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While the future of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps was the focus, the U.S. Naval Institute’s ll9th Annual Meeting and Third Annapolis Seminar on 28-29 April also featured pointed debates concerning the disappearance of Amelia Earhart in July 1937 and the feared demise of the (frigate/sloop) Constellation—should the need for a $10 million overhaul go unsatisfied.
CNO in the Spotlight
Following the yearly business meeting led by Captain Jim Barber, Executive Director of the Naval Institute, focus shifted to serious Navy and Marine Corps concerns. The moderator, naval strategist and author Norman Polmar, characterized the Post-Cold War situation with a quote from Charles Dickens—“It was the best °f times, it was the worst of times.” The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Frank B. Kelso II, fielded questions from retired Vice Admirals Robert F. Dunn (former Assistant CNO for Air Warfare), Henry C. Mustin (former Deputy CNO for Plans, Policy, and Operations), and Nils R. Thunman (former Deputy CNO for Submarine Warfare). While Secretary of Defense Les Aspin Was ordering numerous combat jobs open to women that same day, Admiral Kelso announced that the Navy was ready to expand such opportunities. While he acknowledged that “lots of questions” remained and assured the audience that his Position had nothing to do with the Tail- hook controversy, he said that women Would be able to compete for “most of (he jobs in the Navy” on the basis of capabilities and competence. “Naval aviation is already populated by women,” he noted, and “40% of the Cimarron’s (T-AO-177) crew are women.”
Converting ballistic-missile submarines to cruise-missile carriers is an “attractive idea,” said Admiral Kelso, although he added quickly that the Navy had no plans other than to complete the 18 submarines of the Ohio (SSBN-726) class, while decommissioning all earlier ballistic-missile submarines. He admitted that fiscal pressures probably would force the Navy to continue carrying Trident I/C4 missiles in the first eight units of the Ohio class, instead of being backfitted with the more capable and accurate Trident II/D5s, as originally planned. Still, these 18 submarines would constitute the major component of U.S. strategic deterrence.
The 1992 reorganization of his office was not intended to eliminate platform sponsorships, according to Admiral Kelso. Nevertheless, he admitted that the move responded to changing international and domestic environments that required flexibility in allocating resources among aircraft, surface ships, and submarines. The reorganization facilitated all this, which may be an implicit admission that such flexibility might have been absent little more than a year ago. He specifically singled out the Joint Mission Area Assessment process—championed by Vice Admiral William Owens (N8)— as a critical element in assuring this flexibility as well as meeting new requirements for joint operations.
Admiral Kelso also indicated that some flight training could become joint rather than service-specific. While he recognized that consolidation in some cases would be neither necessarily economical nor efficient, he did state that “we are headed in the direction of the consolidation of primary flight training.”
“People issues” then came to the fore, as Admiral Kelso expressed concern that the downsizing of the Navy and Marine Corps not ignore the personal needs of sailors and Marines and in the process create a “hollow” force. “We will take care of our people” during this period of change, he said, while striving to maintain readiness and training at the highest possible levels.
Wordfrom the Office of the Secretary of Defense
In his luncheon address, the Honorable William J. Perry, Deputy Secretary of Defense, recited the challenges facing President Bill Clinton’s Department of Defense—far-reaching changes in the international political-military situation, changing roles and missions for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Bosnia- Herzegovina conflict and other future crises that might require U.S. responses, and the compelling reduction in resources for defense needs.
Noting that the White House and the Defense Department had “full confidence” in the Navy’s leadership, Dr. Perry nonetheless cataloged the concerns and focus of the new administration, as it seeks to restructure the armed services for post-Cold War roles and missions:
> “We must sustain a semblance of ‘balance’ in the draw-down, taking care to
To kick off the Third Annapolis Seminar, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Kelso, fielded questions from retired Vice Admirals Dunn, Mustin, and Thunman.
avoid ‘hollow forces.’”
>• “We intend to invest in research and development for technology and intelligence, with a goal of integrating the Defense Department with the national technology base.”
>• Department of Defense “overhead and infrastructure” will continue to be reduced
commensurate with the real needs of the military.
► The Defense Department “acquisition system must be reformed and brought under control,” with some 40% of the costs of weapon systems and platforms resulting from “management and control” functions, as compared to a civilian industry figure of “about 10%.”
Dr. Perry also addressed the ongoing Defense Department “Bottom-Up Review,” noting that it was “one review with several components.” He concluded his remarks with a Churchillian observation: “You can always count on the Americans to do the right thing, after they have exhausted all alternatives.”
