12 nations signed the memorandum of understandÂing on broad aspects of IFF. Other memÂoranda involving two or more nations covered specific international cooperative IFF activities.
Interestingly, there is no NATO IdenÂtification System (NIS) project in the traÂditional NATO sense. Until recently there was not even a written requirement, but rather vague pronouncements. The Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe, for example, stated that the lack of adequate, interoperable IFF was the â. .. most glaring gap in air defense.â NevÂertheless, the group was able to produce a STANAGâno mean feat under NATOâs rigid rule of unanimous accord. Each national effort remained nationally funded; NATO provided only routine adÂministrative services. The NIS Special
Project Office was special in that it had no budget, no authority, and no political clout. Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States each sponsored a repÂresentative, France joined later, and Italy was about to send a representative when a dismaying series of events occurred.
The United States decided to develop a new question-and-answer combination, the Mark XV, to replace the inadequate Mark X/XII interrogation-and-reply deÂvices first used during World War II. The United States also proposed the Mark XV system to NATO as its candidate for the NIS question-and-answer function. The U.S. Air Force led the armed forces efÂfort, and by 1990 had succeeded in putting the Mark XV into engineering and manufacturing development.
The most formidable obstacle was the choice of frequency. The United States had initially espoused the 3-gigahertz (GHz) band on technical grounds, while the Europeans vigorously held out for the 1-GHz band. The United States prevailed, but, after years of funding had been sunk into the 3-GHz work, the United States informed its partners that it now backed the 1-GHz system because it would be too expensive to convert several thousand
U.S. platform antenna installations (whose Mark X/XII systems were based on 1-GHz) to the new 3-GHz system.
The Europeans howled, convinced that the United States had sandbagged them in order to sell them yet another made- in-the-U.S.A. military system. Placating our financially and morally wounded alÂlies took a face-to-face meeting between then-German Defense Minister Manfred Woerner (later to become NATO Secre-
at best seen only at close range; colored lights were better, but easily duplicated by the enemy.
Whatever the future of IFF, linked t0 active or passive sensorsâor bothâthem is no substitute for money to carry on tl>e work. It would be the worst possibly waste to scrap the results of 20 years o' international cooperative effort by stop' ping short. The U.S. Navy is best pos'" tioned to salvage and continue to use the irreplaceable store of IFF system kno"'" how assembled by NATO. A strong re' quirement, boosted by a concerned Com gress, could generate extraordinary IF* funding for the Navyâs AFX. It makes sense to field such an expensive aircra'1 without better IFF.
With a year of development behind '*â the Mark XV horse was almost in the starting gate for the race to become op'
The limited air-to-air threat during Operation Desert Storm meant that almost all aircraft were friendlyâ which made life easier for U.S. Navy F-14 and RAF F-4 crews like these.
tary-General) and then-U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger. With Germany consenting, the other European partners reluctantly went along.
The U.S. Navy had kept its own counÂsel on the frequency question, except to indicate, from time to time at NATO meetings, that it was not enamored of changing its 1-GHz equipment. Ground- oriented Army and Marine Corps deleÂgates at the meetings expressed lukeÂwarm interest in IFF generally. As a Marine officer said, for the record, âWe prefer the Mark-I eyeball.â (Laughter around the table.) A German technician agreed: âWe donât want a tank that looks like a deer [with] antenna horns sticking out all over.â The British joined in the amused chuckles. A U.S. participant asked, perhaps impertinently, âWould you rather have a tank that looks like a Swiss cheese . . . big holes all through it?â Neither he nor any of the others there were aware of the simileâs unforÂtunate prescience.
Now the fratricides of Desert Storm have caused the Army and the Marine Corps to take another look at IFF for fighting vehicles. As for the Air Force, it is hard to understand the attitude of the service most likely to benefit from new and better IFF. Air Force officers at the highest levels recognize the need for a secure IFF system, but when the Defense Department sought voluntary sacrifices for the altar of the post-Cold War stand down, the Air Force offered up the Mark XV.
