Professional Notes

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By Major M. S. Fagan, U. S. Marine Corps

The Marine Corps’s RF-4B photo Phantom is going to be a tough act to fol­low. How will its successor measure up if, in fact, a successor is needed, consid­ering the growing numbers of other im­agery collectors?

The Department of the Navy’s last active-duty, dedicated reconnaissance plane, the RF-4B, can operate an infrared line scanner (IRLS) and six film cameras simultaneously, or image through clouds, rain, and battlefield smoke 30 miles away with its side-looking radar (SLR), and data-link that SLR imagery to the ground. The Marine Corps wants to replace the RF-4B with a recce-configurable F/A- 18D (two-seat) in the early 1990s. How­ever, the increased threat, renewed inter­est in remotely piloted vehicles, and the perceived availability of other non­organic sensors have led some to believe that the requirement for manned tactical reconnaissance is becoming obsolete.

It might be true that manned tacrecce will become obsolete in 30-40 years, but in the interim, the recce-configurable F/A-18D promises to provide state-of- the-art, real-time, all-weather targeting imagery for the tactical commander.

Imagery locates targets with more pre­cision than any other collection method. No known system will replace imagery for intelligence and targeting, but collect­ing that imagery in high-threat areas has become very difficult. This increased threat and the deception capabilities of potential enemies have made survivabil­ity and high-quality sensors key elements of tomorrow’s reconnaissance system.

Current Capabilities: The RF-4B is the Marine Corps’s primary tactical recon­naissance platform. There are 28 in the inventory; 21 are authorized for the Corps’s only tactical reconnaissance squadron, VMFP-3, based at Marine Corps Air Station El Toro, California. VMFP-3 keeps four of those aircraft in Iwakuni, Japan, with a six-month rotat­ing detachment.

The RF-4B carries its sensors inter­nally, using three nose stations for film cameras, a fuselage cavity for the IRLS, and flush radomes forward of each intake for the SLR. When the RF-4B is config­ured for data-linked SLR, the number- two nose station is used for the data-link equipment.

The cameras shoot black-and-white, color-negative or reversal, camouflage- detection (color) infrared, or black-and- white infrared film. Four types of cam­eras are available, offering vertical, pan­oramic, side-oblique standoff, or for­ward-oblique coverage—all in stereo. Available lenses range from wide-angle (180° across track for panoramic cam­eras) to longer focal lengths for standoff ranges of more than 25 miles.

The infrared line scanner is not actu­ally a camera; it is a thermal recorder that scans a 120° across-track field of view below the aircraft and electronically rec­ords those scan lines on photographic film. This process results in a continuous, photo-like image on negative film that can be interpreted or printed. The IRLS is more sensitive than a forward-looking infrared (FLIR) sensor and has about ten times more field of view. Although the IRLS is somewhat stabilized, it cannot be slewed from the cockpit as a FLIR can. Because the imagery is electronic before put on film, it can be easily converted for data-link transmission. VMFP-3 has demonstrated data-linked infrared im­agery using its SLR data-link, but an op­erational capability for data-linked infra­red is not planned for the RF-4B.

The IRLS is not just a night sensor; there are many applications for using in­frared in daylight. Infrared imagery looks much like black-and-white photography day or night, and it can collect imagery through light haze. It cannot see through clouds, nor can it be used as a standoff sensor.

Capable of the greatest standoff range, the SLR is the Navy’s only all-weather imaging sensor. Applications for the SLR are still being discovered, and VMFP-3 frequently participates in research proj­ects that enhance the utility of SLR and contribute to the development of more effective friendly tactical deception mea­sures (the other side has SL ._0IlS of

One of the internal camera ^s _order- the RF-4B is used for the SL _unproC' which electronically records t                                        fjlrn

essed radar signals on photograj? ^ tft This data film is then remove . ^ei aircraft and run through a g^r0 ^ jgta correlator/processor, which rea ^ into film with a laser, converts t e _Ollto imagery, and records that in^S is ³ photographic film. The P^r° ^ 0 photo-like image on negative ^ da¹³' can be interpreted or printed-                                        gp-jB

links now being installed in ^ta to will allow the unprocessed ra ,₀ i

be transmitted during the ^’^eiati⁰" ground station where the same c ^ process will occur, thereby S^,vl .^gathef real-time capability for both a precision targeting and bat assessment. _recon^nai>

The term “multi-spectral r ₍₀ 0 sance” is often used when reft ~spe^ct<3, capabilities of the RF-4B. S), ^aflf are light (i.e., cameras), heat ( radio frequency energy (SLR)- _c0iled electronic methods are u^sed _w,_et-h'^!1' imagery in two of these spectra- ^ to processing is required in ev ; ^ recover the latent images f^r0 ,j_e£j SL^ posed film. Even the newly i^ns data-links send their signals ^t0^_eS“_ed °ⁿ station where the image is P^r° wet film.                          pm^ce5>"

The requirement for wet-f* jj. n ing inhibits the availability ⁰ _t0 tP sponsive targeting in format¹¹³ _sy commander. With current we ^_st $ terns, a reconnaissance ^aircra _{f ce}-ba^si; turn its exposed film to su ^00' processing and interpretation jn¹ VMFP-3 processes the film ⁱⁿ^ agery processing vans. The fle® ^ fiL¹ interpretation unit then interpre and sends reports from the ⁱⁿJ^a£_ur pretation facility complex of Film can be processed and be o jjft¹ table about 15 minutes after the jgfpff chocked. The time required ^t0 _s the film and issue the report ^v^_note^s-. the mission, but averages 30 n ^ j₀gt-^s

Wet-film processing rema>^nS

ten van_s           Edition to transporting

Quires ’ ' . ^sy^stems need film (which 1,520 _ga,i^re^^r'8^erated storage), about teid ^ °^ns °f processing chemicals, ^each 2a ,^sands of gallons of water for Wfn, /u°^Urs °* operation.

•tewed Z^{anned Recce at All? The re}*

^cles fppy^rCSt ‘^{n re}motely piloted vehi- °^taini^_ ^s-* ^ant* the perceived ease in

^^Py, the ^{m the RF}"^{4B t0 the FLIR in an} Ne (j_u .Performance difference closes a

^RF'4B a^{S St}'^{R a}hout 10:1 in favor of the °ffer tp,_e ,ⁿ ^P'*⁷ carrying an IRLS would ^era»„ ^est combination of ground cov-

^lge

^sorp_e , ^nonorganic imagery have led ^sance _Ca ?^leve that manned reconnais- The m* °^{e re}P'^aced by these systems. ?^rarn to ^aV^ *^3e8^{an an} accelerated pro­files ^^{Cure BBy}s for the Navy and **te sij ' ^ae first two of these systems, ttedium ^ran§^e Pioneer system and the

^s°0n_ _w^r?.ⁿ®^{e s}ystem—to be selected

^{aild s}urve ,^{haVe ima}g^ery reconnaissance An _0rf' ^{ance as a} primary mission. ^c°ⁿnai_ss ^Cl" ^{0p mer}it for efficiency in re- ^at the re ^{anCe s}y^stems is ground coverage ’'tie. >k^Ulred resolution over a period of ^ _C0v_er^{e RF}"^{4B s} SLR, for instance, ®te ai_rcr, ,^a,^ten'^mile swath at speeds up to %J h_not ^{1 s} dmit. At a nominal speed of ^fate of 4 ok¹*^{16 bb}-4B can image at the father' a ^S(l^uare miles per hour in any W/H* sensor on a medium- "tiles win ^Can ‘mage a swath about 0.33 **te _Cov ^e iⁿ dear weather; at 480 knots, ?‘ies pe*¹?^rate is about 160 square n 4B _c ^h°^Ur' cover the same area an ^{an cover} in 30 minutes, then, a !)Jted 15 p*PP^ed, medium-range RPV will [his i_nc 'gl¹¹ hours and several sorties. ^ets_es ^eases its exposure to enemy de- ^a8ery _tQⁿd delays the return of the im- ®te a '^e commander. If we compare la,. ⁶ m the RF-4B to the FLIR in an ue h„.’.P^erformance difference closes a

hittin [^eso'^ut*^on in infrared imagery. [^,°md_ci® ^a'8her-quality sensors in RPVs ^,|rrtia_nc°^Sc fhe manned aircraft-RPV per- ®^aP somewhat, but this is not • °^,'^s on °^{r tPle near} f^uture- The limita- ^aVailabl_e ^Pay*^oad weight and volume, b^hfe th ^cl^ectrical power, and cost will ^V_s ^{at at} least the first generation of ¹ he fielded with lower-cost and

lower-performance sensors, recorders, and data-links.

There should be no question, however, that RPVs are required as one element of the imagery collection system. They allow reconnaissance or surveillance in high-threat areas at lower risk than manned aircraft and can be used for some types of clandestine collection. Initial standoff capabilities will be very limited, though. If surprise is necessary before an operation, an RPV flown over an objec­tive may not be as good a choice as a high-altitude manned aircraft flying in international airspace and imaging with a standoff sensor. If the RPV accidently crashed near the objective and was dis­covered, surprise might be lost.

RPVs are harder than aircraft to detect, which may allow them to loiter in the vi­cinity of a target, but the approximate location of the target must be known in advance, owing to the RPV’s limited field of view. Until sensors and data-links comparable to those used in manned air­craft are developed for the space, weight, and power constraints of RPVs, manned aircraft will be needed to deliver more imagery in less time than RPVs.

The use of nonorganic platforms to collect imagery for the tactical com­mander will not be addressed here. You do not have to be a rocket scientist, though, to figure out that when the fan gets FOD-ed, competition for nonorganic (including national systems) collection support will be keen. Even if the request is made far enough in advance and makes it to the top of the priority list, the classi­fication of the product may still preclude its dissemination to many who need it.

Future Manned Recce Capabilities: What kind of a system, then, is needed for the future? There is a continuing re­quirement to cover large areas in as short a time as possible, image from standoff ranges for survivability and clandestine operation, collect imagery in all weather, deliver the products to the commander in the shortest time possible, and promote readiness by reducing the required logis­tics support.

Forerunner of the Marine Corps’s manned tacrecce aircraft of the 1990s and beyond, the F/A-18 recce test bed is developing follow-on imaging technology to replace, among others, the AN/AAD-5 infrared line scanner, which produced the (retouched) ther­mal image below.

The Marine Corps’s future tactical re­connaissance system should accommo­date all of these qualities. There are plans to replace all film-based reconnaissance sensors with electronic sensors that rec­ord imagery on magnetic tape on board the aircraft. The imagery may be played back through a data-link transmitter while the aircraft is in flight, or it may be si­multaneously data-linked and recorded. The two major components of this system will be the F/A-18D and the ground- based receiving and exploitation system, the all-source imagery processor (ASIP).