Lost at Sea ?
Richard Gillespie, Executive Director of The International Group for Historic Aircraft Recovery (TIGHAR), claims to have found compelling, “preponderant” evidence that in July 1937 Amelia Earhart and her navigator, Fred Noonan, landed on Gardner (Nikumaroro) Island in Micronesia and perished of unknown causes.
Dr. Thomas Crouch, Chairman of Aeronautics at the Smithsonian Institution, disputed Gillespie’s conclusions with his own evidence, much of which Gillespie discounted in turn.
The debate centers on radio logs of nearby ships and aircraft that reported distress signals at the time of Earhart’s disappearance and a navigational line that passes within sight of the island. Signs of “previous habitation,” on land that supposedly had not been inhabited since 1892, include aircraft wreckage—notably, a piece of aluminum said to be consistent with structures and materials of Earhart’s modified/repaired Lockheed Electra 10E—and the remains of a U.S.-made woman’s shoe with features thought to be identical to shoes worn by Earhart in a photograph taken days before she disappeared. (See Summer 1993 Naval History, pp. 11-12, and the February 1993 Proceedings, pp. 73-77.)
The seminar discussion also entertained the notion that Earhart and Noonan might have been captured and executed by the Japanese after the Americans had discovered “fortifications” being erected on some Micronesian islands. Hiroshi Nakajima, Executive Director of the Pacific Society, in from Tokyo to represent the Japanese perspective, along with Dr. Mark Peattie of the Edwin O. Reis- chauer Institute of Japanese Studies, and J. Gordon Vaeth, former Director of Weather Satellite Operations for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, flatly rejected that contention.
Finally, retired Rear Admiral Francis Foley spoke from the unique perspective of one who took part in the air search from the carrier USS Lexington (CV-2) in mid-July 1937. He recalled a hurried attempt to locate and rescue Amelia and
Fred, concluding, rather forlornly after nearly 55 years, that “we did all that we could; we saw nothing that gave any hope of finding anything.”
In an unofficial poll taken after the program, a majority of some 60% in attendance concluded that Amelia Earhart and Fred Noonan were lost at sea.
Save the Constellation
Retired Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf served as moderator for a panel of experts who were to agree that the Constellation in Baltimore’s Inner Harbor was one of two remaining warships from the age of sail and, as a vital part of our maritime heritage, must be saved.
Despite Admiral Metcalf’s warnings to the contrary, however, the debate began to focus on whether or not the ship was the frigate Constellation built in Baltimore in 1797 or the sloop-of-war of the same name built at Norfolk, Virginia, in 1855.
Dana Wegner, Curator of Ship Models for the U.S. Navy and author of the Navy report, Fouled Anchors, stated that practically nothing of the 1797 frigate remained in the almost completely new sloop built in 1855. Addressing panel member Fred Leiner, of the Committee for the Constellation, Wegner exhorted the committee to deemphasize the Baltimore origin of the ship, to restore her to her 1855 condition and design by removing ill-conceived modifications made during the 1950s, and to preserve her as a representative of the zenith—rather than the infancy—of U.S. sailing warships.
Dr. William Dunne, Adjunct Professor of History at Long Island University, noting that he had “come to salvage Constellation, not sink her,” claimed that Wegner’s Fouled Anchors gave an incomplete history, that the ship’s “prove-
nance” extended to the 1797 frigate, and that she should be preserved as such.
Admiral Metcalf soon brought the Panel back to the issue at hand: whether the ship is a frigate or a sloop is secondary. This ship is a valuable artifact that should be preserved just as the Navy has preserved the USS Constitution in Boston Harbor.
At this point the discussion turned to Commander R. B. Amirault, commanding officer of the Constitution, who reported that he found the Constellation in “terrible shape” during a recent below- hecks tour. If the work required does not commence soon, he said, the ship could break in half. Mr. Leiner underscored this view by emphasizing the difficulty in raising funds to do the job: “She needs to be dry-docked, repaired, a new gun deck built, and have the 1950s modifications removed at a cost of about $10 rnillion.”
Admiral Metcalf concluded that all ! Panel members had agreed on the need to preserve the Constellation, and that a Partnership should be spawned among the Navy, Baltimore, and the Naval Institute to accomplish this “most worthy objective.”
