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Though a relatively small unit of naval force, the maritime action group encompasses a formidable spectrum of naval capability. Maritime patrol aircraft are a vital component of this creative operational force.
For many years, U.S. Navy maritime patrol aircraft squadrons in the Mediterranean provided area antisurface warfare (ASUW) and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) coverage, as well as quick-reaction support forces to U. S. carrier battle groups stationed on the NATO southern flank. These squadrons, sized against the Soviet threat, c°ntained sufficient ready capability to respond to crises such as the 1967 and 1973 Mideast wars, the Lebanon inflict, and Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Flying from f°rward bases—including Rota, Sigonella, and Souda Bay—maritime patrol aircraft provided air coverage, indications and warning, and surface-subsurface tracking to officers in tactical command, as well as to commanders °f regional coalitions.
Remarkable changes in global politics and fiscal realises are driving dramatic changes in naval doctrine and Operations. The maritime action group is a Mediterranean heater contribution to this ongoing evolution in U.S. military doctrine. Though a relatively small unit of naval force, it can present a formidable spectrum of naval capability against a local threat. Either alone or as a part of a larger force, the maritime action group has demonstrated the capabilities necessary to manage many crisis situations. Maritime patrol aircraft, with speed, altitude, and multimission capability, have proved vital to the success of this creative operational force.
As It Was
For more than 40 years, maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) operations—in keeping with the U.S. defense policy of global deterrence—focused on the Soviet threat. Aircraft sensors and tactics were optimized to seek out and destroy submarines and surface ships, most often in the open ocean with no nearby U.S. forces. MPA forces were sized and located to defend northern latitude sea lines of communication. Other naval communities also focused on Soviet- centered threats and challenges, such as land-based bombers, surface ships and submarines with cruise missiles, and enormous resupply requirements. A global force of 15 carrier battle groups augmented by NATO was thought by many to be marginal. All that has changed.
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Even as arguments about proper force levels continue, we must learn to deal with new realities. While we will continue to face a high probability of limited force operations—including show of force, intervention, and noncombatant evacuations—it is clear that we will have fewer assets to accomplish them. In fact, active MPA squadrons may be reduced from 24 to 16, and squadron-assigned aircraft have been reduced from 9 to 8. In the new era of post-Cold War operations, maritime patrol aircraft, as well as all our naval forces, must devise new ways of getting the job done and being prepared to do the jobs we are asked to do, when we are asked to do them.
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A New Era
U.S. forces are dealing with new friends, new challenges, and new operational areas, at a time when budgets and force levels are being restructured. Amid these changes, the Navy has articulated a vision for its future in the white paper, “. . . From the Sea.” Fully consistent with this vision is the maritime action group (MAG). The MAG has been referred to as a force molecule—a fundamental unit of functional combat capability. With a nucleus consisting of an Aegis cruiser, an escort with LAMPS, an attack submarine, maritime patrol aircraft, and, as needed, land-based reconnaissance and airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft, the MAG does indeed present a full spectrum of sea-air-land surveillance, targeting, strike, and defense capability. Used alone, with an amphibious ready group, or as the force catalyst of a joint or allied task group, the MAG can:
>• Provide the means to safely inject forces into potential trouble areas, giving them ASW, ASUW, airborne electronic warfare, and antiair warfare protection coordinated from a unified command center on the Aegis cruiser
► Complement the capability of allied carrier forces, extending their range of operations and facilitating multiple mission engagements
>• Allow application of limited, tailored power projection to underscore diplomatic initiatives
> Defend against attacks by limited adversaries and maintain control of the situation until a carrier battle groupG' other forces arrive
The MAG concept has been under test in the Meditef ranean for two years, as one of a series of innovative d£" ployment options for naval forces. Fundamental to tb{j demonstrated relevance of MAG operations has been tb£ understanding that today’s naval expeditionary forces n#1 be shaped for joint and allied operations, for both routine and crisis situations. In addition, as littoral warfatf becomes our focus, command-and-control and surveillance, battlespace dominance, and power projection aTf all achievable to various degrees by MAGs.
The Aegis cruiser holds the central position in the MA1 nucleus, with one of the most capable battle-managemeu* systems ever constructed. Information from outlying elements of the MAG is integrated and evaluated at this pom1, giving the commander a complete regional picture in fouf dimensions—surface, air, subsurface, and the electromagnetic spectrum. When the MAG needs fleet reconnaissance support, the EP-3E is available. Similarly, whe" long-range airborne early warning is needed, E-3 AWAC- is the platform of choice. NATO or U.S. Air Force AWACS units can be used, and- with Aegis-compatible software a coordinated real-time airborN: electronic warfare battle plan can, be drawn to direct MAG or combined force reaction.
The attack submarine and maritime patrol aircraft extend the MAG battlespace in complemen" i tary ways. The submarine brings stealth, sustained presence, and im situ sensors to the tasks of indi" cations and warning, ASW, and ASUW. The uncertainty factor associated with the stealth of the submarine is a potent destabili2' ing factor against potential adversaries. The array of acoustic and nonacoustic sensors and standoff weapons of the patrol aircraft and the submarine make them ideal intelligence and targeting platforms, as well flS lethal strike systems. A MAG does not replace a carrier battle group. In fact, it represents only a small portion of the capability indigenous to today’s battle groups. But wit*1 the potential for crises expanding globally, the ability t0 cover all hot spots with forward deployed U.S. carried may not be achievable. The MAG can fill in coverage gaps when needed, defend itself should trouble erupt, and—wit*1 vertical launch missile systems, attack submarine, and patrol aircraft capabilities—launch attacks of its own. some situations, this may be enough, but where it is nof the MAG can buy time to enable other forces to arrive, b® they naval, joint, or coalition.