U.S. politicians pointed out the local domestic economic consequences, and the international repercussions that would reÂsult as Europeans, still smarting from the NIS frequency choice reversal, viewed the demise of Mark XV as another trip down the U.S. primrose path. Italy had just added $15 million. The Pentagon subsequently ordered the program to conÂtinue through Milestone III in fiscal year 1994, but no one had foreseen the disÂsolution of the Soviet Union. Budgets colÂlapsed worldwideâa reunified Germany faced complicated refinancing problems, well before Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait.
There were no peace dividends, but rather increases in obligations. Germany, hitherto a fervent, relatively affluent supÂporter of new IFF, hesitated, as did France and the United Kingdom.
European firms had been moving toÂward a consortium focusing on IFF proÂduction: Plessey, Ferranti, Siemens, Thomson, Italtel/Alenia all expected to begin reaping returns from their investÂments. But their governments cut fundÂing, and the United States responded by again canceling the Mark XV program.
Today, regardless of what the EuroÂpeans do, loss of the Mark XV leaves a huge hole in NATO. It also leaves U.S. forces with no replacement for the vulÂnerable Mark X/XII. The Air Force jusÂtified abandoning the Mark XV because it cannot identify foesâsomething it was never intended to do. It was designed to be a jam-resistant, spoof-proof, secure, interoperable interrogation-and-reply component of an identification systemâ although capable of functioning indeÂpendently to identify friends.
Use of the term target might be viewed by a purist as inexact, since it does not necessarily mean an object to be shot atâonly an indication of the presence of an object. An air controller, bound by his rules of engagement, must rely on an identification officer if he is to judge and advise an operational comÂmander whether targets are friends, foes, neutrals, unknowns, suspects, or someÂthing else. The nomenclature and termiÂnology is constantly evolving, changing and being refined. The category of unÂknowns is probably the most vexing. It can mean any target not definitely hosÂtile (hostile being used to denote a tarÂget that poses a threat). But what about suspect? And when does an unknown beÂcome one?
We need something to ease the mind- boggling burden weighing on those who have to make final decisionsâpeople like the skippers of the USS Stark (FFG-31) and the USS Vincennes (CG-49).
The conspicuous absence of the Iraqi Air Force from Desert Storm aerial comÂbat may have badly obscured the vision of some who should be sponsoring new IFF systems. Aside from surface-to-air missile and antiaircraft artillery, the prinÂcipal risk to Coalition aircraft was from a midair collision with a friendly. Air conÂtrol relied on the air tasking order, saft corridors, restricted airspace, discipline flight plans, tough rules of engagerne"1 and well-coordinated command, control- and communicationsâprocedural con' trol, in many cases. The battle experience accumulated has probably not yet been analyzed to determine how modern, se" cure, and interoperable IFF could have 1*' duced the work load on the participant'
Neither land- nor sea-based Coal1' tion aircraft had to worry much abon1 identifying foes. Had Desert Storm proved similar to the'Pacific and Eur°' pean Wars, with massive aerial fleets at' tacking each other, there is little doulâ that efforts to field an improved system would have accelerated.
On the ground, though, the fratricide experiences of armored warfare during Desert Storm may tip the financial scale8 in favor of surface IFF. The ground so* lution, if one is sought, will probably 1|C with cost-effective selection of key IFF' carrying vehicles. Emissions will have10 be limited, and directional application8 may emerge. Passive IFF is another mat' ter, involving many strange factors pe" culiar to combatant rolling stock. .
Cheap, simple measures to identify friendly armor have not worked well' Colored panels are invisible at night ana
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Rational. The U.S. replacement for the Mark X/XII system would be sure of 'J'orldwide markets, whatever NATO °es. The United States should lead efÂforts to:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
IFF Update
Mobilize the international consortium.
