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By m " "
an Polmar, Editor, Guide to the Soviet Navy
^•Tor’s x,
fr°tn foj °TE: This column is adapted Fleet” ; olwar’s chapter “State of the !he 1*** new 4 th edition of Guide to Hich Jrii 7'y Waval Institute Press),
1 °e released this month.
Th
3 Cr°ssro°adet Navy t*le mid-1980s is at Program - S "^e ongoing modernization i'iavy “ cJearly providing the Soviet Several j' international leadership in arPonP JnP°rtant areas of naval warfare,
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Warfare An‘iship
> NUZ“P missiles
* Sh0llt.ar/chemical warfare In addft^6 amP*1’i3'0US assault
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extensive aircraft carrier construction program. The Soviet fleet is not a balanced fleet—at least not in the Western sense—despite statements to the contrary by senior Soviet naval officers. Soviet strategic missile and attack (torpedo and cruise missile) submarines are the principal striking forces of the navy in most combat scenarios.
The large industrial facilities allocated to submarine construction and support, the many types developed during the past few years, and the tradition of a large undersea fleet all argue in favor of the continued emphasis on submarines.
Indeed, the role of submarines is increasing because of the effectiveness of their cruise and ballistic missiles, the ability to use offboard (remote) sensors to detect targets, and improved communication methods. The recent Soviet rate of development of new submarines and submarine-related systems is remarkable, with seven new combat types and two research submarines being built since 1980, in addition to several significant submarine conversions.
Recent Soviet developments in nu- clear-propelled attack submarines (the Mike, Sierra, and Akula classes) are, in some respects, the major concern of Western naval leaders. However, the deployment of the Delta IV and Typhoon ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), indications of a major construction or conversion program for submarines to carry the SS-N-24 strategic cruise missile, and deployment of the SS-N-21 land-attack cruise missile demonstrate the breadth of Soviet submarine efforts.
Also, the Soviets have not abandoned the diesel submarine. The low cost of these craft (to build and to crew), their ability to conduct some missions as well or better than a nuclear submarine, and their extremely low acoustic detectability have apparently led the Soviets recently to increase production of diesel subs.
This massive submarine effort provides the Soviets with opportunities to
develop and evaluate a variety of technologies and operational concepts, allowing them to choose the best design(s) for series production. The variety of submarine types presents Western antisubmarine warfare (ASW) forces with the need to develop different tactics and, possibly, different weapons for dealing with various submarine performance envelopes and other features.
The Soviet Navy is moving ahead rapidly with nuclear-propelled surface ships as well as nuclear submarines. A fourth nuclear-propelled Kirov-class battle cruiser has been started. Two of these 28,000-ton warships are operational and a third is under construction. (Slava-class antiship missile cruisers, large Sov- remennyy-dass antiship destroyers, and Udaloy-class ASW destroyers are also in series production.) During the past few years, the Soviets have laid down the fourth of the large, 23,460-ton Arktika- class nuclear icebreakers; a very large nuclear-propelled missile range instrumental ship; and the first of the Sev- morput’- class nuclear barge/container carriers of some 31,900 deadweight tons.
With two nuclear-propelled aircraft carriers of some 70,000 tons also under construction, the Soviet Union has a significant nuclear surface ship program under way, with five ship types being built at three yards and four yards building nuclear submarines. (The Soviet surface ship yards are Nikolayev south [carriers], the Baltic yard in Leningrad [cruisers, missile-range ships, and icebreakers], and Zaliv/Butoma yard in Kerch [merchant ships]; the submarine yards are Severodvinsk, Komsomol’sk, the Krasnoye Sormovo yard in Gor’kiy, and the Admiralty-Sudomekh yard in Leningrad.)
The Soviet nuclear carriers and Kirov- class cruisers have obvious military roles, but so too do the Arktika-dass icebreakers and the missile range instrumentation ship. Although the icebreakers are civilian-manned and assigned to the mer-
major Soviet efforts are areas of submarine war-
ip in tj,°Cean surveillance, and leader- are cou]HSe tWo v*tal areas of naval war- °I the Ces^'Pt t0 the Soviets by the end extent, QntUry' Qualitative and, to some ^as ;rUantita'ive assessments in these The mmore difficult, pearly c.aSS'Ve Soviet submarine effort is !°viet .°M.n§ fhc gap between U. S. and i hi|e . Hdcrsca warfare capabilities.