Development of a reconnaissance ca­pability for the two-seat F/A-18D is under way, and an engineering test-bed aircraft has been working with a variety of sensors at Naval Air Test Center Pa­tuxent River, Maryland. When the F/A- 18 achieves its “full-up” recce capability in the mid-1990s, it will be able to per­form almost all of the missions its prede­cessor—the RF-4B—did: low-altitude overflight collection in the visible light and infrared spectra, and standoff collec­tion using visible light and all-weather SLR sensors. However, it will not be capable of color or stereo imagery, nor will it be able to operate more than two sensors at once.

However, not all of these capabilities will be present at the recce F/A-18’s fleet introduction. The F/A-18D recce capabil­ity will begin with a baseline system that includes, (in order of priority): a data- linked SLR, an IRLS with recorder, and electro-optical standoff sensors.

SLR was chosen by the Marines as the primary sensor for several reasons. First, it is the only all-weather-capable imagery

to &^Cc

needed to provide imagery

for M³¹**

imagery was delivered ashore _sarne

. /.jje sa'¹

Corps interpreters to exploit l           £₀jps

method was used by the Army ^ jp. and Marine Corps in Won j_tatioH When Marine Corps film ^eX^ gjp, th^e equipment is replaced with th^e ^jp/

Marine Corps will have to rely ^ ADDISS-compatible, in-thea

tiuiiit atnauid, cuiu in*-' * Jc

interpreted with unprecedente ^s _statjon^s- accuracy at computerized wor

Survivability of the platform ._rf_raro^e^T

hanced by a state-of-the-art ³¹ will¹

the F/A-18D—and standoff ^seI1.„_s they

replace. These improvernen A*> crease the lethality of a |?uygi''iⁿ^ Ground Task Force several fol _in re³

to VMCJ-2 and later to VMFP-3 i

compw"-—_fK,_r

detachments to the Midway (CV-41F _h£ attf³^

ments with Marine Aircraft Group .* "c_agafl ^p ’ 31 the Armed Forces Staff College. Major Q^fic^r the Air Reconnaissance Requiremen Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps-

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sensor. Second, it is the only sensor that is not being considered for first-genera­tion RPVs. RPVs will, however, be able to use their television and FLIR sensors to temporarily fill the gaps left in the in­frared and visible-light spectra until the higher-quality IRLS and electro-optical sensors are incorporated into the Hornet. The F/A-18 also has a FLIR capability that can be used (although with a greatly reduced field-of-view and resolution compared to the IRLS). Third, SLR has been in operation for many years and, unlike tactical electro-optical sensors, has little, if any, technological risk. Last, the SLR gives a 50-nautical mile standoff capability to the Hornet. A plan to put the RF-4B SLR and data-link into a pod is being considered. Such a pod has already been built and test-flown.

All F/A-18s delivered from 1990 on will have a “common nose” which in­cludes a kit that can accommodate either a 20-mm. gun or a reconnaissance pallet. The current program proposal calls for a depot-level kit to be installed in 48 F/A- 18Ds, which will allow the changeout of the gun for a reconnaissance pallet on the flight line in less than eight hours. Twenty-four reconnaissance pallets and gun-bay doors with sensor viewing aper­tures will be bought. When these planes are configured for recce, they will retain every capability of the non-recce aircraft except for the gun.

The first pallets will follow the SLR by about one year and will contain an IRLS and a tape recorder. (The initial SLR ca­pability will not have on-board record­ing.) Infrared imagery will be recorded and delivered/datalinked to the ASIP.

Requirements for the standoff electro­optical sensors have not been refined into specifications for focal length, resolu­tion, and field-of-view. As threat ranges have increased, U. S. and foreign forces have moved to longer lenses for tactical sensors. The RF-4B used an 18-inch lens in Vietnam. VMFP-3 is getting 24-inch lenses. Today, 48-inch lenses seem to be about the minimum being specified for future requirements in other services and countries, and 66-inch lenses are being used more frequently for tactical standoff sensors. As lens sizes grow, tradeoff studies will consider the greater cost, greater volume requirements, narrower field-of-view, more critical image stabili­zation, and, in some cases, rigid temper­ature stability.

The Air Force has the lead in develop­ing tactical electro-optical sensors for it­self and the Navy. Although current electro-optical technology cannot match the focal plane resolution of film, recce tests conducted with the F-16 have shown a significant increase in resolution over that achieved with the RF-4B. This is believed by some to be owing to the F-16’s fly-by-wire system, which reduces the vibration that can cause blur or smear. If the F/A-18 recce tests show similar re­sults, requirements could be met with shorter lenses than originally thought.

If the standoff sensor will not fit into the nose, it might be put into the center­line pod with the SLR. When carrying the pod, then, the F/A-18D would be capable of both the optical and SLR standoff mis­sions. The higher altitudes associated with standoff imagery and the reduced requirement for high speeds and more fuel (greater distance from the threat) would offset many of the disadvantages of having to carry a pod. When the pod is not carried, the internal configuration of equipment would allow high-speed over­flight missions with the option of carry­ing an extra fuel tank. The internal-only configuration, though, will not allow data-link because that equipment will be in the pod.

The ground-based part of the recon­naissance system—the ASIP—will re­ceive imagery from many sources, in­cluding RPVs and F/A-18Ds. It will not, however, be able to process film nor have light tables for film exploitation. The ASIP will exploit digital “soft-copy” imagery that has been received directly from the collection platform or from an intermediate relay. The soft-copy exploi­tation will be done by interpreters view­ing high-resolution cathode ray tubes. Interpretation reports will be written using preformated displays at the com­puterized work stations—the interpreters filling in the blanks.

The five-van ASIP will be more sup­portable logistically than the system it replaces, and its only major consumables will be magnetic tape (which can be re­used) and petroleum-oil-lubricants.

The Air Force has joined the Marine Corps in the ASIP program, and has be­come the executive service; the Air Force’s almost identical system is called the advanced deployable digital imagery interpretation system (ADDISS). The Navy is interested in a similar shipboard capability and has been monitoring the ASIP/ADDISS program.

The Marine Corps is headed toward a completely modernized tactical recon­naissance system that by 1992 will pro­vide a greatly increased capability to lo­cate and target hard-to-find, mobile forces before those forces can move. Eliminating film for real-time electronic imagery makes this possible, but until other U. S. services and allies make the switch, there will be some rough spots in

the transition.                ■ :_ng its

Although the Navy is modern^* to tactical recce systems by ^conve_wj_tch to digital, real-time imagery, the s ^ eliminate film probably will n until at least a year or so after t ^ j. Corps has done so. Today, ^a fjini forces and allies are able to ^e*P jy[arin^£ imagery. The Air Force and t ₍j_ajg. Corps are also interoperable, w linked SLR from the RF-4C ^an^ Q_Uard respectively (Army and ^<-~^aS _eCotP⁵ SLRs are different from the M^a gpR)- SLR, and the Navy does not hav ^ When the Marines ^tranS‘^U_fficUlt (°^! pletely to the ASIP, it will be ¹ _nIiais- the F-14 Tomcat tactical air ^ _vjde sance pod system (TARPS) 9_g goes support ashore until the TA j_on of electronic. Before the fly-in-^e , _eater. Marine Corps aviation arrives i .j| t>e film-based F-14 TARPS aircran __t!,_; needed to provide imager commanders ashore. In Gre

Alt

Force aircraft or use field'^P^gpS film-exploitation methods wt ^ to film. One possible solution mts^ _apd incorporate electro-optical sen will* data-links in a few TARPS, w ^_{en sU}p- used to transmit to the ASIP porting Marines.

Heal ^reC°ⁿ

Tomorrow’s manned tact naissance will be collected Wi ^jn N tronic sensors, and the image™ j atid

wiU ^

greater capabilities than the ^s^^te_vVill ^

ie

it the ability to target enemy f°^rce time and in all weather.

■ 1972 ^aIlc • n

Major Fagan was commissioned in ¹ _c0Inple^tl° ₀p ation from Indiana University. Upon        ^ R^eC j

Naval Flight Officer training and Air ^ a$sil? naissance Systems Officer training. ^c .c £1 j, a 1FP-3 at N*

CA. While in VMFP-3, he complete* jssiPj

' ti.^T>

^2Pting Containers to Military Requirements

^or§^e D. Saunders

Georos n c...  .

^laT^s 20- and 40-foot intermodal

»                    • “ vwiiv^iaivjn puituuai,

₂ ^pabl|ity to handle a wide range of

j o                          _      ^ ^a          laiigt/ ui

of ^_L^attaching a frame structure o

Solved ^rri ■          ^u‘tsc piooieins can ue

idling f^{S conce}Pt ^aNo facilitates the T ret_rn„ ° ,^tbe container when empty or r\. ^ustade

° ““‘tit iu meet vanuus

^;d ^<?^L'^lrenients these problems can be

‘^{e ca}P^ability to move a shipment

^Irom<

^aer to

>^s well known.¹' Containerships •he second °^{VCr a}**^lbe major and most of ⁿati_{0ns f}^arT *'^ner routes linking trading Com,: ^{0 a}*i sizes all over the world.

Tod;

^C°^ntainerc „                            iiiuauiuum

qui_reirie ^{are not} built with military re- ^c°ⁿstruct h '^{n m}‘^nc*- Neither are they o^r_lhec_a^with a conversion potential,

^Car8oe

on ~~^{J ai1}^

^nd u_l0nL^a-*^la^‘*¹'8b open top container carg₀ r—*   ^tbe T^rame to meet various

^Demo movement.

fe_r the¹¹¹¹¹³*³*⁶ 'ntermodal containers 0 ■ . ¹ —“‘vr iu move a Miipmciii

1° tr._lns."^m to destination without having ■v, _(Q ^{er re}load from one mode of car- ^?ati_0n . ⁿ°ther. The story of containeri-

^0titai_ner                       ^a“ ^{uvcl ulc} wuiiu.

^and f₀ . ^are on most U. S. domestic ^lrilerniod'f^{n militar}y installations. The “tUch a r,^{3 c}°ntainer has become so *iiat it j_s | °i ‘he logistics infrastructure ^a8e °^ubtful that we could ever man- Tinl k°^Ut '^l'

fitted t₀^{C Conta}inerships, which can be ■dents _c ^{meet s}P^ecific military require- ¹°’t'odjf_l°^nta’^ners do not lend themselves ^tl°ⁿ'Stand ^at'°^{n bor tbe} accommodation of ■'one 31 ^ar<i cargoes or irregular opera- tcrmodal containers were de­signed for the movement of commercial cargo in the private sector. They operate most efficiently in a point-to-point lift or round-trip cycle. Military adaptation is another matter entirely.