. hey donât like folding now, after hav- ln8 performed innumerable studies, many at c°tnpany expense. Around the stars on ?tage are clusters of subcontractors, itch- ln8 to act. With strong leadership by one °f the starsâEuropean or Americanâa Pool of industry funds could be pledged 0 augment government contributions
bound
ÂŁhey could at least build a prototype.
freeze a design. The consortium, as Pnncipal contributor, would have little trouble persuading individual nations to ack off parochial positions on relatively Jf'tor details and special requirements.
Establish a NATO IFF fund. CombinÂes the contributions of the consortium and their governments calls for working °ut fair-share monetary formulae to egin, and adjustments with progress atd change. NATO infrastructure experts ave pounded out solutions to far more c°mplex problemsâthe Atlantic maritime Patrol aircraft, and the NATO air com-
to austerity by economic realities.
b,
eand-and-control system, for example.
Install strong management. Two top- futch individualsâa high-level, compeÂtent- respected NATO official, civilian or Pt'Etary, and an experienced, dynamic p°mpany officer from the consortiumâs ea<t firm could assemble a staff. The Ptaritime patrol aircraft benefited from l*e genius of French Air Engineer Rear Admiral Rene Bloch; the early success the air control team can be ascribed to *ae brilliant leadership of Air Commodore ^tokla from The Netherlands.
Shorten engineering development to
The Army is developing the battlefield identification system, while the Navy is responsible for the aircraft identification system. A near-term battleÂfield system will be fielded as soon as possible, and a millimeter-wave system developed by McDonnell Douglas showed the most promise during recent tests at Fort Bliss, Texas, during which attack helicopters, F-16s, and A-6Es evaluated the system while flying over terrain on which M1A1 tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles were operating. The Armyâs request for proposals based on their system was issued in January 1993.
The ground vehicles continuously transmitted an omnidirectional, spread- spectrum encoded, millimeter-wave signal. No interrogation was involved.
Each aircraft carried a receiver boresighted to its guns or longitudinal axis; ground-vehicle receivers were boresighted with the vehicles main armament.
A signal-decoding processor in the receiver illuminated a yellow light to indiÂcate a valid friendly identification. Obviously, a system like this that identifies positively only friendsâleaving all others unknownâis far short of the optiÂmum. Nevertheless, it is a vital step toward such a capability and provides a near-term shield against tragic battlefield mistakes.
The Navy's program for aircraft identification has not yet progressed to the hardware stage. Radar expert Merrill Skolnik, Director of Aircraft IdentificaÂtion, heads a team that includes the institute for Defense Analysis, and the Annapolis-based Electromagnetic Compatibility Analysis Center. Operational research studies are due in the fall of 1993. Our NATO allies will demand inÂteroperability, and a Joint IFF Engineering Group that meets bi-monthly is using STANAG 4162 as the basis for proceeding.
Reinventing the wheel takes time, but IFF once again is rolling, however bumpily, into the future.
G. Cornelius
save time and money. There is an excelÂlent base to build upon, and tough manÂagement of a frozen design should perÂmit the process to accelerate. The price tag on a U.S. Air Force F-15 Eagle fighter is at least $30 million. The cost for a B-2 bomber is approaching $1 bilÂlion. Not funding a better IFF system would be irresponsible.
All the armed services, solidly supÂ
ported by the Congress and industry, would do well to heed the lessons learned, the hard way, by the best arÂmored warfighters in the world and take another look at IFF.
Commander Cornelius, a submariner and naval aviÂator, served as U.S. Representative to the NATO Identification System Special Project Office, BrusÂsels, Belgium, from 1980 to 1985.
Enhanced Helicopter
Night VID Tactics
By Lieutenant Seamus McGovern, U.S. Navy
fâUrrent helicopter night VID (Visual ''-'Identification) techniques can be reÂmarkably improved using readily availÂable assets. The Navyâs numerous deÂployed aircraft can conduct night reconnaissance, VID, ship- and systems- mielligence gathering missions more ef- A'tively by using the combination of the rtvTP'S AN/pVS-5(C) night-vision goggles /TVGs) and a red lens-configured Aldis atllP found in the aircraftâs search-and-
rescue bag.