A View from the Corps
manders for littoral warfare would most often be Marines, who have spent their lifetimes developing ways to project power “... From the Sea.” He suggested two outstanding examples of recent vintage: Lieutenant General Henry C. Stack- pole III, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, who commanded the Sea Angel operation in Bangladesh; and Lieutenant General Robert Johnston, who ran peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.
The next morning, General Stackpole originally planned to focus on the changing roles and missions of the U.S. Armed Forces in his keynote address. But instead, he opened the second day of the Annapolis Seminar by concentrating on joint warfighting. The general emphasized that the services have been making joint warfare work since before the Gulf War. “Inside the beltway,” however, issues of affordability and inter- and intraservice competition and friction come to the fore. He noted that the “one-third/one- third/one-third” apportionment of defense dollars among the services no longer makes sense. The most effective and flexible of the armed services should receive the most resources, he said, so that we can meet the challenges of the uncertain, but still-threatening, world of the 1990s and beyond.
Without a coherent national strategy, General Stackpole stated, all other efforts are doomed to failure, including the ongoing “Bottom-Up Review” conducted by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
the others in case they should ever have to fight as a future coalition.
One of the most significant results from the push for jointness has been in the area of command and control, according to General Stackpole. Component staffs (Navy, Army, Air Force) are now structured not only to provide advice and forces to theater commanders in chief, but also must be ready to deploy in support of joint task forces. The services are on the verge of a breakthrough, allowing a seamless meshing of systems from different services.
“Presence and prevention” will be cornerstones of U.S. national strategy in the coming years, according to General Stackpole, and the ability to project influence and military pressure from international waters is a key capability.
“. . . From the Sea” in the Future
Moderator John Petersen of the Arlington Institute began with a discourse on scientific revolutions and the differences between Newtonian and quantum physics.
Dr. Michael Vlahos, of the Center for Naval Analyses, refocused the seminar, opening the substantive discussion on “. . . From the Sea” by criticizing it for not looking far enough ahead and being too small a vision for the “big change” occurring in the United States, the Navy, and the nature of warfare. Dr. Vlahos believes that . . From the Sea” looks at only the end of the Cold War and does
uPon graduation this year. Although they •istened politely to the acceptance speeches of prizewinning essayists, the focus of their attention was the guest of honor, Marine Corps Commandant General Carl E. Mundy, Jr. After touching on the major issues facing the Corps today, General Mundy praised the contribution °f the Naval Institute in fostering full discussion of matters affecting the sea services, and put yet another issue on the table for the next day’s seminars.
Noting recent commentary in Pro- °eedings about selecting the best-qualified (in terms of military experience) flag and general officers to command joint task forces, General Mundy went on to suggest that the best prospective com-
A central concept of national military strategy, according to him, is that the U.S. armed forces must advance technologically, even as they shrink.
At the operational level, jointness is not a “passing fad,” and he predicted that the United States probably never again will witness a military operation that is neither joint nor combined. The joint task forces formed for each crisis have been building upon the lessons learned by previous ones, leading the joint integration process to become smoother and more effective with time. In the Pacific, a comprehensive exercise program and meetings between U.S. and foreign military staffs are familiarizing most countries with the capabilities and doctrines of
Discussing the future of the Navy White Paper .. From the Sea” were (left to right): Rear Admiral Baker,
Dr. Vlahos, Vice Admiral Flanagan, moderator Petersen, Rear Admiral Oliver, Major General Hearney, and Rear Admiral Dur.
not account for new ideas and new technology centers. His three principal points were:
> The United States populace and its politicians are focused inwardly on the domestic agenda, with little concern for international threats and issues.
>• An elite subculture dominates U.S. political leadership and is somehow in
Sponsors lor the Third Annapolis Seminar and 119th Annual Meeting were:
For information about sponsorship opportunities for the Fourth Annapolis Seminar & 120th Annual Meeting, 27-28 April 1994, contact: Carol Feldmann, U.S. Naval Institute, 118 Maryland Avenue, Annapolis, MD 21402-5035 or call: 410-268-6110
streamlining efforts, the Navy is decorn- N missioning older ships and retiring aging e aircraft, and eliminating unnecessary r
bases and contractor facilities. Admiral t]
Owens emphasized that the Navy has / committed to a vertical process, rather C than allocating the pain horizontally ( across numerous warfare areas and sys- 1: terns, which tended in the past to produce 1 hollow forces. c
The central focus of the new Navy, ac- C cording to him, is power projection in the a form of Marines and amphibious ships, r carriers and aircraft, and strike assets such i as Tomahawk cruise missiles. The naval ) services have also made a commitment ) to increase research-and-development ex- 1
penditures. “It’s not the number but the ) capability that matters,” according to Ad- t
miral Owens. He added that the Navy is )
focusing on two key concepts in its i
power-projection role: standoff weapons 1
and support to Marines ashore. (
Former Under Secretary of the Navy Dan Howard asked Admiral Owens hoW 1
conflict with U.S. society in general. The Navy’s leadership runs the risk of association, if not being co-opted.