; S. Su^° decades ago the quality of [fith Sovn'ar'nes was ab°vc comparison • S. Sp 161 Undersea craft, the planned onl^r^ ^SSN-21) class is expected Jet subm ,e t0 ten years ahead of So- dctectj0ar|nes in quieting and acoustic *ae mid ,CaPa^ilities when completed in JNts a90s—if intelligence assess-
0rmanCee Correct. By most other per- Jready „ Cr'teria, Soviet submarines are % (-I, uPeri°r to those of the U. S. '‘m c°nsi°u§h U. S. submarine personnel ClS )■ Th erCt*t0 superior to the Sovi- feiain lean a*3‘*'ty °f the U. S. Navy to Subrnarineersh.ip m 'he important areas of
«hi,
t'Q|i Win".? Acting and acoustic detec- S|lip ePend upon astute Navy leader-
r0r
th C?n®ressi°nal support. e foreseeable future, si
Sov^'^ c°utinue as the mainstay of Ct Navy, even considering
h,
submarine general-purpose and stra- the mainstay of considering the
November 1986
105
The Promorik-class air-cushion landing craft is the Soviet Navy’s latest (1986) and largest (360 tons full load displacement) craft for short-range amphibious strikes. Several air cushion classes are now in production. Note the Pomorik’s three gas turbine engines and the Band Stand radar (guns and probably missiles are fitted for selfdefense).
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7
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An artist’s concept of the first operational Soviet wing-inground (WIG) effect machine, given the NATO code name Orlan. Resembling a large flying boat, this craft is believed to be intended for antisubmarine operations. However, WIG flying craft are also suitable for amphibious assault, and the Orlan has been observed on trials for SS-N-22 antiship missiles.
The stern of the antiship cruiser Slava showing, from left: eight rotary, vertical launchers, each of which hold eight SA-N-6 missiles, Top Dome missile control radar; helicopter hangar with covered Pop Group radars; retracted SA-N-4 launcher cylinders outboard; and the helicopter deck.
chant fleet, on their sea trials, these ships mounted a twin 76.2-mm. gun mount as well as 30-mm. Gatling guns and their associated naval electronics.
The size and breadth of the Soviet naval-maritime nuclear propulsion program provide a large, flexible base which can be focused in any one of several directions, including an acceleration of strategic missile or attack submarines as well as nuclear surface forces.
At the same time, several factors could have a negative impact on the growth of the Soviet Navy: the stagnated Soviet economy; the on-going modernization of the Soviet Ground Forces, Strategic Rocket Forces, and Air Forces; and the changes in political and naval leadership in the Soviet Union. With respect to the last, the men who ruled the Soviet Union from the end of World War II until 1972 (Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev) all had specific interests in the development of the Soviet fleet, and Brezhnev had strong personal ties to the navy. As an army political officer, Brezhnev participated in a major Black Sea amphibious landing at Novorossiysk in 1943, and in the early 1950s, as a civilian, was head of the navy’s political administration.
106
The men who have succeeded Brezhnev—Andropov, Chernenko, and Gorbachev—do not appear to have had such ties. Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union S. G. Gorshkov, who was personally chosen by Khrushchev to head the navy and whose almost 30-year tenure demonstrated his political savvy and effectiveness, has been replaced by a younger man, Admiral of the Fleet N. I. Chemavin. While Chemavin appears intelligent and capable, he lacks the emotional (World War II experience) and political ties that his predecessor was able to exploit on behalf of the navy.
There is, obviously, considerable momentum in ongoing Soviet naval programs, and this, coupled with the full- employment and full-production nature of the Soviet military-industrial complex, will ensure the continuation of current building rates for at least the near term. Also, the navy is perceived by many to contribute directly to the defense of the homeland—the primary role of the Soviet armed forces. Soviet anticarrier and anti-strategic missile submarine forces help to defend Soviet soil against nuclear strikes from the West. At the same time, the Soviet Navy’s SSBNs provide a stra-
tiinatf"
tegic reserve (23% of the tota^e So^1 strategic warheads available to carries Union; the U. S. submarine '°r vaf
ateglC
about 50% of the U. S. str „ -et heads) that is important to the trines of fighting a nuclear vv ^oUt a any level of conflict—bringing favof conclusion to the conflict on te ^ currei>t
ioc-
able to the Soviet Union. Soviet programs to develop o'0'
The ,bile
inter‘
be
e*'
continental ballistic missiles c ^ the pected to reduce the import at1aiiev1' SSBN strategic reserve but no ate its significance. Hurti0” 'j
Even if there is a future re . 3n the rate of Soviet naval develop -^s3 t still pro; -
construction, the Red fleet s
adefS'
powerful force for Kremlin 10
force that has been used in Peae0errtieS' support allies and intimidate ^e\o? Current Soviet naval research, ^.jj fur ment, and production programs ^ ther enhance the effectiveness ^1)
naval forces. This will be Paallf
true if, in the post-Reagan-Le j0n ^ riod, there is the anticipated re , dj U. S. Navy funding. Increasi Soviet Navy will provide .nrof^' leaders with improved means plishing their international g°a
Proceedings
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t>ef