The naked eye is sufficiently effective gainst targets with completeâvice in- er,ruttentâor unusually bright lighting.
NVGs are extremely capable when used to observe vessels with low levels of lighting or navigation lights. UnfortuÂnately the majority of ships do not fall into either of these categories. Whether intentional or not, both merchant and SoÂviet naval vessels tend to employ the most effective of deceptive lightingâ bright, seemingly randomly spaced deck lighting. This provides little or no visual information to the NVGS because of the high contrastâwhich results in the NVG phosphor screen displaying little more than white dots on a green background. The unaided eye is marginally better at
gleaning information from the target shipâs illuminated areas. Dark areas canÂnot be seen, again because of the high contrast. Getting usable data from such ships requires numerous fly-bysâto which there are obvious disadvantages.
Flying low and slow past a large, ilÂluminated target for VID and intelliÂgence-collection on a dark night is a high-workload, potentially disorienting way to earn a living. Also, multiple airÂcraft passes can create the perception that the aircraft is harassing the vessel. A searchlight is not the answer. Besides being unacceptable to fleet commanders
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5. NAVY (J. BOLIVIA)
Navy helicopter crews are called upon for many missions. This SH-60B crew from the USS Antietam (CG-54) might use its on-board Aldis lampâwith a red lensâto supplement goggles on night operations.
:d
and easily interpreted as an act of aggression, the amount of candlepower required to generate a perceivable amount of reÂflected light is tremenÂdous. Use of a bright white searchlight invariÂably results in ruining the night vision (which reÂquires approximately 30 to 45 minutes under minÂimal lighting conditions to approach its maximum level) of both the crew of the aircraft and the perÂsonnel on the ship.
The PVS-5 NVGâs are responsive across the entire visible-light spectrum, peaking in the red portion and continuÂing into the near-infrared (IR) spectrum. Their gain, or ratio of light into the in- tensifier tube to light out is 1:10,000. The human eye peaks in the blue-green region and is not responsive to IR wavelengths. Since NVGs are markedly more sensitive than the human eye in the red and inÂfrared spectrum, and require considerably less reflected light, a relatively low-can- dlepower red lamp should be an effective tool in providing illumination.
Because dark-adapted vision is essenÂtially unaffected by red light, targeting with a red lamp would be virtually unÂobtrusive. This could be diminished even more by using a lamp with directional properties, as opposed to a flood lamp. All of these qualities are incorporated in the interchangeable-lens Aldis signal lamp that is included in aircraft search-and-res- cue bags.
On more than 30 night surface surÂveillance coordination evaluation flights at sea, the technique worked as adverÂtised. Radiating a target shipâs areas of interest with the red lens configured Aldis lamp while observing with NVGs proÂvided maximum visual information while requiring a minimum number of passes. This procedure was most effective when conducted between 1/2 and 1/4 of a mile from the ship. Within this range, the red light reflecting off the ship is not visible to the naked eye but is tremendously reÂvealing to the red/infrared sensitive NVGs. Within 1/8 of a mile the light from the lamp is too bright; a red reÂflection becomes visible on the contacts hull. Outside of 1/4 of a mile, the Aldis lampâs reflection became too weak to provide additional useable illumination to the PVS-5s. Larger standoff distances can be realized when using the third-genÂeration AN/AVS-6(V) NVGs (ANVIS) because of their greater light sensitivity.
If the lamp is inadvertently directed at the target shipâs bridge, the low canÂdlepower combined with the exclusively red light ensures watchstanderâs night viÂsion would be preserved. This was corÂroborated by shipboard personnel who reported the helicopterâs use of the red lens configured Aldis lamp is barely noÂticeable. This is attributed to the standÂoff distance from which the lamp is emÂployed (greater than the distance required to effectively make use of a high power, white searchlight), the fact that the naked eye is less sensitive to red light, and the lamp being both dimmer than a typical searchlight and substantially more directional.