► The nature of warfare is undergoing massive advances in technology and global production capabilities. The military technological revolution is not driven by military necessity but by civilian demand. New global technology centers, such as India, will compete with Japan and the United States in the 21st century. If the United States continues to snub the international system, it may be unable to compete with those newly aggressive, technologically advanced nations.
Several members of the panel noted that Dr. Vlahos’s comments were somewhat short on prescription. During the question-and-answer session, he conceded that . . . From the Sea” is good for perhaps ten years, “but we need more of a hedge than just preparing for littoral warfare.”
Vice Admiral William Flanagan, Commander, Second Fleet and Striking Fleet Atlantic, commented that certain principles of warfare do not change, but we must understand and adapt to those that do. If the new Naval Doctrine Command “does a good job,” the Navy will be prepared for the future, according to him.
Rear Admiral Edward Baker Jr., Assistant Deputy CNO, Plans, Policy and Operations, told the conferees that
. . From the Sea” is the epitome of change, especially in the areas of flexibility and adaptability. Expeditionary forces, he argued, are the most flexible force packages available, because they can be tailored to the requirements of the geographic commander-in-chief. As for Dr. Vlahos’s assertion that the white paper did not look far enough into the future, Admiral Baker noted that it is a new concept of operations based on the years 2000 through 2010. From that perspec-
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tive, many of the Navy’s capabilities, especially surface ships fitted with the vertical launching systems, are “easily adaptable to future needs.”
Marine Corps Major General Richard D. Hearney, Deputy Chief of Staff for Requirements and Programs, added that “*• • • From the Sea’ assists the Navy and Marine Corps with integration by focusing resources and efforts, and preparing the naval services for the next war, even when “the nation is least prepared.”
Rear Admiral David Oliver, Director of the Programming Division, Office of the CNO, suggested that the Navy needs to explain the importance of “presence” to the civilian population. He noted that naval forces are in places that U.S. citizens never see, and thus cannot understand or appreciate. “Presence is difficult to sell,” Admiral Oliver says, “but it’s who we are.”
Rear Admiral Philip Dur, Commander, Cruiser-Destroyer Group Eight, and soon to be on the CNO’s staff, reframed and countered Dr. Vlahos’s assertion that the economy is driving qualitative changes in the Navy. He says that the disappearance of the Soviet threat is allowing all of the armed services to decrease their budgets, downsize, and restructure. The Navy will adapt by refining its existing capabilities, and by maintaining talent and motivation in its youth. “. . . From the Sea” is easy to comprehend and encourages positive action.
A Navy View. . .
In a luncheon address, Vice Admiral William Owens, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Warfare Requirements, and Assessments, acknowledged that a three-way revolution is underway in the Navy and Marine Corps, and it is leading the naval services
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into the 21st century. a i
“. . . From the Sea” is challenging th: ve Navy and Marine Corps to act jointly su to orient themselves toward the littoral pr and to concentrate on advances in tech 0 nology. The reorganization of the Navj or is the second thrust of the revolutiof cc and will allow the Navy and Marinf fe Corps to enhance its joint coordination pr Within the new organization, the estab sti lishment of an Expeditionary Warfare Di Of rectorate, the consolidation of all plat m form sponsors into “one shop,” and 1 w coordinator for commander-in-chief is- br sues will help erase the Navy’s Cold Wa> A focus and force structure. rc
The last element of the revolution is m the establishment of a new process that tc better prepares the Navy for future chal cr lenges. Rather than looking at a tracJi' di tional warfare platform oriented around aircraft, ships, or submarines, the leaden “ ship is now thinking in terms of “joint p mission assessment areas,” including join1 ~ strike, joint littoral warfare, joint space and electronic warfare, and joint strate- di gic deterrence and defense. b
Admiral Owens also referred to the I_ Navy’s new effort to recapitalize itself by Ji trimming its force structure to an afford- c able level in order to permit the future T acquisition of long-term capabilities, such s
as communications, advanced weapons, C
and space and electronic warfare. In its v
the Navy planned to fund its long-range acquisition programs, such as the “stealthy” attack/fighter aircraft. Owens said that the Navy has made some draconian cuts in type/model series, which, along with other cuts in force structure and personnel, were difficult to make,
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Third Annapolis Seminar and 119th Annual Meeting
but necessary. When asked if there was a role for an advanced short take-off and vertical landing aircraft, and whether such an aircraft would serve as the Proposed joint attack fighter. Admiral Owens replied that such a fighter is only °ne option under consideration. He felt that the starting Point would be the stealth attack/fighter operational require- utents document which would then tie merged with the Mr Force’s multirole fighter require- utents in an attempt to achieve a lower- cost more efficient design.