Military containerization is predomi­nately a one-way movement from the continental United States to overseas bases and operating forces. For the most part, these requirements are handled in peacetime by private containers and con- tainership services. Only in an emer­gency, such as a NATO or Arabian Gulf conflict, would container problems be­come acute. Department of Defense con­tainers (such as the Army Milvans) would be activated in the early stages of the emergency, but their relatively limited numbers would require additional con­tainer capacity very quickly.

The problem can be solved by adapting a device that will increase container ca­pacity without greatly increasing the number of containers. To understand how this can be done, we should first review the basic principles of container design and construction.

The intermodal container, built to In­ternational Standards Organization (ISO) specifications and dimensions, is essen­tially a box girder designed to accommo­date and lift cargo, quantified by weight and cube. The floor and four comer posts are the strongest components of the unit. Comer posts are used to lift the container and to stack one container on top of an­other—for example, in the vertical cells of a containership.⁴

Containers built of all-welded steel construction perform as one structure, enhanced by each of the structural com­ponents. Consequently, the type of floor used will influence the roof and/or the side-wall construction. For example, the front end corner posts must be wide and bulky to carry their load and remain stable, while the door-end comer posts are more slender because they are sup­ported by the double doors, vertical lock­ing bars, and hinges.

Regardless of the container’s configu­ration, which is usually determined by its purpose, the box girder principle applies. The strength requirement must be main­tained throughout the structure by some arrangement. The best example is the 20- foot fiat rack, where, except for the end- walls, the strength requirement is con­fined to the bottom girder/floor construc­tion, which can be 12 or more inches deep. A 40-foot flat rack can have a bot­tom girder/floor 24 or more inches deep.

In general, the lower the container in vertical height, the greater the girder con­centration. The higher the container, the more diversified the distribution of strength members. A half-high open top container is roughly a compromise of these two design extremes. With side- and end-walls only four feet high, a heavy gauge metal is required for side­wall construction. The side and end top rails are broad and deep, because they must contribute to the overall strength integrity of the container and its cargo lift capacity.

In retrospect, we see that containeri­zation has developed more or less con­currently in the private and military sec­tors. While there is much commonality of equipment and usage between the two, there are also requirements exclusive to each (see Figure 1).

Container suitability is mostly a matter of matching cargo with the container.⁵

These five loaded half-high open top containers are ready to be loaded on board ship. A removable expansion frame fitted on top of a half-high open top could secure odd-sized mili­tary cargos and facilitate empty con­tainer handling.

Shipper                    /

Acceptance ^

Research and Development

Not every container is suitable for every type of cargo. For example, animal hide containers (complete with juice tanks) and dry bulk containers would be of little use to the Army or Marine Corps. And dry freight containers only eight feet high (the Army Milvans) would be of little use to a commercial operation that requires greater cubic capacity.

The efficiency of the container system is well established, but the productivity of the individual container is another matter. For military logistics purposes, the objective is not so much individual container productivity, but a rapid in­crease in container lift capacity to meet emergency requirements.

Of the container types that could sup­port an overseas operation, the conven­tional dry cargo, the refrigerated, the half-high open top, and the flat rack con­tainers were long ago engineered to their maximum capability in the private sec­tor.⁶ Of this group, only the half-high open top is feasible for use in military operations.

The half-high open top is built of steel and is 20 feet long, eight feet wide, and four feet high, with a 4,000-pound tare weight and a 40,000-pound cargo lift capacity. It is a special container for high density cargo, such as liquid products in 55-gallon drums, steel shapes and cast­ings, lead, aluminum, copper ingots, and large, heavy machinery that must be loaded and removed from the container by an overhead gantry crane.

Like all intermodal containers built to International Organization for Standardi­zation specifications, the half-high open top is fitted with eight comer castings. A gantry crane spreader locks into the four top comer castings.⁷ The bottom four corner castings receive the locking devices of a truck chassis or railroad flat car when the container is being moved overland.

Much of the equipment and supplies needed by a force deployed overseas would be ideal for the half-high open top container, except when the cargo height exceeds the four-foot side-wall. This pre­cludes carrying the container in the verti­cal cells of a containership, owing to the crushing effect of the container above. This problem can be overcome by fitting a steel expansion frame with four-foot vertical legs on the four top corners of the container. This frame will be strong enough to carry the weight of the con­tainer above and thus protect the cargo, though it exceeds the height of the side­walls by as much as four feet.

The expansion frame assembly con­sists of two end-frames, two longitudinal upper rails, and four double-lug locking devices. An end-frame consists of two vertical posts and one transverse mem­ber. The vertical posts have a comer cast­ing attached at each end for an overall dimension of four feet. The transverse member is welded to the top comer cast­ing of each vertical post, for an overall dimension of eight feet—the width of the container.⁸ The longitudinal upper rails are 19 feet long and fit between the inside faces of the end-frames. They are held in place with a lock-pin device at points immediately below the top comer cast­ings, left and right.⁹ (See figures 2 and 3.)

Setting up and attaching the expansion frame to a half-high open top container is a simple process. A double-lug locking device is placed upright in each of the four top corner castings of the container. An end-frame is positioned by a forklift so that its two bottom castings rest on top

Figure 1 Commercial and Military Container Requirements .

Owner

Requirements r\

Department of Defense Requirements

Design

Engineering

International

Standards

Organization

Requirements

X

American Bureau of Shipping Classification

Container Inventories of Ocean Carriers and

Leasing Companies (All Types)

Containers Capable of Serving Commercial and Military Requirements (Specific Types)

Department of Defense Container Inventories

Army

Navy

Marine

Corps

Point-to-Point Resupply Using Commercial Services

Resupply Using Leased Containers

Ocean

Rail

Truck

Intermodal

Capability

Training Exercises: Container Offload & Transfer System Temporary Container Discharge Facility

• f the cofl*

of the two top comer castings uj_ejug tainer, enclosing the four jj₀]ds locks in the process. The '^or ,jj_e the the end-frame in position ^w ^ double-lugs are manually m ^ fjpure⁵ firmly locking both castings- ( -

⁴ and 5.)                                       _secure'

After the two end-frames ,j_ef_t and the two longitudinal upper rai s _verse right) are attached to the inside ,j_3tely faces of each end-frame ^im _stj_ngs. below the four upper corner ca _sj°n

The half-high open top with e Y _g{ frame attached could serve ^tw° n__sjzed military cargo lift requiring ^ate containers. First, it can ^acC0

y and dev;

easily removed for faster anning. Removing the upper ^end-frames after devanning re-

^Cargo

fails

and

> the

•akej

much easier to handle and

^l'¹°^vernent*^{eSS s}P^ace '^{n dlc} retrograde "Phi ’

^c.^xPai

open top container and

It

can

re_Vers-^lner offload and transfer system

•gh ₀p_e^C ffcom beach to ship), the half-

W." ^toP can make an additional

^SccUfed -°ⁿ' ^'ih the expansion frames

^s'ack_e(j ^m containers, two can be

^?ht-f_o^and handled as one eight-foot x

^ef and 1 .^{X 20}-^f°ot container for trans-

^Secn_red fading. The containers would be

c^ch pair ^ /^our double-lug locks, one in

'gUro matching corner castings (see

1 ^nl ha

^ernPtv ^SCale fetrograde or repositioning - J containers in military operations

¹ Us

1,000 loaded containers for delivery:

1.000 containers x 1,280 cubic feet 333 containers x 1,280 cubic feet 667 half-high open top containers with expansion frames attached

After devanning and positioning for retrograde:

333 containers x 1,280 cubic feet 667 half-high open top containers with expansion frames removed

Total retrograde of initial phase equipment:

Savings in retrograde container capacity:

Table 1 Lift Requirement!Retrograde

^erato_r ^{nted car}go, such as motor gen- ^chineV’ *^10sP'^ta' ^ecl^uipment, laundry similar P’ ^e*^ectr'^cal components, and

^retnoval K^U*^{ar S}'^{Ze dems}’ ^wi^{lere eas}y

and raniri ,°^rac'ⁿS and securing devices, end-f_ratn ^evanning are important. The •ached an^ ^anc* ^uPP^{er rads can} at- ‘ⁿ?opera?-^{tllTle dur}'ⁿ8 the loading/secur- ing the ¹⁰ⁿ’ ^3nc* ^rernoved any time dur- ^The_Ser^U"!^e,^CUrin.g^/off-^loading process, cargo co ^C.°^nC* ^USe*^{s as a} conventional dry •ed, _0n ^{a ainer}. for which a carefully fit-

^•nittedl^^{1606 tar}P^au*'ⁿ is necessary, for p_f0 ^a closed container is better ^lheft_; b_u?^Ctlon f^ronl the elements and •veil ^{3 tar}P^aulin will serve almost as

ftairie/tf^^{31 advanta}8^e of the expansion Sickly ⁿ concept is that it can be

•°p, "'hich^C°^nta'^{ner t0 a} ^alf'h'gh °P^en

^hah-high

_a(j .........  system offers four dis-

^°ⁿtain_ers.^nta^^es °^{Ver ot}^^er intermodal *1 _;::^COmniodat° high-density cargo ■°ⁿfiBii,.^rnmun'^t'^cm) in its unmodified

► Wi,_h J⁰"'

°facc₀m ^{6 ex}Pansion frame, it is capable £arg₀ ⁿⁱ°dating irregular and unit-type

k ^cf°scd^f ^tarPaulin fitted, it can serve as ' Aft_er , ^ cargo container.

^Can h_{e re} ^evanning, the expansion frame ^ar>d d,_e ^m°^ved, secured in the container, ^₎v_Cmcn;^,n'¹ Positioned for retrograde No _n '

^Carg_{0 a} °^ntainer offers more range of °Pen (₀ ^Cornm°dation than the half-high ^ever _m ^{and ex}pansion frame—the first Should '^'^c~^use intermodal container, ^i'eduu 1 ^t*^{1C rctr()}grade of empties be °^r a _CQm .^t0 move through a port system, in ►- —

6).

tv, fever „              ---------- ' -*■ —

a'ent j_n j, °ccurred. Container employ-

^Cotnpar_er|^0rca aud Vietnam was primitive

^etiert.₍,„ ^{to w}hat a future full-scale

Let u"^Cy win ^demand-

assume that U. S. forces are to establish and sustain a major presence on foreign shores that will require 1,000 eight-foot x eight-foot x 20-foot con­tainers in the initial phase and about 300 containers per month for resupply. Each container provides 1,280 cubic feet of lift capacity—to be loaded in the United States, transported overseas, and deliv­ered to a port or landed over the beach. One-third of this requirement will consist of rigid, full-sized containers. The lift requirement is summarized in Table 1.