This tactic has disadvantages. The Aldis lamp is not designed for long-term use and the lens assembly heats up quickly. Although its use is not conspicÂuous, in a tactical situation the lamp is
still detectable. Also, ft1' correct use of the lamp (i.e., excessive moveÂment or turning the lamp on and off) could be wrongly interpreted W the subject as a visua signal from the aircraft' Most of these deficieO' cies could be easily overÂcome by making avail' able an infrared Aldp lamp lens or, ideally-11 dedicated hand- held $ lamp with an adjustabk beam. Replacing the airÂcraftâs articulated search' light with an IR lamp is another alternaÂtive. A purely infrared lamp, whether hand held or integrated into the airfrafl>e- would be significantly more discreteÂbeing invisible to the unaided eye ana counter-detected only with IR sensitive devices. Light transmission should pea^ at the wavelength of 0.2 microns for op' tical use with both the PVS-5s and the newer ANVIS goggles.          .
Night-vision gogglesâ inherent lack o magnification capability (which factor1, into standoff distance) with no mission recording capability relegates the tactic to augmenting rather than replacing FLIR. The technique does, however- quickly and easily increase the holt- copter's capabilities and improves safety of flight during night SSC tasking while avoiding the added weight and expend of FLIR. Until all helicopters tasked with SSC receive funding to integrate a FLlft system, proper use of the red-configureâ Aldis lamp in conjunction with NVO* during night VID missions will effec". tively increase the aircraftâs standoi1 range and reduce the number of passes required while simultaneously providing visual information that would otherwise
be unobtainable.
Lieutenant McGovern is a flight instructor with licopter Training Squadron Eight at Naval Air $ta tion Whiting Field, Florida.
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Point Defense Is a Necessary Priority
By Dr. Stephen Sacks
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High-speed, low radar-cross-section, sea-skimming missiles are a critical threat to the surface fleet. Surely the losses and near-losses of warships in the Falklands Conflict and Persian Gulf esÂcort operations have confirmed thisâand we must address the problem.
Given that a hypothetical antiship misÂsile traveling at Mach 3 is first detected at the horizonâ10 miles distantâa tarÂget ship would have 16 seconds to react. In this case:
>âą The captain would have no time to maÂneuver the ship to reposition a close-in gun-defense system blocked by sh>P structure.
âș A vertical-launch defense weap°n would be short-changed on time to mak6 an intercept since the launch itself conÂsumes precious timeâand the sea skin1' merâs trajectory makes engagement nioC
This 30-mm. Goalkeeper close-in defense system firing on board HMS Invincible is a good example of currently fielded weapons built to combat sea- skimming missiles.
difficult. Using a vertical-launch missile for very close-in defense, e.g., a second shot, would not be possible.
The concept of using one ship to de- iond another becomes less feasible.
Manual control of the combination of hard- or soft-kill ship defenses would be almost impossible.
There are various hypothetical cirÂCumstances where a first sighting of attacking missile would occur at short range: a surprise launch where the ht'ssile pops over the horizon, or leaks through the outer air battleâor what about a launch from the shore, when Navy ships are engaged in littoral
derations?
In a broader sense, however, the likeÂlihood of a short-range first sighting is synonymous with hypothetical low radar Cfoss-section missiles. In any case, 10 ftiles is a nominal number. The time line °f the threat is severe whether the misÂsile is first seen at 20, 40, or 60 miles. Indeed the hypothetical advent of a very- h'gh-speed threat can simply be considÂered to be a catalyst for one to recognize and address the antiship missile prob- eitlâparticularly the sea-skimmer mis- s'Ie of any speed.
The problem. Success in defending a jjhip against a missile threat, where de- ense is layered, is measured as the prodÂUct of the kill probabilities of the sucÂCessive defense layers. The assumption °f a layered defense is useful for analy- Sls and is for the most part correct. To be [borough, however, one should note that hypothetical hard- and soft-kill systems can actâand with condensed time scales !Âźay have to actâin tandem rather than In sequence, which would change slightly [he model equation. The equation that de- âânes ship layered defense is:
P = (l-P])x(l-P2)x(l-P3)x ... (l-pn)
Where capital P is the probability of a fissile hit on the ship and pj . . . pn are lhe probabilities of missile kills by sucÂcessive layers of defense.