MPA’s Expanding Role and Joint and Combined Ops
The land-based maritime patrol aircraft, with its highly versatile sensor system and selectable weapon mix, is 3
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vital element in the MAG nucleus. Able to network its sensors with Aegis, the aircraft’s inherent speed, altitude, and multimission capabilities complement those of other MAG units, to allow the force to exercise battle- space dominance or sea control at ranges to 300 nm and beyond. And, with Aegis protection, aircraft survivability in littoral areas is enhanced noticeably.
As part of the MAG, the role of maritime patrol aircraft eontinues to emphasize its multimission attributes and to expand them. Since 1945, MPA have been involved in two- thirds of the crisis operations where U.S. forces were used, in half of these, ASW was relevant; in almost all cases, ASUW was necessary. While it is not news to the MPA c°rnmunity, it often surprises others that the aircraft never Was exclusively an ASW bird. In fact, the maritime patrol aircraft always has been a platform that can do most Anything, anywhere, and do it quickly and well. New technologies for roll-on/roll-off avionics, carry-on/carry-off miniaturization, and modular portable software have increased the aircraft’s versatility. Integration of flexible avionics with the central computer, global positioning system navigation, tailored weapons ensembles, and an interoperative communications suite have made the maritime Patrol aircraft the fleet commanders platform of choice for quick response, find-out-what’s-happening missions.
The MAG has demonstrated its ability to complement and enhance the performance of other Navy, joint, and allied forces. In this regard, the key contributing attributes °f maritime patrol aircraft are:
* Affordability. The modularity of recent and ongoing updates combined with carry-on sensors and tailored avionics, avoids problems of service-life erosion. Hand-held optics and Outlaw Hunter prototype avionics are examples of systems designed for other purposes but successfully and inexpensively integrated into maritime patrol aircraft. ^ Performance. Maritime patrol aircraft supply capabilities not available from other sources. In the Gulf War, they provided near round-the-clock surface surveillance and tracking on 6,500 ships and targeting assistance for 53 confirmed kills. In 1991-1992 Mediterranean joint operations with AW ACS, the two aircraft demonstrated their ability to maintain multidimensional situational awareness for the MAG commander for sustained periods.
^ Interoperability. Maritime patrol aircraft working as a Part of the MAG have been a positive factor in combined allied operations. They have extended the ASW and ASUW horizon of French, Spanish, and Italian carrier battle groups, providing protection and counterforce targeting for carrier-based aircraft and ships.
Mobility. Maritime patrol aircraft can operate from almost any airfield and can operate with or in sequence with allied aircraft. Not only has this expanded our experience with allied tactics and areas of operation, but it has Provided many more opportunities for MAG units to interact with and give mutual support to allied naval forces.
The Future
Results from fleet operations in the Mediterranean have been very encouraging. Because of the efforts in particular of recent Sixth Fleet battle force destroyer squadron commanders who have commanded MAGs, MAG exercises and operations have met their objectives.
The future for the MAG (and maritime patrol aircraft as the MAG air wing) looks bright, but there is still much to be done. We must develop means to work with reduced forces wherever U.S. interests can be threatened. Operational details will be different in different areas, but the designed flexibility of maritime patrol aircraft can enable tailored expeditionary forces such as the MAG to meet operational commitments by reacting quickly and effectively in local situations.
Maritime patrol aircraft can do this if we maintain adequate force levels and modernize those forces along lines already demonstrated as effective. These aircraft are the eyes and ears of the fleet. The life and vitality of these valuable assets will be extended and enhanced within planned budget guidelines by taking advantage of modular software and electronics in avionics and weapons systems. The most modular sensors—sonobuoys—can be loadout-tailored to any subsurface threat anywhere in the world. Improvement in acoustic signal collection and processing, especially active, is available and must be pursued. The Oasis system with inverse synthetic apperture radar, global positioning systems, and satellite communications synergisms should be continued and integrated in all maritime patrol aircraft platforms. High-quality standoff optics, both photographic and video, are available that link patrol aircraft to national tactical systems. Addition of the stand-off land-attack version of Harpoon would extend the combat capability of these aircraft significantly. Expansion of the CP901 on-board computer for the enhanced Update III makes all of these improvements and more available as needed to each aircraft of the active and reserve fleet.
Practice and training in all maritime patrol aircraft mission areas are force multipliers that cost relatively little but pay large dividends. Joint and combined operations must continue worldwide, to ensure that the jobs can be done when needed and to show would-be adversaries that those jobs will be done effectively. We must practice ASW with our allies, so that perishable skills do not diminish for us or for our friends. ASUW must continue to be practiced as we continue to integrate maritime patrol aircraft with U.S. joint/allied strike forces. Finally, mining is a mission relevant to this new world for which maritime patrol aircraft are ideally suited and to which increased joint/allied effort is due.
All of these imperatives are being pursued in the Sixth Fleet. As we continue to develop doctrine that embraces tailored expeditionary forces operating from the sea in the littorals of the world, the MAG, with maritime patrol aircraft in its nucleus, is an idea and a reality in the van.
Rear Admiral Oliver is Commander, Fleet Air Mediterranean; Commander, Maritime Surveillance and Reconnaissance Forces, U.S. Sixth Fleet; Commander, Area ASW Forces, U.S. Sixth Fleet; and Commander, Allied Maritime Air Forces Mediterranean. His most recent previous tours include Director, Total Force Training and Education Policy Division; Executive Assistant/Aide to the Chief of Naval Operations, and Commander, Patrol Wing Two at Barber s Point, Hawaii.