The difference of 426,880 cubic feet of container lift capacity between initial force requirements and empty retrograde can be credited directly to the expansion frame concept.

There is, of course, a trade-off for any system or concept that produces substan­tial savings. In this case, it is the detach­able parts comprising the expansion frame. Each half-high open top will have two end-frames, two upper rails, four double-lug locks, and one tarpaulin. These items must be accounted for after the container is unloaded and the expan­sion frame struck down, and secured in the container before positioning for retro­grade movement.

Transforming the concept into a proto­type program will be considerably less costly and less complicated than one might expect, because there are tens of thousands of half-high open top con­tainers owned by ocean carrier liner ser­vices and container leasing companies in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Western Europe. To advance the ex­pansion frame concept into hardware suit­able for operational testing requires only the engineering of the expansion unit. The required engineering would be little more than that needed to develop the basic frame structure for the average in­termodal container. None of the compo­nents are technically new; it is just that they have not been arranged in this man­ner heretofore.

While intended for wartime service, there is no reason why expansion frames could not be constructed and used with 1.280,000 cubic feet

426. cubic feet

853,760 cubic feet

426. cubic feet
426. cubic feet 853,120 cubic feet
426. cubic feet

half-high open tops in certain Department of Defense peacetime operations.

Wartime requirements for container capacity will depend upon a number of variables that will have as their common denominator the need for more equip­ment. The half-high open top and expan­sion frame can create much of this addi­tional container capacity in far less time and at considerably less cost than it would take to build additional full-sized containers.

'John R. Immer, Container Services of The North Atlantic (Washington, DC: Work Saving Interna­tional, 1967), pp. 3-5.

²John J. Roche, Ron Corkrey, Lawrence Benen, “Sealift Capabilities and Sea Shed,” Naval Engi­neers Journal, April 1982, pp. 64 -66.

'RAdm Penrose L. Albright, JAGC, USNR, “ARAPAHO: A Naval Reserve Mission," Naval Reserve Association News, February 1979, p. 6. ^JJohn R. Immer. Cargo Handling (Washington. DC: Work Saving International. 1984). pp. 225-231. ⁵Ibid., pp. 242-252.

⁶Ibid., pp. 213-224.

⁷Dean James (George D. Saunders), “A Sectional Multi-Purpose Container System," TRANSPORT 2000, January/February 1981, p. 60.

"Ibid., p. 58.

''Ibid., p. 59.

Mr. Saunders has an extensive background in com­mercial containerization, especially during the form­ative years. His experience includes steamship agency and container leasing affiliations in New York and California. He is currently employed by the Mili­tary Sealift Command in Washington, D. C.

Needed: Chemical Warfare Defense Doctrine

By Captain Robert J. Biersner, Medical Service Corps, U. S. Navy, and Dr. Paul O. Davis

Naval planners need to develop a com­prehensive chemical warfare (CW) pro­tection doctrine to improve tactical ef­fectiveness in the CW environment. Problems with current protective clothing and pharmacological antidotes must be recognized and recommendations must be made for overcoming, or at least mini­mizing, these problems.

The following are documented medical case histories of casualties resulting from the use of individual protective equip­ment (IPE). These personnel were not exposed to chemical agents; they suc­cumbed to heat stress caused by wearing IPE in a hot, humid environment.

“A 25-year old . . . sergeant was brought to the Emergency Room by air ambulance from a nearby field training site. . . . [complaining] of confusion, nausea, and abdominal pain. . . . [He] was lethargic, mini­mally responsive to vocal commands, and unable to [provide a] coherent history. Physical examination re­vealed an intermittently agitated pa­tient, disoriented as to place and time. His verbal responses were inappro­priate and demonstrated fearful be­havior alternating with outbursts of anger. Vital signs were as follows: blood pressure was 190170, pulse was 136, respiration was 36, temperature was 106.4°F. The skin was very warm and dry.”¹

‘ ‘Within ten minutes of beginning [a field training exercise in CW protec­tive clothing], one participant ran to a project monitor screaming, 'I'm blind . . . can’t see . . . can’t breathe.’ The soldier's mask lenses had become fogged as a result of hyperventilation [rapid and/or deep breathing], and he was trying to remove his mask. When told by the monitor not to remove his mask but to slow his breathing and relax, the participant ran aimlessly into the main body of the exercise.”²

The first case was officially diagnosed as delirium secondary to heat stroke. The second case appears to have been an acute anxiety reaction secondary to claus­trophobia. While both casualties recov­ered, they would have been incapacitated during an operation, and may have died (from heat stroke) or represented a danger to themselves or others (from claustro­phobia). Research indicates that unit

commanders could experience a 20% casualty rate because of adverse psycho­logical reactions to the wearing of IPE.³ An additional 50% casualty rate within one hour owing to heat stroke could result from wearing IPE while performing heavy physical work in moderately warm temperatures.³

These casualty rates could be induced by an enemy force without firing a lethal weapon, simply by using chemical foils (chemicals with no adverse medical ef­fects). For naval operations, especially amphibious assaults, chemical foils could cause serious reversals at the beachhead. However, chemical foils can be neutral­ized by using chemical agent detectors such as the AN/KAS-1 chemical detector being installed in the U. S. fleet.

The IPE ensemble: The major short­coming of CW protective ensembles— boots, overgarments, gloves, hoods, and masks—is the failure to adequately ven­tilate heat created by physical exercise and the environment. A special National Research Council (NRC) committee esti­mated that the maximum level of sus­tained physical exercise for personnel wearing the British Mark-Ill chemical protective suit adopted by the U. S. Navy is 250 kilocalories, which is equivalent to a 154-pound male walking two miles per hour on a level surface without a pack in an ambient wet bulb globe temperature (WBGT) of 70°F.⁴

The NRC committee estimated that if this was doubled to four miles per hour at a WBGT of 80°F, about 50% of the per­sonnel would become heat casualties within one hour. Three quarts of water every six hours is essential under these conditions. Water and other fluid supple­ments would be stored in impermeable bags that would be connected to a valve on a drinking tube in CW masks, as is provided in the new Navy MCU/2P chemical protective mask which is re­placing the Mark-V mask in the fleet. The Army XM40 mask (with drinking tube) will probably replace the M17A1- series mask.

After six hours of work, the water must contain a special mixture of carbohy­drates (for energy) and a sodium chloride additive (for maintaining proper neuro­muscular function) if this workload is to be maintained for up to 18 more hours. This requirement may impose some lo­gistical problems on combat operations. The NRC committee did not consider the nutritional requirements for personnel

engaged in CW operations

lasting

than 24 hours because proteins

fats

more

vita-

, and minerals would have

added, further complicating

logistics;

degrading the palatability c Because some dehydration

of the soi may

lutio"-

itill

iiei

occur, the NRC committee reco ^_ofatory testing the regime under both ^a jj^a- and field conditions using *^iea_o]_untee>'^s'

tized and -unacclimatized ^s°^₀\jp

Using the CW ensemble beyon ^ ^od- will lead to problems in disposm^^^ ily wastes, which is not accom by any available CW ensemb e. _£llt

Several other problems

with cut jdenti

_;fjed.

CW ensembles also have been i _g^_ej

and

water)

The extent to which sweat forms of moisture (e.g., ^{sea w}“‘ ₀f the

pair the filtration characteristic js

charcoal-embedded underga ₍

ifli-

undergarn³^

being determined by the Nav-nahlg^ren' Weapons Center (NavSWC) in _f0to- Virginia. NavSWC developed I an ,_hat type suit with von Blucher sp ^jn- can be washed and reused w * ^ -pie taining adequate filtration prope ¹ ^ to ensemble’s boot laces have been ^_flts break easily.⁵ These “fish-tai ₀p- also fill with water during amph' _igIIient- erations, thereby hindering ^nl°' j^pedc Gloves snag on sharp objects an j_gV tactile sensitivity and manna ^ _teie- mance.⁷ For example, operatic^ ₀nlV typewriter keyboards is p^o5S1 paring with the index finger while j_nte-

gloves. Equipment repair ^ailu/_n0t in’" nance would also be difficult’ i _gjisettr possible. The design of curren ^0 bles complicates triage ot ^af¹ casualties. Methods to detern¹¹ .pi­rate, blood pressure, and body ture do not exist, although desig j_e(j 0 cations have been recommen ^^0 would permit such monitoring- . jfC and equipment to assess ^v,_c ^S ^jlitaflj

under development by the U- field services and should be ready ^0 use soon. Several authors have no CW ensembles do not permit rdj “ _rank- tification of personnel, especia [ _gc0p Ensembles with rank displayed ^ lights are now under considerati ^/C

ensembles also severely lim*^{1 e} ^ and vocal communications (both ^sP^e i_uatinr hearing).⁹ The Air Force is ^

voice transmitters for use with t _uni- 2P mask. Reception of voice co         ._ec-

cations might be distorted by th^e ”_v0icC' tive hood. Available solid-state, ^ ^js activated transceivers could ^s°.            tl¹**¹

communication problem, assum -

^c|°thi

°nnel

—i (j ^Wear'ⁿg regulation (non-CW) ^l‘°ns, p ^0r'ⁿ§ noisy amphibious opera­nd         personnel identification

^eratio_ns" ,^anh control during combat op- Ne ] ’, ^lsrupt unit integrity, and im-

^1Ce thrr, , ^^{C)l on}'y ^are masks the inter- 'Ut _aj ^u8n which filtered air must pass, ^sks ,. ^Sl§ht and sound. All available ^Cl)U)m_Un- ^Usec* with hoods) distort vocal ^a% p_er- ^l0at'ons and normal vision (usu- X _b ^pheral vision).¹⁰ The M24 mask ?^Cuity ' ^nava* aviators impedes visual ⁹*Ml ^ant* depth perception.¹¹ The ^near|y /^0ash reduces marksmanship by ^st _CQrn ⁷⁰ • ~ The Mark-V mask, the '^v0rn wit^^{01011 on} naval ships, cannot be

p_r ^Sceivers could be adapted to the ^^ve b_Ce^^Ct*^Ve hood. Such transceivers used with notable success by

^In,and ^CO,^rnrnun'^cat*ons will impair

_K ^ne IPP

P’Urtant _c ^mas^^: Probably the most im- b ^rnasi|¹¹^^{0nent t}*^1C ensemble ^nti_a) ^u,^{n c}°rrective lenses without sub- ^_aw ^akage." The MCU/2P mask ^^ce p_er' ®'Tteld visor which should re- ^Servee'^¹^ ^Vlsi0n obstruction. Some ^Scasicl_cn^S ”^{3Ve notC(}J that the incidence of dsing ₍i ^CS8 appears to be higher when • ¹dieted ^"V ^arK* M17A1 masks.¹⁴ Ss ^v*sion has impeded interac­ts _(b. ^^een visual and vestibular proc- j^khess .f^{6 necesi}>ary to prevent motion h'gh_er k 'he Mark-V mask imposes tks if,^r°^athing resistances than other ^S'^Stajlces ^ⁿ§^lneer'ⁿg evaluations of re­associated with canister and inhalation mechanics have been con­ducted by the Army for the M9A1, M17A1, M24, M25A1, and XM30 masks.¹⁷ The only physiological evalua­tions of CW masks, in which breathing resistances under varying levels of physi­cal exercise are assessed, are being per­formed under a contract sponsored by the Naval Medical Research Institute. These physiological assessments are critical because sustained levels of moderate physical exercise are very probable while wearing these masks, at least during amphibious operations. Increased breath­ing resistance adds to the overall physical workload, thereby diminishing the capac­ity for work.