There are several critical points to be n°ted with respect to the equation. First, 'he only acceptable goal number for P, lbe probability of the missile hitting the ship, is a number approaching zero. This yiew is based on consideration of reÂCent naval incidents and predictions that 11 Would be easier for an attacker to im- Ptove missile warheads than it would be *0r a defender to improve armor, or the homage-control characteristics of a shipâalthough clearly every effort should be made to maximize these latter characteristics.
The second point to note with respect to the equation is that generally the pj . . . pnâs have large error bands. The success of a defensive system, be it a part of the outer air battle or a close- in, point-defense layer cannot be preÂdicted with the same exactitude with which one might predict the shipâs avÂerage cruise fuel consumptionâthere are simply too many uncertainties and too little historical data. While this may seem to be a trivial statement, there is sometimes a tendency to attempt to deÂvelop exact probabilistic predictions.
Finally, it is to be noted that the pâs in the equation are not all the same. Clearly there are advantages to killing the launch platform and missile before missile launchâkilling the missile in flight as far from the ship as possible.
There also are advantages to maximizing defense nearer the ship. In a most fundamental sense, however, it does not make a major difference in conventional scenarios whether the missile is killed at 30 miles or 1 mile. The important point is that P approach zero.
With respect to definitions, clearly a ship defending herÂself is in a point-defense role, no matter what the range of the incoming missile. For this disÂcussion, however, point deÂfense exists when the target is within the order of the distance to the horizonâseveral miles from the ship constitutes close- in point defense.
Ship point defense. While there are advantages to defense at a distance, there also are sigÂnificant advantages to close-in defense. First, the targetâs loÂcation can be known more acÂcurately. The most significant fact, however, is that the tarÂgeted ship is the most likely platform to see our hypothetiÂcal low radar cross-section misÂsile and the sighting will in all likelihood be at a close range.
That a missile has a low radar cross-section should not be considered in isolation. For radar, the likelihood of seeing a target to first order varies as the inverse fourth power of the distance from the target. (Note that in this first- order analysis, compounding factors such as the relationship with range of clutter, multipath effects, etc. are not considered.) No matter how small missile radar crossÂsections become in the future, the missile will be seen by the defending ship using radar at some close in range.
The argument is analogous for infrared systems, although the likelihood on a first-order basis of detection varies as the inverse second power of distance beÂtween target and detector. (Here again corresponding factors such as glitter, ship- target elevation effects, windows created by the horizon, etc., are not considered.) An infrared system is likely to see the missile at some close-in range, simply beÂcause of geometry. Electronic support measures (ESM) are not included as loÂcating or targeting systems in this disÂcussion. While great strides have been made, ESM at this time is considered mainly a cuing technique. Adequacy of sensors of all types is perhaps the critiÂcal issue for point defense.
The overall implication is that all reaÂsonable paths must be followed to maxÂimize the pj . . . pnâs for all layers of deÂfense and minimize the probability of a missile hitting the ship. Reasonable imÂplies use of an appropriate fraction of ship resources as well as reasonable in terms of a cost comparison with the value of a ship. Any system that adds a layer of de-
of
fense with a significant pn contribution must be consideredârecognizing that the pnâs will never be known exactly. AnÂother implication is that special emphaÂsis must be given to the point-defense asÂpect of the overall problem. This is because a ship in its point-defense role may be the only vessel to sight and tarÂget the incoming missile.
Ground-launched missiles such as this MM40 Exocet threaten ships engaged near shore. The USS Ingraham (FFG-61), background, like the ill-fated Stark (FFG-31), mounts a single Mk-15 Phalanx.