Operation Precision Strike”
A mock wargame devised and narrated by retired Army Lieutenant General J°hn Cushman con- eluded the 119th Annual Meeting and Third Annapolis Seminar. Moderated by syndicated columnist and retired Army Colonel Harry Summers, the wargame involved planning for a joint strike against Meanland, an oblong island off the southern coast of Florida. Retired Vice Admiral Dunn returned to the platform from the previous day’s “CNO Question and Answer” in the role of Commander-inChief, Atlantic, and retired Marine Corps Colonel James Barrett served as the Atlantic Command’s Director of Operations. The various planning and operational co- °rdination issues were posed by General Cushman, acted out by Admiral Dunn and Colonel Barrett, with Colonel Summers providing insight to resolving the issues:
^ What are the operational objectives?
What is the status of the threats?
^ Who is in charge?
^ Is it an amphibious or airborne operation, and does that matter?
^ Who should have control of air assets and carrier forces?
^ How will targeting selection be carried out and keep-out zones be allocated?
Two panels addressed these issues: Navy Rear Admirals David Frost (Director of Operations, U.S. European Command) and Fred Lewis (commander, U.S. Naval Doctrine Command), Air Force Major General John Lorber (Director of Plans and Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans of the Air Staff), Army Brigadier General Lon Maggart (Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine, Army Training and Doctrine Command), and Lieutenant General Stackpole, who delivered the keynote address that morning. The second panel, comprised of retired flag and general
officers, included: Air Force Major General John Corder (former Commander of the Air Warfare Center), Marine Corps Major General Fred Haynes (former Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development, and Studies), Army General Fred Kroesen (former Commander-inChief U.S. Army Europe and 7th Army), and Vice Admiral Metcalf, who stayed on after moderating the Constellation panel the day before.
The most notable aspect of the wargame was how far jointness had come, even since Operation Desert Storm. While much of the joint operational aspects were just beginning to be put in place before and during Desert Shield and Desert Storm, and there was something of an ad-hoc nature to Central Command’s planning and operations, clearly the active-duty panelists acknowledged that many of the issues just simply were not contentious anymore. While the retired flag and general officers could reminisce about “how bad it was,” with Admiral Metcalf commenting about planning and operational aspects for Grenada, the tenor of the wargame soon shifted to the future systems needs to facilitate even more jointness.
This was clear from the wrap-up provided by Rear Admiral (select) William D. Center, on the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, staff. He provided a “howto” based upon current operational command relationships to the issues posed by
the strike against Meanland. With the Commander-in-Chief Atlantic having overall responsibility, the joint force commander would exercise operational control over all assigned forces. General Cushman’s new Joint Commander’s
Under the aegis of retired Army Lieutenant General John Cushman (inset), the Naval Institute staged its first-ever wargame, where retired and active-duty military officers gathered to debate a joint doctrine.
Handbook, available at the Naval Institute, outlines relationships within the joint force that give subordinate commanders authority to execute all assigned missions.
While the principal focus and concern of many in attendance at the Naval Institute’s 119th Annual Meeting was on the future of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, something of substance was certainly available to all. And while several historical issues were, more or less, resolved during the first day, and jointness hailed by all uniformed officers during the second, the more difficult questions of roles, missions, and resources will remain undecided—at least until Secretary Aspin’s “Bottom-Up Review” is completed.
Dr. Truver is the Director, Studies and Analysis, TECHMATICS, Inc., and also supports the Naval Institute as Special Assistant for Seminar Programs. He thanks Ed Feege and Jim Devlin of his staff, as well as Steve LeSueur of Inside the Pentagon, for their assistance in preparing this report.