Every mask will leak if not fitted prop­erly. Although the Mark-V mask is not compatible with any spectacle, the M17A1 mask has optical inserts and a combat spectacle has been developed for the MCU/2P mask.

There are uniform standards and proto­cols for testing mask leakage. The evalu­ation of the Mark-V mask used dilute he­lium, a highly diffusible gas, as the challenge (test) agent. Many protocols use aerosols, but the penetrating proper­ties of these agents vary widely.¹⁸ More­over, the choice of aerosols does not ap­pear to be based on the penetrating properties of the CW agents being simu­lated. Even if a standard aerosol (or set of aerosols) was used, there are differences in the ratio of ambient agent concentra­tion to the concentration of agent mea-

Barbed wire could be the least of this Marine’s worries. U. S. forces could be snagged by heat stress inside poorly ventilated chemical warfare protection gear—even if the enemy has merely used a chemical foil.

sured inside the masks (called the protec­tion factor [PF]) to be used as a safety standard. The NATO standard is a PF of 10,000; the Air Force standard PF is

7. ¹⁹ The American National Stan­dards Institute (ANSI) recommends an industrial PF standard of 100 or 1,000, depending on whether the individual wearing the mask is asked if the test agent is detectable, or if leakage is measured from inside the mask. The lower ANSI standard was established for toxic sub­stances emitted during industrial process­ing, and these substances typically are not as lethal as CW agents.

The only valid and acceptable way to determine the lethal and incapacitating effects of CW agents is to expose experi­mental animals to various concentrations of CW agents and note the level or dose of CW agent required to induce these ef­fects. Then, exposure limits (standards) can be set for military personnel. Since animal exposure data are available for many CW agents, standards for these agents could be readily developed.

The efficiency of filters used in the masks for periods as long as 24 hours must be determined, and should empha­size the effects of filter obstruction on breathing resistance during prolonged periods of moderate physical exercise.

The best location for sensing the pres­ence of aerosol or gaseous (e.g., helium) test agents is probably close to the nose. However, some protocols have sensed challenge agents close to the eyes be­cause many CW agents are membrane irritants and may cause acute visual im­pairments. Sampling from the exhalation valve (typical of many British evalua­tions) dilutes the sample with normal expired air. Most protocols sample at multiple sites.

An analysis was made of the M17A1 masks under various configurations.²⁰ These evaluations used a PF criterion of

1. an oil mist polydisperse aerosol test agent, and placed the sensors near the eyes. The personnel sample was prese­lected to be representative of facial lengths and widths typical of the overall military population. Only 16% of this sample met the 10,000 PF criterion while wearing the M17A1 mask and the non- pressurized protective hood. Another sample of personnel with similar facial characteristics was tested wearing the

'Oct,

November 19X6

117

symptoms of CW toxicity

ing^eS;

same mask, with this sample being more carefully fitted with the masks (taking about 15 minutes each to fit the mask) and wearing the protective hood in the pressurized mode (i.e., exhaled air is vented into the hood instead of to the environment). These procedures raised the percentage of those meeting the 10,000 PF criterion from 16% to 50%. However, with sampling occurring near the nose instead of the eyes, 84% of the personnel met the PF criterion. Proper fit was found to be an important factor in the results obtained under these conditions.

Thus, CW mask protection depends heavily on training in the correct donning of the masks (and adequate time to do so), the procedures used in sampling the test agent, and selecting a mask that fits properly. Masks that vary in size should be fitted individually and retained by the individual, if possible.

CW Antidotes: Organophosphate nerve agents are the primary CW threat and act principally on the nervous system by de­activating the biochemicals that regulate neuroelectrical discharges crossing the junctions between nerve endings and muscle fibers, thereby controlling mus­cular function. If the exposure to nerve agent is acute, the net effect is a massive, indiscriminate activation of bodily func­tions, resulting in respiratory distress,

Emerging chemical warfare antidotes and protection equipment must be studied for their adverse psychologi­cal, as well as physiological, effects. In combination, such effects could account for up to a 70% casualty rate during the first hour of wearing individual protective equipment.

gastrointestinal symptoms, convulsions, and (eventually) death. The only nerve agent antidotes authorized by the Defense Department (i.e., by the Army, lead agent for CW defense) are atropine and pralidoxime chloride (2-PAM chloride, introduced in fiscal year 1984). Injected into the large muscles on the outer side of the upper thigh, these antidotes prevent the massive discharge of nervous system activity previously described. U. S. Navy personnel are issued five autoinjectors, three containing a two-milligram dose of atropine each, and two containing 600- milligram doses of 2-PAM chloride.²¹ The number of autoinjections used de­pends on the level of CW agent exposure. However, atropine causes inhibition of selected muscle groups at high doses. The result is a general slowing of sensory and motor function, which may lead to impaired performance. If CW agent con­centrations are high, the antidotes’ pro­tective buffer would be overwhelmed. Recent findings indicate that normal (two-milligram) doses of atropine disrupt some types of sensory functions and im­pair commensurate performance (such as near vision and marksmanship).²² How­ever, other research shows that these impairments may be of little practical sig­nificance under combat conditions. Tasks that are well-practiced before two- milligram injections of atropine appear to be highly resistant to the drug. Thus, in­dividual and unit training is extremely important to ensure that combat tasks are resistant to the physiological effects of atropine.

D. B. Headley noted that substantial performance deficits were found in a map

and compass task after soldiers rece ^ six-milligram dose of atropine- ,_c0ln- milligram dose of atropine impe ^ ₀f pass setting accuracy among me ^ a night compass patrol, l^arg^e y ^tiich vision was blurred. Using a tas ^[1] volunteers (non-military ma es years old) were to track a sea tank across a simulated dese _ubstantial other researchers showed a ^s impairment in tracking P^^pine- using a four-milligram dose o but failed to show any perform ^ ₀f pairment using a two-nii 11 ig^ran1 ,

the drug.²⁵ These researchers no'         $■

the four-milligram dose of atmP f_atigu^e suited in extreme sedation an several hours after injection. ^ce Scientific literature on the p^e ^ effects of 2-PAM chloride is v _g{ Headly noted that clinical ^al 2-PAM chloride do not result in a _a,. heart rate or blood pressure e ^_ver3] though the drug has produce ^ _sjte troublesome side effects: jpain _reSLllts of injection and diarrhea."^[2] ^^e^^e._nCjj_cated from Army-supported research ¹ ₀f 600- and 1,200-milligram _visUal 2-PAM chloride do not ^inipa‘_mUlate^d function or performance on the s ,₇ <j_cj. tracking task described previous y _{(s 0}f entific data on the performance ^|_oride

combined atropine and 2-PA^|Vl ^stent- injections are virtually ,ⁿ°_trj-servi^ce

Under an Army-sponsored ^y tl>^e

program managed for the ^?^VjLyel0P' Naval Medical Research and _an[i- ment Command, the effects ot . _tyof dotes are being determined on a ^-ra­pe rformance measures, includi g tional tasks.               . _nrtj₀n *^ith

Use of these drugs in conjun _se- CW protective clothing could ^c__> j_s a vere heat stress. Because ^atr°P p_ress^e> nervous system inhibitor, it ,m« normal sweat gland functions, _soCjated ing the heat stress problem ^aS . y_Sjcal with IPE. Only low levels ^{0 P} _caity' work (e.g., slow walking ing any loads other than a n§ _con' rifle) would be possible under j | _e{- ditions. The absence of physio o _sllg- fects from 2-PAM chloride inj^eC _ugnr^£rit gests that this drug would not heat stress.                                        .

Compliance with the injectio g dure also is a problem, especia y^ fiie personnel who have not expert ^_ellpC' physiological effects of atropine- rienced personnel are likely to jS the physiological effects of ^atrlip jpjed r'wr ti^virifv an⁰ .

themselves with the remaining ^ Jfiif Again, only training in the use o ^ ef- and familiarity with the physiology ^ fects will prevent misuse. Anot nation nf • treatmp _t !■ ^atroP'^{ne use} concerns the can i_nc °^{f comba}t casualties. The drug projecti]^{reaSe b}'^oob ‘^oss resulting from ^rate and^ehi^W°^UnC*^S ^ increasing heart theadm' ■ °°^, P^ressure) and complicate ^ancsthe|^lniStrat'⁰ⁿ °* ^treatment drugs and ing (_{0 d}*^cs' While the Army is attempt- Physiolo ^Vel°P ^ant'^c*^otes that avoid these risk rese^r! P^ro^*^ems> this is a high- ^lrnProved^fC" .^cnc^^eavor; prospects for an feinote ^anbc*^ote in the next ten years is Hff*