The question of hard- versus soft- kill often arises with respect to ship point defense and electronic warfare terminal defense. In terms of this disÂcussion, though, the issue is immaÂterial. What matters is the kill probÂability itself, regardless of whether it derives from a hard- or soft-kill sysÂtem. Therefore, to the extent that us every gun, missile, directed-energy weapon hard-kill system is pursued, every reasonable radio frequency, infrared, elecÂtronic warfare decoy or countermeasure system also should be pursued.
The role of directed-energy weapons. In the longer term, such weapons have the potential to contribute significantly to close-in ship point defense. Their advanÂtages include almost-instantaneous traÂverse onto a moving targetâprovided the pointing and tracking system has the necÂessary capabilitiesâand the greatest imÂpact at short range. Instantaneous traverse is a particularly relevant advantage against a highly maneuverable incoming missile. Such systems, however, are not emphasized in the nearer-term architecÂture to be sketched in the next section beÂcause they will require a vigorous reÂsearch and development programâand there is no guarantee that this will hapÂpen any time soon
A possible architecture. A desirable point-defense system hypothetically inÂcludes a grouping of integrated gun-misÂsile systems plus a grouping of electronic warfare systems. Under this approach, multiple systems are mounted on the ship superstructure so as to provide 360- degree defense. The defensive missiles would be fired in the direction of the incoming tarÂget. It may be desirable to use both radar and infrared sensors and the systems may involve sensors dediÂcated to point defense. ElecÂtronic-support-measure cuing would be used where circumstances permit.
Given the short time available for point defense against incoming supersonic misÂsiles, the combination of hard- and soft- kill systems must be controlled autoÂmaticallyâwith, of course, the possibility of manual override. Both hard- and soft- kill systems must be either capable of alÂmost instantaneous launch orâin the case of airborne decoysâsustainable for long periods of time. Based on a nomiÂnal 16-second detection, the desired inÂtercept point for a hard-kill defensive misÂsile should be at a point that optimizes acquisition and targeting but is still slightly beyond the close-in gun system range. An intercept point several miles from the ship should thus allow time to determine missile effectiveness before the gun system comes into play.
If the intercept point is only a short distance from the ship, short-range, highl) maneuverable defensive missiles may be the appropriate choice. The smaller the defensive missile, the more that can bÂŁ carried. Note that a combined missile-gun defense system provides the opportunity to engage multiple missile threats siÂmultaneously. The gun and missile, °r even multiple missiles, can be aimed n1 separate targets provided that the targe15 are in the same general orientation relaÂtive to the ship.
Should the gun system fail, the system should be capable of launching another missile for an intercept close to the ship- This could be less than one mile, whieh would probably preclude a verticu* launch. This second system would overÂlap the gun system and terminal electron^ warfare defense systems. As an alternaÂtive, a small directed-energy weap011 could be used for a last-ditch shot.
Because the defensive missiles mu5' travel at most several miles, they could, in principle, use fiber-opm guidance. The fiber-optic link would provide assured initial course inforÂmation from the ship to each defenÂsive missile in the expected dense electromagnetic environment. A reaÂsonable approach would be to use the fiber-optic guidance for initia aiming of the missile with guidance information from shipboard radar of infrared equipment. As the defensive missile closes on the threat missile- on-board guidance could also be used to provide the best possible overall lock on the target.
Since acquisition and targeting 0 the incoming missile is critical to any point-defense system, other shipboard sensing systems not dedÂicated to point defense might play a role. It is likely, however, particularly with the advent of lower radar cross-secÂtion missiles, that dedicated systems wn be necessary.
This architectural sketch resemble5 some other conceptualized point-defense systems, but it also has significant difÂferences. Regardless, it is possible to deÂvelop a viable defense against a hyP0'
thetical high-speed, low radar-cross-sec tion, sea-skimming missile. Variations the architecture are, of course, possible- The point is that appropriate point deÂfense for the futureâa necessary priorÂityâcan be achieved.
Dr. Sacks is the Technology Base Manager at tl>'e Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, D.C., where I he oversees electronic warfare and surveillance pr0 1 grams related to point defense.