^rent jpg^{S arc} underway to redesign cur- teriais t₀ ° ^mcorP^orate von Blucher ma- The n_ew J™P^r°ve resistance to moisture, hy „_ro "MO mask is scheduled for use Minor ipp ^trooP^s 'ⁿ fiscal year 1988. Permit m ^^es'8ⁿ modifications would of medi_r°[^{e accurat}e diagnosis and triage Uated en ^{3 casua}lties in a CW-contami- ^cati_0n ^v'^ronment and improve identifi- ^c°^uldbe° P^ers°nnel. Communication ^set of h'ⁿⁱ,i^aroveti hy adopting a standard •Hitter _a"| ^signals and, perhaps, trans­^system_s " ^vo'^ce-activated transceiver

he eqnjj" *ⁿ‘^erim, naval personnel should the Mcun ^{tbe best} available IPE— ^unde_rg0- mask which currently is ^COn,Patibi^g °P^erati°ⁿal evaluation and is «e; (,₀₍l ^{e w}ith the new combat specta- hurin„ t(.^{are ava}ilable for procurement, human f. ^{6 next} *~^lve y^ears, a thorough tient sh ^UC.^lors evaluation of this equip- ^ettiph_asi'_s^>U ^ ^c°nducted, with primary Uication °" 'kfining visual and commu- ^Uual ^C°^nstraints, the extent to which St im^Perfon"^ance is impaired, and, ‘^IUpos°^rIant^’ ^tbe Physiological lim- ^form _SUsj^Ct* °ⁿ personnel who must per- hy j_nVo| ^a'^nc(J physical work (i.e., activ­es h^)ree(j^,n^ ^carcli⁰vascular stress, such Ming) ,■ marching and ordnance han- Vh an^ ^a,^few minutes to 24 hours. ^univ_erSa] ^evaluation should be based on Ptoc_e(|_u ^rneasurement and challenge the r_es^f^s’ ^an(l known toxicity effects. ^s'gH f_ea( ^{ts Ca}n be used to determine de- *he ms that can be incorporated into years _s ^ensemble over the next 5-15 Present] ^buman factors evaluations ^are underway at NavSWC and Curre_m T?^0ratories-

Muxirm, ^Navy doctrine states that the i't; ⁿⁱ Period of continuous Mark-III Mem j_s '^{n a} CW-contaminated environ- ex_er^S,^lX h^()urs.²⁸ During heavy physi- ^eyen ₍l ^CISc’ *he possibility of reaching ^Sho_ui_d *^S] ^niocl^est limit may be remote. ^Iled °ihing be designed with unlim- v°uid _c P^r°tection, biomedical factors |hi_s 2_d ^strain use to about 24 hours. Mg tub °^Ur. *‘^mh assumes that a drink- I'vhicb ^{C ls} incorporated into the mask Mask) ^{be th}e case for the MCU/2P ’ “at appropriate nutritional sup-

v_din

plements can be supplied to personnel under these conditions, and that every effort would be made to keep physical work at the lowest possible level.

Use of CW agents against amphibious operations is an especially attractive op­tion for enemy forces. It would reduce the risks and the resources required to confront amphibious assault forces. CW weapons are ideal for use against combat operations (such as amphibious forces) that are concentrated in delimited geo­graphic areas and involved in complex maneuvers that would be easily disrupted by the physical constraints and psycho­logical stress imposed by assuming a CW defensive posture. In addition, use of CW agents is likely to be perceived by other (neutral) nations as less destructive and threatening than the next most likely al­ternative—tactical nuclear weapons. (Note that the international response to the use of CW agents by Iraq has been constrained.)

Naval amphibious planners must be prepared to evacuate the operational area in an orderly fashion or adopt tactics that will project and disperse forces rapidly over the beachhead in self-contained or pressurized vehicles (aircraft and person­nel carriers) if CW agents are used. How­ever, development and manufacture of self-contained or pressurized vehicles in the near term is highly unlikely, but may be feasible in 5-10 years. Protracted combat operations (over 24 hours) or op­erations at WBGTs above 90°F lasting only a few hours are questionable if per­sonnel must rely solely on current IPE.

The use of CW antidotes in combina­tion with IPE does not appear to be war­ranted unless the risk of personnel con­tamination is high. Antidotes will shorten dramatically the period during which per­sonnel can stay in a CW-contaminated environment and perform useful physical work because of the high risk of heat stroke. It is unlikely that an antidote can be developed in the near- to mid-term that will not debilitate some major component of the nervous system.

Personnel need to be trained in IPE under a variety of temperature and com­bat conditions to learn to cope with the physical stresses of these conditions, and to differentiate the physical symptoms re­sulting from exposure to both nerve agents and antidotes.

The most significant improvement in IPE would be a fabric that would dissi­pate body heat and perspiration from the suit while remaining impervious to CW agents. While synthetic materials have been developed that have some of these characteristics (Gortex dissipates body heat to the environment without permit­ting the transfer of ambient cold to the suit interior), selective transfer and im- pedence of large molecules of water and CW agents may be too formidable a problem to solve with synthetic materi­als. Suits made from biomaterials could be developed to selectively metabolize large, complex molecules (especially the organic molecules that constitute CW agents). A program using enzymes as decontaminating substances is being planned as a tri-service initiative under Army sponsorship. A miniaturized elec­tromechanical system could be incorpo­rated into current IPE that would vent body heat and water vapor. Such a de­vice, several prototypes of which are to be evaluated by the Army and Air Force, would have to be light. If any of these developments are successful, some con­tinuous heavy physical work may be pos­sible while exposed to CW agents. The requirement for these developments will depend on an analysis of the frequency and criticality of heavy physical work tasks in CW-contaminated environments, a determination of the extent to which these physical workloads can be circum­vented or reduced using alternative pro­cedures and techniques, and collateral development of effective systems to re­move body wastes and to supply required nutrients. ^{* [3] [4] [5] [6] 6 [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15]}

Nauseogenic and Disorienting Effects of Some Whole-Body Motions—A Proposed Mechanism,” Naval Aerospace Medical Research Laboratory Re­port No. 1232, 16 February 1977, pp. 1-13. ^Institute of Human Performance, “Observations and Comments ...”

^,7Neil P. Wold and Jerry Steelman, “Development Test II (PQT-G) of XM30 Series Protective Masks and Accessories,” U. S. Army Dug way Proving Ground Final Report, March 1984.

¹⁸Alan Halk, Los Alamos National Laboratory Letter Report, H-5R 82-104, 30 August 1982, pp. 1-9. ¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Naval Medical Command Instruction 6710.3, “Medical Material Requirements for Defense Against Biological Chemical Warfare Agents,” 21 June 1984.

²²Roy Baker, Anthony Adams, Arthur Jampolsky, Brian Brown, Gunilla Haegerstrom-Portnoy, and

Reese Jones, “Effects of Atropine on Visual Perfor­mance,” Military Medicine, June 1983, pp. 530­535.

²³Tom Seppala and Risto Visakorpi, “Effects of At­ropine on Shooting: A Field Trial,” Military Medi­cine, August 1983, pp. 673-675.

²⁴Donald B. Headley, “Effects of Atropine Sulfate and Pralidoxime Chloride on Visual, Physiological, Performance, Subjective, and Cognitive Variables in Man: A Review,” Military Medicine, February 1982, pp. 122-132.

²⁵Gunilla Haegerstrom-Portnoy, Reese Jones, An­thony J. Adams, and Arthur Jampolsky, “Effects of Atropine and 2-PAM Chloride on Vision and Perfor­mance,” Draft Annual Report to the U. S. Army Medical Research and Development Command, 1 November 1984, pp. 1-34.

²⁶Headley.

²⁷Gunilla Haegerstrom-Portnoy, personal communi­cation to the author, 24 January 1985.

₀f Hufli^an

Dr. Davis is the director of the I^nS|‘^tut^_raanjzati^on Performance, a research and consu tin£ ped°^r' specializing in the development of P ^ bigh mance standards for occupations requi els of physical fitness.

By Colonel Wallace Wessel, U. S. Marine Corps (Retired)

It’s Time to Talk About Airfields

Our airfields have not been attacked by a determined enemy for a long time. There were a few incidents during the Korean War, and several unguided rock­ets were directed at our airfields during the Vietnam War. But not since World War II has anyone seriously targeted our Navy and Marine Corps forward tactical air support bases. Should we count on this to continue indefinitely? Can we as­sume that our antiair capability will deter any serious threat to our fleet support air bases?

Our allies and potential adversaries are developing and fielding a new generation of antiairfield weapons, in air and surface delivery modes. They are designed to penetrate and crater runways and taxiways, making it difficult if not im­possible for tactical or support aircraft to take off or land until repairs are made. When these weapons are combined with other conventional munitions, new and exotic area-denial munitions, or chem- ical/biological weapons, repair times can be extended significantly.

Other support facilities at fleet support air bases essential to air operations are also subject to damage or destruction, including fuel, ammunition, mainte­nance, and supply facilities. Aircraft are prime targets while on the ground being serviced. Command, control, and com­munications facilities become crucial during defense and recovery operations; these may also be damaged during attacks on forward air bases. The threat applies to all Navy antisubmarine warfare sup­port air bases, which support our de­ployed carrier battle groups, and the ex­peditionary air bases that support Marine Corps contingency operations.

We have not thought about this prob­lem adequately for a number of years. There are three main reasons:

• The Navy devotes its primary concern over vulnerability to fleet elements, not the supporting air base structure.
• The Marine Corps has been developing vertical/short takeoff and landing (V/ STOL) technology for more than two decades.
• Neither the Navy nor the Marine Corps has been subjected to an offensive air at­tack since World War II, limiting such experience to empirical, and usually su­perficial, planning and training exercises.

Why has the Navy not worried particu­larly about air base vulnerability? There has been considerable emphasis on devel­oping ships that can operate for extended periods without support and improving the at-sea support forces, thus reducing the requirement for shore-based support. This is as it should be. However, it is clear that fleet support bases are essential to battle group effectiveness in any com­bat posture. This is demonstrated by our Indian Ocean battle group’s critical de­pendence on frequent air resupply from Diego Garcia, and the extended line of communication for the surface support force. Are not these land bases prime tar­gets for attack?

In addition, our P-3 Orion patrol air­craft must keep track of important move­ments and actions of adversarial forces. Stopping or limiting their operations could introduce serious gaps in our battle intelligence. Are not these air bases to be considered logical targets?

What impact has the emphasis on V/STOL had on Marine Corps forward air defense thinking? It has shown that forward airfields are not needed, that tac­tical aviation support, i.e., for V/STOL

URTESY OF W. WESSEL                {{ft'

ltd helicopters, can be operate^ _stru^c'

vely without a sophisticated           ^Jl1

ire. V/STOL gives the ^Marine_bjj_ity ^ tceptional capability for fl^eXI _be t,as^e isponse, including a change *ⁿ , _sup' ructure required to provide tac _s a art. Nevertheless, V/STOL ^ _engifl^sS ise structure to be effective: ^{, lC},_arnag^e' e still subject to foreign object ie aircraft and weapon systen iphisticated maintenance ^sU^_]lUniti^o1’ rge amounts of fuel and am lust be readily available.           _bein-

What is the significance of ₍ fo^r tacked by a serious antiair t _£ po ore than three decades? We _expe' avy or Marine Corps active-rm ence of the receiving end of an ^gpr imbing attack, and only lirnitc ^ ice with isolated attacks ^a®^a!"_{ve t}|ie ipport facilities. Some beh^e g. lemv cannot attack, because ' _;npty-

l#

r

Others k i-

^|0\v-i_nt ^e.^leve future conflicts will be ^tnerriy^{CnS,ty con}fli^cts, in which the *hreat_e ^W'" ^not be able ^t0 seriously that _0u"_r °^Ur forces. Still others believe the fi_a ^assets will be used at sea or on fore th ^ °f ^a major conflict, and there- ^c'^ent _r^{C enem}y ^will likely not have suffi- force_s ^CS\i/^{UrCes t0 serious}ly threaten our ty°ef_ui| Whatever the reason, we have tablij^ ^ ^neylected our capability to es- ^SUPPon ^ma'^ntam ^a forward combat atifjn _f ^ase structure for our tactical avi- ■f? ^f°rces.

• he I] e ..

air (j_as ' o. Air Force has conducted an for y ^e defense development program Progr_a ^rs’ ^anc* recently consolidated the ity” . Under an “air base survivabil- all ^ ^with top level coordination of ties. ^ ^c °Pment and acquisition activi- rec_ent| ^ub-scale Air Force exercise was Uat_e(J i^'onducted in Europe which eval- in_C]_ud^{a as}P^ects °f air base survivability, ^lng post-attack recovery. The exer­cise showed that there are still serious deficiencies in capability and response. It must be noted, however, that the Air Force is concerned primarily with fixed bases; a tailored system can be preposi­tioned, and training and readiness can be rehearsed. At fixed bases, such things as protective construction, signature sup­pression, and optimum survival arrange­ment of aircraft and facilities can be com­pleted and enhanced long before a potential attack.

The Navy and Marine Corps have a different problem: they must be prepared to go anywhere in the world and do the job required. A few years ago, we strained this capability to the maximum in the Middle East theater. We had no significant support base. Our lines of communication and support were long and tenuous. Diego Garcia became a crit­ical base, and we created a maritime pre­positioned ships program to improve our long-range support capability.

The Navy and Marine Corps do not have the luxury of preconfiguring the air­fields from which tactical and support aviation must operate. The Marines are tasked to sieze and to develop bases needed for support.

More than 25 years ago, the two ser­vices developed the expeditionary airfield (EAF) to have the capability to “create” an airfield when and where needed. This EAF system is constantly maintained in a ready status. However, it requires a heavy logistics burden to deliver it and a significant construction effort to emplace it. The result is a strong tendency during contingency planning to rely on the bare

Cratering weapons like the BAPlOOs dropped by the French Air Force on the Libyan-built Ouadi Doum air base in northern Chad (above) can turn U. S. Marine Corps/Navy expe­ditionary airfields into moonscapes. U. S. runway repair programs (left) must be expanded to keep support air bases in operation during any future conflicts.

base airfields available in the objective area. But the survivability of that bare base, when configured for tactical and fleet support, generally has not been con­sidered. We cannot rely on sanctuaries for support, nor can we believe our forces will not be attacked or damaged.

Currently, a small Navy and Marine Corps development program is concerned with the technical aspects of runway bomb crater repair. Efforts to establish a broader focus have been unsuccessful, largely owing to a lack of operational concern or clearly defined operational need. How do we get contingency plan­ners to analyze the vulnerability of our forward combat facilities, and consider specific ways to improve survivability and post-attack recovery?

First, the Navy and Marine Corps should ensure that airfield vulnerability receives realistic, priority play in all training exercises involving tactical air. Employing simulated threat air weapons against our installations will develop an appreciation of vulnerability and recov­ery problems. How many aircraft were damaged? What is the post-attack condi-

luadrons

■ ■ Ha Calif⁰⁰¹'^{3 Alamed}p.intMhf^u

?e Detachment ai n.^ p₀j_nt . and the Marine Aviation Detachment a California. He served in Korea, where _{a fxv0} co^ in the early helicopter program   the

tion of the field? What is the extent of damage to such other key facilities as communications, fuel, ammunition, and maintenance? How soon can the next air­craft be launched? Can the aircraft that are still in the air be recovered? How can we deal with the unexploded ordnance that has blanketed the area? How do we cope with the chemical environment that has just been created? How could we have prevented some of the damage by actions before the attack? The real issue is whether we can continue to carry out the support mission. It does not take much damage to throttle an airfield oper­ating close to maximum capacity, launching and recovering up to 300 sup­port sorties every day.

Second, the Navy and Marine Corps should use existing simulation and war gaming facilities to develop a more com­prehensive data base on air base surviva­bility. Gaming actions using projected offense-versus-defense air and weapons capabilities can reveal potential prob­lems. Recovery actions based on current construction and repair techniques can establish recovery times and equipment limitations. Where simulation programs do not exist, they should be developed and exercised to establish the necessary data base for decision analysis. What lay­out for aircraft and facilities will mini­mize damage? What added construction effort will create and enhance that layout? What is the typical damage suffered dur­ing attack by current and projected weap­ons? How long before normal launch and recovery operations can begin after an attack? What are the unexploded ord­nance problems during repair efforts, and are we equipped to deal with them? Rea­sonable answers can be obtained to these and many other questions through simu­lation models. These answers can be highly beneficial in programming the re­sources necessary to attack the problem directly. Even something so basic as a handbook containing guidance on how to set up an airfield and minimize vulnera­bility would be helpful.

Third, a top level Navy/Marine Corps working group should be established to monitor and coordinate requirements and actions. This group should represent the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps as the principal requirements agencies. The group should include representatives of the key systems commands to ensure that development and acquisition planning and programming are adequately cov­ered. Early action to prepare an objec­tives plan and to initiate the definition and assignment of responsibility for both operational and technical actions should

be primary objectives. A secon              ^

jective should be to ensure ^ ^ Navy/Marine Corps interface     ^

technology base established )

Force.                                     , hattali°ⁿ

When terrorists attacked the            ^_uSj_ng

headquarters building in Beiru ,       . _[0

great loss of life, many ^wfjj^e _e f,een suggest that something shoul _{of fe}. done before the attack to p^reV0 j_t until duce its effect. Do we have to some capable enemy attacks o                                 ^d?

air bases before we become co manded two all-weather fighter sq’ rine Air Reserve Detachment at

................................. _r„. _r„„._n, and ^served_he Utii^vcr

bat tours in Vietnam. He has a B.S. f^r0 _ yyas'¹'"’, sity of Maryland and an M.S. from c° ton University. He attended the Amp ¹ jj_aVgl w School, Armed Forces Staff College, a College.

Anything But a Ground Tour!

By Captain Paul Loschiavo, U. S. Marine Corps

I couldn’t help but hear my buddy talk­ing on the telephone about his next as­signment with his monitor.

“By the end of the year, I’ll have four years on station and an overseas control date. You can send me down to flight school to be an instructor.

“Shoot... Oh well. How about a sta­tion billet so I can fly the C-12?

“Well, then, it’ll have to be I & I duty with the 4th MAW [Marine Aircraft Wing].

“Are there any SAR [search and res­cue] billets open?

“How about NARF [Naval Air Re­work Facility]?”

My buddy was getting rattled.

“OK . . . how does OSO LA [officer selection office-Los Angeles] sound?”

He broke out in a cold sweat.

“I’ll take OSO North Dakota!”

I detected the first signs of hysteria.

“Send me to AWS [Amphibious War­fare School] . . . Please . . .

“I give up . . . you can send me to Headquarters.”

His breathing was now rapid and shal­low. He was shaking visibly.

“Isn’t there anything else?!!”

I grabbed him by his collar. He had a crazed look. I shook him and slapped him across the face, then picked up the phone; there was only a buzz on the line.

He whispered something. I didn’t un­derstand it. He said it a little louder.

“I’m going to be . . .a FAC [forward air controller].”

Now hang on a second! A lot of avia­tors have been FACs and survived their tours. And a lot of them even enjoyed it. Recently, I completed a tour at 2d ANGLICO (Air and Naval Gunfire Liai­son Company) as a FAC, or more techni­cally, an AO (air officer).

My tour with ANGLICO was good— and bad. First, the good: before reporting to ANGLICO, I received temporary addi­tional duty orders to Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) school—a three-week course that teaches aviators to be AOs. A TACP graduate is expected to be able to go into a battalion Fire Support Coordi­

nation Center as the air

office

Of

itrik^eS:

course, he learns to control but the majority of the course ^ to learning the Marine Air C°m _ote to Control System. There is a '° ,-_{0 a}nd^a controlling air than a PRC-75 ra

.......... _r_. ,><5

An unusual unit, ANGLICO

nine-line briefing format. After TACP, I reported

to •

normally work with or ^sUPP^,se

Marine Corps units. The P^urj*lw of owes

tence to the fact that somebody^"

_r ~                                                 Army.

ANGLICO is to support U. ¹⁵ ■ exi^s'

allied units. ANGLICO owes

act^ua

iiiy

had read the after-action ^reP⁰^_ated World War II. The Army P^art‘^C‘_rj_ng th^e many amphibious landings ^oU .^d' war, in fact, the largest amphm¹⁰^ ^ S­ing in history was conducted by p₀rts- Army. Reading the after-action ^

*                                             ‘ —g £1** • -^a

landing supported by Navy °^r \,ieifl^s

ruiiij’ . iwuuuig uiv/ uiiv. —                               /V*

somebody noticed that during ^a landing supported by Navy °^r _r0bl^eItlS aviation and naval gunfire, P P< arose because we use differe ^ in dures and talk different lang^u®^j_ttiiO 1948, an ANGLICO was forme⁰

her!⁹** / Novem'^,er

the M_ar: n

gunfirg ^ne ^^orP^s to provide Navy naval ^c°ntroIle ^P°^{tterS and} Marine forward air ^Unit evn," *°.^tlle Army. Over time, the Gunfire p • '^{nt0 tkc} Air and Naval f°^rc_e A.|^laiSOn Company, Fleet Marine 'ⁿclud_{e th}^amiC’ ^{and l}^^e mission grew to spotters ^C) Fro vision of naval gunfire W_en ^{3n a}'^r officers to allied units as

°f^ten works with the ^eVeryone .^?^orne Division, thus

¹ Was

^was

.Hu

Off t                 *                 pdiacu me

lere ^,°^rt ®^enr*ing> Georgia

'■‘ure-on ANGLICO must be para­de ^ ^al,”ed. Before I even walked in '^nyited * ⁶ ANGL1CO training officer PhysicalHp” °^{V£r to take} the Airborne designs ^{ltness test (PFr})- This PFT is P^Vsicall ° ^ensure that an individual is school ?K,P^rcP^arec* f°^r the Army’s jump tassing f °^Id'ⁿ8 could be more embar- ^an Army* ³ ^^adnc than to flunk out of good ^school because he was not in

fe^{h Shape}-)

Foce _Sj_tu ^rt>orne PFT consists of 60 bent­holding ^^{>S tWo} minutes with nobody P^Ushup_s ^y°^{Ur anklcs}> 50 Airborne ^t'rtiil' ^{ten dea}d-hang pullups, and a forked f ^{13111 ln} ^2 minutes. Having ^pFT, i °^{r a}hout four months on this

^^c°^rgia 'f *'^{tde dou}b^l one is in south •he skyi'^{3 ter arr}i^v>ng at Fort Benning: foo„_0w^lne ‘^s dominated by three 250- %aii_v^eff-Though my orders said spe- ^vice ,/^eP°rt for duty in Summer Ser- Soutjj q ’         ¹¹ *^s downright sweltering in

^skey_e(j ®^0r8'^a—so 1 checked in in short­ly f_lr ^UlT1mer Service “C.” That was thirig f₀ ^nastake. Jump school is a big '# the ^ ⁶ Army; it’s a test. Anybody "hethe_r ^can 8° ^t0 jump school, hillet. a °^{r not} h^e is going to an Airborne A*^rbo_rn ^S °^ne soldier put it, “If you ain’t Xsesju®’ ^^ou ain’t sugar.” The Army Miat j_t ^{P Sc}hool to see if a soldier has ^u«it. > ^takcs to go to a “high-speed” i'adge P*P wings are a sort of “lead ^S°l<lie_r ■ ^C0Urage” and indicate that a 'Weed ₀*^{S tou}gh. Therefore, they try to ⁿiqij_es ’Jf the weak with several tech- Nn’t’e "^{e Plrst} °f which is pushups. I hef_0re .^Ven finished the entry paperwork ^PH_Ud’ J°st count of the number of ‘^CharlL!,^haddone> sweating through my °^rder_s ¹⁶. dniform. No matter what my u ^a*d, I should have worn utilities

,C“-

itite_re.^6X1 three-and-a-half weeks were hay _w sting.” The first formation each “9ck t_Q^S f¹ and I normally stumbled Sut | ‘;;^c bachelor officers’ quarters at Jdg (j_a Throughout the entire train- ^lf|gQ_e^y’ °^ne is running, climbing, push- ^cSe !^^la’ ^an(i doing nine million para- ^class_roo ^and'ⁿ8 falls. There are no •tts at jump school; everything is physical. They don’t stop for “black flag” (hot weather) conditions; they just hose everybody down and keep going. But, amazingly, they have very few heat casualties. As far as I’m concerned, they run an outstanding program, considering the extraordinary number of students going through the course.

I returned to ANGLICO with my jump wings and settled into the routine. ANGLICO’s mission is to provide sup­porting arms controllers to different units, and we did just that—constantly.

During the year I was at ANGLICO, our teams supported the 82d Airborne, 101st Airmobile, 24th Infantry, Rangers, and several Navy carrier air wings and ships, as well as the Turks, Brits, Norwe­gians, and the UNITAS cruise. I made two trips to Vieques, Puerto Rico, and one to Georgia with the 82d Airborne. I also went to Naval Gunfire Spotters School and Fire Support Coordination School, and participated in several exer­cises with ANGLICO in the Camp Le- jeune area. As an aviator, I got to do things few aviators get to do. For one exercise, I led a convoy of 22 vehicles to a training site. I also learned to rappel, and rappeled from a helicopter. SPIE (special patrol insertion-extraction) rig­ging is a kick in the rear. I led a ten-man patrol in a night attack and proved to my­self that it is easier to find the bad guys from an aircraft than from the ground.

I had the pleasure of being on the re­ceiving end of all sorts of aviation sup­port. I got to control: Marine A-4s, A-6s, F-4s, AV-8s, and F/A-18s; Navy A-6s and A-7s; and Air Force A-lOs. With a tank as the target, the first of three F/A- 18s hit the turret on the first pass. The A-lO’s 30-mm. Gatling gun is truly awe­some. I also got to control a Navy frig­ate’s five-inch/54-caliber gun. (Next

Marine aviators exist to support ground troops. And getting to know first-hand what the troops need— whether with ANGLICO or other ground units—makes good aviators better.

time, I hope to control the New Jersey [BB-62] and her 16-inch guns.)

Working with the Marines of ANGLICO was a pleasure. They were mostly communicators and artillerymen; I’d had little contact with ground troops before this tour. I don’t know if they were any more special than other communica­tors and artillerymen, but they sure thought that they were special and they acted like it. On one of my trips to Vieques, I was the officer in charge of a ten-man detachment. The sergeant was unlike any other sergeant I had ever dealt with. He was hard as nails, yet compas­sionate with the young Marines. If I told him to have the det ready to move out in ten minutes, they were ready to go in five. Later, he would spend 20 minutes explaining to the young Marines how best to set up the radios. Leading the det was a unique experience for me. In the past, I had led detachments to distant bases, but we were never more than an Autovon phone call away from the squadron. Down in Vieques, we were totally on our own, out in the boonies. If anybody in Puerto Rico knew that we were in the field, I doubt that they cared. Calling back to ANGLICO was nearly impossible because the phone system on the island is, believe it or not, not up to par with Camp Lejeune’s—even if we could get to a phone.

Since ANGLICO must be self-deploy­able to an Army base, it has its own ser­vice support elements. A truck was only five minutes away. Supply, armory, communications, paraloft, and medical functions were provided by ANGLICO Marines and sailors, who cared about the service they provide and did their jobs well. There was no need to go through a higher headquarters or a different unit to get such service; we provided our own.

Yet, there are some things about ANGLICO that need to be improved. Because ANGLICO’s mission is to sup­port the Army and allies, it rarely works with Marine Corps infantry. The purpose of Marine Corps aviation is to support Marine Corps infantry, yet, as an air offi­cer on nonflying orders to a ground unit, I learned little about Marine infantry.

The ANGLICO table of organization has an officer in charge of each of 20 teams. In garrison, the Marines of the 20 teams are assigned to three platoons and almost all of the officers work in staff bil­lets. And officers were everywhere. At one point, there were ten captains sharing three desks in the operations office. Usu­ally a lot of the officers are deployed, but there are times when there is standing room only, and we did a lot of reinvent­ing of the wheel.

Though I have not served as an air offi­cer in an infantry battalion, I’ve known aviators who have. Their feelings range from mild acceptance to outright strong

TheV, to®’

favor for their ground tour. ^;_{Q[)e 0}f did some unusual things. At l^ea ^ ^ them was offered command o company, but turned it down °g_ecallSe the battalion executive officer- ^₀.

an infantry battalion has a lot ni pie than ANGLICO, the b^atty . _ently. sonnel approach their jobs ¹₀pera- The aviators normally servedM     ₀gj-

tions office and did not suffer cer overkill.            . f_or on®

Most Marine aviators exis ,₀

thing—to fly. But there is a ⁰ jp y₀u

the Marine Corps than just Avinjf j_n [he want to see where we aviators ^ _aS whole scheme of things, serve                                ^_en

an air officer. If nothing ^{e s} ^ you’re back in the cockpit, y^oU._{r str}ike. sure that you are not late for an a _tj,_e or you’ll make sure that yo^u _z0ne)- grunts in the right LZ (landing You’ll try to ensure that some o _u„d tor won’t have to explain to _vvr0ng- troops why you did something

Captain Loschiavo has been a flight ins _sj_nLe CH-46 training squadron at MCAS Ne ^ _serve June 1985. From June 1984 to June ^_otB fli? with 2d ANGLICO. After graduating ^fd-26⁴’ school in 1980, he served two tours wi Leh'S including time in Beirut. He graduate _a[1(j froth University in 1976 with a B.S. in F® \l A ¹ Pepperdine University in 1979 w><     co^

Human Resources Management. Ai _ears as missioned through OCS, he served tw ground officer.

Sea Knights in the 21st Century?

eV

an oriS¹' These <

gine(s), and components °^uts^ jj_{e 0}veL

kits-

of the SR&M modification

1970s when the engineering ^s <- _oro t^^e NARF Cherry Point, personnel I Naval Air Systems Command, . _c0sb ing Vertol examined the causes a

By Lieutenant Commander Harry Burden, U. S.

A few years ago, Congress approved an inconspicuous program to avert mounting costs for maintenance required by U. S. Marine Corps and Navy H-46 Sea Knight helicopters. This modifica­tion effort consists of improving or re­placing components responsible for more than 90% of the H-46’s unscheduled maintenance burden. The H-46 SR&M program is named for its three most im­portant goals: safety, reliability, and maintainability.

Between 1960 and 1971, Boeing Ver- tol produced more than 620 twin-turbine, tandem-rotor H-46s for military and ci­vilian customers in the United States, Canada, Sweden, and Japan. Today, the U. S. Navy and Marine Corps operate a fleet of more than 350 H-46s which is made up of three different models: the A-model (CH-46A, HH-46A, and UH- 46A), the D-model (CH-46D and UH- 46D), and the E-model (CH-46E).

The H-46 Sea Knight has been the Marine Corps’ primary troop-assault he-

Navy (Retired)

licopter and the Navy’s vertical replen­ishment (Vertrep) aircraft for more than 20 years. It will be phased out of Marine Corps service during the mid-1990s and replaced by the MV-22A Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft. Once relieved, about 100 Marine Corps H-46s will be turned over to the Navy to serve as Vertrep aircraft for ten or more years; there is no suitable re­placement aircraft for this role.

The H-46 has a crew of three and ac­commodates 25 troops. It can accept av­erage loads of about 4,000 pounds inter­nally or externally, yet its compact size makes this helicopter ideal for shipboard operations. The H-46’s fuselage is just a few inches shorter than that of another versatile vertical-takeoff Marine Corps aircraft: the AV-8B Harrier.

Each year, one-third of the H-46 fleet— about 120 helicopters—passes through the Naval Air Rework Facilities (NARFs) to undergo regular standard depot-level maintenance (SDLM), which is the most extensive form of repair or modification

permitted on an aircraft’s ^a'^rf^ra^ _0ligi' nal manufacturer’s facilities- ¹ ,_a]lati^o11 hauls now allow the efficient in me 01S.06IV1 iiiuuineanv/.* - NARF Cherry Point, North ^ _one is one of six NARFs and the ^ oili- managed by the Marine Corps- y^gjnia- ers are located at: Norfolk, . Jacksonville and Pensacola, Ft° .jp₀rnia- Alameda and North Island, ® jgiatw Only the Cherry Point and No _atjon^s facilities—near the largest conce of the H-46 fleet—are involveo ^ H-46 SR&M program. Of the . yts, copters planned to receive SK ^Ji-

40%—about 140 aircraft— _abo^uI

fied at Cherry Point and the res ^₀fth 210 H-46s—will be modified^ ,_es. Island during their regular SDL late The SR&M program began W at